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This study is an exercise in historical theology and theolinguistics. The mention of 
historical theology entails that this investigation will dialogue with Christian authors of the past 
in order to illuminate modern theological issues. On the other hand, the allusion to 
theolinguistics (the study of how religious belief, thought and practice relates to language) 
indicates that this study will endeavor to discern what Christians mean when they employ terms 
like “Father” in theological discourse or corporate worship (i.e. liturgy). Should “Father” be 
viewed as a literal assignation for God? To what extent does this divine title signify the ontology 
or being of God? These questions will be addressed in the course of this study to show what 
bearing the doctrine of God the Father has on Christian belief and praxis. In particular, we are 
interested in what Lactantius means when he refers to God as Father. What implications thereby 
follow from his usage of this expression? 
I would like to thank Ian Hazlett for patiently and skillfully guiding my research and 
writing for more than three years. His suggestions have been invaluable and his eye for detail 
prevented me from making numerous errors of fact or style. My dissertation examiners David 
Jasper and Sara Parvis provided many helpful suggestions. They helped me to make hidden 
implications more implicit or helped me to improve the structure of this work. 
 This study would not have been possible without source material from Antonie Wlosok, 
Latin texts by Jan Waszink or Internet sources produced by Tertullian.org. The Glasgow 
University Library and its staff provided assistance in terms of help with accounts for electronic 
journals and requests for requisite publications. The Caldwell County Public Library in Lenoir 
(NC) with its inter-library loan system also obtained Latin or Greek texts that made my research 
possible and more efficient. To them, I am eternally grateful.  
I would briefly like to explain why Lactantius has been chosen as a test case for an 
ancient Latin writer, who thought of God as Father. While it seems that numerous early church 
writers conceived God as Father in a metaphorical sense, the Lactantian concept of divine 




Father in a number of senses and primarily in terms of his status as Lord (dominus). Lactantius is 
accustomed to call God “Father and Lord” (pater et dominus). This vocabulary is used in the 
context of Roman notions such as paterfamilias, pater patriae and pater or patria potestas. 
Lactantius also stresses the eschatological character of God’s paternity in the final book of his 
Divine Institutes (Divinae institutiones). While modern theology has articulated and expanded 
our knowledge of God’s eschatological fatherhood, this study proposes that the Lactantian 
concept illuminates elements of God’s future paternity that may be useful to those engaging in 
historical theology. 
Finally, I would like to thank the following persons for their varying and diverse 
contributions to this study: Dr. Philip Blosser gave me the inspiration to pursue the question of 
divine gender and pointed me towards useful definitions for the term “metaphor” such as 
“ambiguous identity synthesis” or “cross-modal sorting.” Rotary International (especially in the 
Lenoir and Hickory area) made my studies in Glasgow possible and they have been a fine 
support even after my 2001-2002 tenure as a Rotary scholar ended. I also want to express my 
appreciation to Dr. John Blakey (my erstwhile classics professor), Stacy Feldstein (a colleague in 
classical studies), Edward and Eleanor Foster (my parents), Sylvia Foster (my wife); David 
Schuman (for emphasizing the importance of carefully scrutinizing primary texts from antiquity 
when one undertakes a research project), and Solomon Landers (Hebrew and Aramaic specialist) 
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Life of Lactantius in Breve 
 
Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius
1 was born circa 250 CE in Proconsular Africa and 
possibly died at Trier in 325 CE.
2 Arnobius of Sicca evidently taught Lactantius the art of 
rhetoric while the latter resided in Africa, although historians from time to time dispute this 
point.
3 Lactantius also wrote a number of literary works, the first of which he entitled the 
Banquet, which is no longer extant.
4 He further composed a document in hexameter prose 
entitled Journey from Africa to Nicomedia and a pamphlet De mortibus persecutorum.
5 Finally, 
it appears that Lactantius authored his most memorable work Divinae institutiones circa 311 CE 
in order to confront verbal and physical aggressions directed against the Christian faith by 
Emperor Diocletian.
6 McGiffert considers Divinae institutiones “the most ambitious work 
published by a Latin Christian before the time of Augustine.”
7 Lactantius markedly demonstrates 
his ability to make a persuasive case for the Christian faith in this apologetic treatise. Moreover, 
he exhibits uncharacteristic erudition in this notable work. 
 
1 A number of MSS contain the praenomen Lucius and the nomen Caecilius (Caelius) for Lactantius (his 
Christian name). See Charles Thomas Cruttwell, A Literary History of Early Christianity Including the Fathers and 
the Chief Heretical Writers of the Ante-Nicene Period, 2 volumes (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), 
2:642. 
2 Cruttwell (Ibid. 2:643) suggests that Lactantius was born in Africa. Antonie Wlosok prefers the date 250 CE 
for his birth date. See “Lactantius, L. Caelius Firmianus (ca. 250-325),” in Theologische Realenzyklopädie (TR), ed. 
Robert Horst Balz, et al., 36 volumes (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976-2004), 20:370. However, A. C. McGiffert 
states that the details of Lactantius’ death are unknown. See his text A History of Christian Thought, 2 volumes 
(New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933), 2:44. 
3 See Epistle 70.5; De viribus illustribus 80; Lactantius, Divine Institutes, trans. Anthony Bowen and Peter 
Garnsey (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 283, note 8. 
4 Johannes Quasten, Patrology, 4 volumes (Utrecht-Antwerp: Spectrum, 1950-1986), 2:392-393; Hans von 
Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Church, combined edition (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1998), 2:62. Use of the 
numerals 1 or 2 in the footnotes before the page numbers will refer to the Greek or Latin fathers respectively in 
Campenhausen’s combined edition. 
5 Barry Baldwin, “Lactantius,” in The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan, 3 
volumes (New York and Oxford: 1991), 2:1168. 
6 See H. A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 141-148; Charles A. Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology:  Antecedents and 
Early Evidence (London: Brill, 1998), 197. 




                                                
Lactantius eventually departed from Africa at the behest of Diocletian (284-304 CE) to 
assume the position of rhetor Latinus
8 in Nicomedia.
9 However, he did not fare well as an 
instructor of rhetoric since rhetorical training apparently was not an esteemed commodity at that 
time; nor was it a lucrative profession at any time.
10 Therefore, Lactantius’ pecuniary resources 
rapidly depleted. He subsequently undertook the task of writing theological documents in order 
to sustain himself materially and advocate the Christian religion.
11 Nevertheless, this 
accomplished student of Arnobius still maintained his position as professor of rhetoric until 
fateful events dictated otherwise. 
In 303 CE, persecution directed against Christians by Diocletian forced the African 
apologist to relinquish his prestigious chair as rhetor Latinus.
12 Lactantius accordingly departed 
from Bithynia (modern-day Turkey) circa 305-306 CE and in time became the tutor of 
Constantine the Great’s son, Caesar Crispus (De vir illustribus 80).
13 While tutoring Crispus, 
Lactantius persisted in the composition of apologetic treatises, thereby attempting to emulate 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (Epistle 58.10; 70.5).
14 Lactantius possibly never learned Greek for this 
reason: he presumably acquired his familiarity of Greek philosophy by reading Cicero or Seneca 
 
8  DI 3.13.12; 5.2.2. George A. Kennedy notes that five of the major Latin writers taught rhetoric prior to 
becoming Christians. These rhetores were Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius and Augustine. See A New 
History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 264-265. 
 9 Quasten, Patrology, 2:393; Campenhausen, Fathers, 2:62; Otto Bardenhewer, Patrology: The Lives and Works 
of the Fathers of the Church, trans. Thomas J. Shahan (Freiburg im Breisgau and Saint Louis: Herder, 1908), 203; 
Wlosok, “Lactantius,” in TR, 20:370; John Anthony McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology 
(Louisville: The Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 202; McGiffert, History of Christian Thought, 2:44; Timothy 
David Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 13. 
10  De viribus illustribus 80. See H. I. Marrou, trans. George Lamb, A History of Education in Antiquity 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 284. 
11 Quasten, Patrology, 2:393. 
12 Lactantius evidently witnessed the razing of Nicomedia’s city church. See Historia ecclesiastica 8.2.1-4; De 
mortibus persecutorum 12; DI 5.2.2; Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society: from Galilee to Gregory the 
Great (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 191; Hugo Koch, “Der ‘Tempel Gottes’ bei 
Laktantius,”  Philologus 76 (1920): 235-238. Lactantius recounts the steps that Diocletian took to remove 
“eloquence” from Nicomedia in De mortibus persecutorum 22. Compare Drake, Constantine and the Bishops, 117-
118. 
13 See Quasten, Patrology, 2:393, Bardenhewer, Patrology, 203, Wlosok, “Lactantius,” in TR, 20:371. 
14  There are fourteen extant MSS for writings of Lactantius dating from the fifteenth century (Quasten, 
Patrology, 2:394). Additionally, it is not unusual to see historians affixing the moniker “Christian Cicero” to 




                                                                                                                                                            
(two illustrious Stoics in antiquity).
15 Nevertheless, while the lacuna concerning Greek writings 
seems to manifest itself in the Lactantian corpus, Bowen and Garnsey believe that Lactantius 
actually had first-hand knowledge of Greek and even quoted texts written in the Hellenic 
language.
16 Divinae institutiones 1.6 evidently supports this view.
17 
In conclusion, successors of Lactantius did not consider him a profound thinker, 
especially respecting theological matters. It is possible that he denies either the existence or at 
least the distinct personality of God’s Holy Spirit; he evidently identifies the Spirit of holiness 
(spiritum sanctificationis)
18 with the Father or the Son.
19 Immediate evidence of Lactantius’ 
pneumatology, however, does not survive in written form. But in view of his “unorthodox” 
Christology and pneumatology, an oft-heard criticism is that “he was not a theologian” 
(theologus non erat).
20 Modern-day research nonetheless mitigates this negative evaluation.
21
 
Christian Biography and Literature to the End of the Sixth Century A. D.: With an Account of the Principal Sects 
and Heresies (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999), 639; Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, xi. 
15 See Campenhausen, Fathers of the Church, 2:63-64; DI 2.8.23; 1.17.3. Compare T. B. de Graff, “Plato in 
Cicero,” Classical Philology 35 (1940): 143-153. 
16 Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 65, note 11. 
17 Oracula Sibyllina (Prologue). See Johannes Geffcken, Die Oracula Sibyllina (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 
1-5. 
18 See Romans 1:4 (Vg) for the expression “Spirit of holiness” (spiritum sanctificationis). 
19 See Quasten, Patrology, 2:407; J. A. McGuckin, Handbook, 203; Epistle 84.7; Comm in Gal ad 4.6 (Jerome). 
20 Wace and Piercy, Dictionary of Christian Biography, 639. See Pierre Champagne de Labriolle, History and 
Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), 207; Quasten, 
Patrology, 2:405-406. 
21  Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 5; Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy:  An Approach to Fourth 







Metaphor and Divine Paternity: The Concept of God the Father in the Divinae institutiones 
of Lactantius (250-325 CE) 
 
A.  The Focal Point of Study 
 
This study’s focal point is the Lactantian concept of God the Father in the light of classical and 
contemporary metaphor theory. Accordingly, it has four primary goals: (1) This investigation 
will determine the possible conceptual or ecclesiastical antecedents that motivated Lactantius to 
apply the paternal metaphor “Father” to God; (2) it will explore what Lactantius and other 
Christian writers possibly mean by “Father”; (3) moreover, this study will scrutinize how 
Lactantius conceives the relationship between the Father and the Son; (4) it will probe the 
eschatological significance that “Father” possibly has for Lactantius.  
The introductory portion of this study is structured as follows. First, it is necessary to 
provide an overview of Lactantian studies. In the overview, a marked contrast between common 
preoccupations of patristic scholars or historians and the focus of this work will be established. 
Second, the overview will supply an outline of Lactantius’ conception of God the Father. In that 
portion of this investigation, the seeming heterodox Christology of Lactantius will be 
contextualized. Third, a synopsis of each chapter contained in this study will be furnished. In 
contrast to other works that have elected to research non-theological aspects of the early 
apologist’s work, this study will scrutinize Lactantian thought pertaining to God the Father. Its 
chief aim is to ascertain whether Lactantius employs “Father” as a metaphor for God rather than 
as a proper name for an immutable and eternal distinction of the triune Godhead. Furthermore, 
this study proposes that by using the divine epithet “Father” as a metaphor, Lactantius apparently 
downplays the role of gender in his conceptualization of God. It is possible that Lactantius 




                                                
exemplar is divine. Therefore, while it might not be possible to apodictically discern Lactantian 
intent regarding divine gender, this investigation will argue that at the very least Lactantius is not 
preoccupied with the reputed gender of God the Father when he employs this venerable concept. 
 
B. An Overview of Lactantian Studies 
Paul McGuckin remarks that literary or historical studies “inordinately outweigh the amount of 
theological research that Lactantius has been able to attract.”
22 It appears that scholars generally 
are more interested in culling historical data rather than theological notions from the oeuvre of 
Lactantius.
23 One historian who approaches Divinae institutiones from a historical perspective is 
Elizabeth DePalma Digeser.
24 She corroborates McGuckin’s observation by portraying 
Lactantius as a fervent defender of the Christian faith, who apparently had an instrumental role in 
shaping Roman governmental policy under the suzerainty of Constantine the Great (ca. 275-337 
CE). While Digeser does not entirely neglect the Lactantian doctrine of God in her study, it 
perceptibly is not her investigation’s chief focus. As opposed to God-talk, Digeser primarily 
concerns herself with historico-political motifs.
25 
Arne Søby Christensen,
26 on the other hand, probes the Lactantian treatise De mortibus 
persecutorum in order to assess significant epochal details relating to the Constantinian era. 
Christensen largely concentrates on the applied historiography or provenance of De mortibus as 
well as the literary influences that molded the document. Yet, in the manner of other studies 
regarding Lactantius, Christensen devotes limited attention to Lactantian theology or, more 
 
22 Paul McGuckin, “The Christology of Lactantius,” SP 17.2 (1982): 813-820. 
23 Timothy David Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); idem, 
“Lactantius and Constantine,” JRS 63 (1973): 29-46; Mary L. Carlson, “Pagan Examples of Fortitude in the Latin 
Christian Apologists,” CPh 43 (1948): 93-104. 
24 Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), 32-33. See the comparable study by E. A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops. An 
exception to the general rule of not examining Lactantian theology is Antonie Wlosok, Lactanz und die 
philosophische Gnosis:  Untersuchungen zu Geschichte und Terminologie der gnostischen Erlösungsvorstellung 
(Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1960), 232-246. 
25 Bowen and Garnsey (Divine Institutes, 3) consider possible Lactantian influence on Constantinian policy to be 
a matter of speculation. 
26 A.S. Christensen, Lactantius the Historian:  An Analysis of the De Mortibus Persecutorum (Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 1980).                                            
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specifically, to the Lactantian concept of God the Father. In fact (as Widdicombe notes) patristic 
studies in general have paid scant attention to questions regarding God’s fatherliness.
27  But this 
study will attempt to compensate for the scarcity of patrological studies related to divine 
fatherhood. Nevertheless, in contrast to Widdicombe’s text (which studies the divine fatherhood 
doctrines of Origen and Athanasius), the salient focus of this analysis will be a Christian 
rhetorician from Africa and his working concept of God the Father.  
This study will distinguish itself from Widdicombe’s important work since it focuses on 
theologians in the West rather than the East. Moreover, this investigation corrects a tendency 
found in Widdicombe’s study, namely, the proclivity for using the term “metaphor” in reference 
to God the Father without defining the operative term or explaining how one reaches the 
conclusion that Father is a metaphor without begging the question. It may very well be the case 
that early church writers use “Father” metaphorically. However, one needs to define what the 
terms “metaphor” and “Father” possibly mean, then explain the implications of both terms 
accompanied by an epistemic justification for the determination that “Father” is metaphorical 
over against being a literal or essential term of predication. Another problematic aspect of 
Widdicombe’s text is his intentional decision to avoid examining the broader social or 
intellectual context of the Greco-Roman milieu in his study of divine paternity. This study’s 
contention is that the socio-historical and intellectual context of the ancient Mediterranean world 
provides a utile matrix against which the Christian notion of divine paternity may be analyzed. 
Before proceeding to an exploration of the Lactantian concept of God the Father and 
exploring what part metaphor possibly plays in his thought, we must note that one notable 
exception to the aforementioned studies has been the historical work undertaken by Antonie 
Wlosok. While she certainly has focused on the historical details or social context of Lactantius 
in her writings, Wlosok has not been remiss in theological matters when investigating Lactantian 
 
27 See Peter Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, revised edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000, 1. He has written three other journal articles concerned with divine fatherhood: “Justin 
Martyr and the Fatherhood of God,” Laval Theologique et Philosophique 54 (1998): 109-126; “Fatherhood and the 
Conception of God in Early Greek Christian Literature,” ATR 82.3 (2000): 519-536; “The Fathers on the Father in 
the Gospel of John,” Semeia 85 (1999): 105-126. It is evident that Widdicombe has been preoccupied with early 
Greek Christian writers as opposed to ancient Latin thinkers. Conversely, the present study chiefly discusses Latin 
church writers.                                            
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thought. In the appendix (Anhang) of Laktanz und die philosophische Gnosis, she documents the 
literary evidence for “die Gottesprädikation pater et dominus bei Laktanz.”
28 One illuminating 
aspect of Wlosok’s appendix is the proposal that numerous Lactantian passages suggest that 
there is a utilization of the paterfamilias concept. Lactantius evidently appeals to this ancient 
Roman social arrangement in order to elucidate his notion of the dominion and paternity of God 
(Divinae institutiones 1.6.4; 4.2.6; 6.24.4; Epitome 2.2; De ira Dei 19.6). The study by Wlosok is 
rare in terms of its thematic focus since it examines the topic of divine paternity in a patristic 
context. Most ecclesiastical studies have not followed Wlosok’s lead. 
As indicated above, most historians analyzing the Lactantian corpus exhibit a predilection 
for the non-theological aspects of his work. They usually concede the graceful eloquence of 
Lactantius
29 or his patent ability to rebuff ideological onslaughts mounted against the Christian 
faith; or scholars laud the natural facility of Lactantius to sway eminent political leaders in favor 
of the church.
30 But not every writer extols the virtues of Lactantius. Notably, Jerome (340-420 
CE) and a number of contemporary scholars
31 have called into question his proficiency as a 
theologian or Christian thinker.
32 Some ecclesiastical historians alternately describe the African 
rhetor as shallow, naïve, or inept in the matter of articulating sound Christian doctrine.
33 For 
instance, Hagenbach states: “Unfortunately, the quality of his [theological] thought does not 
 
28 See Laktanz und die philosophische Gnosis, 232-246. 
29 See Hans Lietzmann, A History of the Early Church. trans. Bertram Lee Woolf, 2 Volumes (Cleveland and 
New York: Meridian Books, 1961), 1:174; Bardenhewer, Patrology, 203-204; Marcia L. Colish. Medieval 
Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition:  400-1400 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1997), 14; Quasten, Patrology, 2:393-394; Paul McGuckin, “Christology of Lactantius,” 813; Campenhausen, 
Fathers of the Church, 2:64; W. H. C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 451. Cf. 
Jerome’s Epistle 70.5. 
30 Digeser, Making of a Christian Empire, 37-39. 
31 Jerome writes: Utinam tam nostra confirmare potuisset quam facile aliena destruxit (Epistle 58.10). See 
Bardenhewer, Patrology, 203. 
32 Colish refers to Lactantius’ “rather sketchy grasp of Christian theology” (Medieval Foundations, 14).  See 
Ermin Francis Micka, The Problem of Divine Anger in Arnobius and Lactantius (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1943), 100; Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity, 199. Basil Studer, Trinity 
and Incarnation: the Faith of the Early Church, trans. Andrew Louth (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1993), 191 
calls Lactantius a “simpleminded theologian.” 
33 See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 5. For what appears to be a balanced assessment of Lactantius, see 
Robert L. Wilken’s The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 297. He acknowledges the Lactantian lack of theological depth, but still points out that Lactantius had 
insights that eluded other ancient apologists.                                            
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correspond to the excellence of its expression.”
34 Lactantian theology purportedly is “an isolated 
phenomenon” of ancient Christianity that “has always been regarded as heterodox.”
35 Yet, 
Hagenbach’s negative assessment of Lactantian thought may lack requisite subtlety or nuance 
and it is possibly at variance with the extant historical data available to modern students of 
ecclesiastical history. Consequently, there are likely three substantial reasons for critically 
assessing his evaluation of Lactantian theology.  
Firstly, one already witnesses doctrinal phenomena in Latin theology that resembles the 
christology or paterology of Lactantius.
36 Hippolytus of Rome (c. 160-236 CE)
37 evidently 
thought of the Logos as “a created being to whom divinity had been arbitrarily and temporarily 
assigned.”
38 Hippolytus in all likelihood does not affirm the eternal generation of the Son and 
even refers to him as a “creature,” although speech relating to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
admittedly was somewhat fluid in his day.
39 Tertullian also believes that the Son is “derivative” 
or ontologically subordinate to the Father
40 but he is not alone in this regard since “Fourth-
 
34 K. R. Hagenbach, A Text-Book of the History of Doctrines, 2 volumes (New York: Sheldon and Company, 
1861-1862) 1:244. While Jerome appears to downplay Lactantius’ skill as a theologian, he states regarding 
Lactantian eloquence: Vir omnium suo tempore eloquentissimus, quasi quidam fluvius eloquentiae Tullianae. See 
Bardenhewer, Patrology, 203-204. Jerome (Epistle 84.7; Comm in Gal ad 4.6) also contends that Lactantius denied 
the personality of the Holy Spirit in a Lactantian work that is no longer extant entitled Letters to Demetrianus. 
Jerome thus believed that Lactantius was not well versed in the Scriptures (Quasten, Patrology, 2:407). But for an 
opposing interpretation of Jerome’s words, see Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 5. 
35 Hagenbach, Text-book, 1:244. Alois Grillmeier contends: “Methodius of Olympus, Lactantius and an unknown 
preacher on the ‘three fruits of the spiritual life’ would seem to be much nearer to the suspicion of Arian heresy.” 
See Christ in Christian Tradition (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975 [1995]), 61; Joseph Barbel, Christos Angelos, die 
Anschauung von Christus als Bote und Engel in der gelehrten und volkstümlichen Literatur des christichen 
Altertums. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ursprungs und der Fortdauer des Arianismus (Bonn: P. 
Hanstein, 1941), 181-195.  
36 Frend, The Rise of Christianity, 344-346. Reinhold Seeberg, The History of Doctrines, 2 volumes (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1977), 1:126, 169-171. R. P. C. Hanson writes that until 355 CE, “subordinationism might indeed, 
until the dénouement of the [Arian] controversy, have been described as accepted orthodoxy.” See The Search for 
the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318-381 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), xix. 
37 The present author recognizes that Hippolytus did not write in Latin. However, it seems appropriate to 
mention him since Tertullian influenced his christology and Hippolytus was part of the church in Rome. Moreover, 
his christological thought exemplifies that of the apologists who did compose their works in Latin. 
38 Frend, Rise of Christianity, 345. Refutatio 10.33 probably corroborates this intuition. 
39 Charles Bigg and Thomas B. Strong, Origins of Christianity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 392-394; 
Robert W. Jenson, The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 82. 
40 See Frend, Rise of Christianity, 345; Gerald Lewis Bray, The Doctrine of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1993), 130-131. Adversus Praxean 9 refers to the Son as a “derivation” (derivatio) and “portion of the whole” 
(totius et portio) divine substance. The second part of the construction is probably a wholative or partitive genitive.                                            
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century inscriptions [from North Africa] if anything emphasize the subordination of Son to 
Father.”
41 Indeed, few Christians living in North Africa took umbrage with the so-called Arian 
theology of Donatus (De viris illustribus 93).
42 Lactantian paterology or christology thus does 
not appear to have been an isolated phenomenon in Christian antiquity.
43 
Secondly, the pre-Nicene Christian tradition
44  tout court evidently did not supply an 
unambiguous answer to queries concerning the Son of God’s ontological identity or his putative 
immanent relationship with God the Father (De Principiis, Preface 2).
45 Norbert Brox recounts 
that there was no universal definition for the tripersonal God dogma prior to 325 CE, “only rival 
[triadic] traditions and schemes.”
46 Pelikan has even argued that it may not be advisable to think 
of the pro-Nicene Christians or “heterodox” Arians as diametrically opposed groups since both 
movements “worshiped” the Son of God in that Arians and pro-Nicenes mutually intoned 
hymnic praises to Christ while simultaneously lauding his presumed timeless generation from the 
Father.
47 Arius adjudged Christ as “fully God” despite the fact that he admittedly believed that 
the Father created the Son from nothing (ex nihilo).
48 However one interprets one of the most 
celebrated doctrinal controversies, it seems that the orthodox pro-Nicene party had not yet 
disambiguated or formalized its doctrine of Christ or God when Lactantius composed his 
 
See Edgar G. Foster, Angelomorphic Christology and the Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean: 
An Examination of Tertullian’s Reluctance to Attribute Angelic Properties to the Son of God (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 2006), 73-74. 
41 Frend, Rise of Christianity, 346. 
42 Ibid.   
43  Admittedly, a number of scholars argue that the subordination of Tertullian and other pre-Nicenes was 
economic (not immanent) subordinationism. But there is historical evidence that favors either side of the argument. 
See W. Marcus, Der Subordinationismus: als historisches Phanomenon (München: M. Hubner, 1963), 171; Sydney 
H. Mellone, Leaders of Early Christian Thought (London: Lindsey Press, 1954), 178. 
44 By “tradition,” we mean “the handing down of Christian teaching during the course of the history of the 
church, but it also means that which was handed down.” See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of 
the Development of Doctrine, 5 volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971-1989), 1:7. The term 
encompasses orthodox teachings handed down in both the East and the West. 
45 See Gregory J. Riley, The River of God: A New History of Christian Origins (HarperCollins: New York, 
2001), 81; Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 5. 
46 Norbert Brox, A History of the Early Church (London: S. C. M., 1994), 154. See Hanson, Search for the 
Christian Doctrine, xviii. 
47 Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 1:200. 
48 Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History 1.4.                                            
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apologetic treatises.
49 Therefore, it is problematic to affix the label “heretic” to him; the 
assignation of this descriptive term (in this case) appears to be anachronistic. 
Wilken states that orthodox pre-Nicene Christians typically were inclined to believe that 
the Son is not “fully God.”
50 These early followers of the risen Messiah possibly did not affirm 
that the Son of God instantiates every divine-constituting property exemplified by the Father.
51 
The pre-Nicenes thereby seem to have conceived the Son’s divinity as relative rather than 
absolute; they considered the Son’s mode of being God to be (ontologically) dependent on the 
Father’s deity. The pre-Nicenes generally maintained that Christ derives his divine-constituting 
properties from the Father.
52 Hence, Bulgakov is exceedingly critical of patristic christology. He 
contends that “cosmological subordinationism” pervades the writings of western theologians in 
the early church.
53 Therefore, the formative theology of Lactantius on balance is evidently not a 
solitary phenomenon. 
A third reason for not accepting uncritically Hagenbach’s evaluation of Lactantian 
theology concerns ecclesiastical formality. It appears that no conciliar body has ever determined 
Lactantius’ doctrine of Christ or God to be heretical
54 nor is there good reason to believe that he 
was an Arian (as Hagenbach claims) although Lactantius may not have avoided subordinating 
Christ to the Father per essentiam.
55 Much depends on how one defines “Arianism.” It is 
 
49 R. A. Greer, “Cicero’s Sketch and Lactantius’s Plan,” in The Early Church in Its Context: Essays in Honor of 
Everett Ferguson, ed. Everett Ferguson, et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1998), 155-174. 
50 Robert Wilken, The Myth of Christian Beginnings (London: SCM Press, 1979), 179; Bray, Doctrine of God, 
130-131. For a contrasting but nuanced viewpoint, see Walter H. Wagner, After the Apostles: Christianity in the 
Second Century (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 112. 
51 The expression “divine constituting property” here denotes a characteristic or attribute that constitutes an entity 
as divine in the unmitigated sense that the entity is (with respect to its being) “God.” An analogous expression that 
Alvin Plantinga employs for God is “great making property.” See “A Contemporary Modal Version of the 
Ontological Argument,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. William Hasker, et al. (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 150-163. The present study uses the verbs “exemplify” and “instantiate” 
interchangeably. 
52 See C. C. Richardson, The Christianity of Ignatius of Antioch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 
44-45; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, revised edition (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 125-126. 
Compare R. P. C. Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine, 3. 
53 The Comforter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 9-15. 
54 See Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.J., eds., Enchiridion Symbolorum: Definitionum et 
Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 36th edition (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), 124. 
55 Hagenbach, Text-book, 1:244. See Vincenzo Loi, “Cristologia e soteriologia nella dottrina di Lattanzio,” 
Rivista di Storia e Letteratura religiosa 4 (1968): 237-287.                                            
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conceptually possible that Lactantius circumvented Arianism (formally speaking) by cognitively 
formulating a supernatural generation for the Son of God that palpably differed from the 
christological origin postulated by Arius (250-336 CE): he certainly does not state that God 
created the Son ex nihilo (Divinae institutiones 4.8.6-10). Consequently, although Lactantius 
might be an ontological subordinationist respecting his Christology, he probably is not a formal 
Arian.
56  
While appraisals of Lactantian theology can be stringent in nature now and again, some 
historians note that Lactantius was attempting to illuminate the Christian understanding of God 
the Father and his Son before the church had defined (formulaically or precisely) the 
transcendent relationship purportedly obtaining between the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit.
57 At any rate, when judged against the standards of his own socio-historical or religious 
context, Lactantius may not appear to be inept or heretical since it becomes clear that he 
reflected on God within a particular early Christian matrix or distinctive ancient cultural milieu. 
It accordingly seems that Lactantius availed himself of theological, literary or conceptual 
materials that were accessible to him.
58 Hence, along the lines of other seminal Christian 
thinkers, one probably should evaluate Lactantius based on the resources that were at his 
disposal: Lactantius should be appraised with respect to the socio-religious environment wherein 
he lived, thought, and articulated theological concepts. 
Having given an overview of Lactantian studies and scholarly assessments of him, this 
study will now outline Lactantius’ employment of father imagery in speech concerning God. He 
seems to construe “Father” as a metaphor that delineates God’s intimate affinity for his Son and 
the world. Therefore, it seems that Lactantius does not impute masculinity to God’s inner life. 
The emphasis in the title “Father” is functional rather than ontological. The subsequent portion 
of this investigation will thus propose that early Christians (including Lactantius) generally 
 
56 This investigation will explore the Lactantian doctrine of Christ and its relation to his teaching regarding God 
the Father in Chapter 6 of this study. 
57 Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 5.  
58 Emil Schneweis notes that Lactantius adheres closely to the writers of the African Church respecting the 
content of his apologetics. See Angels and Demons according to Lactantius (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1944), 14. This apologetic approach undoubtedly accounts for Lactantius’ theological 
methods and expressions.                                            
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viewed the paternitas of God metaphorically; they thought of God as an emblematic Father 
without reading masculinity into the metaphor. 
 
C. Lactantius and Divine Paternity 
 
The term “Father” appears to be a metafora. (metaphora)  or figure of speech
59 that 
Christians employ non-literally
60 for the purpose of making relational comparisons between two 
otherwise disparate concepts: God and human fathers.
61 The rhetorical trope “Father” is a 
theological expression that manifestly acknowledges God’s numerous beneficences (Apology 
2.6).
62 This figure of speech serves as a transferred application (Übertragung)
63 of the nominal 
term
64 that rational discourse agents commonly apply to males who biologically engender, 
legally adopt, or sociologically guide progeny in the sensible realm.
65 By means of this 
metaphor, early Latin Christian writers seem to have elucidated God’s generative, 
compassionate, paedeutic or providential functionality in relation to his firstborn Son and the 
entire contingent universe.
66 Lactantius makes use of this particular trope in Divinae 
institutiones, Epitome divinarum and De ira Dei.
67 
 
59 The ambiguous signifier, metaphora, generally denoted a tropical figure of speech in antiquity. The Latins 
used it interchangeably with translatio. See George P. Klubertanz, S. J., St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual 
Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 145-147. 
60 The morphological forms “literal” or “literality” in this study refer to S (a given subject) having or 
exemplifying a certain property P (e.g. wisdom, beauty or being paternal). 
61 See James 1:17; Oratio ad Graecos 4; Annals 3.61; Aeneid 12.703; Georgics 1:328; Meditations 10.1. 
62 Galen O. Rowe demonstrates the eminent place that tropes had in ancient rhetoric. Rhetoricians employed 
tropes to obtain certain effects from their listeners. Moreover, while the Greeks used tropo,j to describe a turn 
of phrase, Latins pressed into service the nomenclature modus elocutionis. Vide “Style,” in Handbook of Classical 
Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B. C. – A. D. 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2001), 
124-129. 
63 Übertragung and its derivatives are synonymous with metafora... Tim Murphy discusses how Nietzsche 
employs Übertragung. See Nietzsche, Metaphor, Religion (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 
22-23. 
64 The expression “nominal” here signifies a term that functions substantivally. 
65 One can find these distinctions in Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 134-
135. 
66 See the entry for “father” in ABD 2:1054-1055. William Alston suggests that Father “wears its metaphorical 
provenance on its face” insofar as “an ideal picture of fathers” is utilized in this instance without the supposition of 
metaphor or its tropic focus being spelled out in detail. See “Literal Talk of God” in This Is My Name Forever: The                                            
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This study utilizes “metaphor” to delineate a figure of speech whereby a signifier or 
phrase designating one entity is applied comparatively (i.e. by suggestion) to another entity, 
through a process of linguistic transference. Another way of expressing the same idea is to say 
that “metaphor” refers to an as-if sentential construct that creates new meaning through the 
articulated enactment of an “unfamiliar identity synthesis” or cross-modal sorting. The signifier 
may also imply that one conceptual domain (A) maps onto another distinct conceptual domain 
(B). While there are alternate ways to define “metaphor,” this investigation primarily is 
concerned with the classical definition of metafora. and words that semantically overlap with 
this term. Ultimately, how one defines “metaphor” will depend in large part on the “language 
game” that one is playing. Quintilian, for instance, explains the sense of metaphora in terse 
words: “Metaphora brevior est similitudo” (Institutiones Oratoria 8.6.8).
68 Modern theorists, 
however, are inclined to describe metaphoricity in conceptual terms. This study will not attempt 
to resolve these intractable problematics but will maintain that metaphor is both conceptual and 
linguistic: it is both a trope and a conceptual domain. 
The present investigation assesses how Lactantius presumably uses “Father” to 
emblematically represent the God and Father of Jesus Christ (1 Peter 1:3 NRSV).
69 It further 
ascertains how the Lactantian concept of God as Father contributes to the Christian 
understanding of divine paternity as a whole. In particular, this study investigates how Lactantius 
(within Divinae institutiones) uses “Father” as a metaphor for God.
70 Based on the classical 
understanding of metafora., a compound Greek word derived from meta,  (“across”) + 
 
Trinity & Gender Language for God, ed. Alvin F. Kimel Jr. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 154. 
67 Specific instances are DI 2.17.12; 4.4.11; 4.26.29; 7.3.19; Epitome 2; De Ira Dei 8. 
68 See Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study (Leiden, Boston and 
Köln: Brill, 1998), §558; Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, second edition (London, Berkeley, 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 100. 
69 Thomas A. Marsh maintains that when Father is applied to YHWH (Yahweh) in the Tanakh (the Christian Old 
Testament), it “is clearly a metaphor, an image employed to express some aspect or aspects of God’s relationship 
with God’s people. It is never here a name for God.” See The Triune God: A Biblical, Historical, and Theological 
Study (Mystic, CN: Twenty-Third Publications, 1994), 29. The referring expression “Father” occurs approximately 
20 times in the Tanakh. 
70 Bardenhewer, Patrology, 204. See Arthur L. Fisher, “Lactantius’ Ideas Relating Christian Truth and Christian 
Society,” Journal of the History of Ideas 43 (1982): 355-377. He observes that Lactantius espouses a paternalistic 
form of monotheism in which God is like a Father to childlike humans.                                            
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ferein (“to carry”)
71, it seems that one can prudently submit that such figurative language 
used regarding God probably does not entail an “ontologization of gender” for Lactantius.
72 The 
divine title “Father” is a figure of speech (manière de parler) for the absolute source or parent of 
all.
73 It does not convey any significative information concerning God’s immanent nature, but is 
part of human discourse about God as the deity unveils Godself in salvation history (pro nobis or 
quoad nos).
74 Additionally, the signifier “Father” (as conscripted in Divinae institutiones and De 
ira Dei) refers to the Being who generates his only-begotten Son by means of a preternatural act 
that testifies to God’s absolute divine freedom or aseity.
75 One notable feature of Lactantian 
theology is the belief that God becomes a Father to the pre-existent Logos (Divinae institutiones 
4.6.1). Lactantius posits two nativities for the Logos, who (according to the Christian tradition) 
became flesh.
76 He maintains that prior to the creation of the world, God generatively produced 
the Logos as a celestial spirit entity who later functioned as the exemplary or primordial image of 
God: “God, in the beginning, before He made the world, from the fountain of His own eternity, 
and from the divine and everlasting Spirit, begat for Himself a Son incorruptible, faithful, 
corresponding to His Father's excellence and majesty” (Epitome 42).
77 In addition to the 
supernatural event
78 that Lactantius calls “first nativity” (prima nativitas), he suggests that God 
 
71 Stanford recounts that the first Greek writer to refer the term metafora. to a rhetorical trope is Isocrates 
(fifth-fourth century BCE) in Evagoras 190 D. See W. Bedell Stanford, Greek Metaphor: Studies in Theory and 
Practice (New York and London: Johnson, 1972), 3. LSJ also lists Isocrates, Aristotle, Epicurus, Plutarch and 
Demetrianus as examples of ancient writers who employ the term to describe a trope. 
72 Marianne M. Thompson borrows the expression “ontologization of gender” from Miroslav Volf. See The 
Promise of the Father: Jesus and God in the New Testament (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 181-
182; M. Volf, Exclusion and Embrace:  A Theological Exploration of Identity,  Otherness,  and Reconciliation 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 173. 
73 See James 1:17; Mandates 1; Similitudes 9.12.2; 2 Clement 20.5; De opificio Dei 2; the entry path,r in LSJ 
and the entry for pater in Albert Blaise, Dictionnaire Latin-Français Des Auteurs Chrétiens: Revu Specialement 
Pour le Vocabulaire Théologique (Brepolis: de Strasbourg, 1954). 
74 See Octavius 18; Adversus Hermogenes 3. 
75 DI 4.6-8; Epitome 42. 
76 Seeberg, History of Doctrines, 1:170. 
77 Deus in principio, antequam mundum institueret, de aeternitatis suae fonte deque divino ac perenni spiritu suo 
filium sibi ipse progenuit incorruptum, fidelem, virtuti ac maiestati patriae respondentem (Latin text is Epitome 
Divinarum Institutionum, Eberhard Heck and Antonie Wlosok, 51). Harry Austryn Wolfson notes that Lactantius is 
the “last of the Fathers, whether Latin or Greek” to speak directly in favor of the bi-stage generation theory of the 
Logos. See The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, volume one (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 
197.  
78 The term “event” admittedly is problematic when one is referring to that which takes place in the divine                                            
                                                            12        
     
 
                                                                                                                                                            
the Father also generated the Son as a human being during the first century CE. This unparalleled 
event constitutes the second nativity (secunda nativitas)
79 of the Logos:  
For He was twice born: first of God, in the spirit, before the origin of the world; 
afterwards in the flesh of man, in the reign of Augustus; and in connection with this fact 
is an illustrious and great mystery, in which is contained both the salvation of men and 
the religion of the Supreme God, and all truth (Epitome 43).
80  
 
Lactantius thus stresses carefully the historical character of the Son’s “second generation,” which 
results in the Son being motherless and fatherless (amētor et apator); motherless with respect to 
his “first generation” but fatherless concerning his “second generation.”
81 Lactantius believes 
that the second generation of Christ occurred during the reign of Augustus (27 BCE-14 CE).
82 At 
that time, the Son uniquely manifested salvation and true religion to all humanity.
83  
Based on what Lactantius writes in Divinae institutiones,  De ira Dei and Epitome 
Divinarum Institutionum, one can surmise that he does not think that the Son’s first generation is 
eternal (= timeless) or prior to the world’s creation in a logical sense only. More specifically, 
Lactantius appears to believe that the Father is temporally prior to the Son (a thought possibly 
espoused by Justin Martyr) as the Son is temporally prior to the world. Yet, to call Lactantius an 
“Arian” appears somewhat retrocipatory (i.e. backward looking or regressive).
84 For it seems 
 
sphere. Marsh speaks of the Son’s generation or the Spirit’s procession from the Father as “eternal events within the 
Godhead itself” that somewhat account for the timeless emergence of two divine subsistencies (Triune God, 148-
149). It appears that allowances must be made for analogical language here since Marsh (in harmony with the 
traditional Christian view of God) insists that God is timeless. Therefore, he contends that a divine “event” does not 
entail temporality. Richard Swinburne alternatively contends that “event” does imply temporality. See The Christian 
God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 72, 139. Swinburne argues that God is temporal or sempiternal. If language 
such as “event” is pressed, his view may be preferable as opposed to talk of timeless events occurring in the ad intra 
life of the Godhead. This study will work from the assumption that an event entails temporality. 
79 Tertullian uses the Latin nativitas to reference “birth” or to communicate the notion of “generation” (Adversus 
Praxean 11). Alexander Souter notes that the expression nativitas secunda can refer to “baptism,” but Lactantius 
employs the terminology to reference the second generation of the Son. Moreover, he seems to have a predilection 
for the construction secunda nativitas. See A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A. D. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 
262. 
80 Bis enim natus est: primum de deo in spiritu ante ortum mundi, postmodum in carne ex homine Augusto 
imperante. Cuius rei praeclarum et grande mysterium est, in quo salus hominum et religio summi dei et omnis 
veritas continetur (Epitome, Heck and Wlosok, 53-54). 
81 See DI 1.7.2, where Lactantius speaks of Apollo in similar terms. For the New Testament usage of this 
vocabulary, see Hebrews 7:3. 
82 The emperor is otherwise known as Octavian. 
83 DI 4.8.8. 
84 See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 232.                                            
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that he may avoid being an Arian in the same way that Tertullian does (Aduersus Praxean 5-7): 
Lactantius may posit an essential generation of the Son from the Father. Additionally, he 
possibly assumes that the Son emanates (temporally) from the very substance or essence of God 
without possessing every divine-constituting property that the Father exemplifies since 
Lactantius evidently affirms that God (the Father) existed alone in time before generating the 
Son:  
Since nothing existed at the time apart from himself, because the source of full and 
perfect good was in himself, as it always is, in order that good should spring from him 
like a stream and flow forth on and on, he produced a spirit like himself, which was to be 
endowed with all the virtues of God his father. How he did it when there was only 
himself I will try to explain in my fourth book.
85 
 
Lactantius possibly speaks of God making or producing his Son within time; prior to the Son’s 
generation or creation, God (the Father) exists alone.
86 Lactantius apparently stands in an early 
Christian tradition that conceives of God emblematically becoming a Father.
87 The data from 
ancient Christian history therefore suggests that the designation “Father” (for Lactantius and 
other pre-Nicenes) might not specify an eternal, necessary, non-contingent or immutable 
distinction in the triune Godhead. The present discussion will thus demonstrate the integral role 
that Lactantius might play in understanding the early Latin Christian formulation of God’s 
fatherhood or how the Father relates to the Son. For while post-Nicene writers in both the East 
and the West demonstrate a penchant for viewing God as inherently generative or inherently 
relational (De Decretis 22),
88 it looks as though writers preceding Lactantius commonly espouse 
a more dynamic or metaphorical view of God’s paternity. Furthermore, although it would 
probably be injudicious to construe the Latin notion of God the Father in monolithic terms, it 
seems innocuous to submit that western writers prior to Nicea may have thought that God (in 
some sense) became a Father, whether God did so from eternity or in time; but the first sense of 
 
85 DI 2.8.3. 
86 Ibid. 2.8.4. 
87 See Adversus Hermogonem 3.4; Contra Noetum 10; Apology 1.6; 1.12; 1.22 (Justin Martyr). 
88 Athanasius considers “Father” a term that is descriptive of God’s essence. See Widdicombe, Fatherhood of 
God, 206; Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought, 105; Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 142, 155.                                            
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becoming Father would appear contradictory within the confines of Platonic metaphysics or 
similar theoretical frameworks that define “eternity” in terms of timelessness.  
 
D. Delineation of Methodology  
 
The methodology employed in this investigation is straightforward. The present study is 
an exercise in historical theology and theolinguistics. Accordingly, it will examine ancient 
theological documents produced by Lactantius while liberally invoking textual, intertextual, 
cotextual and contextual features of discourse to apprehend his thought regarding divine 
paternity. Lactantius consistently grounds his model of divine paternity in scriptural or classical 
resources at his disposal. Consequently, one goal of this study will be to situate the apologist 
within a specific discourse universe. This investigation henceforth will reconstruct a plausible 
ancient thought-world and endeavor to place Lactantius within it. Situational relevance will play 
an important role in this particular exploration of Lactantian thought. Consequently, the 
following paragraphs will outline and distinguish five levels of context. For the sake of 
discussion, one may think of “context” in terms of that which frames a text or discourse.
89 
The term “context” is tantamount to situational relevance; it may denote “the total 
environment in which a text [or discourse] unfolds.”
90 The Latin contextus from which “context” 
derives may refer to the act of “joining together” or interweaving.
91 Barry Sandywell analyzes 
this concept in terms of five levels: (1) internal contexts; (2) problematic contexts; (3) 
cotextuality; (4) intertextuality; (5) cultural contexts.
92 Of course, these respective taxonomies do 
not exhaust the manifold aspects of situational relevance. Nevertheless, as this study progresses, 
 
89 See Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon, Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin, 
ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3. 
90 M. L. K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hassan, Language, Context and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social-
Semiotic Perspective (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 5. 
91 Duranti and Goodwin, Rethinking Context, 3. 
92 See Presocratic Reflexivity: The Construction of Philosophical Discourse c. 600-450 BC (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 30. Roland Daniel Zimany notes that context encompasses one’s cultural and national 
environment or socio-economic status in Vehicle for God: The Metaphorical Theology of Eberhard Jüngel (Macon: 
Mercer University Press, 1994), 122.                                            
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familiarity with these distinct levels will prove to be indispensable. It is therefore necessary to 
discriminate between these five situational categories. 
(1) Sandywell associates internal contexts with grammatical, semantic or stylistic textual 
structures, which necessarily encompass analogical or metaphorical speech-acts in theoretical or 
practical settings. Internal contexts pertain to the mechanics of language or discourse. They make 
it possible for communicative discourse to obtain by providing a systemic framework for 
language.
93 (2) The terminology “problematic contexts” describes the situation wherein one 
relates a given text to questions that the text either addresses or ignores.
94 For example, inquiries 
that were relevant during the Pre-Socratic period and that are reflected in texts or fragments from 
that era later became extraneous in the third century (BCE) discourse universe of Athens. 
Distinctive problematics obtain in particular milieus: cultural exigencies formally determine the 
material content of abstract problematics. Lactantius therefore concerns himself with specific 
theological issues or questions. His life situation (Sitz-im-Leben) apparently informs the 
questions that one finds treated or disregarded in Divinae institutiones.
95 (3) Cotextuality
96 
signifies the literary surroundings (e.g. terms, sentences, paragraphs, chapters and sections) of a 
text or discourse; the cotext putatively allows a reader to reconstruct (as opposed to deconstruct) 
a text.
97 Furthermore, it permits discourse to cohere. The cotext or literary context may also 
determine or clarify the meaning of concepts employed in discourse. (4) Intertextuality may 
denote the act of referencing texts that possibly relate to discourse units being analyzed or 
composed. One may classify intertextual effects as “internal” or “external” types, which means 
that texts pertaining to a given unit of discourse may be written by one author (internal) or 
 
93 Sandywell, Presocratic Reflexivity, 30; Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 64-65.  
94 Sandywell, Presocratic Reflexivity, 30. 
95 Sergius N. Bulgakov illustrates how context shapes the problematics of theological discourse in The 
Comforter, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 5-7. 
96 Ernst R. Wendland, “A Tale of Two Debtors: On the Interaction of Text, Cotext, and Context in a New 
Testament Dramatic Narrative (Luke 7:36-50)” in Linguistics and New Testament Interpretation:  Essays on 
Discourse Analysis, ed. David A. Black, et al.  (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1992), 116. 
97 See Samuel B. Southwell, Kenneth Burke and Martin Heidegger: With a Note against Deconstructionism 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1987), 87-105; Vincent Brümmer, Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay 
in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 15.                                            
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composed by multiple authors (external).
98 Hence, with respect to the subject matter of this 
investigation, Epitome Divinarum and De ira Dei are internal effects that intertextually relate to 
Divinae institutiones since Lactantius is the presumed author of all three treatises. On the other 
hand, works composed by Arnobius or Tertullian are external intertextual effects in relation to 
the Lactantian treatises. Intertextuality (as defined in this paragraph) will play a vital part in this 
study. (5) Cultural contexts encompass the socio-religious or political conditions attending a text. 
They include “the wider, extra-discursive social, institutional, and communicative settings of 
speech and writing.”
99 Therefore, religious or political institutions that obtain at the time that a 
text is written partly form its cultural context. Scholars have contended that it is not possible to 
understand ancient texts without being privy to the cultural background that informs them. It 
then becomes necessary to place Lactantius within a determinate cultural milieu. 
In view of this investigation’s general thesis, it also seems fitting to employ the tools of 
ancient and contemporary metaphor theory, systematic theology, classical studies and speech-act 
theory. Four primary tasks of this study are (a) to define the term “metaphor,” (b) ascertain a 
diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity, (c) situate Lactantius within a specific discourse universe, 
and (d) illuminate his thought concerning divine paternity. Utilizing ancient and contemporary 
notions of metaphoricity consequently will be requisite methods for this study. Furthermore, the 
categories of systematic theology will provide structure to this analysis of Lactantian thought. 
Additionally, since this investigation endeavors to grasp what Christians intend 
(phenomenologically) by the term “Father,” certain vocabulary that one normally associates with 
continental thought and linguistics will be indispensable for this study.  
The next section outlines the chapters of this study. It provides a rationale for devoting 
extensive time and space in this work to metaphor theory and the establishment of a rudimentary 
diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity. Since a primary contention of this tome is that Lactantius 
 
98 See Wendland, Linguistics and NT Interpretation, 116-117; Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading of 
Midrash (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 14. The latter argues that no text is the 
result of a freely acting “self-identical subject.” Boyarin contends that every text is “dialogical” insofar as it doubles 
back on itself: he argues that each text contains an internal dialogue. The position taken in this study is more akin to 
Wendland’s literary approach in the sense that he clearly seems to affirm the existence of an author while 
simultaneously insisting that there is no text without intertextuality. 
99 Sandywell, Presocratic Reflexivity, 30.                                            
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employs metaphorical speech to delineate God’s paternity, defining “metaphor” is an essential 
task for this work. Additionally, it is imperative to ascertain a diagnostic criterion for 
metaphoricity, that is, a conceptual tool whereby one can determine when a writer or speaker is 
possibly employing metaphorical speech. Since it is outside the scope of this investigation to set 
forth an all-encompassing diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity, this study primarily will 
concentrate on what the term “metaphor” communicated to ancient Greek and Roman citizens 
and how one can make that determination from a theoretical perspective.          
                         
  E. Outline of Chapters      
 
Chapter 1 of this investigation initially proffers a stipulative or provisional working definition for 
the term “metaphor.” It conscripts speech-act theory and appeals to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of 
classical metaphorology. The chapter examines the classical definition of “metaphor,” then it 
proffers a diagnostic criterion for recognizing metaphors by using speech-act theory, which 
emphasizes the role of context in discourse. It is imperative to define “metaphor” and how one 
goes about recognizing it since very few, if any, patristic studies have performed this 
undertaking. This aspect of the study will constitute an advance in the knowledge of metaphor 
theory and its relation to early Christian discourse. 
Chapter 2 examines the role that metaphors play in the religious life of the Christian 
community. In particular, it discusses the Augustinian and Thomistic views of metaphor. The 
chapter also explores arguments that favor revising the Christian understanding of God as Father, 
but it presents reasons for preserving paternal metaphors in Christian theolinguistics. Finally, the 
chapter analyzes how Donald Bloesch employs metaphor theory, and how he distinguishes 
between symbol, metaphor and analogy. The chapter concludes that metaphor adequately 
delineates the reality of God, even paternal imagery does not exhaust the Father’s reality. 
Chapter 3 will outline the Greco-Roman and Judaic influences that possibly shaped 
Lactantian thought concerning God the Father. It will explore how Stoicism and other antecedent 
schools of philosophical thought affected Lactantius’ understanding of the Christian deity. While                                            
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it is clear that Lactantius did not assimilate Greco-Roman thought uncritically, he nevertheless 
relied upon a number of non-Christian sources from his cultural milieu to rebuff contemporary 
pagan opponents. This chapter will thus argue that the apologist utilized contemporary 
metaphorical concepts regarding God’s fatherhood. As this study has hitherto indicated, the 
thought of Lactantius did not develop in a vacuum: Stoicism and Platonism undoubtedly 
exercised considerable influence on his concept of divine paternity.  
Chapter 4 will analyze early Christian views of God the Father. It will provide the 
evidentiary ground for the contention that Lactantius represents a particular Christian school of 
thought by reviewing what pre-Nicene Latin writers expressed concerning the (metaphorical) 
generative correlation between God and His Son as well as how God qua Father relates to the 
created order. The chapter will explore documents composed by Novatian, Minucius Felix, 
Tertullian of Carthage, Arnobius of Sicca, Cyprian of Carthage, and Hippolytus of Rome while 
making paterology the salient focus of discussion. The chapter will submit that early Christians 
have a predilection for viewing God as Father in a metaphorical sense. 
Chapter 5 probes the anonymous “God and Father of all” concept. It provides historical 
evidence that illuminates the locus classicus of Lactantius’ apophaticism (i.e. a type of negative 
speech that says what God is not). Additionally, this chapter demonstrates the tenability of a 
possible nexus between the Lactantian notion of divine paternity and similar concepts that one 
encounters in Neoplatonism, Middle Platonism, Hermes Trismegistus, and Cicero. It argues that 
certain notions in Lactantius appear to have an Egyptian provenance by means of Lactantius’ use 
of the Corpus Hermeticum. Other possible sources of Lactantian Christology include the 
Deuterocanonicals and the Tanakh. 
Chapter 6 is one of the most important aspects of this study since it explores the vital 
function that Christology plays in understanding Lactantius’ conception of God the Father. This 
chapter submits that the apologist’s view of God’s paternity is a dynamic one. That is, while 
Lactantius affirms God’s impassibility to a certain extent, it is evident that his thought functions 
dialectically vis-à-vis the divine inability to be conditioned, affected or moved by external 
factors. Lactantius (in continuity with his Latin predecessors) thinks that God becomes a Father                                            
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when he generates the Son by means of divine breath. Father (for Lactantius) consequently is a 
term that does not necessarily designate the immanental essence of God or an eternal distinction 
in the tripersonal Godhead. Gregory Nazianzus also notes that “Father” is a relation (not a term 
denoting substance) in Oration 29:16. He formulates God’s paternity in terms of relationality. 
Chapter 7 delineates the nexus that Lactantius envisions between God’s fatherhood and 
divine judgment, between everlasting life and aionian punishment, between divine paternity and 
eschatology. Lactantius often describes the Father as “indulgent” or lenient in the Divinae 
institutiones. Nevertheless, he argues that God qua Father is not only compassionate or 
indulgent, but he is also severe in that God eternally or everlastingly purposes to exact retribution 
for wrongs committed in the here and now. However, God grants everlasting beatitude to those 
who demonstrate gratefulness for the beneficence of divine providence. Nonetheless, besides 
analyzing God’s indulgence and severity, the final chapter will review the issue of provenance 
for the Lactantian eschatological conception of God the Father by drawing upon the rich and 
diverse apocalyptic sources that possibly influenced these notions.                                             
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Chapter 1 
 
Defining and Recognizing Metaphoric Speech 
 
The lexical meaning of “metaphor” differs from one metaphorologist to another metaphorologist. 
As Thévenaz suggests, experience indicates that it is often easier to describe (rather than define) 
some types of phenomena.
100 This observation seems particularly applicable to the denotation or 
extension for “metaphor.”
101 As with art, it seems nearly impossible to define “metaphor” 
adequately, much less definitively.
102 The term seems to resist all attempts at semantic 
reductionism. But while most lexemes (minimal lexical units) or signifiers (meaningful linguistic 
units or patterns) are polysemous in nature,
103 it appears that competing approaches, conflicting 
ideologies or variant interests are chiefly responsible for the polysemous character of the 
referring expression “metaphor.”
104  Linguists, neuroscientists, philosophers and theologians, 
inter alios, manifestly possess diverse agendas when scrutinizing the alleged properties of 
 
100 Pierre Thévenaz, What is Phenomenology? ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1962), 29-30. 
101 See The Ubiquity of Metaphor: Metaphor in Language and Thought, ed. René Dirven and Wolf Paprotté  
(Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1985), vii; Werner Abraham, A Linguistic Approach to Metaphor 
(Lisse/Netherlands: Peter De Ridder Press, 1975), 6. 
102 See Donald B. Calne for a discussion of the problems associated with defining art in Within Reason: 
Rationality and Human Behavior (New York: Pantheon Books, 1999), 203. John Locke thinks that the human 
employment of general terms for phenomena such as gold and other similar objects only pertains to the nominal 
essence of an entity, not its real essence. He defines “the nominal essence of gold” as “that complex idea the word 
gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real 
essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body, on which those qualities and all the other properties of 
gold depend” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 6.2). For discussions about open definitions and 
Locke’s concept of “nominal essence,” see Colin Gunton, Act and Being:  Towards a Theology of the Divine 
Attributes (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 95; Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 34-36; J. L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), 85-100. 
103 Paul Ricoeur writes: “Most of our words are polysemic; they have more than one meaning.” See 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 
17. Stephen Ullmann also maintains that polysemy fundamentally characterizes human speech in Semantics: An 
Introduction to the Science of Meaning (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), 159. 
104 Peter W. Macky, The Centrality of Metaphors to Biblical Thought: A Method for Interpreting the Bible 
(Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 42. Referring expression means a word (or words) that signifies “an 
individual entity or multiple entities in order to say something about the individual entity or multiple entities.” See 
Swinburne, Revelation, 10.                                            
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metaphor. Therefore, it is not astonishing to observe theorists with varied worldviews 
(Weltanschauungen) disparately characterizing metaphorical speech.
105  
This chapter will not seek to classify metaphor definitively or exhaustively. Rather, its 
purpose is to set forth a working denotation for the operative term as well as a rudimentary 
diagnostic criterion that one can employ to identify metaphorical uses of speech.
106 The most 
important task for this chapter is determining the predominant classical denotation of 
metafora.. Nevertheless, it is also vital to examine contemporary metaphor theories that 
illuminate the ancient ones. In this portion of the current study, a working definition for 




A.  The Definition of “Metaphor” 
 
Before discussing the manner whereby Lactantius implements the metaphor “Father” when 
speaking about God, it is essential to render precisely the term “metaphor” (as understood by 
classical and modern thinkers) and then ascertain an elementary diagnostic criterion for 
recognizing metaphorical speech. Hence, this chapter will explore two questions: (1) What is a 
metaphor? (2) How can one determine whether a particular construct is metaphorical? 
Contemporary metaphor theorists have fashioned terminology that attempts to clarify 
explanatory discourse as it pertains to tropic utterances. For example, I. A. Richards introduced 
the terminology “tenor” and “vehicle” in 1936, but he did not precisely define these categorical 
terms.
108 While Richards did not set forth his proposed tenor-vehicle categories in a precise 
 
105 Colin Gunton notes that in 1964, one author could allude to a book that contained 125 definitions of 
“metaphor.” For Gunton, Aristotle’s definition in Poetica seems to describe only one facet of metaphor. See The 
Actuality of Atonement (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 27-28.  
106 See The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, 8 volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 1:39. 
107  Researching and Applying Metaphor, ed. Lynne Cameron and Graham Low (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 6. 
108 The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 100-102. See Paul Del 
Brassey, Metaphor and the Incomparable God in Isaiah 40-55: A Thesis (North Richland Hills, TX: BIBAL Press, 
2001), 3; J. J. A. Mooij, A Study of Metaphor: On the Nature of Metaphorical Expressions, with Special Reference 
to Their Reference (Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland Pub Co., 1976), 76-79.                                            
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manner, however, one tentatively can argue that by “tenor,” he meant the “principal subject” (the 
entity to which a speaker is referring) in a metaphorical structure.
109 On the other hand, 
Richards’ term “vehicle” evidently refers to the “subsidiary subject” (the concept that further 
describes the tenor); it is that concept to which one compares the principal subject.
110 Hence, in 
the proposition “God is the Father of Jesus Christ,”
111 the concept “God” is the tenor (principal 
subject being referenced), while the predicate term “Father of Jesus Christ” functions as the 
vehicle (subsidiary subject or concept to which God is being compared) that elucidates the 
tenor.
112 Richards ultimately maintains that linguistic sense results from the “co-presence” of the 
tenor and vehicle: both the principal and subsidiary subject bring about metaphoric significance 
through conceptual interaction.
113 He thereby insists that the tenor and vehicle create new 
meaning, and this approach to metaphor theory has proved to be indispensable for cognitive 
linguists,
114 although the tenor-vehicle approach is limited in scope since it is not readily 
applicable to all tropic constructions.
115  
Another technical expression in metaphor theory is “point of similarity” or common 
domain factor which refers to the intended focus of a metaphorical concept.
116 William Alston 
contends that when speakers use terms metaphorically, they mean to exploit certain 
resemblances that putatively obtain between two concepts or terms occurring in a metaphorical 
 
109 Richards defines tenor as “the underlying idea or principal subject which the vehicle or figure means” 
(Philosophy of Rhetoric, 97). See Metaphor and God-Talk, ed. Lieven Boeve and Kurt Feyaerts (Bern, Berlin and 
New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 8; Sarah J. Dille, Mixing Metaphors: God as Mother and Father in Deutero-Isaiah 
(London and New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 5 for similar definitions of “tenor.” 
110 Ullmann, Semantics, 213. 
111 The term “proposition” here simply denotes an assertion (following Nicholas Wolterstorff) or a judgment. 
William P. Alston, on the other hand, associates the concept “proposition” with the content of what is believed or 
asserted. See A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 15-22. Swinburne 
defines “proposition” (in this context) as an “element of claim in what is said” by a token sentence that may be 
synonymous with another token sentence (Revelation, 9). Token sentences are particular instances of sentential 
types (e.g. “The King is dead” and “Rex mortuus est” are tokens that express the same proposition). 
112 Philip Wheelwright defines tenor as a word’s “semantic content” or lexical meaning and vehicle as “a 
semantic carrier.” See The Burning Fountain: A Study in the Language of Symbolism (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 
1982), 7. Of course, Richards’ concern is linguistic rather than theological. 
113 Philosophy of Rhetoric, 96-97. 
114 Cameron and Low, Researching and Applying, 13. 
115 Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, Clarendon Library of Logic and 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 16-17. 
116 Murphy, Nietzsche, 38.                                            
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speech act.
117 The specific resemblance that a speaker or writer makes the focus in a given 
construct is what one might call the “common domain factor.” For instance, when Jesus of 
Nazareth refers to Herod Antipas as a “fox” (ei;pate th/| avlw,peki), he evidently has 
specific qualities of the animal in mind, not every unique property (characteristic or attribute) of 
a fox (Luke 13:32).
118 To be precise, the metaphor “fox” (avlw,phx) that describes Herod is 
likely based on properties that humans commonly attribute to foxes, whether such attributions 
are fitting or malapropos. In any event, the particular commonplaces or attributed properties of a 
fox that Jesus is stressing in Luke’s Gospel constitute the so-called point of similarity or 
common domain factor. 
The dominical Sermon on the Mount further illustrates how the point of similarity differs 
from the tenor or vehicle in metaphor theory. While recounting that renowned public discourse, 
the apostle Matthew relates that Jesus utilized a metaphor wherein he depicted Christian 
disciples as “the salt of the earth” (Matthew 5:13).
119 In that particular Matthean account, the 
disciples referenced by the pronominal “you” (u`meij) function as the tenor; the vehicle is 
“salt” (to. a[laj) and the point of similarity (i.e. common domain factor) apparently is the 
preservative quality of salt or its inherent potential to accentuate the taste of food. As opposed to 
tenor-vehicle terminology, Richard Young employs the language “topic-image.” While 
conceding that other interpretations of the “salt” metaphor are possible, Young prefers to 
emphasize the seasoning or preservative aspects of the Matthean trope. 
120 Just as salt may 
 
117 Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989), 22-23.   
118 Luke uses avlw,phx here metaphorically to suggest that Herod is a crafty person (BDAG 49). Compare 
Pythian Odes 2.77. 
119 The Greek text of Matthew 5:13 reads: u`mei/j evste to. a[laj th/j gh/j. See Kurt Aland, et 
al., The Greek New Testament: former editions edited by Kurt Aland, Matthew Black, Carlo M. Martini, Bruce M. 
Metzger and Allen Wikgren: fourth revised edition edited by Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, 
Carlo M. Martini and Bruce Metzger in cooperation with the Institute for New Testament Textual Research, 
Münster/Westphalia. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1998. This Greek New Testament will subsequently be 
abbreviated by its common designation UBS4. 
120 Richard A. Young, Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach (Nashville: 
Broadman and Holman, 1994), 236-237. Similar emphases are found in TDNT 1:228. Cf. Leviticus 2:13; Numbers 
18:19; 2 Chronicles 13:5; Mark 9:50. For an alternative understanding of the metaphor in Matthew 5:13, see Hans 
D. Betz, Sermon on the Mount (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 158. He interprets the metaphor as an implicit 
exhortation to become involved (socially) in the world, based on the genitival th/j gh/j. However, this                                            
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function as a preservative or augment the palatability of food (Job 6:6; Colossians 4:6), so the 
disciples of Jesus preserve human lives by means of the Gospel: they utter expressions of 
graciousness to bring about salvation vis-à-vis their listeners.
121 Regardless of its speaker 
intended meaning,
122 however, the imagery used in Matthew 5:13 illustrates three distinctions 
(tenor, vehicle and point of similarity) that metaphor theorists commonly implement when 
undertaking research of elocutionary tropes or conceptual metaphors.
123  
Altogether there are five approaches to metaphor that this study will consider: (1) 
cognitive semantic theory; (2) so-called substitution theory; (3) comparison theory; (4) 
interactionism, and (5) speech act theory. First, this investigation will discuss cognitive semantic 
theory, before reviewing the comparison and substitution theories of metaphor. Subsequently it 
will clarify the details of interactionism prior to analyzing the conceptual relationship between 
speech act thought and metaphor as such. The cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson are most 
often associated with cognitive semantic theory. Their theoretical model will therefore constitute 






interpretation places unnecessary weight on the genitival construction that it possibly cannot bear. 
121 The metaphor concerning salt was a common one and apparently did not need much explication for Jesus’ 
original hearers. See Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales 685A; Anna Wierzbicka, What Did Jesus Mean?: Explaining 
the Sermon on the Mount and the Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 126-127; Petr Pokorný, Colossians: A Commentary (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991), 187; 
Ralph Earle, Word Meanings in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1974-1984), 362; Eduard 
Lohse, Colossians and Philemon: A Commentary on the Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1971). See the entries a[laj and avrtu,w in BDAG. 
122 Jerrold J. Katz distinguishes between sentence meaning and “contextual meaning” (utterance meaning). The 
latter refers to what a speaker intends when uttering a sentence. Utterance or contextual meaning is illocutionary 
insofar as it is performative or indicative of an accomplishment or act by means of a verbal articulation. See 
Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force: A Study of the Contribution of Sentence Meaning to Speech Acts 
(New York: Crowell, 1977), 14-15. For a helpful introduction to semantics in general and sentence or speaker 
meaning, in particular, consult John I. Saeed, Semantics, second edition  (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 18. 
123 Rhetoricians traditionally have understood metaphors in terms of tropes or figures of speech. But cognitive 
linguists tend to construe metaphors as conceptual domains tied to bodily experience. This study assumes that                                            
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B.  Cognitive Semantic Theory 
 
Besides availing themselves of distinctions such as tenor, vehicle and point of similarity (= 
common domain factor), cognitive linguists prefer to think of metaphor as the noetic 
phenomenon that entails understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual 
domain.
124 With respect to the metaphoric utterance, “She blew up at me,” cognitive semantic 
theory contends that the CONTAINMENT image-schema
125 is mapped onto anger.
126 One thus 
envisages anger as liquid stored in a container, along with its various logical entailments.
127 The 
source domain CONTAINMENT maps onto the target domain ANGER
128 Similarly, the source 
domain “father” evidently maps onto “God” (target domain) in the metaphorical structure “God 
is the Father of Israel.”  
As suggested above, cognitive linguists differentiate between target and source domains. 
The target domain is the aforementioned “tenor” (principal conceptual subject) of Richards. 
Conversely, the source domain is what earlier was identified as the “vehicle” (subsidiary 
conceptual subject).
129 Stated in terms of variables, the target domain of a metaphoric construct 
is A whereas the source domain is B. Hence, in the conceptual metaphoric utterance “Love is a 
journey” the abstract signifier “love” functions as the target domain (A); “journey,” on the other 
 
metaphors are both tropes and conceptual domains. Hence, the nomenclature “tropes” and “conceptual domains” in 
reference to metaphors will be used throughout this investigation. 
124 Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor:  A Practical Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4; 
Cameron and Low, Researching and Applying, 8-10; Antonio Barcelona, “Clarifying and Applying Metaphor and 
Metonymy” in Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, ed. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (Berlin and 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2002), 211.  
125 The general convention in cognitive semantic theory is to spell terms that are used for image-schemas with all 
uppercase letters.  
126 Schema (sch/ma) as used in cognitive semantic theory generally denotes a perennial mental pattern that 
makes it possible for divergent human experiences to be structured in ordered ways. Additionally, image-schemata 
can be used as source domains in metaphorical constructs to inform target domains. See Mark Johnson, The Body in 
the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); 
From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. Beate Hampe (Berlin and New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 1-2; F. Ungerer and H. – J. Schmid, An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics (London 
and New York: Longman, 1996), 108. 
127 Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., “The Fight over Metaphor in Thought and Language” in Figurative Language and 
Thought, ed. Albert N. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 114. 
128 Ibid. 
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hand, represents the concrete source domain (B).
130 It is apt that “love” functions as the target, 
rather than the source domain since the metaphorical locution “Love is a journey” predicates 
something concrete about love (an abstract quality). 
A metaphor (according to cognitive semantic theory) generally asserts that conceptual 
domain A is conceptual domain B (e.g. “The Lord is my Shepherd”).
131 One domain maps onto 
another.
132 The expression “mapping” (in this context) refers to systematic correspondences that 
obtain between the source and target domain.
133 The vocabulary “mapping” stems from 
mathematics, where it describes the arithmetical correspondence of abstract sets: numerical sets 
map onto other analogous sets. In the case of metaphors or conceptual domains, however, when 
one utters the words “God is the Father of Jesus Christ” the respective conceptual domains 
“God” and “Father” systematically correspond with or map onto one another. The one speaking 
evidently understands God in terms of the domain “Father.”
134 Therefore, metaphor does not 
merely result from the locutionary act of turning a word or phrase to make comparisons or 
substitute names; metaphors are structured concepts that influence how percipient subjects 
experience (amorphous) sensory data.
135 The cognitive semantic model thus distinguishes 
rhetorical metaphors from experientially structured domains that are cognitive in nature.
136 
Lakoff and Johnson
137 argue that metaphors organize perceptions, thoughts and actions; domains 
 
130 The target domain is usually more abstract in nature than the source domain. Another example of this 
phenomenon is “Time (A) is money (B).” By its very nature, time is abstract; money (on the other hand) is concrete. 
131 Kövecses, Metaphor, 4. 
132 Murphy, Nietzsche, 37; Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 159. 
133 Kövecses, Metaphor, 6-8. 
134 Theorists utilizing the cognitive semantic model tend to regard metaphoric senses as unidirectional, arguing 
that conceptual transferences only extend from source to target domain (Boeve, God-talk, 9). Schopenhauer’s 
metaphoric speech-act “A geometrical proof is a mousetrap” certainly appears to be unidirectional or asymmetric. 
There seems to be asymmetry in this case since a geometrical proof may be comparable to a mousetrap, but a 
mousetrap is not analogous to a geometrical proof.  Hence, the metaphoric extension “mousetrap” strictly applies to 
the target, not the source domain. The sense (in this case) is unidirectional. See Nelly Stienstra, YHWH is the 
Husband of His People:  Analysis of a Biblical Metaphor with Special Reference to Translation (Kampen, the 
Netherlands: Pharos, 1993), 22; Kövesecs, Metaphor, 6. 
135 Dirven and Paprotté, Ubiquity of Metaphor, ix. 
136 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 117. 
137 Ibid. 4.                                            
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cohesively structure human experience.
138 Consequently, perceiving subjects are reputedly 
incapable of forming abstract notions without the cognitive input of metaphors: “Primarily on the 
basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is 
metaphorical in nature.”
139 Vanhoozer (following Ricoeur) depicts metaphors as “indispensable 
cognitive instruments” that enable rational creatures to identify resemblances between entities 
that otherwise would be imperceptible.
140 The employment of cognitive semantic theory thereby 
illustrates the tension that exists between conceptual and linguistic approaches to metaphor.
141 
Metaphors (according to this model) are viewed as ways of thinking rather than speech 
stratagems. 
Cognitive linguists insist that conceptual domains are aesthetically consistent wholes.
142 
Metaphors are supposedly rooted in bodily experience or human imagination.
143 Concepts such 
as happiness, well-being or life consequently are depicted as being “up” while death, 
despondency or evil are portrayed as being “down.”
144 Lakoff and Johnson accordingly use the 
terminology “experiential gestalts” to describe metaphors since these conceptual wholes typify 
structures or patterns associated with persistent forms of human culture, bodily experience or 
discursivity.
145 Conceptual domains allegedly make it possible for multiple human experiences 
to cohere respecting natural dimensions such as parts, stages or causes.
146 Moreover, these 
domains evidently are “culturally coded” (one’s culture informs particular domains) and stored 
 
138 “The primary function of metaphor is to provide a partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of 
another kind of experience” (Ibid. 154).  
139  Ibid. 4. See Murphy, Nietzsche, 38-39; Andrew Goatly, The Language of Metaphors (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 1. Richards maintains that metaphor “is the omnipresent principle of language,” which empirical 
observation verifies (Philosophy of Rhetoric, 92). 
140 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 129. 
141 Goatly, The Language of Metaphors, 42. 
142 Robyn Carston, Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication (Malden and Oxford:  
Blackwell, 2002), 355; Kövecses, Metaphor, 4. 
143 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003), 204. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Murphy, Religion, 38; Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 31. 
146 See Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 78, 117. Examples of universal human experiences are 
subsisting in a body or experiencing the force of gravity (Dille, Mixing Metaphors, 17).                                             
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erience. 
reference points (i.e. spatial dimensions such as up-down, left-right) also does not develop until 
                                                
in long-term memory (LTM).
147 Metaphors thereby acquire a conceptual character, as opposed 
to a rhetorical one. Kövecses fittingly categorizes two related domains of experience assuming 
the form “A is B” as conceptual metaphors.
148 Damasio additionally insists that metaphors 
formed by our cognitive faculties “describe events and qualities in the world.”
149 Conceptual 
domains help us to make sense of bodily exp
Yet, Lakoff and Johnson’s experientialist thought has its critics, some of whom have 
produced formidable challenges in response to this paradigm. One trenchant criticism of 
experientialism as an account of metaphoricity is its prima facie conflict with Piagetian thought. 
In particular, the basic theoretical claims postulated by experientialists supposedly are at 
variance with certain findings of developmental psychology.
150 For instance, Lakoff and Johnson 
emphasize the image-schema of CONTAINMENT: they argue that metaphoric thinking is 
biological or rooted in experience.
151 Conceptual structures such as “Gas prices are up” or 
“Local unemployment rates are down” thus supposedly derive from the early somatic 
experiences of rational-biological entities.
152 On the other hand, Rakova contends that a child’s 
grasp of CONTAINMENT imagery (e.g. “more is up, less is down”) does not appear until the 
later stages of human development.
153 Additionally, “object permanence” (the ability to 
understand that objects continue to exist when they are no longer within one’s field of vision or 
perceptible to the senses)
154 takes sufficient time (approximately two years) to develop. The 
ability to represent oneself as an agent (a subject or doer) as well as the mastery of external 
 
147 Charles G. Morris defines long-term memory (LTM) as the “Portion of memory that is more or less 
permanent corresponding to everything we ‘know.’ ” See his text Understanding Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1993), 211. Murphy (Nietzsche, 39), Cameron and Low (Researching and Applying, 18) explain the 
relationship between LTM and metaphor. Metaphor is supposedly coded or preserved in LTM. 
148 Metaphor, 4. 
149 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 204. 
150 Marina Rakova, The Extent of the Literal: Metaphor, Polysemy and the Theories of Concepts (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25. 
151 Albert N. Katz, “Figurative Language and Figurative Thought,” in Figurative Language and Thought, ed. 
idem (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 32-33. 
152 Ibid. 
153 The Extent of the Literal, 25. 
154 Carol K. Sigelman and Elizabeth A. Rider, Life-Span Human Development, fourth edition (Australia and 
Canada: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003), 169.                                            
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d problematics associated with Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive 
semant
age three or later.
155 The research stemming from developmental psychology consequently 
seems to militate against the basic theoretical claims of experientialism. Conversely, other 
evidence suggests that although the ability to grasp CONTAINMENT imagery may be a 
posterior occurrence in human development, it seems that the subsequent formation of this 
cognitive imagery is possibly rooted in prior sensory experience.
156  
Regardless of the allege
ic thought, it appears that rational agents do contemplate noetic objects (including God) 
by means of metaphoric indirection.
157 But McFague posits the stronger thesis that it is 
impossible to perceive empirical phenomena or cogitate Kantian “noumena” (Dinge-an-sich) 
apart from metaphoric intercession.
158 Whether the object of intentionality (consciousness) is 
God, beauty, a rock or tree, rational creatures supposedly make judgments or cognize indirectly 
by incessantly pressing metaphorical thought into service. Like Nietzsche, McFague exhibits a 
proclivity for collapsing the standard metaphysical distinction that obtains between metaphor and 
referential objects.
159 Her theoretical paradigm apparently dictates that all God-talk must be 
symbolic or non-literal.
160 McFague evidently thinks that God does not objectively exemplify the 
properties that Christians usually attribute to deity (i.e. God is not actually paternal nor is God 
ontologically personal).
161 Nevertheless, her “neo-Kantian agnosticism” does not characterize all 
                                                 
155 Rakova, The Extent of the Literal, 25. 
156 See Lawrence E. Marks, et al., Perceiving Similarity and Comprehending Metaphor (Chicago: University of 
Ch
al soul constitute noumena, which legislative or free agents cannot know as things in themselves. See 
Cri
). The one-volume edition of Arendt’s work contains two parts with one part titled Thinking and 
the
 Baker Academic, 2004), 168; Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard 
Uni
icago Press, 1987), 72-74.  
157 Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1982), 16. 
158 Ibid. Immanuel Kant argues that noumena are thinkable, but not knowable. He states that God, freedom and 
the immort
tique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft), trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 
1990), 416-418. 
159 For Nietzsche, see Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, one-volume edition (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1981
 other part entitled Judging. In subsequent notes, this study will reference her book by pointing out whether a 
citation is taken from the Thinking or Judging part of the one-volume text. 
160 John W. Cooper, Our Father in Heaven: Christian Faith and Inclusive Language for God (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Books, 1998), 175-176. 
161 For helpful discussions on properties, see Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation out of Nothing 
(Leicester and Grand Rapids:
versity Press, 1980); D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978).                                            
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more adequate terms. Additionally, metaphors are iconoclastic in that they now and again 
              
theorists who espouse a conceptual (as opposed to a linguistic) metaphorology.
162 Despite the 
prevailing attraction of the cognitive approach to metaphor, however, the principal ancient 
metaphor theories are the comparison and substitution models.
163 Comparison theory initially 
will be discussed below; this study will then explore substitution theory.  
 
C.  Comparison Theory 
 
Those who advocate comparison theory generally claim that metaphors “help us to make sense 
of things with which we are initially unfamiliar by making comparisons.”
164 Thinking 
metaphorically (according to this theory) means perceiving similarities between two otherwise 
divergent objects, events or structures (e.g. “Man is a puppet.”).
165 Moreover, comparison theory 
assumes that metaphorical constructions of the form “S is P” condense the locutionary forms “S 
is like P.” It suggests that metaphorical constructs tend to make implicit comparisons.
166 
Comparison theory further suggests that metaphors provide an innovative portrayal of reality by 
combining “a dialectic of the familiar and the strange.”
167 It implies that metaphors are both 
tools of discovery and lingual stratagems that presage interpretations of human experience in 
                                    
162 The “heavily projectionist” tenor of McFague’s metaphor theory has been analyzed by Colin Gunton, 
“Proteus and Procrustes: A Study in the Dialectic of Language in Disagreement with Sallie McFague,” in Speaking 
the Christian God, ed. Alvin F. Kimel Jr. (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1992), 65ff. While Gunton contends that 
McFague’s methodology entails agnosticism, John W. Cooper prefers to maintain that McFague is not wholly 
agnostic since she does somewhat affirm God. See Our Father in Heaven: Christian Faith and Inclusive Language 
for God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 175. 
163 See Levinson, Pragmatics, 151-152. 
164 John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 15. 
165 See McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15; Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171; Ruth C. Duck, Gender and the Name of God: The Trinitarian 
Baptismal Formula (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1991), 14; Mogen Stiller Kjärgaard, Metaphor and Parable: A 
Systematic Analysis of the Specific Structure and Cognitive Function of the Synoptic Similes and Parables Qua 
Metaphors, Acta Theologica Danica, volume 20 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 44-45. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 93. Sokolowski argues: “Metaphor rearranges the potentials of our sensibility 
and provokes a new way of perceiving.” See his text Husserlian  Meditations:  How Words Present Things. 
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974), 227. The verb “perceive” here means “any unarticulated intuition at all,” not just intentional activities 
such as seeing or touching.                                            
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ving a sociogenic function (i.e. metaphors have the ability to constitute 
or influ
                                                
eradicate inadequate construals of lived existence.
168 For instance, tropes occasionally militate 
against prevailing social institutions,
169 their ongoing maintenance and meaning-constituting 
plausibility structures (i.e. foundations that legitimate socially constructed worlds).
170 Combes 
fittingly deems metaphors “dangerous things.”
171 They are capable of altering the existing status 
quo; moreover, communicative agents evidently preserve or slay one another depending on 
metaphors that comprise social discourse.
172 It also seems that metaphors have the ability to 
shape one’s belief or disbelief in God. Fretheim thus argues that “metaphors matter” when one is 
formulating a theological system.
173 
In addition to ha
ence societal institutions), tropes appear capable of disclosing that which is ineffable, 
abstract, supersensible or transcendent.
174 The process of phenomenological unconcealing 
generally transpires by means of a speaker or discourse agent interchanging familiar and strange 
concepts, nominals or genera in order to make comparisons.
175 This function ultimately plays an 
integral role in theology or the formulation of speculative thought. For instance, the Gospel of 
John identifies Christ as “the lamb of God” (John 1:29). The imagery that the author employs 
conveys profound religious truths that are best understood within the cultural milieu of the 
Gospel. The “lamb” metaphor probably evokes images of ritual or sin-atoning practices carried 
out in ancient Israel (Exodus 12:1-13; 29:39-41; Leviticus 3:7; 4:32, 35; 5:6-7; 9:3; 12:6-8; 
 
168 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 93. 
169 Listen to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” (Columbia, MD: American Audio Prose 
Library, 1990) for an example of this phenomenon. 
170 Sanders, God Who Risks, 11-12. Authors such as Maureen A. Tilley, The Bible in Christian North Africa: The 
Donatist World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 5-7; Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a 
Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 45-47, Lewis R. Gordon, Her Majesty’s Other 
Children: Sketches of Racism from a Neocolonial Age (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 38-39 and Richard 
C. Lewontin, Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 7 discuss social 
construction and the legitimating role of plausibility structures. 
171 I. A. H. Combes, The Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church: From the New Testament to 
the Beginning of the Fifth Century (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 11.   
172 See Kenneth S. Hicks, “Metaphors We Kill By: The Legacy of U. S. Antiterrorist Rhetoric,” The Political 
Chronicle (1991): 21-29. 
173 Terence Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective, Overtures to Biblical Theology, 14 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 1. 
174 Ibid. 5-12. 
175 Kittay, Metaphor, 4.                                            
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D.  Substitution Theory 
Substitution theory allegedly originated with Aristotle (384-322 BCE), who was the first western 
rives from Aristotle, who indicates 
that m
                                                
Isaiah 53:7; John 19:14, 31-37; 1 Corinthians 5:7; Apocalypse 5:6); the Gospel of John does not 
just utilize “lamb” imagery based on natural properties indigenous to sheep.
176 But one also 
witnesses the revelatory nature of tropic speech in substitution theories of metaphor. The most 
celebrated substitution theory is the formulation wrought by Aristotle that section D outlines. 
 
 
thinker to scrutinize metaphors.
177 One can find his remarks concerning metaphors in De 
Rhetorica 3.1405, Poetica 21.1457b and Topica 157a. His theory is probably one of the foremost 
metaphorologies in existence. But how does Aristotle define the signifier “metaphor”? 
Furthermore, does his concept of “metaphor” (metafora.) or “transference” (evpifora) 
possibly influence the Lactantian notion of divine paternity? 
Wheelwright points out that the Greek evpifora de
etaphor is the “transference” of a name to another denotatum.
178 The etymological 
formation of the word consists of the preposition epi. (“over on to”) + fora, (“movement”). 
This compound term thereby illustrates the conceptual motion of “transference” that metaphoric 
speech-acts entail. However, Wheelwright distinguishes epiphoric from diaphoric metaphors. 
Diaphors move through actual or imagined particulars of experiences, opening new vistas by 
means of juxtapositions such as “the apparition of these faces in the crowd; Petals on a wet, 
black bough.”
179 These types of metaphors proceed “mediately and through combination of 
 




phor & Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 72-73. 
rchert, John 1-11, The New American Commentary, volume 25A (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1996), 135-
136; David E. Aune, Revelation 1-5, Word Biblical Commentary, volume 52A (Dallas: Word Books, 1997), 367-
373, Edwyn Clement Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel, ed. F. N. Davey (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), 176. 
177 Brassey, Metaphor, 2. Implicit discussions regarding the subject of metaphors evidently date back to th
tury BCE, where one finds the nature of metaphoricity being explored in writings by the Presocratics and Stoics. 
Plato also contributed to the ancient debate on metaphors. See Janet M. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 1.  
178 Philip Ellis Wheelwright, Meta
179 Ibid. 78-80.                                            
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totle thinks that metaphors involve renaming things: “Metaphor consists in giving the 
thing a
Poetica 21.1457b delineates the fourfold manner in which transferred naming may occur. 
Specifically, metaphors reassign nouns from genus to species (“There lies my ship”),
187 species 
                                                
discrete terms.”
180 Conversely, epiphors transfer a name from a concrete object to a more 
abstract one.




 name that belongs to something else.”
183 His putative substitution theory implies that 
metaphor entails the transferring of a noun or name (o;noma,) from one entity to another or 
from one discourse field to another discourse field, as in the proposition “YHWH is my 
shepherd” (Psalm 23:1).
184 According to the common reading of Aristotle’s remarks on 
metaphor, substitution occurs in a metaphor when a communicative agent employs an ostensibly 
less precise (but stylistic) term in place of a less stylistic (but precise) term.
185 Hence, in the case 
of “YHWH is my shepherd,” the predicate term functions as an alien referring expression for a 




180 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in  
obert Czerny (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 250. 
7-8: metafora. De, 
ev no,m      
rred from its proper place and assigned 
to 
hip between YHWH and 
Isr Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2000), 28. 
dge, MA: Cowley 
Pub
Language, trans. R
181 Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, 72-73. 
182 Ibid. 
183  Poetica 21.1457b 
st astoj avllotriou evpifora. h;  avpo. Tou/ ge,nouj evpi. 
ei=doj h; avpo. Tou/  ei;douj evpi. to.` ge,noj h; avpo. Tou/ 
ei;douj evpi.` ei=doj h; kata. to. avna,logon. See Aristotle’s Ars Poetica, ed. R. Kassel 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1966). 
Vanhoozer describes the Aristotelian notion of metaphor in these terms: “On this standard account, metaphor is a 
deviant naming, a swerve from literal meaning. In metaphor a name is transfe
in ov
a context where it does not belong” (Is There a Meaning, 128). Similarly, Richard Nate defines metaphor as “a 
metasememe” (Figuren der semantischen Deviation) that is characterized by a substitution involving similarities. 
See “Metaphor” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 493. Cf. Samuel R. Levin, The Semantics of Metaphor (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1977), 85-86. Henceforth, this study will use metaphor and metasememe interchangeably. 
184 See Lanham, Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 100. 
185 Gerlinde Baumann, Love and Violence: Marriage as Metaphor for the Relations
ael in the Prophetic Books, trans. Linda M. Maloney (
186 Brassey, Metaphor, 3. 
187 James E. Griffiss, Naming the Mystery: How Our Words Shape Prayer and Belief (Cambri
lications, 1990), 120.                                            
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to genu
ecessary to begin with the 
famous
                                                
s (“King David has slain ten thousand men”), species to species (“Cleft the water with the 
vessel of unyielding bronze”) or analogically (“the evening of a man’s life”).
188 Aristotle devotes 
the most attention to the last kind of nominal transference, which he identifies as kata. to. 
avna,logon. Since this type of naming apparently entails the substitution of nouns, it is 
evident that the ancient Stagirite conceives of metaphoricity primarily as a word-level, not a 
sentential or macrostructural (super-sentential) phenomenon.
189 Precision requires that one 
actually say that Aristotle ultimately views metaphoricity as encompassing the interchanging of 
objects, terms, names, concepts, signifiers, discourse fields, words or genera for the purpose of 
renaming objects, terms, names, discourse fields, genera, words, signifiers, and concepts. 
Nevertheless, his emphasis on word-level phenomena may remain.
190 
Another significant aspect of Aristotelian metaphor theory is the concept of relational 
proportionality. To appreciate this facet of Aristotle’s thinking, it is n
 observation that the coining of metaphors is a mark of genius.
191 Aristotle writes: “The 
greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor” (Poetica 22.1459a).
192 He concomitantly 
insists that metaphors incomparably provide clarity or winsomeness to literary discourse: they 
distinguish the accomplished rhetorician from one who is pedestrian respecting style (Rhetorica 
3.1405a).
193 However, an effective metaphor must correspond (relationally) to that which a 
speaker or writer applies it. In Aristotelian terms, metaphors must be “proportionate”
194 or befit 
the respective entities that stand in an analogical relationship to one another.
195 For instance, if 
 
icero also places emphasis on metaphor as a word-level phenomenon (De oratore 
3.3 onstrates that Rhetorica 1413a seems to undermine the word-
lev
nt from a neuroscientific standpoint in Phantoms in the Brain: 
Pro  (New York: Quill, 1999), 197-198. 
ga.r ma,lista kai. 
h` On Style 
Mar
etaphor, 11. 
188 See Poetica 21.1457b; Brassey, Metaphor, 2. 
189 Soskice, Metaphor, 5. C
8). However, Stanford (Greek Metaphor, 7-8) dem
el view posited elsewhere in Aristotle. See De oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 volumes 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942). 
190 Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, 16-17. 
191 V. S. Ramachandran makes a similar argume
bing the Mysteries of the Human Mind
192 polu. De. me,giston to. metaforiko.n ei=nai (LCL). 
193  Metaphors “impart a special charm and grandeur to style” (au-tai 
nhn sumba,llontai toi/j lo,gioj kai. me,geqoj). do  See  77-78 quoted in 
sh H. McCall, Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison, LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1969), 141-142. 
194 Rhetorica 1405b. 
195 Stanford, Greek M                                           
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ilarity of relation (ad esse) between two normally 
contras
ristotle’s metaphorical formula such that C:D = A:B.
201 
However, the adumbrated invertibility subsisting in the Aristotelian equation for metaphoric 
                                                
the metaphorical proposition, “Juliet is the sun”
196 conforms to Aristotle’s notion of relational 
proportionality, then the term “sun” corresponds to the term “Juliet.”
197 Similarly, regarding the 
metaphoric sentential locution, “Righteousness is the scepter of Christ,” Aristotle would 
probably state that the referring-expression “righteousness” corresponds relationally to the 
referring-expression “scepter,” if the construct is proportionate.  That is, righteousness is to 
Christ as a scepter is to an earthly king. 
Hannah Arendt endeavors to clarify the Aristotelian concept of proportionality by 
explaining that metaphors posit a sim
ting entities or concepts (e.g. a “scepter” and “righteousness”).
198 She argues that the 
symmetry of metaphorical relations is comparable to a four-term analogy with the form B:A = 
D:C.
199 Therefore, the correspondence of relations pertaining to “Juliet is the sun” lies in the fact 
that Juliet is to Romeo as the sun is to the solar system. The proportionality thus consists in the 
stated relations (Juliet:Romeo = the sun:solar system); it does not obtain, per se, with respect to 
the individual objects, names or events that possibly function as meaning-bearing constituents of 
sentential utterances akin to “Juliet is the sun.”
200 Aristotle thus defines a “proportional” 
metaphor as one that is “always capable of reciprocal transference, and to either of its co-
ordinate terms” (Rhetorica 3.1407a). 
In harmony with Aristotle’s definition of a proportional metaphor, Arendt contends that 
an implied reversibility subsists in A
 
espeare’s Romeo and Juliet I.II.3. Most contemporary metaphorologists view 
this
hite (Structure of Metaphor, 153), who notes that in mathematics, the common 
util
king, 103. 
196 This locution derives from Shak
 proposition as a metaphor. Roger M. White, however, thinks that this sentential locution regarding Juliet is one 
element of a metaphor that is dependent on the macrostructural context in which it appears. He argues that the 
metaphor (in this case) is not exhausted by the subject-predicate construction “Juliet is the sun.” See The Structure 
of Metaphor: The Way the Language of Metaphor Works, Philosophical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 321-322. 
197 Cicero argues for his own type of proportionality in De oratore 3.162-168. Compare Poetica 21.1457b. 
198 Arendt, Thinking, 103. 
199 Ibid. But see Roger W
ization of analogy normally follows the schema A:B = C:D. Aristotle’s exact words in Poetica 21.1457b are: 
“Analogy or proportion is when the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. We may then use the fourth 
for the second, or the second for the fourth.” This explains Arendt’s schema B:A = D:C. Cf. Mooij, A Study of 
Metaphor, 64-65. 
200 Arendt, Thin
201 Poetica 21.1457b.                                            
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relation
e proposition, “God is the Father of Jesus Christ” because of 
                                                
s possibly stems from the nature of sensible images that the philosopher presses into 
service, namely, emblematic figures such as the cup of Dionysius or the shield of Ares, which 
are (poetically speaking) visible phenomena.
202 Therefore, it appears that one cannot mentally 
invert every possible metaphorical construct such that all tropic propositions will exemplify the 
attribute of proportional symmetry. Metasememes (i.e. metaphors) generally depend on 
empirical data to make intelligible objects lucid to those existing in the phenomenal realm. For 
example, with respect to the judgment, “God is a rock,” a sensible object which one is able to 
cognize (a rock) is utilized to disclose something previously unknown regarding a supersensible 
object (God).
203 One may thus viably ascertain something about God’s nature by contemplating 
the objective properties of a rock: “All our thinking moves from the world to God, and can never 
move in the opposite direction.”
204 But could thought about God ever disclose to rational 
creatures the ontological nature of a rock? If the phenomenal realm is somewhat analogous to 
God’s essential being, then creation evidently reveals something immanent about the divine. 
Viewed from this perspective, the conceptual movement from world to God (i.e. from finite 
effects to the infinite cause) rather than from God to world certainly seems to be tenable 
(Romans 1:20; Hebrews 3:4). The implied reversibility formula regarding metaphors accordingly 
does not seem applicable in this case.
205 The relations spoken of in the utterance “God is a rock” 
are asymmetrical (not convertible); the inherent nature of the relations (God: rock) evidently 
accounts for their asymmetry.
 206 
In view of the observations made concerning implied reversibility, it seems that we can 
suggest that the principle of unidirectionality (i.e. extensions in metaphoric contructs are one-
directional) probably applies to th
 
ite, Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion, 
3 (
rine Mowry Lacugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San 
Fra
es that it is “surely false” (at the level of the linguistic expression of similarities) to 
ma
202 Rhetorica 1407a. 
203 Brian Hebblethwa
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 59-60. 
204 Piet Schoonenberg quoted in Catha
ncisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), 218. 
205 Arendt, Judging, 165. 
206 George A. Miller argu
intain that just because A is similar to B, B must always be similar to A. This is especially the case where “the 
linguistic expression of similarities” are under consideration. See “Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors” in 
Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 214-215.                                            
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the ger
mena, there would be 
“no bri
                                                
mane relations mentioned in the utterance. Yet, whether the principle is applicable to this 
declarative sentence or not, Arendt ostensibly construes Aristotle’s theory of metaphor 
sympathetically when she indicates that his focus is posited relations, not abstract or concrete 
objects as such.
207 Her suggestion that metaphors disclose supersensible objects properly 
belonging to the intelligible realm is also worthy of further reflection, especially in view of the 
fact that this study is concerned with possible transcendent objects of the intellect. The next 
paragraph thus discusses metaphor in relation to the noetic realm of being. 
Arendt insists that speculative thought only reveals itself by means of metaphors.
208 
Metaphoric speech bridges the gulf that allegedly demarcates noetic processes from the realm of 
sensible objects.
209 Without metasememes to rhetorically maneuver pheno
dge whereby to cross from the minor truth of the seen to the major truth of the unseen” or 
vice versa.
210 Arendt therefore contends that metaphors revert the contemplative intellect back 
towards the sensible realm so that the contemplative intellect can disclose its hitherto wholly 
noetic activities to rational datives of manifestation (i.e. centers of awareness) existing in the 
phenomenal realm of appearances.
211 Based on her reading of Aristotle and Kant, Arendt prefers 
to associate “metaphor” with “the transition from one existential state, that of thinking, to 
another, that of being an appearance among appearances.”
212 She postulates that abstract relata 
forming metasememic constructs allow thought concealed to become thought revealed. That is to 





hy Do We Speak Metaphorically: Reflections on the Functions of Metaphor in 
Dis
n, Semantics, 215-216. He categorizes 
me
207 Examples of abstracta are numbers, sets, propositions or properties that bear no causal rel
crete entities or to other abstracta. Concrete objects (on the other hand) stand in a causal relation to other 
entities. God, angels, rocks and chairs (in this restricted sense) are concreta. They stand in a cause-effect 
relationship to cosmic entities. However, abstract objects are causally inefficacious (Copan and Craig, Creation out 
of Nothing, 168-170). 
208 Arendt, Thinking
209 Cristina Cacciari, “W
course and Reasoning” in Figurative Language and Thought, 121-122. 
210 Ernest Fenollosa quoted in Arendt, Thinking, 106. See Ullman
taphors into four groups, one of which is metaphors that “translate abstract experiences into concrete terms.” The 
other groups are anthropomorphic metaphors (“the two lungs of the church”), animal metaphors (“All men are 
dogs”) and synaesthetic metaphors (“He has such a warm voice”). 
211 Arendt, Thinking, 106. 
212 Ibid.                                            
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Black formulated his interactive metaphorology during the mid-1950s, whereby he suggested 
that metaphors create new mea ehicle by means of interacting 
concepts.
215 Black insisted that resemblances associated with the tenor and vehicle do not exist 
                                                
level of existence by positing metaphors that stand in analogical relation to one another.
213 
Arendt’s reading of Aristotle’s substitution theory through a Kantian-Heideggerian template 
probably explains the uniqueness of her construal. This particular approach to substitution theory 
provides a logical basis for the view that metaphor is the sine qua non of theolinguistics. Without 
rational creatures deploying metaphors that are relationally proportionate to one another, it 
would probably be factually impossible to bridge the chasm that evidently subsists between the 
seen (= creatures) and the unseen (= God), the sensible and the intelligible. 
The paragraphs above imply that substitution theory, while having a limited scope, does 
have some relevance for theolinguistics. In order for concepts regarding God to be 
communicated, it seems that rational creatures have no recourse but to 
y in their discourse regarding God. However, one weakness of substitution theory is its 
emphasis on word-level phenomena since it appears to claim that metaphors are substitutes for 
more precise, but less ornate terms. Yet, metaphors do not only decorate sentential locutions; 
they inform, elucidate or bridge otherwise complicated notions.
214 But a modified substitution 
theory has been influential since Aristotle. Additionally, Max Black has developed the 
interaction theory of metaphor that will be discussed in section E which represents an advance in 
our thought concerning metaphors. 
 
E.  Interactionism 
nings between tenor and v
prior to tenor-vehicle interaction; notional similarity is a result of the interplay that occurs 
 
3. 





ities; a view that has been questioned by contemporary theorists (Zimany, Vehicle for God, 53). 
215 See Max Black, “More about Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, 37; Kittay, Metaphor, 13                                           
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 as “Man is a wolf” create 
                                                
between two conceptual subjects.
216 Black modified the work of Richards by defining the tenor 
as the “primary subject” in contrast to the term “principal subject.”
217 On the other hand, he 
conceived “vehicle” in terms of the “secondary subject” as opposed to Richards’ “subsidiary 
subject.”
218 Black later maintained that metaphors systematize one’s view of the primary subject 
in relation to the secondary subject: the latter functions as a conceptual lens for the former.
219 
The two subjects (primary and secondary) are not denotational objects but connotational notions; 
they are intensional in nature rather than extensional.
220 Black contends that metaphor as such 
thus involves contemplating a primary notional subject through a secondary notional subject and 
discovering possible incongruities or similarities by means of these hitherto disparate concepts 
(e.g. “Man is a wolf”). Consequently, one recognizes a metaphorical construct by observing the 
contradiction that arises between two conceptual subjects (“man” and “wolf”) interacting with 
one another.
221 Not only do the individual concepts in Black’s model interact or create new 
meaning, however, they both emphasize and suppress certain ideas. For instance, when a speaker 
utters the locution “Man is a wolf,” the supposed ferocity of wolves is made prominent, whereas 
the altruism commonly manifested among wolves is suppressed.
222  
Another salient characteristic of Black’s metaphorology is his theory of associated 
commonplaces (e;ndo,xa).
223 Black insists that metaphors such
 
216 See Dille, Mixing Metaphors, 6-7; Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy 
(Ith
s and Metaphors, 37. 
j, A Study of Metaphor, 79; Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell, 
Me rstanding (Texas Christian University Press, 
For
sume the linguistic-grammatical structure “Subject-Predicate,” but the logical-grammatical 
stru
, 41-42; Stienstra, YHWH is the Husband, 22; Kittay, Metaphor, 31, 
Mo
aca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 25-47. 
217 Kjärgaard, Metaphor and Parable, 84-86. 
218 Dille, Mixing Metaphors, 6; Black, Model
219 Stienstra, YHWH is the Husband, 24; Mooi
taphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Unde
t Worth, 1984) 104. 
220 Kjärgaard (Metaphor and Parable, 86-87) clarifies Black’s strategy by explaining that he believes metaphors 
of the form “A is B” as
cture “Subject1-Subject2- (Predicate2).” Therefore, from a logical-grammatical standpoint, one is able to 
reconstruct the metaphor “Man is a wolf” thus: (1) primary subject, (2) secondary subject, (3) secondary predicate 
which alludes to a system of “associated commonplaces” or e;ndo,xa. Black holds that the secondary predicate 
represents systemic e;ndo,xa implied by the secondary subject. 
221 van Nappen in Boeve, God-talk, 97. 
222 Stienstra, YHWH is the Husband, 23. 
223 Max Black, Models and Metaphors
oij, A Study of Metaphor, 79.                                            
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g by virtue of the qualities appended to a wolf (the secondary subject).
224 The associated 
commonplaces that the metaphor evokes do not have to be factual, only readily evoked in a 
particular culture.
225 Therefore, Dille maintains that one needs to possess knowledge of cultural 
presuppositions that obtained in the ancient near East respecting childbirth or parenting to 
understand specific OT metaphors.
226 Preapprehensions that communicative agents hold in 
common facilitate recognition of that which is metaphorical.
227 Consequently, hearing the word 
“father” in a determinate setting generally evokes particular experiences or associations, whether 
these commonplaces are positive or negative, representative or non-representative of a given 
actual state of affairs.
228 Moreover, the noetic association of commonplaces is evidently bi-
directional.
229 The proposition “Man is a wolf” not only calls to mind culturally perceived 
attributes of a wolf; it also evokes properties commonly imputed to the generic subject “man.”
230 
Black’s associated commonplaces fundamentally amount to Aristotelian e;ndo,xa or “current 
opinions shared by members of a certain speech-community.” 
231  
Black also distinguishes between the focus and the frame of a metaphor.
232 The focus 
refers to the term in a metaphorical utterance that a speaker or w
applies to a sentential construction (that assumes the form “A is B”) that creates a nexus 
between the primary and secondary subject.
234 Moreover, the frame effectively constitutes the 
focal term’s context.
235 An example of how “focus” and “frame” interact is “The human mind is 
 
4. 
f God, 15; Black, Models and Metaphors, 40. 
pson contends that associations evoked by a term like “father” is based on particular experiences, not 
som
ason that it evidently applies to 




224 Duck, Gender and the Name of God, 15. 
225 Dille, Mixing Metaphors, 2
226 Ibid. 
227 Duck, Gender and the Name o
228 Thom
e idealized or universal concept of paternity. See Promise of the Father, 18-19. 
229 Max Black, Models and Metaphors, 40-44. 
230 Swinburne (Revelation, 47) is somewhat critical of Black’s model for the re
ject-predicate sentential constructions only and
icular metaphorical constructs. Furthermore, not all metaphors assume the syntactical form “S is P.” 
231 See Kittay, Metaphor, 32. Aristotle uses the lexeme e;ndoxoj to oppose what is necessarily true over 
against that which communities or individuals generally accept as factual. Cf. the entry for e;ndoxoj in
232 Gregory W. Dawes, The Body in Question: Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 5:21-
33, Biblical Interpretation Series, volume 30 (Leiden and Boston: 1998), 28-29. 
233 Ibid. See Max Black, “More about Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, 28. 
234 See Gerhart and Russell, Metaphoric Process, 104; Dawes, Body in Quest
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ommunicative agent are direct or indirect, which ones are metaphorical 
and wh
, prefers to portray metaphor as “that figure of speech 
whereb
    
a lethal weapon.” The noun phrase “lethal weapon” is the focus while “the human mind” (in this 
context) constitutes the frame.
236 The amalgamation of focus and frame is what comprises a 
metaphor for Black.
237  
Being aware of the commonplaces associated with metaphors assists one in discerning 
which speech acts of a c
ich are literal. Yet, Black issues a caveat with regard to metaphoric constructs. He 
ultimately thinks that an indefeasible diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity does not—probably 
cannot—exist: “Every criterion for a metaphor’s presence, however plausible, is defeasible in 
special circumstances.”
238 Nevertheless, Black seems to believe that associated commonplaces 
function as suitable criteria for determining latent metaphoricity in sentential locutions. While an 
indefeasible criterion for determining the presence of metaphoricity evidently does not exist, 
employing the concept of associated commonplaces may provide an effective but fallible tool for 
ascertaining metaphorical speech acts. 
The present discussion reveals that master tropes (i.e. metaphors) can be defined in 
various ways.
239 Soskice, for instance
y we speak about one thing in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another.”
240 
Hence, she emphasizes the lingual nature of metaphor, characterizing it as a “figure of speech” 
that involves discoursing about one entity in ways suggestive of another entity (e.g. “YHWH is 
my shepherd”). Arendt, on the other hand, thinks that metasememes make veiled cogitation 
accessible to the phenomenal realm, so that thought is capable of functioning as an appearance in 
the midst of sensory phenomena. Nonetheless, the definition most critical for this study is that 
which Aristotle ascribes to metaphora: “a transferring to one word or name the sense of 
another.”
241 Similarly, Cicero conceives the word “metaphor” in terms of verbi translatio (a 
                                             
236 Using Max Black’s schema, one  f  could ormulate the metaphoric construction thus: SSP. 
or,” in Metaphor and Thought, 36. 
eek:  A Survey of Basic Concepts and 
Ap
e, 15. 
237 Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, 87. 
238 Max Black, “More about Metaph
239 David A. Black, Linguistics for Students of New Testament Gr
plications (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 135. 
240 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Languag
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In De oratore 3.152-155, adorned vocabulary by 
pressing into service archaic words, neologisms and metaphors. He recounts that it was the 
states that rustics customarily have availed themselves of tropic figures.
246 
He accordingly indicates that metaphor is a fundamental aspect of human experience; all rational 
                                                
linguistic sign that undergoes change respecting sense or reference).
242 One can understand this 
point by analyzing his instructions concerning literary devices, vocabulary, style and syntax. The 
directives contained in De oratore actually elucidate classical metaphor theory by illuminating 
the manner in which some ancient rhetoricians construed metaphora. Moreover, Cicero 
facilitates apprehension of the theoretical concepts possibly utilized by Lactantius as the latter 
endeavored to systematize his thoughts about God the Father. 
 
F.  Metaphor in Cicero and L
 Cicero exhorts orators to embellish otherwise un
inherent poverty or deficiency of language, which originally caused agents of discourse to 
employ metaphors with a certain degree of liberality (quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et 
angustiis).
243 However, skilled orators ulteriorly began to wield metaphors “for the sake of 
entertainment” or pleasure (sic verbi translatio institua est inopiae causa,  frequentata 
delectationis).
244 Employing metaphors thus became a form of rhetorical ornamentation in the 
classical tradition which had the explicit goal of training rhetoricians to speak 
extemporaneously.
245 
Not only have those who specialize in the art of oratory used metaphors for literary 
effect, but Cicero also 
 
ratoria 8.25) also speaks of metaphors in the following way: “We 
bor
 Stanford, Greek Metaphor, 35. 
 this study. 
 rustici dicunt (De oratore 3.155). 
242 De oratore 3.155. Quintilian (Institutio o
row figures and metaphors from the most decadent poets, and regard it as a real sign of genius that it should 
require a genius to understand our meaning” (A corruptissimo quoque poetarum figures seu translations mutuamur, 
tum demum ingeniosi scilicet, si ad intelligendos nos opus sit ingenio). See The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, 
trans. Harold Edgeworth Butler, 4 volumes (London: W. Heinemann, 1921), 3:190-191. Cf. Soskice, Metaphor and 
Religious Language, 6-7.  
243 Kittay, Metaphor, 1;
244 De oratore 3.155. 
245 See Appendix A in
246 Cicero recounts: Nam . . . etiam                                           
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creatur
 declamatory speech to avail themselves of metasememes frequently (ut 
transla
es employ tropes to communicate ideas with clarity or distinctness.
247 Metaphors (by 
means of transferred significations) evidently accomplish what “proper terminology” (verbo 
proprio) cannot.
248 Metaphoric figures of speech assert relational similarities between two 
otherwise disparately structured notions such as “wolf” and “man.”
249 Cicero aptly states that 
one may consider metaphoric speech “a sort of [linguistic] borrowing” (hae translations quasi 
mutations sunt).
250 By virtue of rhetorical devices, communicative agents are able to speak in an 
unequivocal manner. Consequently, metaphors have the effect of disambiguating common or 
“proper” speech.
251 
It is clear that Cicero is faithfully preserving the antecedent thought of Aristotle, namely, 
“It is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh.”
252 He fittingly exhorts those 
trained in the art of
tis utamur frequenter).
253 But while the classical account of metaphoricity emphasizes the 
substitution of one term for another term or concept, it would probably be less than accurate to 
characterize the theories of Aristotle or Cicero as substitution metaphorologies.
254 Aristotle 
seems to imply that rational agents cannot think without the use of metaphors.
255 Cicero also 
maintains that metaphors—in addition to ornamenting human speech or transferring conceptual 
terms, names or genera—serve to illuminate human concepts expressed in discourse.
256 It 
                                                 
247 Stanford, Greek Metaphor, 36. 
248 Metaphors sometimes function as tools of communication. See Thomas G. Sticht, “Educational Uses of 
Me
understood in a proper light, it “is a lens through which we see 
thin iss.” See The Language and Imagery of the Bible (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
198 akoff and Johnson also contend that metaphor is useful for partially comprehending that which is 
inc
8-129; Soskice, Metaphor 
and
tes that “an essentially cognitive view of metaphor as the substitution in discourse of one 
ide
iscourse, Sather Classical Lectures, volume 55 (Berkeley: University of California 
Pre
taphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, 475-485. 
249 De oratore 3.155-156. 
250 Ibid. 
251 George Caird argues that when metaphor is 
gs we would otherwise m
0), xxiv. L
apable of being comprehended exhaustively, namely, transrational phenomena such as human feelings or 
aesthetic experiences. Metaphor is imaginative rationality (Metaphors We Live By, 193). 
252 Poetica 22.1459a5-8. See McCall, Ancient Rhetorical Theories, 50. 
253 De oratore 3.201. 
254 Contra Feyaerts and Boeve, God-talk, 7. See Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 12
 Religious Language, 10-14. 
255 Averil Cameron no
a for another to produce new understanding” occurs in Aristotle. See Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: 
The Development of Christian D
ss, 1991), 9. 
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8 His formal training in rhetoric and copious quotes alluding to Cicero indicate 
that Ci
ly human experience into a conceptual domain, which by definition is a Gestalt.
262 
The di
appears that even persons who are untutored in the science of public discourse use metasememes 
to communicate notions that matter-of-fact terminology is simply unable to convey. Therefore, 
both the urbane and the rustic utilize metaphors to make difficult concepts intelligible to other 
phatic agents.
257 
Lactantius undoubtedly possessed an intimate knowledge of Ciceronian 
metaphorology.
25
cero is Lactantius’ “principal dialogue partner”; his works evidently provided Lactantius 
with rhetorical tools to defend the Christian faith.
259 It is therefore with good reason that 
Renaissance humanists speak of Lactantius as the Christian Cicero.
260 Even more significantly, it 
appears that one tentatively can propose that Lactantius ostensibly uses “Father” as a structural 
metaphor within an apologetico-rhetorical context.
261 Nevertheless, how does this paternal trope 
function as a trope in Christian discourse? What elements of the term allow one to describe it as 
“structural”? 
The referring expression “Father” is possibly structural in that it cohesively organizes an 
aspect of bodi
vine title also is structural for the reason that it constitutes a foundational Christian 
symbol.
263 Hence, Roland Frye implies that the theological import conveyed by “Father” could 
                                                 
257 Ibid. 3.155. 
 an awareness of metaphor as a rhetorical tool: “In the two second areas of north and 
sou taphor of life and death [figura vitae ac mortis], because life depends on warmth but cold is the 
con
ress, 2000), 655; Digeser, Making, 
57. 
stian Poets (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 27. 
ische Gnosis, 232-233. 
anguage,” in Speaking the 
Christian God, 42). They are also foundational symbols, word pictures or images that ground Christian belief. 
258 Lactantius demonstrates
th there is a me
text of death” (DI 2.9.10). Cf. Ibid. 4.17.15. The Latin figura may denote: “type, example, allegory; allegorical 
meaning” (Souter, Glossary of Later Latin, 147). The term may also refer to a figure of speech or trope (Institutio 
oratoria 8.25).  See Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from 
Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 118. 
259 See Frances Young, “Christianity,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. 
Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University P
260 See R. M. Ogilvie, The Library of Lactantius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 69; Carolinne White, Early 
Chri
261 See Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 223; Wlosok, Laktanz und die philosoph
262 Kövecses, Metaphor, 33-34.   
263 Father and Son are structural metaphors (Frye, “Language for God and Feminist L                                           
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since this study will use the 
theory 
salience of context in metaphor recognition. Therefore, while investigating the performative 
    
become vacuous, if Christians decide to repudiate this structural metasememe.
264 The paternal 
designation adumbrates God’s beneficences or how he providentially relates to his worshipers: 
“Fatherhood is strictly a symbol or metaphor for God’s relationship to his people.”
265 Specific 
remarks in Divinae institutiones indicate that Lactantius views “Father” as a structural metaphor 
in that it is a foundational Christian symbol. This position will be demonstrated fully in 
subsequent chapters of this study. However, before outlining the Lactantian view of God the 
Father, this work will undertake an examination of context and its role vis-à-vis metaphor. The 
present chapter has already discussed four prominent metaphorologies. It will now review and 
elucidate speech-act theory in the capacity of a contemporary metaphorology; in particular, the 
speech-act theories espoused by Searle and Austin will be explored.  
Apprehending the intricacies of speech-act thought is crucial 
to proffer a diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity. In addition, speech-act theory will be 
employed to clarify the function of “context” as it relates to phatic agents. Traditionally, 
metaphor theorists have taken two distinct approaches to formulating diagnostic criteria for 
metaphor recognition. These well-defined methods respectively have been (a) the pragmatic and 
(b) the semantic approaches to language. However, Kittay indicates that the two purportedly 
divergent methods are actually complementary relations because it seems hard to formulate 
diagnostic criteria for metaphoricity without appealing to both semantic (the meaning of 
linguistic signs in the abstract) and pragmatic (the meaning of linguistic signs in context of 
discourse) factors.
266 The expression “pragmatics” has reference to non-linguistic factors that 
elucidate the implied meaning of a locutionary construct.
267 Speech act theory tends to 
emphasize pragmaticity over against semanticity; it stresses the context of discourse or 
utterance.
268 Speech act theory underscores pragmatic aspects of discourse by emphasizing the 
                                             
264 Ibid. 
265 Hammerton-Kelly quoted in Speaking the Christian God, 88.   
266 Kittay, Metaphor, 10-11. 
ragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
199 Pragmatics (Oxford and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
267 Accessible introductions to this subject include George Yule, P
6), 3-4; Stephen C. Levinson, 
268 Strictly speaking, speech act theory is “a hybrid” since it is partly semantic and partly pragmatic (Katz, 
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G. Context and the Detection of Metaphorical Employment 
 
Albert Katz phoricity in 
discourse: (1) predicative violations of category me bership;
269 (2) unusual thematic usages of 
s and indexical terms (e.g. “I,” “he,” “she,” “here,” 
“there”
nature of speech, this study will analyze the role that “context” plays in the cognitive act of 
recognizing a metaphor. Initially, however, the following section (G) will disambiguate the 
lexical import of “context” as this terminology is employed in the present investigation. 
 
 
 identifies a number of “heuristic cues” that signal the presence of meta
m
verbs; (3) discourse contexts.
270 This section will be preoccupied with the role that discourse 
contexts play in the act of recognizing metaphoric speech. Other studies on metaphor theory also 
accentuate the saliency of context in connection with metaphor recognition.
271 One relatively 
informative analysis of context-dependency and metaphor is Josef Stern’s Metaphor in 
Context.
272 Stern’s work lucidly accounts for the role that context plays in the cognitive detection 
of metaphorical tropes. The next two paragraphs consequently discuss his theory of the 
relationship between metaphor and context. 
Stern posits a semantic account of metaphors. His study proposes that there is a point of 
similarity between metaphors, demonstrative
 and “this”). Indexicals deictically reference specific linguistic objects in varied speech 
contexts; it appears that both indexicals and metaphors are context-dependent.
273 Stern thus 
                                                 
269 Examples include “My car is a lemon” or “YHWH is a husband.” 
270 Albert N. Katz, et al. Figurative Language and Thought (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 22. 
ambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 10-11. 
ome philosophers talk about indexicals in 
term
“present,” “here,” and “now”). See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(ht icals/); Yule, Pragmatics, 9; William F. Hanks, “The Indexical Ground of 
De and Charles Goodwin (Cambridge, UK: 
Ca
271 See Kittay, Metaphor, 101-104. 
272 Metaphor in Context (C
273 Deictic expressions usually “point” by means of lingual forms. S
s of true demonstratives (“he,” “she,” “his,” “her,” and “that”) and pure indexicals (“I,” “today,” “tomorrow,” 
“actual,” 
tp://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/index
ictic Reference” in Rethinking Context, ed. Alessandro Duranti 
mbridge University Press, 1992), 43. Hanks illustrates the characteristic features of deictic expressions (i.e. 
indexicals) by appealing to examples such as “here” or “over there.” Moreover, since the referent (that toward which 
an indexical points) of a deictic form can change with the context (as is the case with “I” and “over there”), he points                                            
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essential to acquire a deeper understanding of the term “context” with respect to the act of 
implicitly acknowledges that there also seems to be a pragmatic element involved in 
metaphorical constructs.
274 Two such pragmatic features of discourse are the Sitz-im-Leben (vital 
life situation) and the “koinonoetic context” (a shared social situation) of phatic agents.
275 
Knowledge of how language functions in its real-life setting over against a background of shared 
assumptions or beliefs (koinonoetic context) is therefore crucial for the detection of 
metaphoricity; semantic and pragmatic competences are both integral aspects of formulating a 
diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity.
276  
Stern rigorously develops his theoretical account of metaphor and context-dependency by 
juxtaposing deictic expressions and metaphors.
277 He subsequently alludes to the significance of 
being familiar with the mechanics of a particular lexis and its multi-tiered discourse features: 
“Metaphors do not function in isolation. They exist in both a rhetorical context and a cultural 
context.”
278 Consequently, it would seem to follow that the detection or recognition of 
metaphorical locutions requires intimate knowledge of a specific koinonoetic environment or 
vital life situation; metaphors (if they are semantic) are not only semantic.
279 Precisely speaking, 
being conversant with determinate social, cognitive, political, rhetorical, intellectual or religious 
contexts (inter alia) should enable a communicative agent to discern whether a speaker or author 
belonging to a given phatic community is employing metaphorical speech. It is consequently 
metaphor recognition. One tool that seems to elucidate the role of context in metaphor 
                                                                                                                                                             
out that indexicals are also termed “shifters.” For a similar account of indexicals and a reference to “shifters,” see 
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 13. 
274 Stern, Metaphor in Context, 113-116; Antonio Calcagno, “Metaphor in Context” (Book Review) RMeta 55.1 
(2001): 162-164.  
275 Young, Intermediate New Testament Greek, 264. 
276 Ibid. Swinburne, Revelation, 43.       
277 Metaphor in Context, 13-14. 
278 Ibid. 
279 See Wayne C. Booth, Metaphor as Rhetoric,” in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), 51-53; Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, 229. Contexts help signal metaphors (Kövecses, 
Metaphor, 6). Swinburne also insists that “metaphorical senses” are created by contexts (Revelation, 157). For 
example, the Nicene Creed’s expression “light from light” (fw/j evk fwto,j) is metaphorical; the Son of 
God is not the type of light that is composed of waves and particles (Ibid). Geir Hellemo further demonstrates how 
the post-Nicenes continually attempted to elucidate the metaphor “light from light.” See Adventus Domini: 
Eschatological Thought in 4th-Century Apses and Catecheses (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 35-37.                                            
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objective; the latter, conversely, are not dependent on individual or corporate 
(= coll
recognition is the form of speech-act theory formulated by John Searle. Searle makes distinctions 
between institutional facts, brute facts and constitutive rules. His distinctions seem to illuminate 
the term “context.” The following paragraphs will fittingly examine the speech act concepts 
posited by Searle. 
Institutional facts differ from brute facts in that the former are ontologically subjective, 
but sociologically 
ective or shared) intentionality for their existence.
280 They appear to be ontologically 
objective: “Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence.”
281 Searle defines facts 
(brute or institutional) as “conditions in the world that satisfy the truth conditions expressed by 
statements.”
282 He construes “facts” as truth makers. Accordingly, the atomic weight of 
hydrogen is a brute fact that objectively satisfies certain truth conditions related to the 
proposition “The atomic weight of hydrogen is 1” while “These loaves on the table are 
showbread” constitutes an assertion that is institutionally factual.
283 More specifically, the 
utterance regarding showbread is only a genuine datum, Searle would probably insist, if and only 
if a determinate social group has invested certain loaves of bread on a particular table with a 
designated status-function “showbread.”
284 Correspondingly, the rules associated with games 
like cricket, football, basketball, and golf apparently are the result of corporate intentionality: 
discourse communities valorize these games by means of “we-intentions.” Vanhoozer thus 
                                                 
280 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 27. Searle derives the language of 
“brute facts” from Elizabeth Anscombe. His delineation of such facts are evidently limited to physical mind-
independent truth makers. 
281 Ibid. 2. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 250; Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human 
Nature (New York: Viking, 2002), 65. 
282 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 211. 
283 The present author is not suggesting that the proposition concerning showbread is only an institutional fact. 
But, at the very least, the claim regarding showbread is an institutional fact. If Judaism (along with its arrangements 
for worship or atonement) had never existed, then “showbread” (as it is currently known) would never have existed. 
Showbread (i.e. the bread of presence) is alluded to in Exodus 25:30; 40:22-23; Leviticus 24:5; 1 Samuel 21:5-6; 
Hebrews 9:1-5. For its significance in the ancient tabernacle or temple life, see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23-27: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible (New York and London: Doubleday, 2000), 
3B:2091-2101; Martin Noth, Leviticus: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), 176-178. 
284 See Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 2; idem, “Reality and Social Construction,” Anthropological 
Theory 6.1 (2006): 81-88.                                            
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iety. Constitutive regulations both undergird and make it possible for institutional 
facts to
stitutability of coextensive 
                                                
contends that sports games are products of human valorization.
285 Their respective status-
functions depend on the representational system of a given speech community and its collective 
intentionality. As such, they are institutional facts; institutional facts are a particular subset of 
social facts.
286 
Searle defines “constitutive rules” in terms of procedures that allow determinate activities 
to obtain in soc
 subsist. The primary function of constitutive rules is to ensure “X counts as Y in context 
C.”
287 Of course, Searle qualifies the conditions under which X counts as Y in C; he believes that 
one factor determining the status-function of X is corporate intentionality or we-intentions.
288 
Hence, employing Searle’s reasoning, immersion or sprinkling could not count as baptism nor 
could the wearing of rings count as an outward sign of marriage nor could a kiss count as a 
greeting (or departure symbol) without constitutive rules (Ruth 1:9; Psalm 2:12; 1 Corinthians 
16:20; 1 Thessalonians 5:26).
289 Alternatively, a kiss could not count as an act of betrayal unless 
constitutive rules undergirded institutional facts (Matthew 26:48-50). If rules (against a 
background of shared assumptions) did not make it possible for X to count as Y in C, the 
aforementioned acts would not bear their respective significations.  
Searle makes another distinction between “rules” and “conventions.” Conventions are 
arbitrary social norms, whereas rules do not “permit of sub
 
285 See Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 244-245. 
286 For a sustained critique of Searle’s notion of institutional facts, see Alex Viskovatoff’s “Searle, Rationality, 
and Social Reality,” in John Searle’s Ideas about Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions, ed. 
David R. Koepsell and Laurence S. Moss (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 7-44. Viskovatoff argues that the 
collective acceptance of institutions by rational agents is not required in order for institutional facts to exist. 
287 Timothy Ward, Word and Supplement: Speech Acts, Biblical Texts, and the Sufficiency of Scripture (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 79.  
288 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 28, 44; idem, “Reality and Social Construction,” 86-87.     
289 The “holy kiss” referred to by the apostle Paul may have been a liturgical act indicative of received 
forgiveness or a willingness to share in the Lord’s evening meal. See Cleon L. Rogers Jr., Cleon L. Rogers III, and 
Fritz Rienecker, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan 
Pub. House, 1998), 391. In any event, the “holy kiss” probably symbolized love, fellowship and gratitude (Ibid). Cf. 
Athenagoras, Plea for the Christians 32.3. The point most germane for this study is that a social institution (the 
Christian ecclesia in this case) evidently determined that a kiss (X) would count as a “liturgical act” or as a sign of 
love, gratitude and thankfulness (Y) in context C. One could not arbitrarily substitute this symbol without altering 
the particular meaning of the act.                                            
                                                            50        
     
 
express
r presuppositions that one must consider in order to 
discern
ions salva veritate.”
290 Discourse communities cannot by fiat interchange constitutive 
rules (one with another) and expect to retain the identical truth conditions of determinate norms 
since “X counts as Y in C” is not a capricious social convention, but a meaning-bearing 
institutional datum that functions in a specific manner for groups that valorize X, thereby making 
it count as Y in C. For example, language (la langue) is a group phenomenon that functions 
according to the intentionally defined rules of a determinate collective.
291 Phatic communities 
establish whether “X counts as Y in context C” respecting speech (la parole). Locutions such as 
“I now pronounce you man and wife” “I will be there tomorrow” or “God is our rock” count as 
Y in C for the reason that certain social institutions have invested particular sentential constructs 
with fixed significances or values.
292 Moreover, even written morphemes would probably be 
non-signifying marks on an inscriptional surface if it were not for constitutive rules that allow 
particular denotations to supervene on minimal units of meaning (= morphemes).
293 Familiarity 
with the mechanics of such constitutive procedures plays an indispensable role in ascertaining 
the communicative aim of distinct speech acts, even those indirect locutionary enactments that 
deploy metaphorical speech. Discourse agents therefore cannot arbitrarily alter constitutive rules 
without affecting how X counts as Y in C. 
The foregoing exploration indicates that “context” (as this study utilizes it) denotes the 
relevant circumstances, situations, factors o
 when a phatic agent is employing metaphorical locutions.
294 Contexts may be historical, 
linguistic, canonical, social, political, legal, intellectual, cultural or religious.
295 Additionally, 
                                                 
290 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, 28. 
291 The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure demonstrated that there is a fundamental difference between la 
lan act system comprised of signs or codes. It denotes language, which 
is 
 Meaning, 250; Giuseppe Stellardi, Heidegger and Derrida on Philosophy and 
Me erst: Humanity Books, 2000), 52-53. See the definition for “context” proffered 
by 
gue and la parole. La langue refers to an abstr
a means of facilitating communication. Conversely, la parole refers to the articulation or conscription of a 
semiotic arrangement such as language in order to produce a message or communicative messages. Consult 
Saussure’s  Course in General Linguistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 66; D. A. Black, Linguistics, 5; 
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 2-3; Ullmann, Semantics, 19. 
292 Saeed, Semantics, 221. 
293 See Aduersus nationes 1.59. 
294  Vanhoozer,  Is There a
taphor: Imperfect Thought (Amh
C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, et al. in The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1923), 58-59. 
295 See Stern, Metaphor in Context, 22. Brassey (Metaphor, 6-9) argues that metaphors have to be interpreted in                                            
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 with the assistance of speech act theory, a form of 
researc
H. Speech Act Theory 
discourse agents evidently share contexts: they are inherently “koinonoetic.”
296 If one does not 
partake of a given vital context or have intimate familiarity with the constitutive rules of a 
discourse community, it seems that one will have difficulty ascertaining the presence of tropes 
uttered by a speaker. Since phatic groups fundamentally determine which linguistic practices 
constitute verbal acts of metaphoricity, a communicative agent belonging to a phatic group 
usually can detect easily the occurrence of non-complex metaphors in shared phatic situations.
297 
Being familiar with the common presuppositional pool in which an utterance is situated thus 
appears to constitute one strategy for determining whether a given articulation is metaphorical or 
not. Yet, how does this recognition process work in practice? What specific methods does a 
communicative agent need to utilize in order to determine whether a sentential locution (X) is 
counting as a metaphor (Y) in context C?  
Vanhoozer addresses these queries
h that philosophers of language began undertaking in the twentieth century.
298 Speech act 
theory is more concerned with the human enactment
299 of language and less preoccupied with 
lexical semantics (= word meanings).
300 Individual speech-acts may be locutionary, 
perlocutionary, illocutionary, interlocutionary (i.e. a speech-act that one addresses to an 
interlocutor)
301 and direct or indirect.
302 This study will concern itself with perlocutionary, 
illocutionary and indirect speech-acts in particular. Specifically, the following section will 
review Vanhoozer’s analysis of illocutionary, perlocutionary and indirect speech-acts and define 
these respective terms.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
their broader “literary and cultural context.” Not only does “cotext” illuminate metaphorical utterances, but the 
socio-political or religious contexts also facilitates metaphor recognition.  
296 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 250-251; Stern, Metaphor in Context, 117-118. Another expression that 
illuminates the denotation of  “context” is common presuppositional pool. 
297 See Young, Intermediate NT Greek, 265. 
298 But see White, Structure of Metaphor, 186-187, who is highly critical of speech-act theory. 
299 Definition of “human enactment”: to represent in action (i.e. to act out X or Y).   
300 Young, Intermediate NT Greek, 265. 
301 See Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 14-16. 
302 George Yule, The Study of Language: An Introduction (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985),                                            
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John L. Austin began undertaking a for peech act theory approximately 
fifty years ago. The publication in which he introduced nomenclature such as illocution or 
enactin
                                                                                                                                                            
m of research known as s
perlocution was How to Do Things with Words.
303 For Austin, there is a class of utterances that 
either have illocutionary force (i.e. accomplish something in the act of saying) or bring about 
perlocutionary effects.
304 Austin makes a distinction between “illocutions” (classified as 
performatives) and locutions that lack illocutionary force. He refers to the latter as “constatives,” 
although his study argues that the putative distinction between “constatives” and “illocutions” is 
misleading.
305 Austin maintains that all sayings have illocutionary force, which means that they 
are inherently “performative.” However, in what sense are locutions or utterances performative?  
Austin contends that when a phatic agent utters a sentential locution, an action is 
performed.
306 He posits five categories of performatives that illustrate the concept of speech 
g propositional content in designated situations: (1) Verdictives (the act of giving a 
finding or verdict); (2) Exercitives (the act of exercising a power or right); (3) Commissives (the 
act of committing oneself to an action verbally); (4) Behabitives (the act of expressing attitudes 
about social behavior); (5) Expositives (the act of fitting locutions into discourse). These five 
taxonomies supposedly account for the manner in which agents do things with words. 
Nevertheless, speech act theory has developed gradually since its inception. It now seems that 
Austin’s theory contains lacunae that fail to account for a number of performative utterances; 
 
132-133. 
303 How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); How to Do Things with 
Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). References in this 
study will be from the second edition of Austin’s text. 
304 Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, 73. Austin posits a trichotomy comprised of sentential acts (articulating a 
sentence or sentence surrogate), illocutionary acts (uttering sentences that bear a particular content) and 
perlocutionary acts (the locutionary act of producing an effect through a sentence or sentence surrogate). See 
William P. Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 2. 
305 John Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), 17-18. 
306 Austin, How to Do Things, 85-91, 150. Austin refines his definition of “issuing an utterance” by 
distinguishing between a phonetic, phatic and rhetic act (92-93). He characterizes a phonetic act as the production of 
specified utterances or sounds, which he designates “phones.” One performs a phatic act (according to Austin) when 
utilizing certain words that conform to a “certain grammar” with a “certain intonation” (92). Lastly, a rhetic act 
entails uttering a pheme (a product of the phatic act) with a specified sense and reference (Ibid).                                            
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n the two 
concep
e category to which metaphor belongs) as a lingual 
perform
                                                
even he was aware of its inadequacies.
307 Hence, one evidently must turn to Searle for a fuller 
treatment of speech act theory. He not only differentiates an illocution from a perlocution, but 
also distinguishes direct from indirect speech acts, with metaphors being identified as the latter. 
Searle’s classification of illocutionary utterances somewhat diverges from Austin’s taxonomies. 
Nevertheless, his project appears to be an extension of his mentor’s speech act model. 
Searle’s theory distinguishes an utterance’s illocutionary force (F) from its propositional 
content (p).
308  He introduces the symbol F(p) to indicate the distinction betwee
ts. Illocutionary force results from the illocutionary purpose of an utterance and the 
background assumptions that inform it.
309 The locutions “I suggest that you do as I say” and “I 
insist that you do as I say” have the same illocutionary purpose but bear different forces. They 
also have the same content supplied by both that-clauses in each proposition.
310 But each 
locution counts differently in context, C. 
This study has already alluded to the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. 
Searle defines an indirect speech act (th
ance whereby a phatic agent intends “S is R” when uttering, “S is P.”
311 He accordingly 
argues that a sufficient metaphorology should explain how a speaker arrives at “S is R” 
(utterance meaning) from “S is P” (sentence meaning).
312 Nevertheless, some philosophers have 
questioned whether Searle himself actually demonstrates how a communicative agent effectively 
moves from “S is P” to “S is R” by means of an indirect performative. For example, Swinburne 
contends that a metaphorical utterance does not set forth one proposition (“S is P”) while 
intending that something else (“S is R”) is the case. Rather, he urges that a speaker “uses a 
 
307 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 8-9. 
308 Ibid. 1. 
309 Ibid. Compare John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 30-31. 
310 Besides distinguishing between illocutionary force and propositional content, however, Searle taxonomizes 
speech-acts as follows: Assertive (the speaker expresses or commits to the belief that p); Directive (speech-acts that 
try to bring about an action from the hearer); Commissive (an illocutionary act that commits the speaker to “some 
future course of action”); Expressive (an illocutionary act that expresses the psychological state associated with the 
propositional content of a performative) and Declarations (speech-acts that bring about a fit between propositional 
content and reality). See Expression and Meaning, 12-20. 
311 In this example, S = the subject part of the expression, P = the predicate expression of the locution and “S is 
R” refers to the utterance meaning of the speaker (Ibid. 83-84).                                            
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nicative agents embody intentions when they articulate 
meanin
sentence which independent of context would mean one thing” but in a determinate situation 
means “something else.”
313 If Swinburne is correct, then the truth-conditions of a complex 
metaphor and simile are identical. Neither trope says, “S is P”
314 while meaning “S is R.” We 
simply need a context in order to understand a communicative agent’s embodied intention “S is 
P.” Hence, it is probable that the Shakespearean indirect speech act, “Life is a tale told by an 
idiot; full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” has the same truth-condition (i.e. expresses the 
same truth) as “Life is like a tale told by an idiot; full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”
315 
For it is clearly problematic to assert that the truth condition alluded to above differs from 
metaphor to corresponding simile. Accordingly, in the final analysis, Swinburne’s account of 
indirect speech acts that privileges the role of context in association with metaphoric recognition 
may be preferable to Searle’s theory of indirect sentential locutions. Swinburne may better 
account for the phenomenon of metaphor or more adequately explain the illocutionary force of 
the speech act “S is P” within a particular context.
316 However, it is not necessary for this study 
to determine which theory (Searle’s or Swinburne’s) is more adequate. The chief aim of this 
section is to elucidate Searle and Vanhoozer’s manner of conceptualizing indirect speech acts, 
which include metaphors and similes. 
Building on the research of Austin and Searle, Vanhoozer proposes that human utterances 
are intrinsically performative; commu
gful speech to co-phatic agents, whether such acts entail promising,
317 greeting, 
                                                                                                                                                             
312 Ibid. 84-85. 
313 Swinburne, Revelation, 48. 
314 In the case of similes, “S is like P.” 
315 Swinburne, Revelation, 48.   
 believes that Searle’s account of metaphor, as grammatical deviance simply is not feasible 
(Di d Metonymy, 334-335). Appealing to cognitive semantic theory, he reasons that 
me ch to be a deviant form of locution. Second, metaphor is such an integral 
par ptualization of ideas seems impossible without it. Hence, according to 
exp
 one phatic 
age
316 John Taylor
rven and Pörings, Metaphor an
taphor is too pervasive in everyday spee
t of human experience that conce
erientialism, cognitive domains map onto other cognitive domains (Ibid), which implies that the thought of 
grammatical deviance is not an issue in cognitive theory: metaphor is an inherent structure of cognition. 
317 For discussions regarding the inherent conditional nature of promising, see Clyde Pax, The Approach to God 
in the Thought of Gabriel Marcel, 54-56; Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003 [1958]), 44-46. Vanhoozer discuses the illocutionary force associated with making a promise 
(Is There a Meaning, 210). His analysis indicates that the act of making a promise morally obligates
nt to another. In saying, “I hereby promise,” a communicative agent becomes obligated to keep promises made in 
the act of speaking to an interlocutor. One can find a comparable argument in Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 14.                                            
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This investigation has already suggested that speakers and hearers jointly constitute shared 
commanding,
318 exhorting, prognosticating, requesting or metaphoring.
319 Speech acts are 
illocutionary by nature: they constitute ways of doing things with words (i.e. enacting intention 
X or Y verbally). Language thus becomes “a means by which one human person acts in relation 
to other people.”
320 Saying “I do” constitutes an illocutionary speech act; so does “Please take 
out the trash, dear.” Illocution is the agentive performance of discourse or speech. 
While discourse agents commonly enact performatives (Fp) by means of sentential 
locutions, perlocutionary speech acts, on the other hand, are the effects that a discourse agent 
enacts through the medium of discourse.
321 A phatic agent brings about certain effects within an 
interlocutor when utilizing speech that persuades, frightens, motivates, entices, encourages, 
inspires or disheartens a hearer.
322 Moreover, the perlocutionary effects of agentive enunciations 
may be positive, innocuous or adverse.
323 Regardless of the effect, however, that which a phatic 
agent brings about through any given speech act is considered perlocutionary. Therefore, if S 
requests that R close the door, the effect brought about through the illocutionary appeal (i.e. 
propositional force + content) qualifies as being perlocutionary. Receiving an object that one has 
requested may also count as a perlocutionary effect, which is to say that there is possibly causal 
appositeness between S uttering a locution (X) that counts as Y in C and S being granted a 
certain request.
324 Whether there actually is a causal link between the requesting and closing of 
the door, these examples clarify how speech act theorists conceive perlocutionary effects. 
phatic or discourse communities. Furthermore, phatic agents evidently perform with linguistic 
                                                 
318 Austin, How to Do Things, 108-109. 
319 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 209. Wolterstorff (unlike other speech act theorists) argues that one can 
per
ry,” in Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, ed. Moisés 
Sil
; William P. Alston, Philosophy of Language, Prentice-Hall Foundations 
of 
ions on the Claim That God Speaks 
(Ca
form an illocutionary act without saying or writing anything. For instance, he maintains that it is possible to state 
“something” with smoke signals or sequential light-flashes. Furthermore, a communicative agent may designate 
someone else to speak in his or her behalf. These various forms of semiotic enactments indicate that God may also 
do things with words by using some natural language or alternative form of semeia (Divine Discourse, 13).  
320 Ward, Word and Supplement, 13. 
321 V. Philips Long, “The Art of Biblical Histo
va, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 380.   
322 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 18. 
323 Young, Intermediate NT Greek, 265
Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 35. 
324 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflect
mbridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 33, 137.                                            
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signs b
ame the sense of another” (Aristotle), this study will now summarize the findings of the 
present
chapters that focus on the metaphor “Father” in Divinae institutiones. 
y enacting a systemic lexis (la langue) for the purpose of doing X or Y through the 
meaningful deployment of abstract codes.
325 Vanhoozer accordingly states: “All forms of 
meaning are forms of doing.”
326 To intend X is to do X; alternatively, to intend Y is to perform 
Y.
327 The findings of speech act theory presumably merit the reasonable assumption that phatic 
communities are responsible for valorizing particular speech acts or determining how X counts as 
Y in C.
328 The foregoing principle ostensibly encompasses rules for metaphorical utterances since 
spoken or written metasememes are perforce communicative acts: one who verbalizes or writes a 
metasememic construct (M) apparently does something (indirectly) with the articulated 
construct.
329 One supposedly intends P or Q when uttering M. It consequently appears that 
metaphoric recognition operates according to established institutional rules which subsist in a 
determinate societal context.
330 Yet, metaphors undoubtedly are not purely reducible to literal or 
non-metaphoric discourse; they often communicate information that “proper speech” cannot 
express. 
Having submitted a denotation for the classical notion of metaphor, “a transferring to one 
word or n
 chapter. It will submit a tentative diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity based on the five 
metaphorical theories discussed above, then review how one undertakes the task of defining a 
metaphor. However, the emphasis will be on how classical thinkers understand the concept 
“metaphor.” Discerning the semantics of the term will contribute to the elucidation of subsequent 
                                                 
325 The definition of “lexis” here is: the total stock of meaningful and grammatical signs in a language system. 
326 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 230-232. 
327 The word “ intend” (in this context) refers to the act of directing one’s consciousness toward an object. I.e. 
the object of love is one’s beloved, whereas the object of fear might be a mugger or a ferocious bear. Franz Brentano 
and Edmund Husserl popularized the concept of “object directedness.” Contemporary phenomenologists 
consequently are inclined to believe that consciousness is always consciousness of X or Y. Consciousness entails or 
is identical with intentionality. See Lewis R. Gordon, Existentia Africana, 73; Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide 
to Morals (New York: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1993), 158.  
328 The account given in this study goes beyond Searle’s definition of language since he does not mean to include 
full-blown “natural” languages (e.g. Latin, German, French or English) nor does he seem to rely on Saussure’s 
distinction between la langue and la parole. Nevertheless, Searle does state that language (understood as a 
representational system) is an institution. See Construction of Social Reality, 60-61. 
329 See Jerrold M. Sadock, “Figurative Speech and Linguistics,” in Metaphor and Thought, 42. 
330 Dille, Mixing Metaphors, 4.                                            
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1.  A Diagnostic Criterion for Metaphoricity 
As speech act theory implies, an intimate acquaintance with the constitutive rules of particular 
discourse groups allow essary and sufficient 
conditions for metaphoricity. Lynne Cameron states that two such conditions signaling the 
 (e.g. “All 
the wor








s communicative agents to determine both nec
presence of metaphor are conceptual domain incongruity and the potential transfer of meaning.
331 
Domain incongruity markedly occurs between the tenor-vehicle (i.e. conceptual domains A and 
B) of a metasememic construct. However, Cameron notes that any material incoherence 
transpiring by means of tenor-vehicle interaction has the potential to be resolved, if a locution 
truly is metaphorical.
332 Otherwise, a necessary condition for metaphoricity does not obtain. On 
the other hand, a communicative agent who is acquainted  with the constitutive rules of an 
embodied collective normally will be capable of detecting the potential transfer of meaning in an 
uttered or written sentential construct. The agent can discern readily whether articulated 
performatives are metaphorical; whether they function as direct or indirect speech acts. 
Cameron’s proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for metaphoricity suggest that 
communicative agents often discriminate between metaphors and non-figurative speech acts by 
construing the terms in a given linguistic structure as tropic, non-matter-of-fact usages
ld is a stage”) when they perceive a certain element of domain incongruity associated with 
a specific enunciative act. The example above from Shakespeare comparing the world to a stage 
 
331 Cameron and Low, Researching and Applying, 118.                                            
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g in a particular discourse context, then one may recognize a 
distinct
                                                                                                                                                            
demonstrates the manner in which domain incongruity or the potential transfer of lexemic value 
possibly emerges.
333 English speakers usually do not have any major problem ascertaining that 
this speech act is metaphorical; for there is a definite “unfamiliar identity synthesis”
334 asserted in 
the sentence; the elocutionary pairing of “world” and “stage” is putatively incongruent because a 
synthesis occurs between two heterogeneous conceptual domains or sememes (= linguistic units). 
Similarly, when a discourse agent hears the words, “God is the Father of Israel,” or “God is the 
Father of all,” it seems that he or she usually cannot avoid grasping the inaptness that obtains 
between the concepts “God” and “father.” After all, God does not engender children biologically 
nor does the Father have a non-figurative wife or lover with whom he generates literal progeny 
(Divinae institutiones 4.13).
335 Yet, humanly speaking, “father” (in standard discourse) primarily 
signifies a biological male parent.
336 Domain incongruity consequently obtains in this case, but it 
is resolvable; necessary or sufficient conditions for metaphoricity appear to exist in association 
with this specific trope or domain. 
One evidently can detect metaphoricity by becoming familiar with the communicative 
rules of a specific discourse group. Subsequently, when one identifies domain incongruity or a 
potential transfer of lexical meanin
 locution as an indirect speech act. Detecting metaphorical speech, however, requires a 
degree of fluency with an abstract language and knowledge of its situational relevance (i.e. a 
speaker must possess both semantic and pragmatic competence). It appears that an adequate 
diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity hinges on these two factors. Additionally, the recognition 
of metaphoricity involves being au fait with the embodied intention of a speaker or community 
 
332 Ibid. 
333 Cameron and Low, Researching and Applying, 118. 
334 Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, 227-228. 
335 Macky, Centrality of Metaphors, 78. Sandra M. Schneiders considers it “literally absurd to say that God is our 
father.” See Women and the Word: The Gender of God in the New Testament and the Spirituality of Women, 1986 
Madeleva Lecture in Spirituality (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1986, 25-27). She aptly notes that God 
(according to the Christian tradition) does not engender his figurative children by means of sexual intercourse with 
females. It might be added that God does not possess a human body, male genitalia or male hormones either. In any 
event, Schneiders concludes that Father is a metaphor for God that preserves the dialectical tension between “is” 
(the affirmation) and “is not” (the negative qualifier).                                            
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here are a number of ways that one can define “metaphor.” Cognitive semantic theory suggests 
that metaphors are c ience, while substitution 
theory proposes that metaphors are (deviant) tropes or figures of speech. Speech act thought also 
                                                                                                                                                            
of speakers. What is a speaker or writer endeavoring to do with a given performative? What do 
the pragmatic (speaker intended meaning) factors of a given utterance suggest? For instance, the 
proposition “Stephen fell asleep” could refer to literal somnolence. However, a consideration of 
the speaker or writer’s embodied intention might indicate that literal slumber is not being 
referenced in the case of Stephen (Acts 7:60). The literary context (i.e. cotext) of the proposition 
“Stephen fell asleep” might indicate that “sleep” is a metaphor for death (John 11:11-14; Acts 
13:36; 1 Thessalonians 4:13-15).
337 Moreover, fluency with the presuppositional pool of ancient 
Greek communicative agents and other related texts (i.e. intertextuality) could assist modern 
interpreters of ancient speech acts to sympathetically construe locutions that might seem vague at 
first. Hence, the example from Acts possibly illustrates how context determinately functions in 
the recognition of metaphoric speech. 
 
2.  A Classical Definition for Metaphor 
T
onceptual domains, which account for bodily exper
construes metaphors in terms of propositional locutions, whereas interactionism uses tenor-
vehicle language to frame metaphors as associated concepts influencing one another. While it 
may not be possible to define the term adequately or definitively, what is germane for this study 
is the classical definition of “metaphor” which Lactantius would have known from reading 
Cicero (De oratore 3.152-155). It seems that Lactantius’ working definition of metaphor is “a 
 
336 OED (5:758) notes that the English term “father” primarily refers to “one by whom a child is or has been 
begotten, a male parent” or the nearest male ancestor. When one employs the term “father” to speak of one who 
originates or calls X or Y into being, one is using “father” in a figurative manner (Ibid. 5:759). 
337 See the entries for koima,w in LSJ,  BDAG and L-N. Conversely, Aaron cites an expression from 
Aristophanes’ play The Frogs (“For what is death but an eternal sleep”) to illustrate the opaque nature of utterances 
that seem difficult to categorize as literal or metaphorical. He suggests that there is no good reason to interpret 
Aristophanes’ sentential locution metaphorically, nor will any sustained argument demonstrate the locution to be 
tropic rather than literal. In this case, Aaron reasons, the diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity does not fail, but 
actually works if one shares the “speaker’s strategy, belief system and cultural context.” See Biblical Ambiguities: 
Metaphor, Semantics, and Divine Imagery (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 120-121.                                            
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her does not possess a sexed body 
(Numb
                                                
linguistic sort of borrowing” or transference. He probably thought that metaphor involves 
applying a term employed of one object or discourse field to an otherwise disparate object or 
discourse field. Interactionism suggests that metaphors create new meaning by the relation of 
two concepts (“God” and “sun”). Aristotle makes a similar observation by insisting: “it is from 
metaphor that we best get hold of something fresh” (Poetica 22.1459a5-8). Therefore, when 
Lactantius evidently applies the metaphor “Father” to God, he seems to be using it as a 
“conceptual lens” through which one can view the maximally excellent being; in this way, he is 
bringing about “something fresh.” Moreover, it appears that metaphors are as-if constructs for 
Lactantius: they seemingly attribute properties to particular entities without necessarily making 
any metaphysical pronouncements about things-in-themselves. It is this study’s contention that 
Lactantius uses an illustrious metaphor to predicate that God is comparable to an earthly father. 
He evidently is not wielding “Father” as a literal description of God’s immanent being. This 
conclusion is merited in the light of how Lactantius describes God as Father. The following 
chapters of this study will elaborate this point in more detail. 
In conclusion, a number of distinct factors lead Christians to believe that God is not 
literally a father. That is, God does not have the determining or determinate properties that a 
biological male has. In particular, it seems that God the Fat
ers 23:19; Hosea 11:9). But gender-specificity may be rooted in a corpus that is 
determined biologically.
338 Having suggested a diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity, this study 
will now build on the results from the previous analysis respecting the Christian notion of divine 
paternity. It will seek to answer the questions: What do Christians generally mean when they use 
“Father” for God? Is there an implied ontology of gender in the divine appellation “Father”? In 
 
338 Volf thinks that there is no gender specificity in God; God is genderless (Exclusion and Embrace, 172-176). 
See Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 2 for 
similar reasoning on this subject. However, in a private conversation, Dr. Philip Blosser of Lenoir-Rhyne College 
has argued that there is no gender specificity in God because God is not a species. Granted, the etymology for 
“specific” is the Latin specificus or species but a synchronic view of language takes precedence over a diachronic 
account of language. In time, the English word “specific” came to denote “a distinguishing quality or attribute.” 
Hence, when Volf argues that there is no gender specificity in God, he seems to mean that God is genderless in that 
God has no distinguishing quality or characteristic that one can refer to as “gender.” Nothing in God is distinctly 
masculine or feminine. Therefore, while it may be the case that the category “species” is not applicable to God, this 
conceivable fact evidently has little to do with Volf’s comments regarding gender specificity and the divine. His                                            
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the midst of that analysis, the next chapter will probe the latent connotations of paternal imagery 
for Christians.  
 
remarks evidently are based on the synchronic aspects of the term “specific,” not its diachronic facets.                                            
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Chapter 2 
 
Metaphors and Symbols in Christian Discourse 
 
Metaphor stands at the center of Christian lexis. Many ascriptions to God uttered by followers of 
Jesus Christ illustrate how metaphor informs Christian discourse. Whether disciples of Jesus 
address God as the Rock (Deuteronomy 32:4), Friend (James 2:23) or Shepherd (Psalm 23:1), 
metaphor seems to play a prominent role in religious speech or language.
339 Consequently, the 
main purpose of this chapter will be to apprehend what Christians imply when they evoke God as 
Father. First, the centrality of metaphor within the Christian tradition must be demonstrated. 
While the writings of Augustine of Hippo or Thomas Aquinas exhibit the integral nature of 
metaphoric speech in Christianity, the use of metaphors is not limited to these prominent 
medieval thinkers. Averil Cameron has thoroughly analyzed how metaphoricity and rhetoric 
function in ecclesiastical life as a whole. Metaphor, she reasons, is “at the heart of Christian 
language.”
340 The results of Cameron’s sustained attention to the interplay between rhetoric and 
early Christian discourse palpably accord with the literary evidence amassed in a number of 
modern studies that have discerned tropic motifs suffusing the Gospels,
341 Pauline and Petrine 
epistles,
342 Apocalypse of John,
343 Jude’s epistle
344 and the writings that pre-Nicenes 
composed.
345 There is good reason to believe that the literary use of metaphor functioned as an 
 
339 Schneiders, Women and the Word, 26; Brassey, Metaphor, 1; McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 42; Caird, 
The Language and Imagery of the Bible, 18. 
340 Rhetoric of Empire, 58. 
341 Celia M. Deutsch, Lady Wisdom, Jesus and the Sages: Metaphor and Social Context in Matthew’s Gospel 
(Valley Forge, P. A.: Trinity Press International, 1996). 
342 Terrance Callan, “The Style of the Second Letter of Peter,” Biblica 84 (2003): 202-224; David John Williams, 
Paul’s Metaphors: Their Context and Character (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2003); Trevor J. Burke, Family Matters: A 
Socio-Historical Study of Kinship Metaphors in 1 Thessalonians (London and New York: T & T Clark International, 
2003). 
343 Eva Maria Räpple, The Metaphor of the City in the Apocalypse of John, Studies in Biblical  
Literature, volume 4 (New York: Peter Lang, 2004). 
344 Terrence Callan, “Use of the Letter of Jude by the Second Letter of Peter,” Biblica 85 (2004): 42-64. 
345 I. A. H. Combes, Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church: From the New Testament to the 
Beginning of the Fifth Century (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).                                            
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essential component of early Christian lexis; it actually constituted a frontispiece for ancient and 
medieval Christian discourse. 
Augustine (354-430 CE) liberally utilizes metaphorical terminology. The North African 
bishop overtly professes that tropes are indigenous to Christian language. He demonstrates the 
indispensable nature of metasememic terminology for the Christian church by auspiciously citing 
the Hebrew prophets as examples of those who obscured divine truths under the guise of 
figurative speech: “I see, then, that I must say something about the eloquence of the prophets 
also, where many things are concealed under a metaphorical style, which the more completely 
they seem buried under figures of speech, give the greater pleasure when brought to light” 
(Dicendum ergo mihi aliquid esse video et de eloquentia Prophetarum, ubi per tropologiam 
multa obteguntur. Quae quanto magis translatis verbis videntur operiri, tanto magis cum fuerint 
aperta dulcescunt).
346 Even if one assumes that the sacred prophets of antiquity employed 
metaphor as Augustine indicates, namely, to hide divine truths, one still might be inclined to 
ascertain the prophetic rationale for exploiting metaphor in order to shroud divine truth. De 
doctrina Christiana outlines three primary reasons that account for the prophetic deployment of 
metaphor:  
(1) Augustine contends that the Hebrew prophets intentionally obfuscated divine verities 
by means of figurative language in order that the intellects of the godly might be stimulated, and 
the mental faculties of the irreverent might be converted to godliness or excluded from 
perceiving the divine oracles (sive ut ad pietatem convertantur sive ut a mysteriis secludantur, 
animos impiorum utili ac salubri obscuritate dixerunt).
347 God demarcates the impious from the 
pious by using tropes to mollify or harden the demeanor of the impious. Augustine deems the 
overall effect of this literary technique “a useful and wholesome obscurity” (utili ac salubri 
obscuritate).
348 This effect is “useful and wholesome” because it markedly exposes secret 
intentions of the human heart to the omnipotent Judge of all (Hebrews 4:13): it provides a sound 
basis for divine judgment. 
 
346 De doctrina Christiana 4.7.15; PL 34. Compare DI 1.11.24, 30.  
347 De doctrina Christiana 4.8.22; PL 34. 
348 Ibid.                                            
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(2) Bible writers express themselves metaphorically so that God might thereby allow his 
people to share in the celestial glory vouchsafed to consecrated prophets of old. While the 
dignity of Christians apparently does not rival that of the ancient Hebrew seers, Augustine writes 
that it nonetheless approximates the God-given honor bestowed on those inspired 
spokespersons.
349 The inclusion of metaphor in Scripture is what makes it possible for the 
congregation of God to partake of the Hebrew prophets’ divinely bestowed grandeur. A similar 
notion appears in Peter’s first epistle to Christians living in Asia Minor (1 Peter 1:10-12), 
wherein the apostle suggests that the Tanakh (proleptically) was written for Christians.
350 There 
are distinct hermeneutical senses or levels of textual meaning contained in the Tanakh; its 
passages thereby bear especial significance for Christians.  
(3) Augustine insists that metaphor is one literary mechanism that rational creatures 
employ to communicate theistic notions. The tripersonal Godhead putatively transcends the 
power of ordinary dialogue: “The super-eminence of the Godhead surpasses the power of 
customary speech” (De Trinitate 7.4.7).
351 Therefore, Christians must utilize metaphors in 
theological discourse. But Augustine believes that there are three fundamental ways to articulate 
(intelligible) concepts about God. The threefold distinction that he proffers is substantial, relative 
and metaphorical predication.
352 In section A of this chapter, the three Augustinian categories 
will be amplified. That section will also introduce and elucidate  two  Thomist categories of 







349  Ibid. 
350 Paul J. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, Hermeneia Series (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 111-112. Compare 1 
Corinthians 9:8-10. 
351 See Frye, “Language for God and Feminist Language,” 33. 
352  Augustine,  On the Trinity, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. Gareth B. Matthews 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xxxiii.                                            
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A.  Augustinian and Thomistic Predication of the Divine 
 
Aristotle makes an ontological distinction between substances and accidents.
353 Significantly, 
Augustine develops his predicational view of divinity within a Platonic or Aristotelian 
metaphysical framework. For example, the bishop thinks substantia is virtually equivalent to the 
Latin  essentia or Greek ouvsi,a (De Trinitate 5.2.3).
354 God is uniquely “substance” 
(essentia) in that divinity does not exemplify any contingent or non-essential properties (= 
accidents).
355 Almighty God just is his own wisdom, goodness, power, love or mercy (i.e. the 
“simplicity of God”).
356 Divine simplicity means that God is neither composite nor 
mereologically constituted: there is no potentiality in God since deity does not possess any 
parts.
357 Being non-composite, God is not an entity or being constituted of form and matter; h
 
353  Metaphysica  7-9. See Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), 266-267; Werner Marx, The Meaning of Aristotle’s “Ontology” (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1954). 
354 Bray (The Doctrine of God, 167) explains that Augustine preferred to use essentia rather than substantia to 
convey the thought behind the Greek ouvsi,a because it avoids certain difficulties associated with 
u`po,stasij, the Greek equivalent of substantia. Cf. De Trinitate 5. 
355 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (Divine Attributes, 191) define the philosophical term “accident” as a contingent 
property (P) of an entity or thing. E.g. Socrates’ wisdom is a necessary property of Socrates, but his baldness is 
accidental or contingent; Socrates would still be Socrates, even if he were not bald. However, he would not be 
Socrates without his wisdom or risibility. Regarding accidental properties, Augustine writes: “Therefore there is 
nothing accidental in God, because there is nothing changeable or that may be lost” (De Trinitate 5.4.5). See Isaac 
Watts’ concerning accidental modes of being in Logic: The Right Use of Reason in the Inquiry After Truth with a 
Variety of Rules to Guard Against Error in the Affairs of Religion and Human Life, as well as in the Sciences 
(Morgan, P. A.: Soli Deo Gloria, 1996 [1724]), 18-19. 
356 Emil Brunner, Dogmatics I: The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1949), 1:293. See Christopher Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas’ 
Philosophical Theology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 3-5; Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have 
a Nature? The Aquinas Lecture, 1980 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980); Bray, The Doctrine of God, 
94-96; Jay Wesley Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Immutability 
and Simplicity (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003); David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-
Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 26-27 for explications of divine 
simplicity. For a sustained philosophical analysis of God’s ontological uncompoundedness, consult Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz, Divine Attributes, 59-68. 
357 Thomas Aquinas contends: “it is clear there can be no accident in God” (ST I.3.6). Moreover he insists that 
there is no potentiality in God (Ibid). See Frank G. Kirkpatrick, Together Bound: God, History, and the Religious 
Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 35-36; Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 51. 
358 Ibid.                                            
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Of course, the teaching of God’s simplicity (simplicitas Dei) does not fail to encounter its 
own logical problematics.
359 Copan and Craig argue that it “seems patently false” to make the 
assertion that God does not exemplify properties that are objectively distinct from one 
another.
360 The property of being good apparently is objectively distinct from the property of 
being omniscient, just as the property of being omnipotent is not metaphysically identical to the 
abstract property of being omnibenevolent. Moreover, Stead maintains that it is problematic to 
assert that God’s action toward the world is “simple and uniform.”
361 For divine simplicity does 
not seem to explain adequately how God loves numerous creatures or governs the multitudinous 
events occurring in the world; nor does it putatively account for the notion of a God, who 
personally acts in the world of his creation.
362 Those who advocate this doctrine, however, 
contend that the supposed problematics associated with God’s simplicity emanate from 
dissimilar ontological emphases between the medieval and contemporary periods, not from the 
concept of divine simplicity itself.
363 The medieval thinkers stress constituent ontology (i.e. 
entities are what they are as such),
364 whereas contemporary thinkers tend to emphasize 
relational ontology (i.e. entities have essences, properties or sets of properties).
365 Whether the 
complexities of the doctrine are real or a result of disjunctive emphases, it seems that one 
certainly encounters the simplicity of God doctrine in Augustine (Confessions 4.16.28).
366 He 
believes that God is his justice, wisdom, love or power. 
While Augustine infers that God is his own “substance” (essentia), he nonetheless 
maintains: “yet all that is said [of God] is not said according to substance [i.e. essence].”
367 He 
therefore makes a distinction between the way that God exists in Godself and the way that 
 
359 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity” in Philosophical Perspectives 5, Philosophy of Religion 1991, 
ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, C. A.: Ridgeview, 1991), 531-552; Hughes, Complex Theory, 3-5. 
360 Creation out of Nothing, 177-178. 
361 Christopher Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 131. 
362 Ibid. 
363 See Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” 531-552; Alfred J. Freddoso, “The ‘Openness’ of God: A Reply to 
William Hasker,” Christian Scholar’s Review 28 (1998): 124-133. 
364 Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” 541. 
365 Ibid. See Barry Smith, “On Substances, Accidents and Universals: In Defense of a Constituent Ontology,” 
Philosophical Papers 26 (1997): 105-127. 
366 Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 367.                                            
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rational creatures discourse about God. On the other hand, Augustine fundamentally holds that 
one cannot predicate accidents (contingent properties) of God since the Judeo-Christian ultimate 
reality discloses the self-designation o` w;n (”the being”) or ego sum qui sum (“I am who I 
am”) in the thornbush appearance to Moses, thereby demonstrating that he does not exemplify 
accidental or non-essential properties (Exodus 3:14).
368 Aquinas will later contend that God is 
“pure and perfect act” (actus purus et perfectos) with no potentiality whatsoever.
369 But if one 
cannot speak of God with respect to accidents (per accidens) or if substantial predication fails to 
exhaust the linguistic possibilities of human discourse concerning deity, what theolinguistic 
options remain? To resolve this anticipated difficulty, Augustine submits a second form of 
predication. 
In addition to substantial predication, Augustine indicates that rational creatures may 
utilize relative predication to speak about God.
370 This type of discourse is salient when 
believing souls
371 invoke the divine one as “Father” or “Son.”
372 Augustine reasons that “Father” 
and “Son” are relative, not substantial terms (De Trinitate 5.5.6).
373 He believes that the Christian 
invocation of God the Father does not involve employing the predicate term “Father” with 
respect to deity’s substance ( essentia). Rather, being designated “Father” logically entails a 
reciprocal concept “Son.”
374 Augustine thus maintains that God is Father in that God always 
generates (semper natus) the Son; God is the Son insofar as God (= the second distinction of the 
 
367 De Trinitate 5.5.6: Nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. 
368 Ibid.  5.2.3: “And who is there that is, more than He who said to His servant Moses, ‘I am that I am;’ and, 
‘Thus shall thou say unto the children of Israel, He who is hath sent me unto you?’ But other things that are called 
essences or substances admit of accidents, whereby a change, whether great or small, is produced in them. But there 
can be no accident of this kind in respect to God; and therefore He who is God is the only unchangeable substance 
or essence, to whom certainly being itself, whence comes the name of essence, most especially and most truly 
belongs.” 
369 See ST I.3.2 (Responsio). 
370 Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 376. 
371 Merold Westphal uses this expression in God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion, 
Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 16-17. 
372 Mary T. Clark, “De Trinitate,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 95. 
373 See Matthews, On the Trinity, xxxiii. 
374 Bernhard Lohse, A Short History of Christian Doctrine (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 68-69.                                            
                                                            68        
     
 
                                                
triune Godhead) is generated eternally or continuously by the Father (Ep. 238.4).
375 Augustine 
consequently insists that “Father” and “Son” are relative predicates that signify God the Father is 
Father in relation to God the Son and God the Son is Son in relation to God the Father (De 
Trinitate 7.4.9). He avers that referring to God as Father or Son is an example of relative 
predication. 
Two Augustinian distinctions that this study has reviewed so far are substantial and 
relative predication. It is important to understand that relations in God (for Augustine) are not 
accidents or contingent properties that God just happens to exemplify or that might not have 
been exemplified in divinis. For Augustine, God is always Father, Son and Holy Spirit: paternity, 
filiation or spiration are not divine accidents but eternal relations identical with the three persons. 
In addition to relative predication, however, the third distinction that Augustine makes in terms 
of linguistic expressions for the divine is metaphorical predication.
376 The next paragraph will 
discuss this type of predication as it occurs in Augustine.  
When Scripture attributes position, condition, place or time to deity, Augustine argues 
that these spatio-temporal imputations are “not said to be in God properly, but metaphorically 
and through similitudes” (De Trinitate 5.8.9).
377 For instance, the OT describes YHWH residing 
above the cherubim (Exodus 25:22; Leviticus 16:2; Numbers 7:89; Psalm 18:10) or it reports that 
God journeyed with the nation of Israel both day and night. The psalmist further attributes place 
to YHWH by referring to God’s eminent abode, specifically, heaven itself (Psalm 11:4). King 
Solomon also predicates place of Israel’s God (1 Kings 8:43, 49). Moreover, in the oriental work 
of Job, one reads that the “years” (shaneh) of YHWH surpass counting (Job 36:26).
378 Such 
attributions of place, position, time or condition respecting the divine one supposedly are 
 
375 Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity (Eugene: Wipf and 
Stock Pub, 1999), 144; Studer, Trinity and Incarnation, 183; Clark, “De Trinitate,” 95. 
376 Ayres’ helpful study on the Trinity states that Augustine only proposes two ways of discoursing about God: 
relative and substantial predication (Nicaea and its Legacy, 376-377). However, Augustine’s approach to the 
problem of God-talk is actually threefold since he posits metaphorical predication as another way of doing 
theolinguistics. 
377 See PL 42: non proprie sed translate ac per similitudines dicuntur in Deo; Hosea 12:11. 
378 See John E. Hartley, The Book of Job, New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1988), 479. He indicates that the language of Job 36:26 suggests that God does not suffer the 
normal limitations associated with “years” since God is eternal.                                            
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examples of metaphorical predication since (according to Augustine) God metaphysically 
transcends both time and space.
379 He further maintains that since God is his own immutable 
essence, then biblical passages that speak of the divine one undergoing some type of spatio-
temporal or relational alteration must be examples of metaphorical locutions.
380 Metaphoric 
predication therefore plays an important role in Augustine’s system. It supposedly accounts for 
biblical passages that ascribe change to God. 
While Augustinian thought formatively shaped western Christianity, the vicissitudinal 
accidents of history eventually necessitated that his system of predication undergo conceptual 
development. One writer who modified Augustinian predication of the divine, thereby 
contributing a fuller account of deific predication (while adhering faithfully to the notion of 
divine simplicity) was Thomas Aquinas.
381 His remarks concerning metaphorical over against 
proper predication as well as the distinction he wields between res significata and modus 
significandi now merit consideration.
382 The following paragraphs will explain these distinctions 
and show the role they play in Aquinas’ system of predication. 
Aquinas (1225-1274 CE) explains the nexus between God’s self-disclosure and 
metaphorical enunciations of Scripture in the following way: “Now it is natural to man to attain 
to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. 
Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things.”
383 
Aquinas believes that metaphoric speech arises in the sensible sphere. His claim is that there is 
nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses.
384 Moreover, he suggests that metaphors 
(which creatures utilize to delineate God) emanate from creation itself, which stands in an 
 
379 See De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Surveys include Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. With A Catalog of St. 
Thomas's Works (New York: Random House, 1956); Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, The Cambridge 
Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Josef Pieper, Guide to 
Thomas Aquinas (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991). 
382 Gregory P. Rocca adequately traces the diachronic provenance or historical development of res significata 
and  modus significandi. See “The Distinction between ‘Res Significata’ and ‘Modus Significandi’ in Aquinas’ 
Theological Epistemology,” Thomist 55.2 (1991): 173-197. 
382 ST Ia.1.9, Responsio. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947). 
384 See Davies, Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 43-44.                                              
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analogous relationship of being (analogia entis) to the transcendent and incomprehensible 
God.
385  
While Aquinas believes that metaphors have their appropriate place in Christian 
discourse (ST Ia.1.9, Responsio), however, he does not view tropic speech as the solitary vehicle 
that believers press into service for the purpose of invoking or referencing God.
386 Rather, 
Aquinas chooses to predicate titles such as “Father” of God properly, not metaphorically (ST 
I.33.2).
387 The basis for his non-figurative employment of the designation “Father” is somewhat 
twofold. First, Aquinas insists that “Father” is a proper name distinguishing the first person of 
the Trinity from the other two persons. He professes that the name applied to the putative first 
person of the triune Godhead hypostatically and eternally distinguishes the Father from the Son 
or the Holy Spirit.
388 Second, the decision to treat “Father” as proper speech lies in the 
distinction that Aquinas makes between “the thing signified” (res significata) by a particular 
word and the human “manner of signifying” (modus significandi).
389  
The Dominican theologian initially predicates fatherhood of God with respect to the 
entity signified by means of the concept “father” before he imputes paternity to rational 
creaturely essences. One can supposedly grasp (to a certain degree) what is meant by the 
assignation “father” when one applies the term to God. Thomas consequently reasons that in the 
narrow sense of the concept “father,” there is only one referent to whom the notion properly 
applies: “And call no [man] your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in 
heaven”  (Mt 23:9 KJV).
390 Human procreators are authentic fathers (patrēs) only to the extent 
 
385 ST I.13.3, Responsio. 
386 Davies, Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 67. 
386 See Gregory P. Rocca,
 Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and 
Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 309-313.
 
388 Id autem per quod distinguitur persona Patris ab omnibus aliis est paternitas. Unde proprium nomen personae 
Patris est hoc nomen Pater, quod significat paternitatem (ST I.33.2). Nevertheless, Aquinas knows that Father is a 
“relational term,” not a name in the sense that YHWH or He Who Is (qui est) are nomina (I.13.11). See Cooper, Our 
Father, 120. 
389 ST Ia.13.3. Davies notes that this distinction can be traced back to the scholarly activity of twelfth century 
grammarians (Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 65). 
390 ST I.33.2-4.                                            
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that they share analogically in God’s veritable fatherliness.
391 Aquinas bases this position on his 
reading of Ephesians 3:14-15: “I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ from 
whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named” (flecto genua mea ad Patrem Domini mei 
Jesu Christi, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur).
392 Nevertheless, he insists 
that rational creatures fittingly attribute paternity to biological fathers (respecting the modus 
significandi) before imputing fatherhood to God.
393 While Aquinas observes that “Father” is a 
proper name for deity, not a figure of speech that rational creatures utilize in the preeminent 
science of God-talk, he still acknowledges the crucial role that metaphors play in imparting 
divine verities.
394 
Having briefly traced the use of metaphors in ancient and medieval church thought, this 
study will now turn its attention toward the reality-depicting function of metaphors in modern 
Christianity. We have seen how Augustine limits metaphoric speech to spatio-temporal 
attributions of God, whereas Aquinas considers any term metaphorical that describes or names 
God in creaturely terms. Aquinas thinks that metaphors are based on creaturely experience with 
the sensible realm. Moreover, he views “Father” as a proper term, while making use of the 
distinction between the thing signified (res significata) and the human mode of signifying 
(modus significandi) to unfold his concept of God. The contention of Aquinas is that “father” (as 
a reference to the res significata) chiefly applies to God as opposed to human fathers. However, 
while he thinks that metaphors express divine truths, Aquinas does not believe that “Father” is a 
metaphor since the term is allegedly a proper name that marks the first distinction of the triune 
Godhead or sets the divine relation of paternity apart from filiation or spiration. 
Nonetheless, two questions remain: (1) Are metaphors capable of portraying reality? (2) 
In what sense are metaphors possibly reality depicting? These two issues will be examined in 
section B of this chapter. First, that section will explore how the contemporary ecclesia might 
 
391 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3 volumes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991-1998), 1:344; 
Franklin I. Gamwell, “Speaking of God after Aquinas,” JR 81.2 (2001): 185-210. 
392 ST I.33.3, Responsio 4. 
393 Ad quartum dicendum quod nomen generationis et paternitatis, sicut et alia nomina quae proprie dicuntur in 
divines, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creatures quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum 
significandi (Ibid). 
394 Ibid. I.33.3.                                            
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wield paternal terminology for God. Then it will define the vocabulary “reality depicting” and 
discuss its significance for theolinguistics. 
 
B. Reality Depicting Paternal Metaphors and the Contemporary Ecclesia 
 
Metaphors deployed in Holy Writ and corporate worship express spiritual truths by means of 
reality depicting terminology.
395 Biblical nomenclature is evidently “reality depicting” in that it 
mediates ultimate states of affairs by means of literary similitudes (Hosea 12:11). Additionally, it 
appears that scriptural imagery delineates reality insofar as it postulates a veridical context of 
being between God and the world.
396 Tropes or conceptual domains such as King or Father 
assume personal agency; personal agency in turn furnishes a logical basis for affirming God’s 
legitimate rapport (= a relationship founded on mutual understanding and trust) with the rational 
created order.
397 It seems that God authentically interacts with rational creatures as “Father” 
(Matthew 6:9) “King” (1 Timothy 1:17) or “Friend” (James 2:23). Whether his relation to the 
created order is real or mixed (according to the language of Thomism),
398 each of the foregoing 
divine appellations appear to be metaphorical “as-if” (als ob) structures
399 that mediately portray 
God’s affinity for and sovereignty over rational finite entities subsisting in both the material and 
spiritual realm of being, namely, angels and humans. 
In view of its scriptural and Patristic use, “Father” patently does not seem to be an 
anomalous metaphor for the Judeo-Christian tradition.
400 This trope is evidently a foundational 
 
395 Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 5-12. 
396 Sanders, God Who Risks, 16. 
397 Ibid. Caird discusses the role of low and high correspondence in metaphorical tropes (e.g. Aaron’s beard 
dripping with oil and family unity versus God being called a Father). See Psalm 133:1-3. Low correspondence 
restricts how far that one can press a metaphor. On the other hand, God as Father is the Source of life, cares for His 
people as does a parent, has affection for his people (Hosea 11:3-4), exercises authority and metes out discipline. 
This metaphor thus emphasizes familial unity (Ephesians 3:14) and the mutual love that obtains between God and 
Christians. See Biblical Imagery, 153-154. There is a very high correspondence between God and human fathers in 
Caird’s estimation. 
398 Piet Schoonenberg, The Christ: A Study of the God-Man Relationship in the Whole of Creation and in Jesus 
Christ (New York: The Seabury Press, 1971), 83-86, note 16. 
399 See Bernhard Debatin, Die Rationalität der Metapher: eine sprachphilosophische und 
kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 124-126. 
400 Macky, Centrality of Metaphors, 43, 77. See DI 4.28.                                            
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Christian metaphor that readily evokes mental images of a biological, juridical or sociological 
male figure, who either procreates or rears children.
401 Therefore, “Father” now and again may 
bring about negative perlocutionary effects in those who encounter the designation.
402 
Nevertheless, is this a suitable reason to dispense with paternal God-talk in Christian discourse? 
Granted, inauspicious connotations occasionally do attend paternity; the reasons for these 
associations are manifold. Therefore, the question of whether paternal abuse serves as 
justification for repudiating the use of paternal divine speech will be addressed now.  
The paramount reason that some Christians have a negative view of paternity (divine or 
human) is the bodily or mental abuse often related to human fatherhood. In this regard, there are 
admittedly exhortations in Second Temple Judaic texts that prima facie support the maltreatment 
of children. Such texts appear to disclose the ambivalent relationship that ancient fathers possibly 
had with their progeny. For instance, the directives for child rearing in the Torah, especially with 
its remarks on youthful mischief or the need for parental discipline (Genesis 8:21; Proverbs 
13:24; 22:15; 23:13-14) apparently were used as rationalizations for uncompassionate nurturing 
of children in ancient Israel during the Second Temple period.
403 The writer of Sirach thus 
encourages fathers to chastise sons frequently lest they become obdurate: “Bend him to the yoke 
when he is young, thrash his sides while he is still small, Lest he become stubborn, disobey you, 
and leave you disconsolate” (Sirach 30:12 NAB). God supposedly counsels parents to discipline 
their children “with considerable severity, and even, if they do not submit to the threats which 
are uttered to them by word of mouth, to beat them, and inflict punishment on them, and to 
imprison them,” even chastising them “to the extent of putting them to death,” which the Mosaic 
code permitted in egregious circumstances (De Specialibus Legibus 2.232).
404  
Of course, ancient Jewish parents could not just decide to execute a child independently 
of the judicial system functioning in Israel at that time (Deuteronomy 21:18-21).
405 For the Law 
 
401 Duck, Gender and the Name of God, 5. 
402 Macky, Centrality of Metaphors, 78; Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 11-12. 
403 Pokorný, Colossians, 181. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Gerhard von Rad, Deuteronomy: A Commentary, trans. Dorothea Barton (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 
138. The German edition is Das fünfte Buch Mose: Deuteronomium, Das Alte Testament Deutsch 8 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1964).                                            
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of Moses stipulated that rebellious sons who drank or ate to excess could only be executed 
pursuant to a forensic decision from members of the Jewish gerousia.
406 Yet, it seems that 
neither Philo nor the Tanakh advocate wanton child abuse; nor do Second Temple texts 
necessarily justify purposive decisions made by parents to lethally expose unwanted or obstinate 
children.
407 Hence, this study proposes that the Torah (the Mosaic law code) did not inevitably 
cause Israelite fathers to mistreat their offspring. In addition to passages encouraging discipline, 
the Tanakh apparently implores fathers to display compassion and mercy to children; the NT 
contains similar injunctions (Deuteronomy 1:30-31; Psalm 103:8-14; Ephesians 6:4; Titus 2:1-5). 
Nevertheless, based on the apostle Paul’s moral exhortation to the Colossians, one might sense 
that some Christian fathers possibly were not fulfilling their obligatory household duties 
(Haustafeln) in the first century (Colossians 3:21). The apostolic directives further indicate that it 
seems prudent to distinguish explicit regulations contained in the Tanakh from the manner in 
which some ancient fathers tended to construe divine imperatives. Not only did Jewish fathers 
occasionally mete out harsh punishment to their children, however, but Stoic fathers also 
generally “raised children to absolute obedience” which tended to involve stringent treatment of 
youthful family members.
408 Yet, Stoic philosophers did not consciously adhere to the Tanakh; 
they purportedly obeyed the universal or immutable Logos (i.e. reason). But Epictetus indicates 
that Stoic fathers occasionally treated their children severely: “Is a man a father? The precept is 




406 Compare Exodus 3:16; 21:17; Leviticus 20:9; Acts 5:21. See Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22:  A New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible (New York and London: Doubleday, 2000), 
1745-1747 for pertinent details concerning the expression “judicial execution” (môt yûmāt). Consult the LSJ entry 
gerousia, for instances of this term in classical, Jewish and Christian literature. 
407 Both Philo (De Specialibus Legibus 3.110) and Josephus (Contra Apionem 2.202) expressly refer to the 
Jewish prohibition against lethally exposing children. See Eduard Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, trans. William 
R. Poehlmann and Robert J. Karris, Hermeneia Series (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 159; idem, Die Briefe an die 
kolosser und an Philemon (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1968). Exposure (expositio) was a practice 
familiar to ancient Greeks and Romans. See Aristotle’s Politica 1335bl.7.16.15. Odd Magne Bakke also details the 
early Jewish-Christian attitude towards exposure in his text When Children Became People: The Birth of Childhood 
in Early Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 110-114. 
408 Pokorný, Colossians, 181. 
409 Enchiridion 30.                                            
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It is not the purpose of this study to censure or exculpate ancient disciplinary methods. 
The data from Philo, Sirach and Stoic literature merely indicate that certain male parents in the 
ancient world used sacred or philosophical texts to justify the maltreatment of children. Even 
when consecrated documents do not explicitly advocate severe punishment, one finds that some 
fathers still interpreted certain divine injunctions as an authorization to mistreat children. But 
such abuse was not limited to those heeding sacred or philosophical texts. Garnsey and Humfress 
note that “physical chastisement of the child” was a quotidian occurrence in the North Africa of 
Augustine’s time.
410 The uncompassionate nature of Roman discipline was a well-known social 
phenomenon in the first century CE as well.
411 Cases of severe chastisement in antiquity and 
modernity probably explain why “father” is a pejorative term for many contemporary men and 
women.
412 Although some males have oppressively subjugated women and children 
(Ecclesiastes 8:9), however, several fathers have exercised any concrete or perceived household 
authority they might possess with fitting love and solicitude (Ethica Nicomachea 8.10.4-11.3).
413 
These numerous instances of non-abusive paternal dominion imply that one probably should not 
associate fatherhood with abuse or hegemonic domination tout court.
414 For while phatic agents 
constituting distinct speech communities often manifest a predilection for creating a nexus 
between mothers and nurture or between fathers and domination or abuse, social scientists have 
observed stark forms of communal phenomena wherein mothers also abuse their children or 
domestic partners.  
While one can only point to a relatively small number of mothers who routinely commit 
violent acts against their own children or domestic partners, this datum still lends axiomatic 
 
410 Peter Garnsey and Caroline Humfress, The Evolution of the Late Antique World (Cambridge: Orchard 
Academic, 2001), 186. 
411 See John E. Stambaugh and David L. Balch, The New Testament in Its Social Environment (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 124; Bakke, When Children Became People, 40. Roman law gave the power of life or 
death over offspring to the paterfamilias. Nonetheless, there is little historical evidence to suggest that fathers used 
this power apart from cases of exposure. See Thomas Wiedemann, Adults and Children in the Roman Empire (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 28. 
412 Griffiss, Naming the Mystery, 79-81. 
413 See Michael Joseph Brown, The Lord’s Prayer through North African Eyes:  A Window into Early 
Christianity (London and New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 4-5; Burke, Family Matters, 62-67. 
414 Compare Pliny’s Epistula 5.16.                                            
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weight to Ramshaw’s poignant observation, “Not all mothers are nurturing.”
415 The social 
phenomenon, battered husband syndrome, is less pervasive than battered wife or child syndrome; 
nonetheless, studies have shown that this form of domestic violence still qualifies as a grave 
societal datum.
416 Additionally, when mothers assault domestic partners or their own children, it 
serves as an aide mémoire that one probably should “guard against rhapsodic praise of the 
mother.”
417 The fundamental nature of maternity evidently is more nuanced than various forms 
of socially constructed discourse might lead one to believe.
418 In view of the fact that mothers 
and fathers are both capable of abusing family members, patriarchal domination more than likely 
should not necessarily preclude Christians from utilizing paternal terminology for God. The 
notable maxim “Abuse does not take away use” (abusus non tollit usum) seems appropriate in 
this case.
419  
The continued employment of paternal discourse in Christian discourse perpetuates the 
common historical way of referencing God. Historically, Christians have not shown a tendency 
to repudiate “Father” on the basis of traumatic childhood experiences or familial disfunctionality 
alone.
420 They have affirmed that deity stands in the place of abusive fathers or mothers (Psalm 
27:10). Therefore, this investigation submits that regarding the issue of paternal divine speech, 
one may need to differentiate the speaker intended meaning of a morpheme from its sentential 
meaning, its generalized or specialized conversational implicature
421 from its communal-based 
 
415 Gail Ramshaw, God Beyond Gender: Feminist Christian God-Language (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 
106. Compare the apostolic words in 1 Thessalonians 2:7-8. 
416 See Child Abuse Review 6.2 (1997): 107-117; Brown University Child and Adolescent Behavior Letter 18.7 
(2002): 5-7; Paul Hollander, Discontents:  Postmodern and Postcommunist (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), 153-154; Todd A. Migliaccio, “Abused Husbands: A Narrative Analysis,” Journal of Family 
Issues 23.1 (2002): 26-52. 
417 Ramshaw, God Beyond Gender, 106.   
418 Ibid. 
419 Ben Witherington III and Laura M. Ice, The Shadow of the Almighty: Father, Son, and Spirit 
in Biblical Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), x-xi. The formula “Usus enim, non abusus, legatus est” 
appears in Cicero (Topica III.17). See Marcus Tullius Cicero, De inventione. De optimo genere oratorum. Topica: 
With an English translation by H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 392. 
420 See Fretheim, Suffering of God, 11-12. Father imagery generally has been rejected in our time (Kasper, God 
of Jesus Christ, 133-134). On the other hand, Duck explores how paternity has been associated with abuse in 
modern times (Gender and the Name of God, 46-47). 
421 See D. A. Black, Linguistics, 131. For a technical discussion of generalized conversational implicatures, see 
H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in The Philosophy of Language, ed. Aloysius Martinich (New York: Oxford                                            
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lexical value.
422 Metaphors (similar to referring-expressions in general) are typically polyvalent: 
they assume distinct lexical senses in various contexts. The morpheme “Father” also seems to 
have distinct implicatures that rely on the context of utterance. Consequently, instead of 
eschewing the use of paternal speech for God, Donald G. Bloesch maintains that Christians have 
substantial reasons for affirming God as Father. Nevertheless, he is convinced that metaphors are 
inherently limited in ways that analogical terms are not. Bloesch discusses specific 
vulnerabilities that purportedly attend metaphoric speech in his text The Battle for the Trinity. 
This study will now review and subsequently critique his use of metaphor theory. 
 
C. Metaphors, Symbols and Analogies in Bloesch  
 
Keylock indicates that Bloesch’s theory of metaphor is noteworthy when she describes him as 
the “most brilliant, creative evangelical writing in systematic theology.”
423 Colyer also maintains 
that Bloesch “is undoubtedly one of North America’s foremost evangelical theologians.”
424 
Additionally, he is an outspoken or prominent advocate of gender ontologization in the divine. 
That is to say, Bloesch considers gender an intrinsic property of God’s being, although he does 
 
University Press, 1985), 149-160. He indicates that generalized “conversational implicature” should be understood 
as the following of certain maxims while mentally intending X or Y (variables representative of intentional objects). 
In all, there are four primary Gricean maxims that comprise the cooperative principle of conversation. These are 
quality (state the truth), quantity (sufficient informativity), relation (be relevant) and manner (be clear and 
economical when uttering speech). See Levin, Semantics of Metaphor, 11-12; Aaron, Biblical Ambiguities, 86-87; 
Ray Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition, Current Studies in Linguistics Series, 8 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1983), 155-156; Saeed, Semantics, 204-208. 
For a succinct, but insightful explanation of the ways in which conversational implicature differs from 
conventional implicature, see William G. Lycan, Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2000), 190-192. Conventional implicatures are immediately comprehended by phatic 
agents and they usually employ tendentious connectives such as “but” rather than “and” (e.g. “David is an athlete, 
but he is intelligent” or “Jill is beautiful and smart”). Moreover, they are not cancellable vis-à-vis meaning as 
conversational implicatures are. Jackendoff notes that the construction, “May I ask you to pass the salt,” is an 
example of conversational implicature. Taken literally, it violates the Gricean maxim of relevance. But those who 
hear this question tend to construe it as a request. Therefore, the question is subsumed under the rubric of 
pragmatics. 
422 See D. A. Black, Linguistics, 130-131. 
423 Lesley R. Keylock, quoted in James Emery White, What is Truth? A Comparative Study (Nashville: 
Broadman and Holman, 1994), 140. 
424 Elmer M. Colyer, “A Theology of Word and Spirit: Donald Bloesch's Theological Method,” Journal for 
Christian Theological Research 1:1 (1996): par. 1-88.                                            
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not think that God is male: “While the biblical witness is clear that the living God transcends 
sexuality, that he is neither male nor female, it is equally clear that he encompasses masculinity 
and femininity within himself.”
425 Since the questions motivating this study revolve around the 
ontology of divine gender, Bloesch’s treatment of metaphors deserves circumspect reflection. 
Hence, this portion of the study initially will examine Bloesch’s articulation of symbols and 
metaphors; then it will subsequently discuss the analogical form of God-talk that Bloesch 
espouses in his writings. Following an analysis of his general use of metaphor theory, a critical 
assessment of Bloesch’s working concepts will be in order. Christians alternatively have viewed 
“Father” as literal (i.e. the term attributes a particular essence or a set of properties or a property 
to God),
426 symbolic (the concept stands for something divinely structural), metaphorical (the 
term is not predicated of God in a matter-of-fact sense) or analogical (the term predicates that 
God is both like and unlike human fathers) in nature.
427 A rather sophisticated examination of 
symbols, metaphors and analogies appears in Bloesch. This portion of the study will analyze his 
view of metaphors first, and then examine Bloesch’s stance concerning analogies. 
Bloesch argues that metaphors originate “in cultural experience and only imperfectly” 
describe the transcendent reality they signify.
428 He submits that this metaphoric inadequacy 
stems from the fact that metaphors are wholly locutionary or cognitive products of factical or 
historical existence. Since metaphors are historically conditioned derivatives of creaturely speech 
and thought, which by nature is finite, these particular tropes inadequately signify the divine.
429 
Concurring with Bloesch in this regard, Marsh claims: “All our [theological] expressions are 
metaphors drawn from our own experience to express what God means to us.”
430 The 
 
425 The Battle for the Trinity: The Debate over Inclusive God-Language (Ann Arbor: Servant, 1985), 32-33. 
Gregory Nazianzus insists that God is neither male nor female; the Christian tradition has generally concurred with 
his assessment of the divine one (Oration 31.6-7). Christians have even tended to affirm the ontological 
genderlessness of deity (Cooper, Our Father, 275-276). 
426 Sallie McFague thinks, “Although many Christians use ‘God’ and ‘father’ interchangeably as if ‘father’ were 
a literal description of God,” the proposition “God is Father” is “both true and untrue.” Even when the proposition is 
“true,” it is nevertheless “different from conventional views of patriarchal fatherhood” (Metaphorical Theology, 21). 
427 Cooper, Our Father, 170-175. 
428 Battle for the Trinity, 36.   
429 Ibid. See ST I.13.2-3. In that portion of the illustrious medieval text, Aquinas argues that words such as 
“good” or “living” predicate what God is substantially, but they “fail to represent adequately what he is.” 
430 Marsh, Triune God, 189. He too believes that metaphors for the divine are inadequate, vulnerable and limited.                                            
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pronominals “our” and “us” mentioned in relation to experience imply that Marsh believes that 
human subjectivity could be the primordial emanative locus of theological metaphors. However, 
not only does he seemingly affirm that all theological metasememes originally emanate from 
human experience or phenomenal states (i.e. subjectivity), Marsh contends that all metasememic 
predications respecting the divine one equivocally
431 name God; for such predications 
ineluctably share in creaturely finitude.
432 In view of metaphor’s alleged historical, social or 
subjective origination, Bloesch proposes that one should not conclude that there is a necessary 
semantic correlation between a theological metasememe and its transcendent referent. Instead of 
interpreting Father as a metaphor, he argues that this divine referring-expression is a “symbol” 
which corresponds ontologically to its supreme designated object (in some indispensable 
manner).
433 Nevertheless, what does Bloesch mean by symbol? How does he delineate the nature 
of symbols in his taxonomy of predications?  
Bloesch’s position is reminiscent of that view adopted in Tillichian thought: “Symbols, 
although they are not the same as that which they symbolize, participate in its meaning and 
power.”
434 He appears to think that symbols ontologically participate in their referents. 
Moreover, Bloesch defines the lexeme “symbol” in terms of “any kind of imagistic language 
whose meaning cannot be directly comprehended by theoretical reason.”
435 Being “imagistic” or 
pictorial, symbolic expressions inadequately portray their ontological signifieds (the concepts to 
which they linguistically refer). On the other hand, unlike metaphors, theological symbols 
 
However, unlike Bloesch, Marsh seems to think that all theological expressions are metaphorical. 
431 Equivocity in its theological usage means that a term’s sense when applied to creatures in no way relates to 
the sense a term has when applied to God. This analysis of equivocity has its roots in Aristotle before subsequently 
appearing in Aquinas. 
432 This is one reason that Aquinas objects to construing all God-talk as metaphorical (ST I.13.3, Responsio 1). 
433 However, Cooper argues that while all language may be metaphorical in a sense, propositions such as “The 
Lord is King” should be read in the same way, as the proposition “David is King.” In other words, metaphorical 
speech does not convert divine appellatives into “sheer imagery” (Cooper, Our Father, 121). Cooper also insists that 
“Father” (strictly speaking) is not a metaphor. 
434 Paul Tillich, “Religious Language as Symbolic,” in Hasker, Philosophy of Religion, 358. William J. Hill notes 
that Tillich attributes “participational powers” to symbols. The symbol (according to Tillich) participates in the 
sense or import of what it reveals. See Hill’s text Knowing the Unknown God (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1971), 50. 
435 Battle for the Trinity, 20.                                            
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participate dynamically in the transcendent reality that they signify.
436 Ultimately, Bloesch 
labors under the Barthian-Kantian paradigm that adjudges metaphorical knowledge ersatz since 
it is not conceptual knowledge (Erkenntniss). The belief that metaphors do not impart conceptual 
knowledge appears in Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft) §59; he argues that 
metaphor or the aesthetic does not involve algorithmic activity nor does it generate knowledge 
through determinate concepts or reason.
437 Metaphor supposedly is imagistic or devoid of 
conceptual content. 
In contrast to metaphors, however, Bloesch maintains that analogies
438 do express 
“conceptual content.”
439 The result of his analysis is that propositions such as “God is our Rock” 
are considered metaphorical, but the assertion “God is the Father of Jesus Christ” is supposed to 
be analogical in that the latter expresses knowledge through determinate concepts. There 
purportedly is an “underlying congruity” that obtains between two distinct kinds of entities (God 
and human fathers) in the case of the speech act regarding “God” and “Jesus Christ.”
440 
Nevertheless, Bloesch claims that “Father” is a hierarchical, organic symbol, which does not 
perforce imply that the Christian deity is male.
441 He contends that divine fatherhood also 
embraces divine motherhood; there is a sense in which God is both masculine and feminine 
toward creation.
442 Hence, although Bloesch maintains that God transcends biotic sexuality with 
its inherent creaturely limitations, he nonetheless argues that gender obtains within the Christian 
deity more eminently than it does in creatures.
443 But why does Bloesch postulate gender (rather 
than sexuality) in God? Why ontologize divine gender but eschew divine maleness? 
 
436 Bloesch curiously relegates both metaphor and analogy to the same generic category “symbol.” 
437 See Mark Johnson, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1981), 14. 
438 Analogous speech is neither univocal nor equivocal. Rather it focuses on likenesses and dissimilarities 
between humans and God. Bloesch maintains that the expression “God the Father” is analogical in that it allows 
both an “underlying similarity” as well as a “real difference” to obtain between God and creatures (Battle for the 
Trinity, 21). Aquinas, however, thinks that the dissimilitude obtaining between God and creatures is greater than any 
resemblance that may subsist. On the Thomist account, conceptual knowledge of God thus seems impossible. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 36. See Gerald O’Collins, The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1999), 12. 
442 Battle for the Trinity, 32-37.  
443 Ibid. 53-54.                                              
                                                            81        
     
 
                                                
God is putatively the ground or source of both masculine and feminine gender 
categories.
444 While the boundless Christian deity
445 transcends gender and sexuality, it is 
believed that God ontologically encompasses masculinity and femininity for the reason that deity 
does not utterly surpass the limits of gender; otherwise, it apparently would not be possible for 
rational beings to narrate “the eternal purpose of God”
446 by means of literal or analogical speech 
since the maximally excellent being would then be wholly other in an unqualified sense.
447 
Nevertheless, divinity presumably is both masculine and feminine in that God is active or 
omnipotent (on one hand) but receptive or lovingly submissive (on the other hand).
448 Grasping 
the two posited ontological movements of masculinity and femininity in God requires an 
apprehension of Bloesch’s trinitarian model. However, in the context of this study, a thorough 
exploration of his pneumatology (doctrine of the Holy Spirit) is neither requisite nor possible. 
The following paragraph of this study thus concerns itself with Bloesch’s treatment of Father and 
Son intra-trinitarian relations while chiefly excluding the Spirit’s relation to the Father and the 
Son.  
Barth’s neoorthodox analysis of the triune God formatively shapes Bloesch’s 
understanding of the divine triunity. For instance, the latter professes that there is both an “above 
and a below” in God or “a superior and a junior and subordinate.”
449 The persons of the Trinity 
are considered coequal respecting the divine essence but the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
subordinate to the Father per function: the Son voluntarily yields to the Father in loving 
obedience.
450 Furthermore, the Holy Spirit conforms to the will of the Father and the Son in 
another “feminine” movement of the triune Godhead. But neither “movement” suggests that God 
the Father is strictly masculine while the second or third persons of the triune God are 
exclusively feminine. Therefore, although Bloesch maintains that the Son as Wisdom qua 
 
444 Donald G. Bloesch, Is the Bible Sexist?: Beyond Feminism and Patriarchalism (Westchester, IL: Crossway 
Books, 1982), 66. 
445 De Fide Orthodoxa 1.4. 
446 See Ephesians 3:11. 
447 Bloesch, Is the Bible Sexist, 66.  
448 Ibid. 
449 Ibid. 
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Wisdom is feminine, the Son as such is patently masculine.
451 Depending on which divine 
movement that the Son of God voluntarily initiates, he exhibits a masculine or feminine aspect. 
In this manner, the Son and the Holy Spirit purportedly embrace both masculinity and femininity 
without either divine person intrinsically partaking of maleness or femaleness. 
From a historical perspective, it appears that most Christians have chosen not to 
ontologize divine gender. Ecclesiastical speech imagistically portrays God in masculine and 
feminine terms: the Christian religion has consistently maintained that God supersedes gender 
per essentiam.
452 More precisely, Christianity has affirmed God’s “suprasexuality” in theory,
453 
even if it has not always affirmed it in practice.
454 For instance, Tertullian (Aduersus Praxean 7) 
declares that God the Father generates the Son “from the womb of His own heart,” (de patris 
utero)
455 implying that there is a sense in which God is both Father and Mother to the Son.
456 
Furthermore, sacred writers profess that God is simultaneously “Father” and “Mother” 
(metaphorically speaking) since the Father not only brings forth a multitude of human sons and 
daughters (in a paternal manner),
457 but also feeds them with milk from overflowing maternal 
 
451 Ibid. 69-70. 
452 See Monologium 42; Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. Paul Burns (Kent: Burns and Oates, 1988), 
170; John W. Cooper. Our Father in Heaven: Christian Faith and Inclusive Language for God (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 1998); Gerald O’Collins, Tripersonal God, 12-13; Marianne Meye Thompson. The Promise of the Father: 
Jesus and God in the New Testament (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000); Speaking the Christian God: The 
Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism, ed. Alvin F. Kimel Jr. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 20; Hans 
Kung, On Being a Christian (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976), 311. 
453 See Borchert, John 1-11. 
454 David S. Cunningham, These Three Are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998). Duck writes: “However, although God is not male in sex, in worship Christians again and again attribute 
masculine gender to the divine” (Gender and the Name of God, 32). See Oration 28.13. 
455 Lynne C. Boughton insists that uterus or uterum should not be translated “womb.” See “More than 
Metaphors: Masculine-Gendered Names and the Knowability of God,” Thomist 58.2 (1994): 283-316. However, see 
Leo F. Stelten, Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin: With an Appendix of Latin Expressions Defined and Clarified 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995), 280. 
456 The Eleventh Council of Toledo (675 CE) also states: “We must believe that the Son is begotten or born not 
from nothing or from any other substance, but from the womb of the Father, that is from his substance.” Notice that 
“the womb of the Father” is viewed as appositional with his substance. See Marsh, Triune God, 186-187. Boff 
believes that when the Council of Toledo speaks of the Son being “begotten or born” (genitus vel natus), it intends 
to ascribe maternal characteristics to the Father: “The Father is here given maternal attributes. We need both the 
figures of earthly father and mother to express the riches of divine fatherhood” (Trinity and Society, 170). Ambrose 
(340-397 CE) writes: “Even so, the Father’s womb is the spiritual womb of an inner sanctuary, from which the Son 
has proceeded just as from a generative womb.” (The Patrarches, 11:51). Cf. De fide 4.89. 
457 See Isaiah 43:6; 2 Corinthians 6:18; Stromata 4.21.                                              
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breasts.
458 Such forms of discourse evidently reflect Christianity’s acknowledgment that God, 
even if “he” is inherently generative or relational,
459 is neither masculine nor feminine quoad se. 
The Christian deity transcends gender with respect to the divine essence; the categories of divine 
masculinity or femininity are meaningful only in relation to creatures. 
Accentuating the testimony of Christian believers, who apparently have conceived God in 
genderless terms, Julian of Norwich (ca. 1342-1416 CE) offers the following poetic ascription 
that serves to demonstrate how ecclesial writers have imaginatively envisioned deity: “As truly 
as God is our Father, so truly is God our Mother.”
460 Moreover, Anselm of Canterbury (ca. 
1033-1109 CE) employs feminine speech for God, probably depicting the maximally excellent 
being as both “Father” and “Mother” in an emblematic sense. He pleads to Christ with a speech 
act that is framed (syntactically) as a metasememe: “But you, Jesus, good lord, are you not also a 
mother? Are you not that mother who, like a hen, collects her chickens under her wings? Truly, 
master, you are a mother” (Prayer 10 to Saint Paul).
461 Ware conversely quotes a hymn 
composed by Synesius of Cyrene (ca. 373-414 CE),
462 wherein the orthodox philosopher-
bishop
463 and notable student of Hypatia refers to God as “Father, source of the Son.”
464 Ware 
then inquires why Synesius refers to God as Father and Son rather than using the expressions 
 
458 Paedagogus 1.41.3; 1.43.3-4; 1.46.1. See Denise Kimber Buell. Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria 
and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 160-169, 177-179. 
459 Peter Widdicombe contends that both Origen and Athanasius posit a God who is eternally and inherently 
generative or relational (Fatherhood of God, 1-5). 
460 Showings, trans. Edmund Colledge, OSA and James Walsh, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 295. 
461 Quoted in Caroline Walker Bynum, Jesus As Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 115. See The Prayers and Meditations of St. Anselm, trans. 
Benedicta Ward, Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 153. 
462 Hymn III.5. See The Essays and Hymns of Synesius of Cyrene, 2 volumes, trans. A. Fitzgerald (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1930). 
463 Samuel Vollenweider relates that Synesius was bishop of Ptolemais in 410 CE (“Synesios von Kyrene, der 
adlige neuplatonische Philosoph und Hymnendichter, der um 410 Bischof von Ptolemais wurde”). See 
Neuplatonische und christliche Theologie bei Synesios von Kyrene, Forschungen zur Kirchen und 
Dogmengeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1985), 13. 
464 Drake criticizes the view that suggests Synesius was not a Christian. He reasons that Synesius’ 
contemporaries evidently thought of him as a believer since they appointed him bishop of Ptolemais in Egypt. See 
Constantine and the Bishops, 405; Alan Cameron, Jacqueline Long and Lee Sherry, Barbarians and Politics at the 
Court of Arcadius, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 19 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), 19-28. For a lucid but apparently contrasting account of the philosopher, see von Campenhausen, Fathers of 
the Church, 1:126-139.                                            
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“Mother” and “Daughter.”
465 But the ancient bishop does address God with the words: “You are 
Father, You are Mother, You are male and You are female.”
466 Like Julian of Norwich, he 
adverts to God as Father and Mother—even adding that deity is simultaneously male and 
female.
467  
Regardless of how one construes such hymnic ascriptions, the arresting refrain of 
Synesius is only one instance of how God routinely transcends masculinity and femininity in the 
conceptual life of nearly all believers (past and present).
468 However, Bloesch is not necessarily 
incorrect regarding his belief that there are masculine and feminine movements in the Godhead 
just because of the consensus omnium. Christian history nonetheless does provide an evaluative 
context by means of which contemporary theologians may assess relevant questions pertaining to 
divine gender. The historical testimony of the Christian church also seems to comport with 
Walter Brueggemann’s observations on Scripture and divine gender: “Biblical faith is quite 
uninterested in questions of God’s sexuality, masculine or feminine, or even in God’s asexuality 
but is singularly and passionately concerned with God’s covenanting and the implication of 
covenanting for human history.”
469 Ancient Bible writers were probably not overly concerned 
with God’s ontological gender. This same principle evidently applies in the case of Lactantius 
and his predecessors. 
In contradistinction to the testimony of ecclesiastical history, Bloesch thinks that the term 
“Father” communicates something ontological about God. Since “Father” apparently functions 
as a divine symbol for Bloesch, rather than a metaphor, it is not wholly surprising to discover 
him indicating that this appellation stems from special revelation as opposed to finite noetic 
structures conditioned by the vicissitudinal accidents of history. He reasons that “Father” is 
neither historically conditioned nor socially constructed but that it preeminently originates from 
 
465 Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1979), 33. 
466 Hymn II.64B65 (11); Migne, PG 66.1593.  
467 Virginia R. Mollenkott, The Divine Feminine: The Biblical Imagery of God as Female (New York: Crossroad 
Pub. Co, 1983), 9. 
468 Thompson, Promise of the Father, 19; Cooper, Our Father, 182. 
469 “Israel’s Social Criticism and Yahweh’s Sexuality,” JAAR Supplement 45.3 (1977): 739-772. See Thompson, 
Promise of the Father, 180.                                             
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God’s self-disclosure in the person of Jesus Christ.
470 Bloesch thus views the paternal epithet as 
the regnant symbol for divinity, noting that “Father” is “closer to being literal” since its 
signification is fundamentally transparent.
471 Despite the privileged status of fatherhood as a 
symbol for God, however, Bloesch insists that divine paternity actively confronts established 
creaturely understandings of paternity. God’s fatherliness challenges so-called “patriarchal 
structures” by conterminously bringing it about that hegemonic institutions render an account to 
God (Matthew 23:9).
472 Even scholars who might object to particular elements of Bloesch’s 
methodology seem to concur with this general thesis.
473 But there remain aspects of his paradigm 
that demand critical analysis. Section D therefore undertakes a critique of two arguments posited 
by Bloesch. 
 
D. Critique of Bloesch’s Use of Metaphorology 
 
Bloesch’s metaphorology raises a multitude of questions that directly impinge on the subject of 
ontological gender in the divine. Nevertheless, there are only two issues that this section will 
address in reviewing his implementation of metaphor theory: (1) Are all theological metaphors 
cultural or subjective constructs? (2) Does masculine speech for God necessarily entail that the 
intrinsic nature of divine gender is being delineated?  
The Christian tradition as a whole has affirmed that worshipers of God know the deity as 
Father through general and special revelation (avpoka,luyij).
474 The term “revelation” may 
signify “God’s partial communication to created beings of knowledge he possesses, including his 
intimate self-knowledge.”
475 Thomas observes that avpoka,luyij may literally denote “an 
 
470 Bloesch, Battle, 21.   
471 Ibid. 34-35. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Thompson, Promise of the Father, 183; Witherington, Shadow of the Almighty, 42-43. 
474 J. A. McGuckin, Handbook, 295-297. 
475 Kazhdan, “Revelation” in Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 3:1785.                                             
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uncovering” or “a laying bare.”
476 Moreover, the Greek word implies that “revelation” is a 
means by which God discloses previously hidden truth.
477 Revelation primarily entails the 
disclosure or manifestation of God himself.
478 General revelation refers to God’s act of self-
disclosure in creation (Genesis 1:26-28; Psalm 19:1; Romans 1:20; Hebrews 3:4); special 
revelation designates God’s act of self-disclosure in Scripture (2 Timothy 3:16-17) or salvation 
history (Heilsgeschichte).
479 Salvation history  encompasses God’s providential guidance of 
Israel and the Christian church. Moreover, it alludes to the Father’s disclosure, which occurs 
through the person or soteriological work of Jesus Christ (John 1:18; 14:9; 2 Corinthians 5:19; 1 
John 5:20).
480 Creatures encounter the God who is Father through Scripture, creation and the 
salvific work of the enfleshed Logos.
481 The primordial locus of revelation tends to raise 
misgivings respecting claims that metaphoric speech inadequately references the
Justin Martyr maintains that Christians know God as Father, based on his beneficences or 
creative effects (Apology 2.6). He intimates that titles such as Father are not historical constructs 
(i.e. fictive realities). Rather, rational creatures know God as “Father” by means of general or 
special revelation.
483 While Justin does state that Father is not a divine “name” (o;noma,) but a 
form of address (pro,srhsij), he still believes that this term (which Christians utilize to 
address God) is neither arbitrary nor referentially vacuous. Justin thereby implies that the 
conceptual signifier “Father” possesses meaningful content: it points to a transcendent reality 
that supplies good things in abundance (Stromata 1.24), and chastises the Christian community 
while loyally adhering to it (Clement 1.56). Rational creatures cannot name God “Father” unless 
 
476 Robert L. Thomas, Revelation 1-7: An Exegetical Commentary (Chicago: Moody Press, 1992), 50. Thomas 
derives this lexical sense from George Abbott-Smith, A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1937), 50. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Thomas C. Oden, Systematic Theology, 3 volumes (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1987), 1:18. 
479 See Philo’s De Posteritate Caini 167. 
480 Cooper, Our Father, 139-141. Ignatius of Antioch is evidently the first writer to formulate special revelation 
in terms of divine self-disclosure: “there is one God who manifested Himself through Jesus Christ His Son, who is 
His Word that proceeded from silence, who in all things was well-pleasing unto Him that sent Him” (Magnesians 
8:2). See Wolfhart Pannenberg, et al. Revelation As History (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 8. 
481 Borchert employs the terminology “enfleshed” in John 1-11, 119.   
482 White, What is Truth, 100-109.   
483 Leslie W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 79-80.                                            
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God first reveals himself as Father.
484 The Christian transcendent object of reverence discloses 
multiple “forms of address” in creation, Scripture and salvation history. Justin consequently 
appears to insist that humans derive the names, which they employ to address God, from a 
posteriori reasoning (i.e. by making inferences from the divine effects to the uncreated primum 
movens). In essence, he maintains that spatio-temporal bound rational creatures assign a specific 
functional designation to God based on his interpersonal unveiling to humanity.
485 Justin would 
probably concur with Herman Bavinck who considers divine names neither arbitrary nor “mere 
inventions” of human intellects.
486 In fact, Apology 2.6 professes that the mortal naming of God 
is grounded in natural revelation. But if humans affix designations to God based on divine 
intersubjective unveiling, could theological speech or language (in the form of metaphor) be as 
vulnerable or historically conditioned as Bloesch or Marsh claim? While God evidently mediates 
supernatural revelation through finite noetic structures, which by nature are irremediably fallible, 
the Christian tradition nonetheless affirms that the Father discloses himself in the transcendent 
act of revelation.
487 Hence, although theological metaphors certainly do not recount the entire 
“theo-drama” (Theodramatik)
488 in its comprehensive fullness—they may even suppress 
particular aspects of God’s nature—in order to qualify as revelation, the metaphors that 
Christians invoke to describe God must be reality depicting (in some sense) for the people of 
God. 
 
484 Cooper, Our Father, 139. 
485 See Bloesch, Battle for the Trinity, 25. He notes that God names himself “by showing us who he is.” 
Compare Exodus 3:14. Cooper adds that “rightly naming God is an activity in which humans truly recognize who 
God has identified himself to be in the various modes of special and general revelation” (Our Father, 160). 
Assigning the deity a nomen or nomina means that we “acknowledge” the names that God has given himself in 
revelation (Ibid). Justin’s thoughts are not at variance with these observations. 
486 Cooper, Our Father, 160; Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendriksen (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1951), 84. 
487 See Magnesians 8.2; Dialogue with Trypho 62.4; Exhortation to the Greeks 4 (Tatian); De Anima 18 
(Tertullian). 
488 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume I, Prolegomena, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 15. Balthasar uses the metaphor of the stage to describe “the event of 
God becoming man and his action on the world’s behalf” in salvation history (Ibid. 112).                                            
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Gerald O’Collins and Daniel Kendall argue that theological metaphors “refer to and 
describe reality.”
489 Concurring with Soskice, they reason that metasememes speak about one 
thing in terms that appear suggestive of another thing.
490 For example, God does not instantiate 
the literal mind-independent properties of a crag, but the ancient Hebrew prophets articulate 
speech regarding YHWH in ways that appear suggestive of a rock. Likewise, YHWH is called “a 
sun and shield” in Psalm 84:11(12).
491 Yet, he apparently does not exemplify the matter-of-fact 
predicates that structurally constitute the Sun or a shield.
492 In these instances, the Bible writers 
presumably are employing tropes to speak about one entity (God) in terms suggestive of other 
entities (rock, Sun or shield). Metaphor seemingly permits the writers of Scripture to describe the 
supreme reality adequately, though indirectly. Far from being linguistically insufficient or 
vulnerable, theological metaphors seem to accomplish what “proper terminology” (De oratore 
3.152-155) cannot achieve; they convey truths that non-tropic expressions attributing matter-of-
fact properties to a particular subject are incapable of communicating. 
If metaphors do convey divine verities adequately (in some respect), to what extent are 
they “reality depicting”? Does a metasememe’s reality portraying function necessitate that tropic 
assertions communicate data about the metaphysical properties of a given entity? Analyzing the 
very phenomenon of metaphoricity or determinate tropic constructs may lead one to believe that 
metaphors are assertions comparing God to sensible entities; they are not metaphysical 
pronouncements regarding the nature of structural entities (including God). This study actually 
 
489 The Bible for Theology: Ten Principles for the Theological Use of Scripture (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), 
83. 
490 Ibid. 
491 Joseph Bryant Rotherham, Rotherham’s Emphasized Bible (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1994). 
492 Aaron, however, espouses the view that “historical intervention” is what the writer of Psalm 84:11(12) 
intends. He maintains that the psalmist (by stating that “God is shield” or “God is sun”) predicates that YHWH 
literally is sun or shield. While Aaron denies that “God is sun/shield” asserts an ontological identity between 
YHWH and sun/shield, he nonetheless holds that ontological identity is not the only genuine alternative to 
metaphorical signification. See Biblical Ambiguities, 57-59. Other scholars, conversely, view the language 
comprising this psalm as metaphorical. See Schneiders, Women and the Word, 26; Marvin E. Tate, Psalms 51-100, 
Word Biblical Commentary, volume 20 (Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 361. Tate notes that although “sun” evidently 
is not utilized metasememically for YHWH elsewhere, the term is a rather “common royal epithet” found in ANE 
texts. Cf. Isaiah 60:19; Revelation 21:23; 22:5 for Biblical texts that use sun imagery for God.                                            
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contends that metasememes (i.e. metaphors) exemplify an as-if character.
493 They evidently do 
not predicate metaphysical or literal properties of a conceptual subject, but only affirm 
(tropically or conceptually) that “S is P.” Accordingly, even though the appellation “Father” may 
be reality depicting, it does not necessarily delineate intrinsic properties of God the Father.
494 
Paternal metaphors for God may speak to the deity’s relationship with his people or the manner 
in which the divine one functions vis-à-vis the Son of God and creation as a whole.
495 However, 
imagery couched in masculine terminology does not (perforce) disclose anything concerning 
God’s immanence. Tropes depicting a paternal deity are ostensibly as-if forms of speech that 
affirm unfamiliar identity syntheses (i.e. father/God); conversely, they are not metaphysical 
pronouncements.
496 When Scripture refers to God as a Shepherd, King, Warrior, Lord or Father, 
it is apparently employing metaphorical speech to predicate X or Y of God in a figurative 
manner.
497 Therefore, one probably cannot rely on metaphorical locutions in Scripture to discern 
whether masculinity or femininity are immanent divine categories of being.
498 Yet, metaphors 
about God express divine truth on the tropic level. 
Finally, scholars have constructed a number of arguments against predicating masculinity 
of God. First, perhaps gender should be inextricably associated with a sexed body (= a corpus 
 
493 See Debatin, Die Rationalität der Metapher, 124-126; John R. Searle, Mind: An Introduction (New York and 
London: Oxford University Press), 20. 
494 As an illustration of metaphorical speech applied to divinities, Aristotle writes: “Hence Ganymede is said ‘to 
pour the wine to Zeus,’ though the gods do not drink wine. This last might however be metaphorical” (Poetica 
25.1461b). Aristotle is reasoning that nectar: gods = wine: men. See the notes in Kassel, Ars Poetica, 108. A similar 
claim is being made in this study with respect to “Father” as a divine appellation. When ascribing paternity to God, 
it seems that Scripture and a number of pre-Nicenes do not mean to say that God is inherently masculine. Rather, the 
Bible refers to God as “Father,” even though the infinite God evidently transcends gender categories (Bloesch, Is the 
Bible Sexist, 80). See Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 8-9. He argues that metaphors communicate truths about God, 
but they also remind us of discontinuities that obtain between God and creatures. For instance, metaphors may apply 
temporal categories to God. However, deity is not subject to temporal vicissitudes or the ravages of time, even if 
God is temporal. 
495 Clement 1.19. 
496 See Caird, Language and Imagery, 152-155. 
497 See Tremper Longman III and Daniel G. Reid, God Is a Warrior (Grand Rapids: Zondervan: 1995), 15-17. 
498 Ware argues that “there is in God no such thing as sexuality” (Orthodox Way, 33-34). An infinite God by 
definition (i.e. analytically) cannot be male, female or presumably masculine or feminine since a limitless God 
transcends these categories of being. Yet, Ware maintains that “Father” is a divinely given symbol. However, why 
should Christians continue employing masculine symbols if they might not delineate what God is immanently? 
Ware’s answer is that God has revealed and vouchsafed the symbol “Father” to Christians; moreover, he argues that 
the epithet is rooted in being itself.                                            
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informed by genitalia, hormones or chromosomes). Moreover, gender is possibly a creaturely 
phenomenon that God has vouchsafed to animals and humans for the purpose of generative 
procreation (Divinae institutiones 4.8.3).
499 Nevertheless, let one suppose that God could be a 
superlative Father, who is masculine respecting the divine essence. If this counterfactual 
situation were actualized, then it would seem doubtful that knowledge of God’s masculinity 
would be humanly cognoscible apart from divine revelation. However, the Father apparently has 
not revealed to humankind the putative immanental nature of deific gender. Nor does it appear 
that one legitimately can infer ontological masculinity from the revelatory designation “Father.” 
This paternal figure of speech possibly communicates how God (the Father) relates to entities 
other than God. Since there is an empirical nexus between gender and a sexed body in the 
phenomenal realm, gender (= sexuality) unassociated with maleness or femaleness would appear 
to constitute noumena (in the Kantian sense) for spatio-temporal bound percipient subjects, 
especially if God has not unveiled such metaphysical data by means of revelation.  
Hilary of Poitiers enjoins that a Christian is obligated to “gauge God’s assertions 
concerning Himself by the scale of His own glorious self-revelation.”
500 Therefore, even if God 
were ontologically masculine without being male, this datum would evidently surpass human 
experience or remain unknowable for those existing in the sensible world of appearances unless 
God disclosed such divine masculinity to rational datives of manifestation.
501 Whether one 
appeals to Kantian epistemology to resolve the issue of divine immanent gender or to some other 
theory of knowledge, the fact remains that admonitions concerning projectionist theology appear 
in both the ancient Cappadocians and Miroslav Volf.
502 The former argue that the path of 
 
499 Peter van Inwagen prefers to speak of  “sexual dimorphism” (in this context) which should not be confused 
with “gender.” He argues that since God does not occupy space, then he evidently cannot have a “physical structure” 
or material corpus. But in order to be male or female (sexually dimorphic), one must possess a physical structure. 
Van Inwagen thus reasons that God does not “have a sex.” It is reasonable to assume that God does not have gender 
either since God apparently does not possess a physical structure. See Inwagen’s The Problem of Evil: The Gifford 
Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in 2003 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 21. 
500 De Trinitate 1.18. 
501 See Cooper, Our Father, 184-187. 
502 Gregory Nazianzus writes: “Father is not a name of substance or of activity, but of relationship, and of how 
the Father is related to the Son, or the Son to the Father” (Orationes 29.16). He maintains that the relational Father-
Son language applied to the first two persons of the Trinity must be construed as to preclude importing human 
images of masculinity or femininity into the Godhead (Ibid. 31.7, 31). See Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian                                            
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circumspection dictates that the importation of sensible images into the supersensible Godhead 
ought to be avoided,
503 whereas the latter contends that gender is rooted in a sexed body; 
something God evidently does not possess (Numbers 23:19).
504 This investigation proposes that 
either God is genderless or that we cannot know whether God the Father is masculine (quoad se) 
based on what rational creatures presently know from general or special revelation. For neither 
form of unveiling ostensibly discloses whether God is essentially masculine or feminine:  
There can be no comparison between God and earthly things, yet the weakness of our 
understanding forces us to seek for illustrations from a lower sphere to explain our 
meaning about loftier themes. The course of daily life shows how our experience in 
ordinary matters enables us to form conclusions on unfamiliar subjects. We must 
therefore regard any comparison as helpful to man rather than as descriptive of God, 
since it suggests, rather than exhausts, the sense we seek.
505  
 
Gender in divinis does not appear to be a salient preoccupation of the early church writers. They 
seem to conceive God’s paternity in non-literal terms. Masculine and feminine terms for the 
divine are a result of linguistic accidence or impoverished human speech (Aduersus nationes 
1.59). Early church writers are not inclined to believe that these terms are reflective of what God 




It is clear that there is an ongoing debate regarding the nature of metaphor and God’s paternity. 
Questions remain concerning the manner in which Christians should linguistically communicate 
their perceptions of the divine. Nevertheless, the evidence extracted from discourse used in 
Scripture and the pre-Nicenes suggest that the appellation “Father” is a metaphor that asserts an 
unfamiliar identity synthesis between human males and God. In Aristotelian terms, metaphors 
 
Doctrine of God: One Being, Three Persons (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 158; Marsh, Triune God, 122. 
503 In agreement with the Cappadocians, Athanasius professes: “Accordingly, as in saying ‘offspring,’ we have 
no human thoughts, and, though we know God to be a Father, we entertain no material ideas concerning Him, but 
while we listen to these illustrations and terms, we think suitably of God, for He is not as man, so in like manner, 
when we hear of ‘coessential,’ we ought to transcend all sense, and, according to the Proverb, ‘understand by the 
understanding what is set before us’ ” (De Synodis 42). See Origen’s Peri Archon 1.2.4. 
504 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 174-175. 
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are names transferred from one entity to another: they are forms of linguistic borrowing. Cicero 
espoused this view and Lactantius undoubtedly affirmed it as well (De oratore 3.152-155). 
Debatin, on the other hand, chooses to stress the as-if character (als ob Charakter) of metaphors. 
His approach may be preferable to those taken by either Aristotle or Cicero. God seems to be like 
a Father but God does not exemplify the literal properties of one. 
Conversely, Bloesch argues that God is not a male but is inherently masculine. Since he 
believes that metaphors inadequately delineate the maximally excellent being, Bloesch maintains 
that “Father” is not a metaphor; rather, the term is a symbol that is closer to being a literal 
description of God’s nature than concepts like “Rock” or “Shield.” What evidently gives 
particular force to this notion is the religious belief that Jesus of Nazareth employed the 
appellation “Father” in his earthly ministry while openly proclaiming that he was God’s Son. 
God’s fatherhood was evidently revealed in Christ, the Son. Without denying this premise set 
forth by Bloesch or the NT, this study contends that “Father” is not a name for God; it is a 
metaphorical way to address or invoke God. A possible weakness in Bloesch’s position appears 
to be a failure to recognize that metaphors describing God are rooted in divine revelation. He 
reasons that they are cultural or social constructs. But Hilary Poitiers and Justin Martyr both 
seem to adequately account for the origination of tropes when they suggest that theological 
metaphors are rooted in human reflection on God’s creation or general revelation. This approach 
has the advantage of acknowledging the social or cultural aspects of metaphors without reducing 
metaphor to a socio-cultural construct. 
Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that discourse communities apparently establish 
lingual significance or meaning to facilitate intersubjective relations among phatic agents. In the 
case of metaphoric language for the Christian God, believers probably ascertain or disclose the 
sense that theological metaphors bear: “The assembly of believers, the community of discourse, 
clarifies what the self-contradictory language [of metaphor] means and how such meaning 
functions.”
506 The interpretive community belonging to Christ enables metaphoric speech to 
become meaningful for theological dialogue in the sense that prominent aspects of sacred texts 
 
506 Ramshaw, God beyond Gender, 94.                                            
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that use symbols for God are wielded to formulate coherent doctrines about the Father as he 
discloses himself to rational creatures.
507 In order to grasp the sense of divine paternal imagery, 
one must acquire semantic or pragmatic competence of ecclesiastical and biblical language. An 
intimate familiarity with the social or intellectual context of ancient church treatises facilitates a 
phatic agent’s capacity to detect the presence of metaphoricity in theological speech. 
 
Excursus A:  Non-Metaphorical Speech and God 
 
Paul Brassey claims that the contents of the ostensible literary redaction “Deutero-Isaiah” imply 
that any affirmative locution pertaining to God is essentially metaphorical: “Human language 
must fail in direct description of the deity; it is inadequate to the task.”
508 Therefore, he 
maintains that all divine referring-expressions in Deutero-Isaiah are metasememic or non-
literal.
509 Brassey also indicates that one cannot refer to God univocally; all theological discourse 
putatively is a delineation of both what “is” and what “is not” the case metaphysically or in terms 
of mind-independent properties. Metaphor supposedly preserves the dynamic tension between 
what “is” and what “is not” the case within the realm of divin
Alternatively, Gunton, Swinburne and Alston have suggested that not every theological 
locution or enunciative act is metaphorical.
510 John Cooper further distinguishes between 
metaphor as a literary figure of speech (i.e. trope) and all language being “metaphorical” by 
virtue of the inherent finitude characterizing rational creatures and their individual speech 
acts.
511 For instance, while divine titles may subsist within the matrix of inadequate human 
langue or parole, appellations designating God are not necessarily metaphorical in the sense that 
they are tropes (e.g. evgw. eivmi, o` w;n evidently is not a figurative turn of phrase). 
 
507 Räpple, Metaphor of the City, 108. 
508 Brassey, Metaphor, 49.  
509 Ibid. 
510 Macky, Centrality of Metaphors, 190ff. See Alston, “Literal Talk of God: Its Possibility and Function” in 
This Is My Name Forever, 136. For a discussion of univocity, consult Swinburne, Revelation, 152-154. One can find 
opposing viewpoints regarding theolinguistics in Dille, Mixing Metaphors, 18. She appears to concur with Brassey 
and Soskice regarding the utilization of theological metaphors. 
511 Cooper, Our Father, 67.                                            
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Moreover, Aquinas maintains that one may predicate certain expressions of God (viz. “Father”) 
properly.
512 Context and intent of signification apparently determine whether divine names are 
metaphorical or proper markers of ident
Duns Scotus (1266-1308 CE) also believes that speaking of God non-metaphorically is a 
linguistic possibility. While apophatic or negative theology has secured a venerable place in the 
Christian tradition,
514 Scotus nonetheless argues that denials concerning the nature of God are 
only intelligible “in terms of some affirmation.”
515 He contends that if rational creatures deny 
that God is X, Y or Z, “it is because we wish to do away with something inconsistent with what 
we have already affirmed.”
516 The negative way (via negativa) presupposes the positive way (via 
positiva) in Scotus’ thought: one cannot deny that which one has not affirmed previously. He 
accordingly contends: “a purely negative knowledge is no knowledge at all.”
517 This observation 
noticeably evokes his univocity of being theory––Scotus’ contention that univocal predication 
with reference to God is feasible, when employed within certain strict parameters.  
Univocity of being (ens) pertains to what creatures can know or say about God by means 
of reason (i.e. natural theology) or logical argumentation.
518 Scotus believes “that concept [is] 
univocal which possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the 
same thing would be a contradiction.”
519 He thus suggests that due to its sufficient unity in se, a 
univocal concept may function as the middle term (a term that occurs in the major and minor 
 
512 Gustavo Zonana, God-talk, 52. 
513 The term “context” here means “a cognitive construct formulated by a speaker.” See Ungerer and Schmid, An 
Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics, 46-47. 
514 See Pelikan, Christian Tradition, 2:32, 258. 
515 Gunton, Act and Being, 68; Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:344. 
516 Quoted in Gunton, Act and Being, 68. 
517 See Bernardino M. Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus (Lanham: University Press 
of America, 1983), 100; Ware, Orthodox Way, 14-15. 
518 See Frederick C. Copleston, Medieval Philosophy (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1961), 111-112; 
Peter King, “Duns Scotus on Metaphysics” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams 
(Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-68; Mary Beth Ingham and Mechtild 
Dreyer,  The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus:  An Introduction (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2004), 23. Scotus thinks that univocity only applies to natural or general concepts of 
God: Univocatio enim non est nisi in generalibus rationibus. See William A. Frank and Allan Bernard Wolter, Duns 
Scotus, Metaphysician, Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy (West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 1995), 116. King notes that univocity in Scotus generally applies to Aristotle’s ten categorical 
genera (“Duns Scotus on Metaphysics,” 20-21).                                            
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premise of a syllogism but not in its conclusion) since it analytically obviates equivocation 
whereby a term has variant senses when applied to divergent referents.
520 For example, Scotus 
insists that rational creatures may predicate the concept “being”
521 of necessary and contingent 
beings, of both God and creatures since “being” (ens) is univocal in that it does not allow for 
equivocation in a logical syllogism: “being” has the same denotation regardless of its assigned 
referent.
522 In view of its univocity, the concept of being also functions as a disjunctive 
predicate, distinguishing A from B or C from D (vel cetera). Its signification ultimately depends 
on the content of utilized predicates, not on the subject of the proposition in which it occu
When Scotus refers to “being,” he probably means “being qua being” (the proper object 
of the intellect), which is an abstraction logically prior to the ten genera of Aristotelian 
categories.
524 However, if the term “being” (which rational creatures can neither affirm nor deny 
of one and the same entity) does not have “sufficient unity in itself” when rational creatures 
predicate it of God or creaturely essences, then it evidently has no lexical meaning at all for 
communicative agents vis-à-vis God.
525 Sanders accordingly submits that if univocal predication 
relating to the divine is linguistically impossible, then “we will be back in the cave of 
agnosticism.”
526 If univocal language or speech were theolinguistically impossible, then natural 
theology would remain unfeasible since knowledge of the divine perfections (= wisdom, intellect 
and will) would not be accessible to the unilluminated mind of a created rational existent.
527 Yet, 
a God about whom one cannot think or articulate X or Y significatively using natural means (= 
 
519 Gunton, Act and Being, 69.   
520 Sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis 
concludantur inter se uniri (Frank and Wolter, Duns Scotus, 109). See Bonansea, Approach to God, 102. 
521 The term “being” (ens) in this context refers to an undetermined abstraction that is the de facto proper object 
of the intellect. See Frank and Wolter, Duns Scotus, 121; Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), 455. 
522 But note the qualifications that Peter King makes regarding Scotus’ univocity of being theory in “Duns 
Scotus on Metaphysics,” 5-6.  
523 Anthony John Patrick Kenny, A Brief History of Western Philosophy (Malden: Blackwell Pub, 1998), 153-
154. 
524 Steven E. Ozment, The Age of Reform (1250-1550): An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval 
and Reformation Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 56; Owens, Doctrine of Being, 41. 
525 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 110-111. 
526 God Who Risks, 25. 
527 Bonansea, Approach to God, 102.                                            
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reason) soon becomes irrelevant. Thus, while Scotus postulates a theory of analogy in relation to 
God-talk, he also maintains that the concept of analogy presupposes univocity: univocal 
language grounds natural theology and the analogous terms that it employs.
528 Nevertheless, 
there are yet two further reasons why Scotus espouses univocal speech regarding God.  
(1) If the term “good” does not have a (full or partial) univocal denotation (= extension) 
when rational agents reference both God and creatures, it appears somewhat unintelligible to 
predicate “good” of either God or the created order.
529 For one cannot employ a given term in 
deductive arguments nor can a speaker employ predicates like “good” or “being” as middle terms 
in syllogisms without equivocation being the result unless the predicates “good” or “being” are 
univocal. Scotus argues that to avoid equivocation, a term must possess sufficient unity in itself; 
it must not be susceptible to equivocation. Moreover, another objection to employing a term that 
is not (at least) partially univocal is that a sound basis for positing similarity between God and 
creatures is thereby lacking. While there is a sense in which God is other than his creation, 
scripture indicates that rational creatures in some way emulate God (Genesis 1:26-27). They are 
consequently similar to deity in certain ways. Yet, in order for two entities (A and B) to be 
similar, they must have certain properties in common. If A and B are similar, then it would 
appear that particular terms could be predicated of A and B univocally. Otherwise, the reputed 
similarity obtaining between A and B would seem questionable.
530 
(2) Scotus thinks that if rational creatures are incapable of knowing what God is, they are 
incapable of knowing that God is. For it seems that one cannot know that a being exists unless 
one has some determinate notion of what the particular being under consideration is with respect 
to its quiddity.
531 One cannot know that a cat is, unless he or she has some determinate concept 
of what a cat quidditatively is. Therefore, according to Scotus, natural knowledge of God is not 
limited to analogy or remotion (via remotionis). Hence, he thinks that it is possible to speak 
univocally with reference to the creator of all things in restricted contexts and with specific 
constraints. Based on the theory of univocity, one might contend that the ability to identify a cat 
 
528 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 112. 
529 Gunton, Act and Being, 70.    
530 Alston, “Literal Talk of God,” 155.                                            
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(supposing that one employs Scotus’ reasoning) does not merely rest on prior experience with 
cats or analogical predication alone. Rather, one can identify cats on the basis of intensional 
properties that allow us to apply the extension “cat” to a domesticated feline mammal, which 
instantiates distinct properties that make it possible for the mammal to be subsumed under a 
particular ontological rubric. Similarly, the Subtle Doctor submits that discourse about God rests 
on metaphysical assumptions concerning “being.” Univocal speech is possible because of 
ontological perfections that obtain in both creatures and God. These perfections (wisdom, 
intellect and will) are logically prior to predicable genera. They are consequently applicable to 
finite beings and the infinite being. 
Theologians who espouse analogical God-talk in opposition to univocal speech may 
object to Scotus’ line of reasoning since predicates such as “wise” “loving” or “person” 
purportedly do not refer to God in the same manner that they refer to creatures. As Swinburne 
insists, however, one may predicate the verb “cause” of a supernova explosion or predicate it of a 
communicative agent whose speech acts bring about feelings of undue exasperation in those 
hearing the agent.
532 The signification of the predicate term “cause” in both cases is identical; 
only the referents or application of the predicate differ. However, a lack of referential 
correspondence (Bedeutung) does not seem to entail a disparity of predicative sense (Sinn).
533 
For instance, the predication of the concept “wise” apparently is isomorphic, whether the referent 
of the concept is Socrates or God. Divine wisdom may be qualitatively greater than Socratic 
wisdom; yet, “wise” evidently bears the identical sense in both instances because it conceptually 
refers to the same abstract quality.
534 As a result, univocal speech pertaining to God appears to 




531 Bonansea, Approach to God, 100. 
532 Swinburne, Revelation, 151. 
533 Sinn and Bedeutung are not being used in a strictly Fregean manner above. Rather, in this study, the words 
respectively denote the lexemic value of a term and that concrete or abstract entity to which a term conceptually 
refers. Kjärgaard discusses Frege’s usage of the vocabulary Sinn und Bedeutung in Metaphor and Parable, 47. 
534 Swinburne, Revelation, 151. 
535 Alston, “Literal Talk of God,” 154-156.                                            
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Chapter 3  
 
Greco-Roman and Judaic Influences on Paternal Metaphors in the Divine Institutes 
 
A.  Greco-Roman Notions of Divine Paternity 
 
In Attic Greek, the noun phrase “my Father” (o` path,r mou) has a colloquial tone in 
contrast to the more formal way of referencing one’s father (o` emoj path,r).
536 Abba (an 
Aramaic word for “father”) apparently functioned as a term of endearment in ancient Judaism.
537 
Nevertheless, while “father” may refer to a biological or figurative originator (Romans 4, 11, 12-
16), cultures universally have employed the morpheme to signify numerous facets of divine 
paternity.
538 The father customarily protects, generates and nourishes life.
539 He symbolizes not 
only familial power and authority, but also the ultimate source of copious and good supplies for 
his children (James 1:17). Moreover, ancient writers depict male parents intersubjectively 
 
536 Donald J. Mastronarde, Introduction to Attic Greek (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 167.   
537 Joachim Jeremias believes that Jesus’ use of Abba is unprecedented in ancient Judaism. See Jeremias, New 
Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus (New York: Scribner’s, 1971), 67; idem, The Prayers of Jesus 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967). The body of literature on this subject is immense with scholars arguing for or 
against Jeremias’ position. Works that present both sides of the issue are Ben Witherington III and Laura M. Ice, 
The Shadow of the Almighty (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2002), 19-35; Marianne Meye Thompson, 
The Promise of the Father: Jesus and God in the New Testament (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 
21-34; Ruth C. Duck, Gender and the Name of God: The Trinitarian Baptismal Formula (New York: The Pilgrim 
Press, 1991). Compare Geza Vermes, Jesus in His Jewish Context (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2003), 37-39; idem, 
The Religion of Jesus the Jew (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 152-183; James Barr, “Abba Isn’t Daddy,” JTS 
39 (1988): 28-47. 
538 Witherington III and Ice, Shadow of the Almighty, 4-5; Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ (London: Burns & 
Oates, 1976), 79-80. Ethica Nicomachea 8.10.4 (1160b1) states: “This is why Homer styles Zeus ‘father,’ for the 
ideal of kingship is paternal government” (kai. ♥omhroj to.n di,a 
pate,ra prosagoreu,ei: patrikh. ga.r avrch. bou,letai h` basilei,a 
e≡nai). See The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press 
and William Heinemann, 1968); Loren T. Stuckenbruck, Angel Veneration and Christology: A Study in Early 
Judaism and in the Christology of the Apocalypse of John, WUNT, 70 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1995), 65. 
539 Compare Corpus Hermeticum 2.17: “God’s other name is ‘father’ because he is capable of making all things. 
Making is characteristic of a father.” See Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a 
New English Translation, with Notes and Introduction, trans. Brian P. Copenhaver (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.                                            
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exercising justice toward their families and respective communities (Job 31:11-22).
540 It is no 
wonder that “The idea of the Godhead as Father of the world and of human beings is extremely 
old.”
541  
One antiquitous source for divine father invocations is early Greco-Roman literature. The 
ancient Greeks now and again utilize “Father” (path,r) tropically: “Now to discover the 
Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to declare 
Him unto all men were a thing impossible” (Timaeus 28C).
542 The term here applies in a 
metaphorical sense to the Platonic Demiurge.
543 Plato also has the fashioner of the cosmos 
declare: “Gods of gods, those works whereof I am framer and father are indissoluble save by my 
will” (Timaeus 41a-b).
544 Reflecting on this passage, Plutarch (45-125 CE) observes that Plato 
appears to posit a divine being who functions as both maker and father of all things.
545 In his 
estimation, Timaeus 28 identifies God as “maker” since deity produced the cosmos; Plato’s 
Demiurge is “Father” in that the Creator putatively has imparted rationality to the human soul.
546 
Plutarch explicitly distinguishes the soul from the intellect.
547 He insists that the intellect “is 
better and more divine than soul.”
548 Nevertheless, Plutarch reasons that the Father-Maker of all 
things brings it about that human reason subsists through the conjoining of intellect (nou/j) and 




540 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 133. 
541 Ibid. 137. 
542 The English translation (ET) is taken from Timaeus; Critias; Cleitophon; Menexenus; Epistles, LCL, 234, 
trans. Robert G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). The Greek reads: to.n me.n ou=n 
poihth.n kai pater,a tou/de tou/ panto. e`urei/n te e;rgon kai. eu`ro,nta 
eivj pa,ntaj avdu,naton le,gein. Compare Platonis Respublica 506E. 
543 See entry for path,r in LSJ. 
544 The ET is
 by Robert G. Bury. The Greek text reads: qeoi. Qew/n w￿n evgw. Dhmiourgo.j 
path,r te e;rgwn [a[ diV evmou geno,mena] a;luta evmou/ ge mh. 
evqe,lontoj. See Phaedrus 257b. 
545 See Deirdre Carabine, The Unknown God. Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena 
(Louvain: Peeters Press, 1995), 55. 
546 Ibid.   
547 John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 211-212.   
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid.                                            
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Even if Plutarch’s affinity for Stoic-informed immanentism formatively shapes his 
exegesis of Plato’s remarks on the universal Father-Maker, it is noteworthy that he construes the 
“Father” of this seminal Platonic text in analogical terms (Table Talk 8.3, 718A).
550 Furthermore, 
while Plutarch’s account of the famed creation narrative and mediatorial Demiurge discussed in 
Timaeus evidently is somewhat novel,
551 the figurative uses of “Father” by Plato certainly do not 
astonish students of Homeric poetry.
552 For in his epic works, Homer frequently refers to Zeus as 
“the Father of gods and men” (path,r avndrw/n te qew/n te) or “the Father of men and 
gods.”
553 Other Greek rhapsodists similarly depict Zeus as the primal source (Urgottheit) of all 
divine beings.
554 For instance, one encounters the Hesiodic epithets “Father of gods and men,”
555 
or “Father of men and gods”
556 in Theogony: Hesiod conceptually develops an entire line of 
descent for the gods in his famed work. Moreover, when Pindar recounts that Zeus generates a 
mature divine Athena from his head,
557 he implicitly reveals that the Olympian engenders the 
goddess in a metaphorical sense.
558 This figurative expression concerning birth from the head of 
 
550 Robert M. Grant, Gods and the One God, Library of Early Christianity, 1 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1986), 78.    
551 Carabine, Unknown God, 55-56. 
552 Brown, The Lord’s Prayer, 8; M. L. West, The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry 
and Myth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 108-109; Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 129. See Homeri Opera, ed. David B. Monro et Thomas W. 
Allen, 2 volumes (Oxonii: Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1969). 
553 See Iliad 1.503, 534, 578; 2.371; 3.276, 350; 4.68; 5.421; 7.179; 8.49, 245; 15.12, 47; 16.458; 20.56; 24.100. 
Cf. the entry for path,r in Richard John Cunliffe, A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1963). Widdicombe writes that Homer refers to Zeus as “Father” over 100 times. See “Fatherhood 
and the Conception of God,” 519-536. For historical accounts of gods giving birth to or engendering humans, see 
West, The East Face of Helicon, 433. Justin refers to “Sons of Zeus” in Apology 1.21. 
554 See Bulgakov’s assessment of the Urgottheit concept in The Comforter, 359-361. Prometheus Bound by 
Aeschylus also employs the divine father motif in a number of poetic lines (4, 40, 947, 969, 1018). 
555 Theogony 40, 54, 69, 396, 456. See Hesiod, Theogony, Works and Days, trans. M.L. West (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
556 Ibid. 541, 580, 642, 836, 929ff.   
557 See Olympian Odes 7.36-40; R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1937), 72. 
558 Of course, describing Zeus as Father is not really limited to the Greek poets. Ovid, recounting the story of 
Jupiter (the Greek Zeus) and Europa, refers to the paternal deity of Mount Olympus as “father and ruler of the gods” 
who assumed the form of a bull and “shambled over the tender grass” (Metamorphoses 2.846-3.2). Moreover, in 
ancient Mesopotamian thought, the moon god Sin (Nanna or Nannar) is called “begetter of gods and men” or 
“begetter of everything.” See Jean Bottéro, Religion in Ancient Mesopotamia, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 33.                                            
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a god abounds with deep mythical symbolism;
559 it lends further credence to the belief that 
divine paternity has an extended and celebrated history.
560 
Pindar (522-443 BCE) also deploys the epithet “Father” as a divine expression. One finds 
him applying this imagery to Zeus in Olympian Odes 1.55-56: “But, alas! He could not brook his 
great prosperity, and, owing to his surfeit of good things, he gat himself an overpowering curse, 
which the Father hung over him in the semblance of a monstrous stone, which he is ever eager to 
thrust away from his head, thus wandering from the ways of joy.”
561 Pindar does not depict 
Father Zeus as merciful or compassionate here; rather, he portrays “the Father of gods and men” 
(path,r avndrw/n te qew/n te) as an austere disciplinarian, who is grave in temperament 
when he metes out judgment to Tantalus.
562 Pindar further speaks of “Father time” as “the Father 
of all,” who is unable to reverse human deeds committed in the past.
563 One can readily find 
other instances where he speaks of a divinity as “Father.”
564 Pindar’s Odes thereby illustrate the 
conceptual matrix in which Lactantius and other Christian thinkers forged their conceptions of 
divine paternity.
565 However, Greek literature does not restrict paternal speech to the poets. One 
additionally encounters the ascription of fatherliness to divinities in Greek philosophic writings. 
 
559 C. Kerényi outlines the mythic tradition of Athena springing forth from the head of Zeus in his work The 
Gods of the Greeks (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2004 [1951]), 118-122. 
560 For the formula Zeu path,r, see Iliad 7.179; Oedipus Tyrannus 202. Note also, how Socrates unfolds the 
emblematic significance of the name Athena in Cratylus 407. 
561  Avlla. ga.r katape,myai  me,gan o;lbon ouvk evduna,sqh ko,rw| d.V 
e[len a;tan u`pe,roplon a[n oi` path.r 
u`perkre,mase kartero.n auvtw/| li,qon. See The Odes of Pindar: Including the Principal 
Fragments, LCL, trans. Sir John Edwin Sandys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961). 
562 Tatian wields this point in Oratio ad Graecos 21: “According to you, Zeus is envious, and hides the dream 
from men, wishing their destruction.” Of course, Plato does not fail to ascertain less than flattering depictions of 
Zeus in the poems of Hesiod or Homer. But he tries to discriminate between the gods as portrayed by the poets and 
the gods in their immanence. See Platonis Respublica 378c-379e; Laws 636, 638.  
563  Olympian Odes 2.15-17: oud´ an  cro,noj o` 
pa,ntwn path.r du,naito qe,men e;rgwn te,loj. Compare  Ethica Nicomachea 6.2, where 
Aristotle points out that not even God can undo the past. 
564 See Olympian Odes 2.25-27; 2.75-76; 6.81; 7.85-89; 10.45; 13.25-26; 14.12; Nemean Odes 5.10, 33; 8.35; 
9.31; 9.53; 10.29; 10.55, 10.75; Isthmian Odes 6.42; 8.23. 
565 For other instances of Greek poets and philosophers invoking God as “Father,” see Brown, Lord’s Prayer, 8-
9.                                            
                                                            102        
     
 
                                                
For instance, the Middle Platonists use the metaphor “Father” as a reference to deities.
566 
Particular examples from various thinkers are presented below. 
Numenius of Apamea (fl. 150 CE) was the foremost Platonist-Pythagorean of the second 
century.
567 He possibly shaped Justin Martyr’s religious ideas and was influential in both 
Neoplatonic and Christian groups (Epistle 70.4).
568 One can outline his belief in a divine triad 
thus. For Numenius, the Primal Intellect (Being-in-itself) engenders a deity known as the 
Demiurge or “Creator” (poihth,j).
569 Numenius additionally believes that the Demiurge is 
identical with a third divine entity, which secedes from the Demiurge to constitute a third deity 
that Numenius designates “creation” (poi,hma).
570 Unlike Plutarch, however, Numenius 
interprets the “Creator and Maker” of Timaeus 28C as two distinct transcendent entities rather 
than as a single being. He believes that the primordial deity (as Father) is also the non-
mereological Prime Mover.
571 The only activity undertaken by this entity is self-contemplation, 
which (according to Numenius’ account) requires no external action or movement at all. The 
Father markedly differs from the Demiurge that actively produces the sensible cosmos: “The 
First God is free from all labor, inasmuch as he is King; while the Creator [Demiurge] rules in 
that he passes through the heaven” (5.27a.8).
572 Numenius thinks that the Primal Intellect neither 
creates, nor acts nor moves.
573 Yet, this divine being remains the Good or One of Middle/Neo-
Platonic thought. These details are substantiated by other material contents of Numenius’ 
 
566 The Middle Platonist period spans from ca. 130 BCE (beginning with Antiochus of Ascalon) through 270 CE 
(ending with Plotinus). For the possible relationship between Lactantius and Middle Platonism, see Michel Perrin, 
L'ouvrage du Dieu créateur, 2 volumes (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974). 
567 Grant, Gods and the One God, 153. 
568 M. J. Edwards, “On the Platonic Schooling of Justin Martyr,” JTS n.s. 42 (1991): 17-34. 
569 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 363-366. 
570 Ibid. 368.   
571 F. E. Peters supplies helpful background information on the nexus between divine nou/j and fatherhood. 
See Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 132ff. 
572 to.n me.n prwton qeo,n argon einai ergwn xumpantwn kai. basilea, to.n 
dhmiourgon de. Qeo,n hgemonein diV ouranou ionta. See the Greek text in The Neoplatonic 
Writings of Numenius, trans. Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie (Lawrence: Selene Books, 1987). 
573 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 368.                                              
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fragments: “Numenius, who teaches three Gods, calls the First Father: the Second Creator, and 
the Third Creature; for, according to his opinion, the world is the Third God”(6.36a).
574   
Numenius “asserts a double Creating Divinity, the one Father, but the other Creator” 
(6.36c).
575 He writes: “The First God, who exists in himself, is simple; for as he absolutely deals 
with none but himself, he is in no way divisible; however, the Second and Third God are One. 
When however this (unity) is brought together with Matter, which is Doubleness, the (One 
Divinity) indeed unites it, but is by Matter split, inasmuch as Matter is full of desires, and in a 
flowing condition” (5.26.3).
576 One can detect manifest adumbrations of the Trinity doctrine in 
these declarations. The relevant portion of the text, however, is his doctrine of a paternal deity. 
Even if Lactantius was not personally familiar with the fragments of Numenius—he certainly 
was acquainted with the tenets of Middle Platonism, through which second century theorists 
were inclined to filter such ideas. 
Albinus of Smyrna (fl. ca. 151-152 CE) is another prominent Middle Platonist who 
utilizes paternal notions of deity.
577 Following Aristotle (Metaphysica 12), he affirms that God is 
pure thought contemplating pure thought.
578 The primal deity (= the Father) exclusively reflects 
on himself as the transcendent object of deliberation (Didaskalikos 10).
579 As the final cause 
(causa finalis) of all existent things, the Father is the Unmoved Mover or principal deity 
 
574 noumh,nioj me.n ga.r treij anumnhsaj qeouj pate,ra me.n kalei 
to.n prwton, poihton de. to.n deute,ron poihma de. to.n tri,ton. 
575 kaqaper enqauta ditton, fhsi, to. dhmiourgikon, to. me.n path.r, to. de. 
poihthj. 
576 The Greek of Numenius’ text reads:  
o` qeoj o` me.n prwtoj en e`autw wn estin aplouj, dia 
to. e`autw suggignomenoj diolou mh pote einai diaretoj; o` qeoj mentoi o` 
deuteroj kai.  tritoj estin e`ij; sumferomenoj de. 
th|  u`lh| duadi oush| e`noi me.n authn, scizetai de. u`p 
authj, epiqumhtikon hqoj exoushj kai. reoushj. 
577 R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1937). 
578 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 283. Plotinus (Ennead 5.1.9) also understood Aristotle’s First Mover in terms of 
self-thinking mind, but criticized this view on the basis that mind must think of something apart from itself. See 
John M. Rist, “The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle,” RMeta 27.1 (1973): 75-87. 
579 The Platonic Doctrines of Albinus, trans. Jeremiah Reedy (Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1991), 39.                                            
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superseding the cosmic Demiurge.
580 Furthermore, this contemplative divine intellect is ineffable 
(a;rrhtoj).
581 However, to a certain extent, Albinus thinks that “all things” participate in the 
primal Father by making intellect (nou/j) “the object of thought and of desire.”
582 But what 
does the divine appellation “Father” mean for Albinus? 
Albinus argues that God (qua primal intellect) is Father in that “he is the cause of all 
things and orders the heavenly Mind or the Soul of the World in accordance with himself and 
with his thoughts; for by his own will he has filled all things with himself, rousing up the Soul of 
the World and turning it towards himself, as being the cause of its Mind” (Didaskalikos 10).
583 
He conjoins divine fatherhood with the concepts of pancausality and cosmic order. As Father, the 
First God causes, arranges and fills all things with himself.
584 Hence, rather than emphasizing the 
primal deity’s masculinity, “Father” (in Albinus) places stress on God’s generative or causal 
functionality in relation to all things: “There is also God, the Father and Cause of all things.”
585 
By now, the metaphorical significance of “Father” should be thematic. Nevertheless, this study 
must now review the divine fatherhood concept of Maximus. 
Maximus of Tyre (fl. 152 CE) explicitly professes his belief that there is one “God, 
Father and Creator of all that exist” (qeo.j o` twn ontwn path,r kai dhmiourgoj) 
who is ineffable and incomprehensible.
586 Despite this deity’s incomprehensibility, he is 
nonetheless considered responsible for perpetuating different races of humankind.
587 The very 
human invocation of God as Father evidently connotes affection and paternal care.
588 One God 
 
580 Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, 129. 
581 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 283-284. 
582 Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, 130.   
583 Quoted in Dillon, Middle Platonists, 283-284. 
584 More precisely, primal nou/j orders the universe mediately through the Second Mind or Intellect. See 
Reale, History of Ancient Philosophy, 221-222. Reale’s translator evidently prefers to render nou/j as “mind” 
which should not pose any serious hardships for students of classical Greek. Nevertheless, Peters hones the 
definition of this term somewhat, adding that it can also denote “intelligence or intellect.” See Greek Philosophical 
Terms, 132-139. 
585 Reedy, The Platonic Doctrines, 37. 
586 Oration 2.10. See Grant, Gods and the One God, 48, 82. 
587 Oration 35.1. 
588 Ibid. 35.1-2.                                            
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and Father governs the cosmos as he engenders gods and men.
589 Maximus claims that all 
nations share a consensus on this point: “there is one God who is father and king of all, and with 
him many other gods, his children, who share in his sovereign power.”
590 Moreover, he insists 
that the Father of all is anonymous.
591   
Plotinus (205-270 CE) was born in Upper Egypt (Deltaic Lycopolis). He presumably 
received his philosophical instruction from Ammonius Saccas
592 in Alexandria and was a 
contemporary of Origen (ca. 186-255 CE). Anthony Kenny describes Plotinus as the last great 
non-Christian philosopher and the founder of Neo-Platonism.
593 He composed writings that 
Porphyry (his disciple) organized in nine groups called Enneads. Plotinus employs the term 
“Father” in these writings as a metaphor for God: he prefers to use the paternal epithet to 
describe the One.
594 The One is ultimate reality (ens realissimum) for Plotinus; it is an offshoot 
of the Platonic Good. 
Plotinus argues that intellect generatively emanates from the One.
595 He associates the 
One with Zeus, “the [mythical] father of gods and men,” whereas he identifies intellect as the 
offspring of the Good.
596 Furthermore, the One is “Father” for Plotinus in that it engenders the 
human soul: “The Fatherland to us is There [sic] whence we have come, and There [sic] is The 
Father” (Ennead 1.6.8).
597 In actuality, the One is the Father of all things: “What can it be that 
has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely 
 
589 Ibid. 11.12; 41.2. 
590 Ibid. 11.5. 
591 See Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, ed. 
Michael B. Trapp (Stutgardiae: B.G. Teubner, 1994), 23; idem, The Philosophical Orations, trans. Michael B. Trapp 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 324-325; Robert M. Grant, The Early Christian Doctrine of God (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1966), 5.   
592 Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory the Great, Oxford History of the 
Christian Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 173. Joseph W. Trigg, Origen (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 12. 
593 Brief History, 96. 
594 Carabine, Unknown God, 106. 
595 Ibid. Ennead 5.1.2. 
596 See Platonis Respublica 506 d-e. 
597 See Plotinus, The Six Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna and B.S. Page  (Chicago and London: William 
Benton, 1952), 25; idem, Plotinus, LCL, trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 volumes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1988); Plotini opera recognovit Adolphus Kirchhoff (Lipsiae: Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 1856); Carabine, 
Unknown God, 106.                                            
                                                            106        
     
 
                                                
of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It?” Intellect [nou/j] also “may be thought of as 
a father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with himself” 
(5.1.1-3).
598 Plotinus thereby concludes: “In two ways, then, the Intellectual-Principle [nou/j] 
enhances the divine quality of the soul, as father and as immanent presence.”
599 In a manner 
consistent with third century Christian notions regarding the Godhead, Plotinus presupposes a 
triad of hypostases, namely, the One, Intellect and the Soul.
600 Ultimately, the provenance of this 
concept appears to be Egypt, wherein a number of hypostatic triads prevailed before and during 
the time of Plotinus.
601 Stead nonetheless believes that such triadic conceptions of the divine had 
little to no influence on the ontological dogma of the Trinity.
602 
In addition to Platonic sources for divine Father imagery, one also finds the metaphor 
employed in Stoic literature. Lucius Annaeus Cornutus (a Stoic theorist of allegory) recounts that 
Zeus is father of gods and men since the natural world brings forth all beings as fathers engender 
children.
603 He wields the formula “Zeus the Father of gods and men” (o` Zeuj path.r 
le,getai qew/n kai. avnqrw,pwn) to describe the Olympian father’s relationship to 
his figurative children.
604 However, Cornutus interprets this expression about Zeus in analogical 
terms.
605 He consequently believes that the Olympian father generates men and gods just as 
earthly fathers generate their children (w`j oi. patere,j gennw/si ta. te,kna).
606 
But the emphasis concerning paternity in Cornutus is not on masculinity or literal acts of begettal 
through coitus. Divine paternity is given a tropic cast. 
 
598 See Ibid. 104; William Ralph Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus: The Gifford Lectures at Saint Andrews, 1917-
1918, 2 volumes (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1941). 
599 See Ennead 5.2.1 for Plotinus’ allusion to metafora.. 
600 Chadwick, Church in Ancient Society, 175. 
601 See Paul Johnson, The Civilization of Ancient Egypt (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 127, 176-177; John 
Gwyn Griffiths, Triads and Trinity (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996); Siegfried Morenz, Egyptian Religion 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 255-257. 
602 Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, 155. 
603 Grant, Gods and the One God, 78. 
604 Epidrome 9. This study uses the Greek text found in Allen Wikgren, et al. Hellenistic Greek Texts (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), 148-152. 
605 Grant, Gods and the One God, 78. 
606 Epidrome 9.                                            
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Epictetus (ca. 55-135 CE) was a Stoic philosopher based in Nicopolis of Epidurus.
607 He 
was likely born in Hierapolis (modern-day Turkey) but moved to Nicopolis when Domitian (81-
96 CE) exiled all philosophers from first century Italy during his emperorship.
608 His works 
include the Enchiridion and Discourses (composed by Arrian); additionally, there are extant 
fragments written by diverse authors who expound on his ethical teachings.
609 While Epictetus 
tries to discern how rational beings may attain well-being (euvdaimoni,a), which is an 
ethical concern, one also encounters theological elements in his works.
610 Furthermore, it is 
significant that Long considers Epictetus to be “one of the most memorable and influential 
figures of Graeco-Roman antiquity.”
611 The following paragraph therefore considers the doctrine 
of divine fatherhood in Epictetus. 
Brunner describes the god of Epictetus as a “kindly Father,” whom is portrayed as 
meriting thanksgiving and praise.
612 Nevertheless, Brunner qualifies his observation by noting 
that the god of Epictetus is not ecstatic: this deity does not communicate or disclose himself to 
those who constitute fragments of the divine.
613 Epictetus conscripts pantheism (in this case, the 
notion that cosmic particulars are discrete fragments of God) to stress the paternal nature of the 
divine. Since he is convinced that God is all and all is God, Epictetus insists that the cosmos 
mechanically obeys the inexorable principle known as reason (lo,goj). This active 
metaphysical principle has the effect of binding humans to God so that rational beings on earth 
are stirred to acclaim God as their Father (Discourses 1.6.40). The effect of being a son of God is 
freedom from fear, grief or terror.
614 Since God is the Father of gods and men, one should take 
 
607 A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion, trans. George Long (BiblioBazaar, 2007), 
10.  
608 A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 10. Further 
details concerning the banishment of all philosophers from Italy during the reign of Domitian are outlined in Alfred 
John Church and William Jackson Brodribb, Pliny’s Letters (Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 
1872), 26-29. 
609 See The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, trans. William Abbott Oldfather 
(London: W. Heinemann, 1926). 
610 Long, Epictetus, 162. 
611 Ibid. 8. 
612 Brunner, Dogmatics, 1:200. 
613 Ibid. 
614 Epictetus, Discourses 1.9.6. See Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, trans. 
Reverend R. H. Fuller (Cleveland and New York: Median Books, 1956), 139; Long, Epictetus, 168-169.                                            
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pride in human dignity or in that which rational creatures have in common with God, namely, the 
soul and the intellect. Yet, most rational agents do not exult in their divine inheritance; they do 
not revel in the fact that they are exalted fragments of God: “But if Caesar (the emperor) should 
adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, 
will you not be elated?” (Discourses 1.3.1; 3.24.3)
615 Nevertheless, despite the prima facie 
appearance of a personal deity in Stoicism, Stoic theology is essentially pantheistic.
616 The 
“Father” of Stoicism differs qualitatively from the Judeo-Christian “Father.” Hence, while Greek 
philosophers thus indirectly contribute to the thought world of Lactantius, the primary source of 
his fatherhood doctrine is the Tanakh and the NT. There are at least four ways in which early 
Judaism conceives God as Father. The following section reviews these conceptions of divine 
paternity through the conceptual lens of the Tanakh and Second Temple Judaism. These uses 
probably function as the foremost antecedents to Lactantian paterology along with the form of 
Latin theology that preceded Lactantius. 
 
B.  Ancient Judaic Views of God the Father 
 
 The Hebrew prophets do not refer to God as “Father” (ab) with any frequency in the 
canonical writings of ancient Judaism.
617 The divine title occurs approximately twenty times in 
the Tanakh (OT).
618  But these relatively uncommon occurrences still permit one to ascertain that 
ancient Judaism viewed God as a Father in four primary ways.
619  
(1) God is Father to the nation of Israel since YHWH brings it about that the children of 
Israel exist as a nation (Exodus 4:22-23; Deuteronomy 8:5; 32:6; Psalm 103:13; Isaiah 63:16; 
 
615 See Discourses 1.14; 2.8. 
616 Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1902), 77-80; 
Micka, Problem of Divine Anger, 8. Kelly applies the vocabulary “pantheistic materialism” to Stoicism (Doctrines, 
11). 
617 See Fortman, Triune God, 4; Witherington III and Ice, Shadow of the Almighty, 5; Wilken, Spirit of Early 
Christian Thought, 106. 
618 O’Collins, Tripersonal God, 14; Cooper, Our Father, 106. 
619 The Hebrew writers of the Tanakh evidently do not speak of divine paternity in the sense of a triune relation. 
Fortman writes: “More recent scholars find no evidence in the [Tanakh] that any sacred writer believed in or 
suspected the existence of a divine paternity and filiation within the Godhead itself” (Triune God, 4).                                             
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64:8; Jeremiah 31:9; Malachi 1:6; 2:10).
620 In contrast to immortal “fathers” of Greek 
mythology, when Israel refers to YHWH as its one Father, “the idea in the background is not the 
biological one of procreation, but the theological one of election.”
621 The Judaic view of a 
paternal divinity additionally stands in marked contrast to the god of Stoic pantheism.
622 Unlike 
the deity of Stoicism, the Tanakh portrays YHWH as a personal Father for the sons of Israel. He 
guides the comparatively scant nation through the Middle Eastern wilderness, administering 
remedial discipline that is rooted in love (Deuteronomy 1:31; Proverbs 3:12; Malachi 3:17). In 
accordance with the testimony contained in the Tanakh, the Israelite divinity is not simply a 
universal or immutable force mechanistically governing the cosmos; nor is YHWH an 
impersonal fire that systematically organizes all things.
623 Rather, the God of Judaism carries 
Israel in his everlasting arms, leading the nation through the Sinai desert with figurative cords of 
love (Deuteronomy 33:2; Hosea 11:4).
624 
Kasper states that ancient Israel believed God has “the attitude of a father.”
625 Marsh 
similarly affirms that the usage of “Father” as a divine appellation in the Tanakh  “is clearly a 
metaphor, an image employed to express some aspect or aspects of God’s relationship with 
God’s people.”
626 Moreover, Jeremiah the prophet indicates that God’s paternity with respect to 
Israel is symbolic or metaphorical, when he speaks of YHWH “becoming” a Father to Israel 
 
620 Andrew Hill notes that Malachi and Jeremiah use “Father” (ab) as a metaphor for God’s relationship to his 
people, Israel. See Malachi: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible (New York 
and London: Doubleday, 1998), 224. 
621 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 79. Scholars consistently appear to understand God’s fatherhood as one of election 
rather than procreation. For instance, John W. Cooper maintains regarding Deuteronomy 32:6: “The fatherhood of 
God is connected here with the election and salvation of his people” (Our Father, 106). See Thompson, Promise of 
the Father, 45; Paul Mankowski, “The Gender of Israel’s God,” in This Is My Name Forever, 40-41. O’Collins also 
contends that there are no biological connotations associated with the OT divine term Father (Tripersonal God, 14). 
Conversely, John Pairman Brown (on scant evidence) avers that YHWH begets sons in the same carnal manner that 
Zeus does. See “From Divine Kingship to Dispersal of Power in the Mediterranean City-State,” Zeitschrift für die 
alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 105.1 (1993): 62-86. 
622 See Acts 17:28. 
623 In Stoic physics, spirit (pneu/ma) is “something fiery and ethereal,” but material (Schneweis, Angels and 
Demons, 38). Gerald Bray explains how ancient Christians interpreted the Biblical language referring to God as a 
consuming fire in Doctrine of God, 37-38. See Novatian, De Trinitate 7.4-5. 
624 Kelly, Doctrines, 17-19. Contra Kelly, however, Michael Frede believes that the Stoic and Aristotelian gods 
are personal. See “Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy” in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, ed. Polymnia 
Athanassiadi and Michael Frede (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 48-49. Compare Metaphysica 1072b24-30. 
625 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 80.                                             
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(Jeremiah 31:9 NRSV).
627 Therefore, it seems that the paternal title for deity is a well-
established metaphor in ancient Judaism: the expression appears to form part of an avowed 
unfamiliar identity synthesis (i.e. a metasememe) that communicates the notion of God electing 
or providentially guiding Israel, the historical seed of Abraham (2 Chronicles 20:7; Isaiah 41:8). 
Consequently, although the communal address “our Father” is “relatively late,” (according to 
Vermes) the metaphor of God as Father (ab) to the Israelite nation appears to have been a 
prominent leitmotif in the sacred documents of early Judaism (Prayer for Intercession 3:5-8).
628  
Marianne Meye Thompson has proposed yet other ways in which ancient Israel viewed 
God as Father.  She contends that YHWH is the Father of Israel in that he functions as the 
(tropic) familial head of the nation.
629 That is to say, God is the progenitor of Israel, bequeathing 
life and an inheritance to his metaphorical progeny since he is the figurative patriarch of the clan. 
Moreover, YHWH evidently has deep affection for those he deems offspring. Therefore, as 
Father, the Jewish God provides for, disciplines or lovingly corrects his children (Deuteronomy 
7:6-8; 8:3). 
Thompson also thinks that YHWH exercises the patria postestas over the children of 
Israel. They in turn should obey and reverence YHWH as Father (Malachi 1:6).
630 She thus 
indicates that the Tanakh concept of God the Father is a particular as opposed to a universal 
concept: YHWH is Father to Israel, not to all humans (Psalm 147:19, 20). Thompson seems to 
argue that one can only apprehend the notion of God as “Father” in ancient Judaism by becoming 
intimately familiar with the ancient near eastern culture in which this notion was forged. If this is 
how one should construe her study, then one could say that Thompson’s observations lend 
 
626 Marsh, Triune God, 29. 
627 See Wilhelm Gesenius and E. Kautzsch, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar, trans. A. E. Cowley (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 2006), §44 which explains the “flexion” of the qal perfect (used in Jeremiah 31:9) and the different ways that 
it can be translated. 
628 See Tobit 13:4; Antiquities. 5.93. Cf. Vermes, Religion of Jesus the Jew, 175-176; Marianne Meye 
Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John (Cambridge, UK and Grand Rapids: 2001), 64. However, James M. Scott 
points to 1 Chronicles 29:10 as an early instance of the “our Father formula.” See 2 Corinthians (Peabody: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1998), 31. 
629 Thompson, Promise of the Father, 18. 
630 Ibid. 18, 48. See Tg. Isaiah 63.16; 64:8. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:260-261.                                            
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support to contentions set forth by those espousing a pragmatic approach to metaphoric 
recognition—the context of utterance shapes one’s understanding of the text. 
(2) YHWH is Father to the King of Israel. (2 Samuel 7:12-14; Psalm 2:6-7).
631 The 
nomenclature “sons of God” was familiar in the ancient Near East, particularly in Egypt.
632 
YHWH’s designation of Israelite kings as “sons” is thus not wholly surprising.
633 God begets the 
King in that he installs him upon the divine throne as the God-given leader of Israel or Judah (1 
Chronicles 28:5; 29:23).
634 The title “Father” ensures God’s people that the promise found in 
Psalm 2:7 is binding or immutable respecting Israel’s human ruler: the Davidic pledge inevitably 
will come to fruition (Isaiah 55:1-5).
635 Even in its apparent Messianic sense, “Son” (Psalm 2:7) 
only has reference to the Davidic king’s function; it does not convey the thought of a divine 
generation but rather “an investiture with royal dignity.”
636  
Artur Weiser observes that the Psalms repudiate the notion of God literally procreating a 
royal human son (Psalm 89:26). He argues that the Psalmist’s words preclude YHWH from 
corporeally generating the Israelite monarch in view of the adverbial “today” and the familiar 
adoption formula “you are my son.”
637 The King becomes God’s scion through the process of 
enthronement: he is God’s vice-regent or emblematic royal offspring (Psalm 2:6).
638 
Accordingly, the language contained in the second psalm turns out to be metaphorical.
639 While 
the foremost Davidic sovereign whom God adopts as Son is evidently the Messiah (1 QSa 2:11-
 
631 Paul Mankowski, “The Gender of Israel’s God,” 44-45; Thompson, God of the Gospel of John, 64. 
632 ABD 6:128-129. Witherington notes that some ancients considered Amun Re of Egypt Father of the gods 
(Shadow of the Almighty, 5). For other ancient near eastern parallels of divine paternity, see Mitchell Dahood (S.J.), 
Psalms 1-50, The Anchor Bible (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1966), 11-12; Jean Bottéro, Religion in 
Ancient Mesopotamia, 32-33. 
633 O’Collins, Tripersonal God, 14. 
634 Ibid. 15. See Vermes, Jesus in His Jewish Context, 29. 
635 A. A. Anderson, 2 Samuel, Word Biblical Commentary, volume 11 (Dallas: Word Books, 1989), 122. 
636 Brunner, Dogmatics, 1:210. 
637 Artur Weiser, The Psalms: A Commentary, The Old Testament Library (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2000), 113. Based on similar extra-biblical references, Gottlob Schrenk believes that the formula in Psalm 2:7 
is one of adoption, not generation (TDNT 5:968). Compare Scott, 2 Corinthians, 55. 
638 George Wesley Buchanan, Biblical and Theological Insights from Ancient and Modern Civil Law (Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 14. 
639 Anderson, 2 Samuel, 122; Pierre Grelot, The Language of Symbolism: Biblical Theology, Semantics, and 
Exegesis (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2006), 43.                                            
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12; 4QFlor 1:10 = 4Q174; 4Q246), Psalm 2:7 does not appear to corroborate the eternal 
generation doctrine; nor does it give support to the idea of God literally siring children.
640 
(3) Second Temple literature depicts YHWH as a Father for individual pious Jews: 
“While the exact nuance of the term ‘Father’ remains hazy, there can be no doubt that even on 
the individual level the relationship between God and the Israelites was seen from a family point 
of view.”
641 A noteworthy development began to transpire respecting the Wisdom literature of 
the Second Temple period. It appears that individual devout worshipers of YHWH began to 
address God openly as Father (Wisdom 14:3).
642 Vermes even contends that adherents of Second 
Temple Judaism came to view their status of being God’s figurative children predominantly as a 
matter of merit, not hereditary privilege.
643  He quotes Jubilees 1:24-25 in support of this 
position: “I will be their Father and they shall be my sons, and they shall be called the sons of the 
living God.” Vermes’ thesis may commend itself in some ways; yet, it may be difficult to sustain 
his proposal in light of pre-intertestamental texts that seem to identify pious Israelites as children 
of God by virtue of merit (Psalm 103:13; Hosea 1:10-11). In any event, both proto and 
deuterocanonical works point to individual godly Jews being adjudged children of YHWH.
644 
The writer of Sirach addresses YHWH as Lord, Father and Master of his life (Sirach 23:1, 4) and 
exclaims: “O Lord, you are my father, you are my champion and my savior; do not abandon me 
in time of trouble, in the midst of storms and dangers” (Sirach 51:10 NAB).
645 Another 
intertestamental author invokes God as “Father,” forthrightly utilizing the conventionalized 
expression of intimacy “O Father” (3 Maccabees 6:3, 8). The salient point is that individual 
 
640 Wolfhart Pannenberg also maintains that the second psalm does not posit a physical or carnal birth for the 
King of Israel. His “birth” is not analogous to sons born from the Egyptian deity Re. See The Apostles’ Creed in the 
Light of  Today’s Questions, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), 63. 
641 Vermes, Religion of Jesus the Jew, 173.   
642 Grelot appeals to Wisdom 2:13-18 to uphold the position that “by the Greek period, every righteous person 
came to be considered an adopted child of God” (Language of Symbolism, 43). He notes that the pious benediction 
“our Father, our King” (’abinu malkenu) was a characteristic formula employed during the Hellenistic period. Cf. 
Gerald Friedlander, The Jewish Sources of the Sermon on the Mount (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2005), 133. 
643 Jesus in His Jewish Context, 35. 
644 Thomas Walter Manson, The Teaching of Jesus: Studies of Its Form and Content (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1963), 91-92.   
645 The formula “my Father and my God” (abi we'lohay) appears in the DSS from Qumran (4Q372 1.16). See 
Scott, 2 Corinthians, 31; Eileen M. Schuller, “The Psalm of 4Q372 1 within the Context of Second Temple Prayer,” 
CBQ 54 (1992): 67-79.                                            
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g to consider YHWH a tropic Father to the holy angels in 
the con
11:12; Sirach 4:10; Isaiah 42:13-14; 49:15; 66:13).
651 For instance, Cooper thinks that 
                                                
ancient Israelites viewed God as their Father; they appealed to him by conscripting paternal 
speech in non-corporate prayers.
646 Furthermore, it is significant that Sirach qualifies “Father” 
by the appositional expressions “champion” and “savior.” These nuancing terms illustrate the 
sense in which ancient writers are inclined to think that God is the Father of particu
es.
647 
(4) Although the canonical Hebrew-Aramaic Scriptures do not explicitly categorize 
YHWH as the Father of the holy angels, they do imply that YHWH is the Father of all the sacred 
spirits by means of a rhetorical phenomenon known as “metaphorical entailment.”
648 The OT 
(Tanakh) writers apply the terminology “sons” to the holy angels who apparently comprise 
God’s heavenly regiment. For instance, one finds the expression “sons of God” (bene ha elohim) 
probably used with reference to angels in Genesis 6:2; Job 1:6; 2:1-6; 38:4-7; Psalm 89:6.
649 The 
term “son” entails the correlative relation “father.” If the angels are (metaphorical) sons, then it 
seems to follow logically that they have a (metaphorical) father since these terms appear to imply 
opposed relations. Therefore, one can say that YHWH is Father to his angelic sons through a 
process of metaphorical entailment. The one concept “sons” implies the corresponding notion 
“father.” Scripture further indicates that angels are creations of God, not literally begotten divine 
progeny.
650 Accordingly, it seems fittin
text of ancient Judaic thought. 
(5) Finally, the Tanakh and Apocrypha portray God as a maternal figure to Israel. These 
works apparently depict YHWH in this manner by using both similes and metaphors (Numbers 
 
646 This paragraph is much indebted to Witherington’s Shadow of the Almighty, 13-14. Moreover, see Vermes 
(Religion of Jesus, 176) for Pseudepigraphal, Philonic, and DSS quotes concerning God’s paternitas. 
647 Compare 3 Maccabees 5:7; 7:6. 
648 See Josef Stern, “Metaphor as Demonstrative,” The Journal of Philosophy 82.12 (1985): 677-710; George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, “Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language,” The Journal of Philosophy 77.8 (1980): 
453-486. 
649 The intertestamental literature of Judaism also refers to the angels as “sons.” See Jubilees 2:2; 5:1; 1 Enoch 
7:2. But see Ronald S. Hendel, “Of Demigods and the Deluge: Toward an Interpretation of Genesis 6:1-4,” JBL 
106.1 (1987): 13-26. He argues that the “sons of God” are lesser deities in the assembly of YHWH. 
650 Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 1:289. 
651 The holy writings of Judaism evidently translate God’s fatherliness into the “language of womanliness and 
motherhood” at times (Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 140).                                            
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Deuteronomy 32:18 contains an “explicit maternal metaphor for God” in relation to Israel.
652 
There may even be mixed metaphors in this biblical passage since the writer possibly speaks of 
YHWH both fathering and giving birth to the nation of Israel: “You neglected the Rock who begot 
(yalad) you, And forgot the God who gave you birth (chûwl)” (NASB).
653 Despite various issues 
pertaining to the translation of Deuteronomy 32:18, it seems that the text employs a mixed 
metaphor, albeit one that does not assume the syntactical form A is B (i.e. “God is the Mother of 
Israel”).
654 
Paul Brassey recently has also insisted that certain passages in the ostensible Deutero-
Isaiah metaphorically predicate divine maternity or even allow for “a more fluid depiction of 
YHWH in terms of gender.”
655 He appeals to Isaiah 45:9-11, 46:3-4, and 49:14-15, texts which 
(for the most part) seem to press metaphors into service rather than similes in order that the 
prophet may depict God’s alleged maternity.
656 Isaiah 45:9-11 (NASB) evidently predicates 
motherliness of YHWH by means of a metasememic trope in the context of describing the God 
of Israel as a potter. Grelot additionally thinks that Isaiah 49:14-15 ascribes “maternal 
sentiments” to God: he concludes that “the God of Israel embraces in his person both paternal 
authority and maternal compassion.”
657 Yet, if the Isaian passages do portray divine maternity in 
figurative terms, Volf’s observation concerning the non-ontologization of gender in God seems 
to appertain here.
658 That is, while the Hebrew prophets undoubtedly appear to have affirmed 
YHWH’s “maternal” nature by means of emblematic speech, one does not have to think of the 
Israelite deity as inherently masculine or feminine since God presumably does not have a sexed 
or fleshly corpus in which sexuality or gender are rooted (Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9). 
Additionally, one should undoubtedly read these Isaian passages in their proper rhetorical 
contexts. By realizing the contextual focus of these prophetic images, it is possible to discern that 
 
652 Cooper, Our Father, 71. 
653 Ibid. 
654 Michael P. Knowles, “ ‘The Rock, His Work is Perfect’: Unusual Imagery for God in Deuteronomy XXXII,” 
VT 39.3 (1989): 307-322. 
655 Brassey, Metaphor, 178-180. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Grelot, The Language of Symbolism, 44. 
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the portrayal of God’s reputed motherhood in Isaiah serves as “a narrowly rhetorical and 
deliberately paradoxical conceit.”
659 That is a way of saying that God is a “mother” in unexpected 
ways (Isaiah 66:10-16).  
One usage for “Father” that is noticeably absent in the Tanakh is the concept of God as the 
Father of all. While certain verses from the Tanakh may seem to imply or teach that God is a 
universal father, on closer inspection, such intimations apparently dissipate. Malachi 2:10 is one 
exemplar text in which a Hebrew prophet evidently identifies YHWH as Father to Israel.
660 
Malachi’s allusion to the ancestral “covenant” (berith) as well as the literary context of the verse 
(Malachi 1:6-8; 2:11-12) implies that “Father” is limited to the God of Israel in this scriptural 
passage. The prophet seemingly does not affirm God’s universal paternity; the point of Malachi 
2:10 appears to be that “Israel’s corporate identity or personality is rooted in Yahweh alone.”
661 
The writers of the Tanakh do not appear to make God’s universal paternity explicit.
662 
The Tanakh probably influenced the Lactantian concept of God the Father. However, his 
notion of divine paternity supersedes what one encounters in the Tanakh. Lactantius believes that 
God is the Father of all rational agents
663 and of the Son.
664 And he noticeably de-emphasizes 
gender where the divine is concerned or views God as one who is analogous to a Father. On the 
other hand, there is a sense in which Lactantius thinks that deity is humanity’s authentic Father—
even if God is not inherently or ontologically masculine. God is the entity that has granted 
existence to all rational agents. Moreover, God has blessed humans with a meaningful purpose in 
life. Not only did ancient Judaism’s paterology affect the Lactantian concept of divine fatherhood, 
however, but the apologist was also familiar with concepts of divine paternity that obtained in the 
ancient Greco-Roman milieu. His major literary work bears discernable marks of the socio-
religious matrix in which it was composed. But one does not have to infer at what points 
Lactantius is alluding to pagan notions of divine paternity as opposed to the Tanakh: Lactantius 
 
659 Mankowski, “The Gender of Israel’s God,” in This Is My Name Forever, 59-61. 
660 See The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version Containing the Old and New Testaments (Iowa Falls: 
World Bible Publishers, 1989). 
661 Hill, Malachi, 224. 
662 See Richard A. Taylor and E. Ray Clendenen, Haggai, Malachi, New American Commentary, vol. 21A 
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2004), 322-323. 
663 DI 2.12.15. 
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demonstrates repeatedly that he is employing non-Christian treatises or notions for apologetic 
purposes by liberally quoting classical writers of antiquity.
665 The next section of this study will 
explore such passages and demonstrate how they contribute to an understanding of Lactantian 
thought concerning God the Father. 
 
C.  Greco-Roman Paternal Imagery in the Divine Institutes 
 
Lactantius appeals to non-Christian writers of the Greco-Roman milieu to support his 
Christian beliefs. Divinae institutiones often alludes to such writers in the context of providing a 
vigorous defense for the Christian faith. This section consequently will document the passages 
wherein Lactantius refers to ancient writers, who speak of God in paternal terms. Their use of the 
“Father” metaphor for God is instructive. These writers illuminate the Lactantian use of “Father” 
since they function as possible conceptual antecedents for the Christian apologist. 
Cleanthes of Assos (331-232 BCE) was both a philosopher and bard, who supervised the 
Stoa Poikile (a philosophical school in antiquity) from 262 BC onwards, after Zeno (its original 
founder) died.
666 He introduced a theological motif to Stoicism by articulating the cosmology of 
his predecessor with passionate, but contemplative, religiosity.
667 Cleanthes encapsulates his 
reverence for the universal Father in Hymn to Zeus: “the First Cause of Nature, who rules all things 
with Law, Hail!”
668 This work was so influential that intellectuals of antiquity felt a deep need to 
see that it was carefully preserved. Nevertheless, although Cleanthes was an innovative thinker, 
contemporaries deemed him an obtuse learner, who lacked the mental adroitness required for 
adjudicating intricate logical problems.
669 His successor whose name was Chrysippus thus 
preceded Cleanthes in terms of intellectual prominence. Diogenes Laertius accordingly viewed the 
former as the second originator of Stoicism.
670 
 
665 Ibid. 1.2.3-5. 
666 See Frederick Charles Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 volumes (New York: Image, 1993-1994), 1:385. 
667 Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 volumes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1985),1:10; Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, 44. 
668 Quoted in Manson, Teaching of Jesus, 91. 
669 See Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 355. Cicero accuses 
Cleanthes of being theologically inconsistent and capricious (De natura deorum 1.14). 
670 Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, 72.                                      117 
 
 
                                                
Anaximenes of Miletus (fl. c. 546-525 BCE) was a Presocratic thinker renowned for 
postulating air as the primordial cosmic substrate: “He held that the first principle is air, and that 
this is the unlimited.”
671 Anaximenes was also a noted physiologist (= natural philosopher) and 
monist, who in concert with Cleanthes reasoned that air is the chief deity (Divinae institutiones 
1.5.19).
672 He evidently used the term “God” (qeo.j) to signify the divine status of air.
673 Hence, 
when referring to Cleanthes’ and Anaximenes’ respective theories of air, Lactantius recounts that: 
“to this opinion our poet [Virgil] has assented: ‘Then almighty father Aether descends in fertile 
showers into the bosom of his joyous wife, mingling his greatness in her great body and nourishing 
all her children.’”
674 The Roman poet depicts air as almighty, regal and fecund. But while Virgil 
conceptually acquiesces with Cleanthes and Anaximenes concerning the omnipotent father Aether, 
Cicero offers trenchant criticisms against the Presocratic natural philosopher (Anaximenes) in his 
work  De natura Deorum
675 (a treatise that Lactantius employs in the service of Christian 
apologetics).
676 Cicero alludes to the untenability of a philosophical belief which holds that God 
has been generated as air—thus the Father experienced a beginning—and lacks shape or form. But 
the writings of Cleanthes, Anaximenes and Cicero (De natura Deorum 1.12) all reveal the 
prevalence of divine fatherhood notions in ancient Greco-Roman thought. Moreover, they disclose 
the Lactantian awareness of such concepts since he interacts with the concepts of these 
philosophers in Divinae institutiones. 
Lactantius demonstrates his familiarity with contemporary divine paternal figures in 
Divinae institutiones 1.11.40-41. He builds a sustained case that substantially relies on etymology 
to unfold (what he perceives to be) the actual provenance of Rome’s patron deity, Jupiter.
677 The 
 
671 Diogenes Laertius, Lives 2.3; Aristotle, Metaphysica 984a 5. See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 67; 
Philip Ellis Wheelwright, The Presocratics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 61; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, volume 1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), 1:115-116. 
672 Ibid.    
673 Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conceptions of Early 
Christian Literature and Its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), 2. 
674 DI 1.5.19. See Virgil’s Georgics 2.325-327. In the same work, the poet calls Bacchus, the “Father of the 
winepress.” He elsewhere speaks of “the Father of the gods” (Aeneid 1.50). Virgil also uses expressions such as “the 
Father of the flood” (1.142ff); “the Father of the human race” (1.223 & 1.254) and “Father Tiber” (8.71).” 
675  De natura Deorum 1.10. See De natura Deorum; Academica, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1961), 29. 
676 DI 1.11.40, 48; 4.28.3-5.   
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term “Jupiter” allegedly denotes “a version of a helping father.”
678 The historical origin of this 
name causes Lactantius to reason that “Jupiter” is not an appropriate designation for a god since 
the Roman divinity’s proper name signifies a helper; yet, Lactantius reckons that the act of helping 
someone is an ostensively human endeavor.
679 Furthermore, he contends that socio-rational beings 
generally do not employ the participle “helping” to describe a father engendering or rearing 
children.
680 Lactantius accordingly infers: “The word [‘helper’] is too trivial to express the 
importance of a father’s generosity.”
681 His argument is patently Ciceronian with respect to its 
form and content; one encounters a similar line of reasoning in De natura Deorum 2.25. However, 
what effect is this diachronic argument supposed to have on the divine status of Rome’s paternal 
god? 
Utilizing  a fortiori reasoning, Lactantius contends that if “helper” does not suitably 
delineate the human act of procreation, then to an even greater degree, it does not adequately 
portray God’s (figurative) act of reproduction vis-à-vis humanity or the Son. He believes that God 
is “the true father, through whom we exist and whose possession we all are, he makes us, inspirits 
us, illuminates us; he gives life, health and all manner of food” (Divinae institutiones 1.11.42).
682 
Hence, the epithet “helper” does not befit the true God and Father of all. The divine activities of 
the maximally excellent being cannot adequately be depicted in terms of “helping.” Such 
descriptive language does not do justice to the true Father of all rational beings. Appealing to 
euhemerism, Lactantius thus relates the manner in which Jupiter was transformed from a mere 
anthropic ruler to being acclaimed the omnipotent Father of Mount Olympus.
683 He further appeals 
to the diachronic signification of “Jupiter” in order to prove the impropriety of characterizing a 
supernatural being that possesses this proper name as the Most High God or Father. However, the 
Tanakh manifestly identifies YHWH as Helper (1 Samuel 7:12; 1 Chronicles 5:20; 12:18; 15:26; 
 
678 Ibid. 1.5ff. Cicero attests to this etymology: “But Jupiter himself—the name means ‘the helping father,’ whom 
with a change of inflection we style Jove, from iuvare ‘to help’ ” (De natura Deorum 2.25; ET, Rackham, 185). 
679 DI 1.11.40. 
680 Ibid. 1.11.41. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Compare Metamorphoses 1. The poet there calls Jupiter “Father of the gods.” Ovid thus portrays Jupiter as a 
creator deity who contemplates bringing forth a new race of humans to try his creative skill again.  
683 The term “euhemerism” derives its name from the Greek mythographer Euhemerus (fl. 316 BCE). Cicero 
discusses the basics of his theoretical approach to myths in De natura Deorum 1.42.                                      119 
 
 
                                                
Psalm 10:14; 30:10; 54:4; Isaiah 41:10, 13; 50:7, 9). In particular, the God of Israel is portrayed as 
succoring his elect nation, chiefly when enemies prevail against her. It is possible that Lactantius 
was not acquainted with the multiple passages that refer to YHWH as a “helper.” Then again, 
neither is the NT without reference to God as “helper” (adiutor).
684 This oversight may represent a 
lacuna in Lactantius’ scriptural knowledge.
685  
Although his first objection to Jupiter’s supposed paternity is evidently less than adequate, 
Lactantius insists that there is yet another factor that precludes Jupiter from being the genuine 
Father of all. His second argument is probably more convincing than his first line of disputation. 
The argument goes as follows: Jupiter allegedly was a paternal deity, whom devotees solemnly 
invoked as the “Best and Greatest” (optimus maximus).
686 But the Jupiter of classical mythology 
did not merit that title nor was he the one true God and Father who produced the cosmos and all 
therein. Lactantius relates that one notorious act of “virtual parricide” (pene parricida) is Jupiter’s 
purported seizure of his regal and divine father’s throne. This violent action results in the former 
illegitimately grasping the majestic divine seat of authority from the latter.
687 What Lactantius 
believes is an insolent nearly parricidal act leads to (he presumes) “the beginning of trouble for the 
human race.”
688 Therefore, the root of human conflict is associated with the failure to venerate a 
divine father. Jupiter cannot be the authentic Father of all since he introduced disorder to the 
human race through an unspeakable act of violence directed toward his father. 
Lactantius insists that peaceful conditions cannot obtain when rational creatures spurn the 
omnipotent deity’s fatherhood (Divinae institutiones 5.6.11-13). He subsequently maintains that 
the way to unite humanity or eradicate universal chaos is through deferential awe being shown to 
the Father and God of all. In view of Jupiter’s apparently impious actions, however, neither the 
title “Best and Greatest” (optimus maximus) nor the designation “Father” (pater) befit him since 
Jupiter not only commits “virtual parricide” against his royal parent, but he also comports himself 
 
684 Hebrews 13:5-6. 
685 As a possible solution to this difficulty, see Paul McGuckin, “The Non-Cyprianic Scripture Texts in Lactantius’ 
Divine Institutes,” VC 36 (1982): 145-163. 
686 DI 1.10.10. 
687 Theogony 155-210. Lewis R. Gordon (Existentia Africana, 173) explains the mythological emasculation of 
Uranus in psychoanalytic terms. 
688 DI 1.10.10. Uranus was not a model father. However, Lactantius reasons that his less than stellar behavior does 
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in the manner of a disingenuous philanderer intent on having coitus with both males and females 
(including the wives of other men)—some of whom Jupiter impregnates.
689 Lactantius thereby 
attempts to unmask the professed divinity of this god: he endeavors to divest Rome’s fatherly 
divine patron of the honorific appellation “Best and Greatest” by meticulously recounting the 
god’s sordid affairs and notable but finite theogonic development.
690 Lactantius concludes with an 
appeal to the theory of euhemerism in order to expose thoroughly Jupiter’s non-divine status. He 
employs this theory to argue that Jupiter was once a man, whom some Romans mistakenly 
deified.
691 But Lactantius is convinced that Jupiter does not merit the soubriquet “Father.” He 
contends that the designation belongs exclusively to the holy God and Creator of the universe (the 
one whom Christians worship in view of the fact that gods like Jupiter have besmirched the title of 
“Father”).
692 
In addition to relying on the non-Christian poets and Greco-Roman myths to buttress his 
case for God’s legitimate paternity, Lactantius invokes the poet Lucretius (99-55 BCE) as an 
authority in matters divine. The latter seems to explain clearly in what sense God is the Father of 
all humanity: “So too, if we have all been given the breath of life by one and the same God, we 
must all be brothers in spirit rather in the flesh.”
693 Lactantius thus professes that the bond between 
all rational existents is spiritual (not merely physical); rational creatures are brothers and sisters in 
accordance with the animating spirit or soul that God has bequeathed to them. Although he 
evidently affirms an atomistic metaphysic and opposes formal religion, Lucretius apparently 
concurs with the Christian teaching that all humans emanate from one primal divine source (Acts 
17:26-30). He maintains that all humans stem from one “celestial seed” (denique caelesti sumus 
omnes semine oriundi); all thus have “an identical father” (omnibus ille idem pater est) in common 
(De rerum natura 2.991-92).
694 Lactantius reasons that this familial proximity should function as 
 
689 Ibid. 1.10.11-14. 
690 Ibid. 1.11.1-17. Appealing to the consensus omnium (reflecting Stoic influence), Arnobius of Sicca reasons that 
“the omnipotent God” who is truly our Father never experienced birth (Adversus nationes 1.34). Arnobius’ observation 
implies that Jupiter’s birth would disqualify him from being invoked legitimately as “Father.” 
691 DI 1.11.33-39. 
692 Ibid. 1.11.52. 
693 DI 6.10. 
694 Compare De rerum natura 3.13; 5.408; 6.406. See Titus Lucretius Carus, T. Lvcreti Cari De rervm natvra, libri 
sex, ed. William Ellery Leonard and Stanley Barney Smith (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942).                                      121 
 
 
                                                
an intrinsic check and balance against crime, savagery or atrocities that rational creatures might 
perpetrate against one another.
695 A universal or common origin may also imply that rational 
creatures are naturally social beings, teleologically designed to assist one another in order to 
glorify God the Father.
696 Failure to acknowledge one’s cosmopolitan bond with other children of 
God, who share the one animating spirit of the divine results in utter chaos or trouble.
697 One again 
witnesses evidence that “Father” as a metaphor for deity appears in both pagan and Christian 
writings. It seems that these divine paternal stories that pervaded the Greco-Roman milieu 
significantly influenced Lactantian thought.
698 
Bacchus was another paternal deity of Rome.
699 Roman mythology states that he was a 
prominent deity and the god of wine (Bacchae 1-167). Additionally, Bacchus was delegated the 
role of foremost speaker when the gods of Olympus engaged in senatorial debate; and Lactantius 
relates that Bacchus is the only divinity (apart from Jupiter) to experience a military victory in 
India.
700 Lactantius seeks to deconstruct the story of Bacchus, however, once again reducing a 
putative god to a mere mortal. His theological attack contra the godhood of Bacchus is two-
pronged. Lactantius first characterizes those who uncritically accept the accounts concerning 
Bacchus as blind, senseless or obtuse: they are akin to brute beasts since they think that “people 
born of the coition of male and female could have had any element of superiority and divine 
excellence.”
701 Lactantius invokes the Sibylline Oracles which enunciate the reputed axiomatic 
truth: “A man’s thighs and a womb cannot create a god.”
702 If what he argues is logically sound 
and valid, then he plausibly has demythologized Bacchus.
703 The apologist makes the case that 
Bacchus is possibly mortal since his nativity was contingent upon the pairing of a divine male with 
 
695 DI 6.10.8. 
696 Ibid. 6.10.9-10; Epitome 34. Compare Aristotle’s Politica 1.1253a and his use of zoon politikon there. He thinks 
that social predilections stem from biological factors. See Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical 
Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 212; 
Fisher, “Lactantius’ Ideas Relating Christian Truth and Christian Society,” 367. 
697 DI 6.10.22-27. 
698 Lactantius alludes to Lucretius when providing further evidence that Jupiter is not optimus maximus (DI 3.17). 
699 The Roman Bacchus = the Greek Dionysos. 
700 DI 1.10.8 speaks of Bacchus in lofty terms. For details about his reputed victory in India, see Kerényi, Gods of 
the Greeks, 268-269. 
701 DI 1.8.3. 
702 Ibid. See Fr. Oracula Sibyllina 3.1-2 (Geffcken, 230-232). 
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a female.
704 He believes that a human commingled with a deity evidently cannot bring it about that 
another god exists; Lactantius concludes that Bacchus is therefore not the authentic Father of all. 
Nevertheless, the allusion to Bacchus does suggest that Greco-Roman thought shaped the 
Lactantian concept of God the Father. The numerous references to ancient thinkers and the holy 
writings of Judaism and Christianity in his works seem to reveal the potential derivation of his 
theological notions regarding divine fatherhood. In conclusion, there are three primary points made 




(1) The divine fatherhood concept has an extended history. Classical writers employ 
path,r metaphorically to describe the God and maker of all or the transcendent entity that 
figuratively engenders rational souls or other animate and inanimate entities (Timaeus 28c; 41a-b). 
However, there does not seem to be an ontologization of gender where this trope is concerned. 
Adherents of Judaism or Christianity utilizing “Father” simply desire to assert an unfamiliar 
identity synthesis without making metaphysical pronouncements. Writers of the Tanakh probably 
believe that “Father” is a metaphor. 
(2) Ancient Israel thought of God as Father in four distinct ways. YHWH was a father to 
the nation as a whole, father to the Israelite king, to pious individuals in the nation and to the 
angels in that YHWH created the holy spirits surrounding his throne (Job 38:4-7; Psalm 104:4). 
Nevertheless, writers of the Hebrew-Aramaic scriptures (Tanakh) also deploy feminine imagery to 
adumbrate certain divine functions in relation to the created order (Isaiah 49:15). But none of these 
metaphoric expressions appear to say anything about God as the Father exists in Godself. They are 
verbal expressions of God as the Father subsists “for us” or “in relation to us.” Feminine imagery 
evidently is used in similes or within rhetorical contexts to create a paradoxical utterance for the 
sake of persuasion. Ancient writers of the Tanakh apparently believed that the infinite God 
completely transcends gender categories. Since God is not a man (Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9), 
they apparently reckon that he not masculine either. Speaking of God as “Father” is a metaphor 
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that communicates the intimacy that obtains between God and those who are in a covenant 
relationship with deity. 
(3) Finally, Lactantius demonstrates that he possesses intimate knowledge of Greco-Roman 
myths that refer to divine fathers. However, the apologist endeavors to prove that there is only one 
God and Father of all things. He argues that Jupiter cannot be the one authentic Father based on 
what the classical accounts reveal about his behavior and origin. The one God and Father who 
created all things transcends impure human desire and this God is entitled to be called “Best and 
Greatest.” Lactantius consequently insists: “May not therefore the true and common Father of all 
justly find fault with that saying of Terence: First, learn in what life consists; then, if you shall be 
dissatisfied with life, have recourse to death.”
705 Lactantius believes that the “true and common 
Father” is the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ whom he generated by means of a first and second 
nativity. 
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Early Latin Christian Notions of Divine Paternity 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to document the antecedent concepts of pre-Nicene divine 
fatherhood that predated Lactantian paterology (the doctrine of God the Father).
706 This chapter 
will demonstrate what Latin writers taught concerning the Son’s generation from the Father and 
the relationship that seems to obtain between the Son and the Father. This chapter’s primary goal is 
to determine whether the Latin predecessors of Lactantius consider “Father” a metaphor for God 
(= the putative first person of the triune Godhead). At the outset, it seems that the early Latin 
writers chiefly thought of the Father as God: Christ only appears to be deity in a subordinate or 
derivative sense for most early theologians.
707 Moreover, those Christian authors before Lactantius 
evidently utilize “Father” metaphorically (for the most part) in their writings. Hence, this study 
initially will examine Tertullian, with whom Latin theology probably began.
708 The paternal 
metaphor for God distinctly appears in his literary works. Additionally, this chapter will scrutinize 
evidence for the metaphoric use of “Father” in Cyprian, Novatian, Arnobius and Minucius Felix. 
 
A.  Tertullian (160-230 CE) 
 
Bishop Irenaeus of Lyons (ca. 177 CE) had urged restraint and circumspection regarding 
speculation about the inner life of the Godhead. Applying the prophetic words “In his humiliation 
his judgment was taken away: who shall declare his generation?” (Isaiah 53:8 LXX) to the Son’s 
 
706 Paterology is the technical term that systematic theologians employ for the doctrine of God the Father. The 
expression appears in Floyd H. Barackman, Practical Christian Theology: Examining the Great Doctrines of the Faith 
(Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1984), 129; Aidan Nichols, No Bloodless Myth: A Guide Through Balthasar’s 
Dramatics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 31. 
707 John A. McGuckin, Handbook, 338-341; Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, The Croall Lectures, 
1942-1943 (London: Nisbet and Co, 1943), 100; Richardson, Ignatius of Antioch, 44-45. See De ira Dei 11. 
708 Henry Hart Milman, History of Latin Christianity Including That of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicolas V, 8 
volumes (London: J. Murray, 1857), 1:56-59.                                      125 
 
 
                                                
first generation, he resolutely maintained that it probably is not judicious to speculate on the 
intricate details of the Son’s primordial generation from the Father.
709 Irenaeus thus adamantly 
shied away “from penetrating the inner core of the divine mystery” as opposed to his spiritual 
adversaries (the Gnostics) who continually preoccupied themselves with the so-called hidden God 
behind God.
710 
On the other hand, Tertullian of Carthage exhibited an ardent desire to know God in his 
immanence (quoad se), and not just how God subsists in relation to creatures (quoad nos).
711 The 
Latin apologist from North Africa attempts to investigate the divine life in itself, eventually 
coining technical terms which post-Nicenes subsequently would employ to delineate the eternal 
triadic distinctions in the Godhead. H. O. J. Brown recounts that “Irenaeus contributed breadth to 
the nascent theology of the church; Tertullian, precision.”
712 Tertullian bequeathed terminological 
exactness to the religious nomenclature of the Latin church in manifold ways, but particularly with 
respect to the Son’s putative eternal generation from the Father. He also vouchsafed clarity of 
expression to the “nascent theology” of the ancient Christian community in that Tertullian 
profoundly reflected on the divine consciousness and its nexus with the entity identified as 
Wisdom (sophia) in the sapiential book of Proverbs.
713  
Tertullian endeavored to ascertain how the Son relates to the Father within the divine 
economy and outwith.
714 He concluded that there was a time when “God” was all alone; yet, the 
Supreme Being was not alone since eternal reason was adjacent to God before the cosmos came 
into existence.
715 Nevertheless, there is a sense in which one could state that God (the Father) once 
existed alone since God (the Father) was “the only person” to obtain before the generation of the 
 
709Adversus Haereses. 2.28.2, 6; 4.20.5. 
710 Studer, Trinity and Incarnation, 70. See Marsh, Triune God, 75; Bengt Hägglund, History of Theology (Saint 
Louis and London: Concordia Publishing, 1968), 50-51. 
711 Studer reasons that Tertullian affirms an eternal oikonomia ad intra that is logically prior to the oikonomia ad 
extra. But Tertullian does not seem to locate the oikonomia dei in God pace Studer (Trinity and Incarnation, 70). He 
actually conceives of the oikonomia as God pro nobis in contrast to God in se (Adversus Praxean 2.1; 31.2). 
712 H. O. J. Brown, Heresies: Heresy and Orthodoxy in the History of the Church (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1988), 
78.  
713 See Proverbs 8:22-31. Wisdom motifs appear elsewhere in Sirach 24-6-11; Wisdom 7:25-26; 10:15-18. Cf. 
René Braun, Deus Christianorum:  Recherches Sur Le Vocabulaire Doctrinal De Tertullien (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires De France, 1962), 291-293. 
714 O’Collins, Tripersonal God, 107-109. See Adversus Praxean 5-6. 
715 Adversus Praxean 5.15: Ceterum ne tunc quidem solus.                                      126 
 
 
                                                
Son.
716 Tertullian consequently implies that the Son was not a distinct hypostasis (in the sense of 
being fully personal)
717 prior to the created order because God had not yet begotten him as Son: 
“There was, however, a time when neither sin existed with him [God the Father], nor the Son” (fuit 
autem tempus, cum et delictum et filius non fuit).
718 Precisely speaking, Tertullian urges that the 
Logos-Sophia was not God’s Son before the omnipotent Father dispatched his own ratio for the 
purpose of creation.
719  
Tertullian maintains that the eternal property of reason subsisting in the mind of God 
initially was a quasi-person: it was not (fully) hypostatic or personal because it was God’s own 
mind-independent property of reason, rationality or consciousness (Aduersus Praxean 5).
720 God’s 
primordial reason functioned eternally as immanent deific thought. The generated “person” of the 
Son posteriorly gave hypostatic existence to divine reason (ratio) on the first creative day recorded 
in Genesis.
721 Tertullian expressly writes that God made his own ratio the Son.
722 The immanent 
word (lo,goj endia,qetoj) became the uttered word (lo,goj proforiko.j) when the 
Father spoke creation into existence.
723 Tertullian’s claim that there was a time when the Son in 
his capacity as Son did not exist is familiar to historians of Patristic thought (Aduersus 
Hermogenem 3.4). By this affirmation, he seems to mean that God did not generate the Son until 
 
716 Tertullian evidently argues that God (the Father) was the only hypostasis (= fully personal being) in existence 
until God brought forth his Son for the world’s sake. See Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, 
7 volumes (New York: Dover, 1961), 2:259. Otto W. Heick makes a similar analysis in A History of Christian 
Thought, 2 volumes (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965-1966), 146. 
717 One must exercise prudence when describing Tertullian’s conception of divine personhood. One consideration 
revolves around the denotation of persona in his writings. Some of the necessary caveats regarding a study of persona 
are discussed briefly in Edgar G. Foster, Angelomorphic Christology and the Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in Tertullian's 
Adversus Praxean: An Examination of Tertullian's Reluctance to Attribute Angelic Properties to the Son of God. 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2005), 83-84. See Fortman, Triune God, 150; Eric Francis Osborn, The 
Emergence of Christian Theology (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 190-191. 
718 Adversus Hermogenem 3.4. See Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 181; Brown, The Lord’s Prayer, 223; Jan H. 
Waszink,  Quinti Septimii Florentis Tertulliani Adversus Hermogenem liber, Stromata patristica et mediaevalia 5 
(Utrecht: Spectrum, 1956). 
719 Kelly, Doctrines, 112; Adhémar D’Alès, La Theologie De Tertullien (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1905), 92-93. 
720 Fortman, Triune God, 113-116. 
721 Harnack, History of Dogma, 2:211. 
722 Adversus Praxean 11: Quam nos probamus illum sibi filium fecisse sermonem suum. 
723 Waszink prefers to construe Tertullian’s remarks in Adversus Hermogenem through the hermeneutical grid of 
Middle Platonism (i.e. Albinus) rather than the well-known Stoic distinctions of the innate and expressed Logos. See 
Jan H. Waszink, “Observations on Tertullian’s Treatise against Hermogenes,” VC 9 (1955): 129-147.                                      127 
 
 
                                                
God (the Father) uttered the words, “let light come to be” (lux fiat).
724 The complete nativity of the 
Logos (nativitas perfecta sermonis) then occurred
725; God then made the Word his Son (Aduersus 
Praxean 11).
726 God becomes a Father to his own Word in this manner.
727  
The term “Father” evidently does not signify an eternal distinction in the Godhead for 
Tertullian;
728 nor does he insist that it is a proper name for deity. Rather, Tertullian ostensibly 
thinks of “Father” as a metaphor for the God who temporally brings it about that the Logos 
becomes his Son (chronologically) prior to and for the purpose of creation; he apparently views 
God’s fatherliness as a “relative disposition” over against construing it as an onto-constituting 
divine relation.
729 One can grasp this approach to the problem of intra-trinitarian relations by 
considering the Carthaginian apologist’s preferred metaphysical theory for analyzing the 
accidental dispositions or relations in question. Tertullian was indebted to Stoic thought.
730 He 
chose to utilize the four Stoic categories of being in his theological system rather than Aristotle’s 
renowned ten ontological predicates.
731 One Stoic category of being is relative disposition.
732 But 
in what sense do the Stoic relative dispositions differ from the Aristotelian category of relation? 
What role do relative dispositions play in Tertullian’s thought? 
The relative states or dispositions of Stoicism are at variance (to some extent) with 
Aristotelian relations in that Stoicism does not contend that a specified entity’s particular 
constitution is dependent on its correspondent relative state. All that accidental dispositions tell us 
 
724 Adversus Praxean 5-7. See Studer, Trinity and Incarnation, 71; Edmund Hill, The Mystery of the Trinity 
(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), 51; Hägglund, History of Theology, 54-55. 
725 Adversus Praxean 7. See Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 181. 
726 Wolfson observes that Tertullian does not apply “Father” to God before the generation of the Son or “prior to 
the creation of the world” (Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 1:195).  
727 See Adversus Praxean 7; Adversus Marcionem 2.27; O’Collins, Tripersonal God, 108. 
728 See Boughton, “More than Metaphors,” 292. 
729 Lacugna, God for Us, 58-59. Thomas F. Torrance prefers to use the expression “being-constituting relations” or 
onto-relations. See his work The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992), 47. 
730 See Jean Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977), 3. Colish 
argues that Tertullian was not an exclusive supporter, enemy or transformer of Stoicism. Rather, he simultaneously 
supported, militated against and transformed this philosophical school of thought (Stoic Tradition, 2:13-14). 
731 Tertullian’s debt to Stoicism is noted by Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity, 57-59; Eric Francis 
Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 125-126, 131. 
732 The other three Stoic categories are substance, quality, and disposition.  A. A. Long analyzes all four of these 
categories in Hellenistic Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 160-163. See Edward Vernon 
Arnold,  Roman Stoicism:  Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with Special Reference to Its 
Development within the Roman Empire (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 165-166 for a further delineation of 
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is how some particulars (i.e. masters or parents) relate to other particulars (slaves or children) in 
the sensible realm of particulars.
733 For the philosophers of the ancient Stoa do not believe that the 
(metaphysical) constitution of a relation depends on a relation being “toward something” (ta 
pro.j ti).
734 As Catherine Lacugna explains, “In the case of the father-son relation, if the child 
dies, the man ceases to be a father [functionally] but he does not cease to exist. By contrast, in the 
use made by theologians of Aristotelian philosophy, a father is constituted as father by his son, and 
vice versa.”
735 Hence, ancient Latin theologians generally believe that the putative triune relations 
(Father, Son and Holy Spirit) constitute the divine persons, making them what they are 
ontologically, as opposed to Greek ecclesiastical thought, which suggests that triune relations only 
disclose the mode wherein the three hypostases evidently subsist.
736 In the Greek Trinitarian 
tradition: “relation will show only how, but not what, something is.”
737 Tertullian (although he is a 
Latin theologian) favors the Stoic or eastern Christian understanding of relations as being “toward 
something” in the world without necessarily adjudging that one relative disposition ontologically 
constitutes another disposition such that a father constitutes the being of his son. Consequently, 
Tertullian can maintain that although God subsists from eternity to eternity (Psalm 90:2),
738 there 
was a time when the Son as such or the Father as such did not exist.
739 The relative states do not 
constitute the divine persons qua persons; it is possible for the Father to be God without being 
“Father.” It is also factually possible (Tertullian contends) for divine reason to obtain without 
 
733 See Lacugna, God for Us, 59; Margaret E. Reesor, “The Stoic Categories,” The AJPh 78 (1957): 63-82. 
734 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 163. 
735 Lacugna, God for Us, 59. 
736 Marsh, Triune God, 155. 
737 Lacugna, God for Us, 59. 
738 Psalm 90:2 [89:2] in the Vg reads: Antequam montes nascerentur et parturiretur terra et orbis a saeculo et usque 
in saeculum tu es. The Hebrew lexeme that translators render as “everlasting” or “eternal” is olam. There is probably 
no connotation of timelessness in the word. It simply denotes boundless temporality of undetermined duration. This 
definition of olam is discussed in Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), 24-37; Ernst Jenni, “Das Wort olam im Alten Testament,” Zeitschrift fur die  alttestamentliche 
Wissenschaft 64 (1952): 197-248; P. A. Nordell, “Old Testament Word Studies: Time and Eternity,” Old Testament 
Student 8 (1889): 373-377.   
739 Bigg argues that Tertullian did not differentiate between eternity and time: “Eternity, in his case, simply means 
all time, time without beginning and without end, not that life of spirit to which time with its sequences does not 
belong at all” (Origins, 394). See Adversus Marcionem 1.8; Adversus Hermogenem 4 for Tertullian’s observations on 
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being God’s Son. The divine relations do not make the persons what they ontologically or 
structurally are; they only tell how the persons exist respecting one another. 
The contention that there was a time when the Son as such was not has caused Bernard 
Lonergan to question the logical coherence of Tertullian’s Christology. Although Lonergan avoids 
reproaching the pre-Nicenes for their ostensible need to excise incongruous (non-rational) 
elements from theological notions which they adopted regarding the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, he points out that Tertullian’s argument concerning a time when the Son as such was not 
conflicts with his fundamental case made against Praxeas respecting the three persons.
740 
Tertullian supposedly holds that the Son is God as the Father is God. But this does not mean that 
he believes that the Father and Son have every divine-constituting property in common.
741 The 
Latin apologist is convinced that the Son (being a portion of the divine substance) is God 
(Aduersus Praxean 9).
742 Nevertheless, Tertullian also believes that the entity generating the 
preexistent Christ is eternal or everlasting whereas the Son qua Son is not. But Lonergan insists 
that this position is logically untenable. For if God is everlasting and the Son is God, then the Son 
must also be everlasting; furthermore, if God is the whole divine substance and Christ is God, then 
Christ too is identical with the whole divine substance.
743 A claim to the contrary simply appears 
incoherent, based on the law of transitivity. The logical law of transitivity states that if A=B & 
B=C, then A=C. Stated non-formally, if Marcus is Tullius and Tullius is Cicero, then Marcus is 
Cicero.
744 If the term “God” identifies as opposed to predicating divinity of a subject, then 
 
740 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology: a Translation 
[from the Latin] by Conn O'Donovan from the First Part of De Deo Trino (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 
1976), 48. See Michael O’Carroll, Trinitas:  A Theological Encyclopedia of the Holy Trinity (Collegeville: The 
Liturgical Press, 1987), 209. He makes similar observations concerning some of Tertullian’s christological remarks. 
741 What this study calls “divine-constituting properties” are similar to what philosophers and theologians call 
great-making properties. Thomas V. Morris defines a great-making property as “any property, or attribute, or 
characteristic, or quality which it is intrinsically good to have, any property which endows its bearer with some 
measure of value, or greatness, or metaphysical stature, regardless of external circumstances” in Our Idea of God: An 
Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1991), 35. The difference between a 
divine-constituting property and a great-making property is that while non-divine beings may possess the latter, only a 
being that is fully divine can possess the former. See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, Divine Attributes, 13-20. 
742 Seeberg, History of Doctrines, 1:126. 
743 Lonergan, The Way to Nicea, 48. 
744 See Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1970), 33; 
Simon Blackburn, Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 134; Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences, fourth edition 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 70.                                      130 
 
 
                                                
Lonergan’s argument seems convincing. However, it is possible that “God” is not a term marking 
absolute identity, but one that predicates relative identity of a subject; and relative identity is most 
closely associated with terms that philosophers consider “sortal.” The next paragraph will discuss 
the difference between absolute and sortal-relative identity. The parameters of this investigation, 
however, do not permit a full-blown discussion of this topic. 
The chief objection to Lonergan’s syllogisms is probably the theory of sortal-relative 
identity which Richard Cartwright, Christopher Hughes and John Perry all view as suspect.
745 The 
theory of sortal-relative identity claims that it is logically possible for two entities (A and B) to be 
the same F without being the same G.
746 For example, a couch and chair (A and B) may have the 
same color (F) but still be different pieces of furniture (G).
747 Advocates of sortal-relativity thus 
contend that identity is never absolute since two different or distinct objects can bear one identical 
color or property. One could also reason that the marble constituting a statue is the same F but not 
the same G as the statue of which it is the material cause. Two entities (A and B) are always 
purportedly discernible in some crucial aspect or relativized with respect to a sortal noun (e.g. bird, 
dog, cat, chair, star, couch or tree). John Feinberg, Christopher Hughes, Saul Kripke, Peter Geach, 
Thomas V. Morris and Peter van Inwagen adequately treat the topic of sortal-relative over against 
absolute identity in their respective studies.
748 While a deeper exploration of identity (relative, 
absolute, qualitative or numerical) is outside the bounds of this work, this investigation espouses 
the position that Lonergan’s syllogisms fittingly comport with the theory of absolute identity.  
If Lonergan’s analysis is sound and valid,
749 then Tertullian’s Christology would seem to 
 
745 See Richard Cartwright, Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Hughes, Complex Theory, 
157; John Perry, “The Same F,” Philosophical Review 79 (1972): 181-200. Compare Michael C. Rea, “Relative 
Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” Philosophia Christi 5.2 (2003): 431-446. 
746 Hughes, Complex Theory, 157. G and F are simply two predicates attributed to a logical subject. 
747 Ibid. 158. 
748 Ibid. 156-161; Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 3; Peter Geach, “Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity,” in 
Logic and Ontology, ed. Milton Karl Munitz (New York: New York University Press, 1973); Peter van Inwagen, 
Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Thomas V. Morris, The 
Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of 
God (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 494-496. 
749 Formal logic makes a technical distinction between the validity and soundness of an argument. A valid 
argument is one that does not contain any formal mistakes such as a denial of the antecedent (p) or an affirmation of 
the consequent (q). A sound argument is one in which the premises force the conclusion to be true. That is, both the 
premises and conclusion are true. Richard Von Dohlen explains this philosophical distinction in An Introduction to the 
Logic of the Computing Sciences (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999).                                      131 
 
 
                                                
contain problematic theological elements, not the least of which is the nexus that he posits between  
soteriology (the doctrine of salvation), theology proper (the doctrine of God) and cosmology 
(doctrine of the universe).
750 The Father and Son (in his assessment) are always “for us” or “in 
relation to us.”
751 For Tertullian, neither the Father nor the Son are immanently disclosed to 
rational creatures in the divine act of revelation.
752 He thereby makes a pronounced distinction 
between immanental theologia and salvific-historical oikonomia.
753 Hill nonetheless concludes 
that Tertullian believes that God is atemporally tripersonal: “he has so economized himself 
eternally.”
754 But even if Tertullian does think that oikonomia is a reference to God’s tripersonal 
immanental being, he still evidently does not attribute personhood to the Son or Spirit apart from 
God’s action in the divine economy of salvation history. Nor does Tertullian seem to distinguish 
carefully the personhood of the Son or the Spirit from the temporal oikonomia: the Son and Spirit 
become persons or fully hypostatic only for creation (Aduersus Praxean 5-7). Lampe thus appears 
to ascertain more closely Tertullian’s intent behind the use of oikonomia when he suggests that it 
probably refers to “the disposition or ‘deploying’ of the single Godhead into Father and Son or 
Word (and Spirit) in accordance with the Father’s intention to create.”
755 Edmund Hill is also 
critical of the view set forth by Prestige which insists that the divine economy is eternal.
756 
By making the contention that God becomes Father or the Logos becomes “Son” when 
God initiates his creative work, Tertullian implies that “Father” is a metaphorical term for God that  
 
750 Studer, Trinity and Incarnation, 65ff. Daniélou (Origins, 365-366) recounts that the Trinity doctrine was only 
liberated from cosmological concerns at Nicea (325 CE). See also Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God 
(Crestwood: St Vladimir’s, 2001), 16. 
751 Harnack, History of Dogma, 2:257. 
752 Tertullian supposedly uses oikonomia as a reference to “a distribution in the immanent being of the Godhead.” 
See William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1982), 36-37.  If this claim were true, it would mean that the economy of God 
(understood as Deus pro nobis) would reflect the inner depths of God’s being as triune. However, there are certain 
elements found in Tertullian’s writings that indicate that he views the Trinity as a temporal development in the divine 
oikonomia (Adversus Hermogenem 3.4).  
753 Oikonomia here denotes God’s redemptive activities in Heilsgeschichte. Lacugna writes: “Originally it had the 
purely secular meaning of administering and managing goods or a household, or overseeing an office according to 
some plan or design”  (God forUs, 24). 
754 W. J. Hill, Three-Personed God, 37. 
755 See G. W. Lampe, in A History of Christian Doctrine: In Succession to the Earlier Work of G.P. Fisher, 
Published in the International Theological Library Series, ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, et al. (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1980), 55. 
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does not describe deity according to his essence (quoad essentiam).
757 This implied viewpoint has 
undoubtedly made it possible for certain scholars to proffer critical assessments of Tertullian’s 
oeuvre such as the claim that Tertullian’s concepts had a questionable effect (historically) on 
orthodox Trinitarian doctrine.  
For instance, Thomas Weinandy is critical (to an extent) of Tertullian’s doctrinal 
formulation of the three divine persons. Although he believes that the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
fully God in Tertullian’s theology, Weinandy argues that his deployment of emanation theory “has 
a weakening and blemishing effect on the unity and equality of the persons within the Trinity.”
758 
One could state that Tertullian’s model of the Trinity seems to have a debilitating effect on the 
consubstantial relation of the three persons for these principal reasons: (1) The Father is the source 
of divinity (fons totius divinitatis) for the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, this view appears to 
entail subordinationism (i.e. the Son is inferior in essence to the Father or a lesser deity);
759 (2) 
Tertullian thinks that the persons are arranged in a graded hierarchy of being: the Son and the 
Spirit are subordinate (ontologically) to the one from whom they emanate in an ordered under 
manner; (3) Divine emanation theory suggests that God undergoes an ontological change when he 
generates the Son and the Holy Spirit. Tertullian “implies that God has become a trinity [sic], that 
the divine unity has been distributed into a trio in the course of putting into effect the economies of 
creation and redemption.”
760 Subordinationism or ontological change in God do not comport with 
orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. Tertullian’s formulation of the Son’s generation from the Father thus 
appears problematic from the standpoint of formal Trinitarian dogma. 
Weinandy insists that one significantly problematic aspect of Tertullian’s 
“emanationism”
761 is that it entails that God (the Father) changes ontologically when he generates 
the Son. Tertullian evidently indicates that God brings it about that the Logos becomes a Son to 
deity (Aduersus Praxean 11.1).
762 Emanation also implies a diminution of that which is produced. 
 
757 See Adversus Praxean 8. 
758 Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Change? (Still River: St Bede’s, 1985), xxvi. 
759 Hodgson, Doctrine of the Trinity, 100-102. 
760 Hill, Mystery of the Trinity, 52. Daniélou is also critical of Tertullian’s so-called doctrine of probolh,. See 
Origins, 364. 
761 Compare Harnack’s remarks on Tertullian’s emanationism in History of Dogma, 2:258. 
762 See George C. Stead, “‘Eusebius’ and the Council of Nicaea,” JTS n.s. 24 (1973): 85-100.                                      133 
 
 
                                                
Tertullian himself reasons this way in Aduersus Hermogenem 3. Accordingly, it is possible that he 
envisions God as a metaphorical or provisional Father to Christ: Fatherhood is not essential to God 
but only accidental in the writings of Tertullian.
763  The Son emanates from God and returns to the 
Father when handing over the kingdom to him (Aduersus Praxean 4). Nevertheless, if the 
apologist does adopt this view, it equally seems that he does not restrict the Father’s accidental or 
figurative paternity to his generation of the only-begotten Son of God. Hence, the remainder of this 
section will explore the diverse applications of “Father” introduced by Tertullian. 
Tertullian maintains that God is Father to all persons whom he has imbued with the 
common spirit of holiness, namely, those individuals whom God has transferred from a state of 
ignorance to “the light of truth.”
764 He insists that male Christians (in particular) now hold all 
things in common since they are figurative children of God the Father.
765 But female believers also 
value the privilege of being metaphorical offspring of deity: the Father exalts Christian women by 
adopting them as spiritual daughters who repose their trust in the Son of God.
766 However, God’s 
paternity not only extends to Christians: Tertullian apparently writes that God also engenders 
abstract properties subsisting in concrete objects. Expanding on the notion of God’s paternity, 
Tertullian asks: “Now what wise man is so devoid of truth, as not to know that God is the Father 
and Lord of wisdom itself and truth?”
767 God engenders “wisdom itself” and “truth” (ipsius 
sapientiae ac veritatis). These words point to an emblematic understanding of divine fatherhood; 
they suggest that God causes wisdom and truth to obtain: he is their primal source. The preeminent 
wisdom of God or personified truth (= Christ) is not under consideration in this context (Ad 
nationes 2.2). Tertullian evidently means that God is the Father of intangible properties that are 




763 Boughton, “More than Metaphor,” 292. Jϋrgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, 
trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 137-139. 
764 Apology 39. See The Apology of Tertullian, trans. Herbert Bindley (Oxford: Parker and Co. 1890). 
765 Tertullian writes that Christian men only refrain from sharing their wives with one another (Apology 39). They 
otherwise liberally share their material goods with one another.  
766 See De cultu feminarum 2.1.1; De Anima 9; Stromata 5.9 (Clement of Alexandria). 
767 Ad nationes 2.2. For the Latin text used in this study, see Tertullian, Q. S. Fl. Ad nationes libri II, In Opera 
Omnia, CCSL I, ed. J. W. Ph. Borleffs (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954).                                      134 
 
 
                                                
 
Tertullian’s exegesis regarding the Lukan account of the prodigal son illustrates another 
facet of God’s paternity.
768 He discerns in Luke’s Gospel “that most gentle Father,” one who is 
“truly a Father” since there is no other entity who abounds in “paternal love.”
769 The father 
mentioned in the Lukan parable receives his son back after the latter chooses to pursue a course of 
patent debauchery.
770 The parabolic father of the prodigal son could only depict God.
771 Tertullian 
thus seems to argue that God is Father apropos his qualities: God compassionately receives those 
who (after straying from God) penitently return to the Christian community. Therefore, divine 
masculinity does not seem to be Tertullian’s focus when he employs the designation “Father.” He 
appears to believe that God is Father in a metaphorical sense: the deity is fatherly in terms of his 
attributes. The term “Father” thereby apparently evokes a system of associated commonplaces; 
Luke possibly creates a new meaning when he employs “father” and God in a particular sentential 
locution. While divine paternity is a salient motif in many of Tertullian’s works, however, one 
encounters some of the most poignant or significant uses of the term “Father” for God in On 
Prayer (De oratione) which states: “Happy are they that acknowledge the Father!”
772 That work 
now deserves consideration. 
Michael Brown has demonstrated that the Pater Noster is a distinctive invocation since it 
does not contain any sacred epithets (cognomina) that one would expect to find in first century 
invocations.
773 He suggests that the prayer, when heard by a typical Greco-Roman, would 
probably have evoked notions of a Roman household head (paterfamilias)
774 or called to mind the 
ancient patron-client liaison as well as similar types of divine prayers incorporated in then 
 
768 Luke 15:11-32. 
769 On Repentance 8. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. 
772 De oratione 2.7-8: Felices qui patrem agnoscunt. See De oratione liber: Tract on the Prayer, ed. Ernest Evans 
(London: S.P.C.K., 1953). 
773 The Lord’s Prayer, 4. 
774 Cf. Matthew 10:25; 13:27, 52; 20:1, 11; 21:33; 24:43. One Biblical Greek term for a household head is 





                                                
contemporary Greco-Roman literature. Moreover, the prayer may have reminded some Roman 
citizens of the Emperor, whom they considered father of the homeland (pate
Tertullian himself probably viewed “Father” as a divine cognomen and metaphor.
776 His 
exegesis of the dominical oration indicates as much since he linguistically parallels “Father” and 
“God,” indicating that he believes the paternal title is an integral figurative designation for the 
maximally excellent being: “Moreover, in saying ‘Father,’ we also call Him ‘God.’ That 
appellation is one both of filial duty and of power.”
777 Tertullian reasons that addressing God as 
Father obligates believers to dutifully worship God. And by rendering “filial duty” (pietas) to the 
Father, one simultaneously honors the Son.
778 The Pater Noster also expresses an inextricable 
nexus between God the Father and his earthly progeny. Tertullian professes: “in the Father and the 
Son is recognized the mother [the Christian assembly], from whom arises the name both of Father 
and of Son” (De oratione 2). By referring to the Christian assembly (ecclesia) as “mother” in this 
context,
779 Tertullian probably means that those who articulate the Pater Noster tacitly 
acknowledge the church by means of this prayerful speech-act.
780 
An examination of Tertullian’s oeuvre implies that he utilizes “Father” as a metaphor that 
delineates the uniquely generative relationship between Christ and his Father (Aduersus Praxean 
5-7, 11). Nevertheless, God is also Father for those who implicitly trust in and obey him through 
his Son. Finally, Tertullian appears to contend that one cannot have God as Father without having 
the church as a figurative mother.
781 We therefore learn that the doctrine of God’s fatherhood in 
Tertullian has several facets: (a) God is the Father of the Logos; (b) God is the Father of abstract 
 
775 Brown, The Lord’s Prayer, 4; Eva Marie Lassen, “The Roman Family: Ideal and Metaphor,” in Constructing 
Early Christian Families: Family as Social Reality and Metaphor, ed. Halvor Moxnes, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 110-112. The designation pater patriae was not restricted to the Roman Emperor, however, since 
men deemed great by the Romans (e.g. Cicero) also were ascribed this nomen. See Lily Ross Taylor, The Divinity of 
the Roman Emperor, Philological Monographs, number 1, ed. Joseph William Hewitt (Middletown, CT: American 
Philological Association, 1931), 47. 
776 Brown, Lord’s Prayer, 246. 
777  De oratione 2.10-11: Dicendo autem patrem, deum quoque cognominamus: appellatio ista et pietatis et 
potestatis est (Evans). 
778 Ibid. 
779 See Isaiah 54:1-13; Galatians 4:26. 
780 See Bloesch, Battle, 38; De baptismo 6. 
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qualities that subsist through metaphysical subjects or entities and (c) God is the Father of those 
who utter the words “Pater Noster” in recognition of mater ecclesia. 
Novatian of Rome seeks to refine the divine paternity concepts found in Tertullian. Section 
B of this chapter addresses his doctrine of God’s fatherhood as well as his thoughts on the eternal 
generation doctrine. Moreover, the next section examines the issue of causal priority in relation to 
the Father and the Son. Does Novatian affirm the “eternal generation” of the Son from the Father? 
Does he espouse a form of causal priority? These questions will now be examined in the light of 
the Novatian concept of divine paternity. 
 
B.  Novatian of Rome (d. 257) 
 
Novatian the presbyter was the first Roman ecclesiastical writer to compose a systematic 
theological exposition in Latin.
782 The major literary work that he undertook titled De regula 
veritatis (On the Rule of Truth) or De regula fidei (On the Rule of Faith) is methodical and written 
in an eloquent or refined manner.
783 This treatise, which an unidentified scribe later assigned the 
title On the Trinity (De Trinitate),
784 eventually became a “vademecum” in the West.
785 Early 
western Christians viewed this document as one of the principal Latin texts to outline the Trinity 
doctrine.
786 Nonetheless, Kelly believes that Novatian’s formulation of the three divine persons in 
De Trinitate is “more archaic” than the triune schemata conceptually wrought by Tertullian or 
Hippolytus.
787 The presbyter’s delineation of God’s fatherhood in relation to the Son may also fail 
to emulate the rigorous treatment that one encounters in Aduersus Praxean. Novatian specifically 
appears to lack conceptual precision in the context of discussing the Father and Son’s immanent 
 
782 See Fortman, Triune God, 119; Quasten, Patrology, 2:217; Russell J. DeSimone, The Treatise of Novatian, the 
Roman Presbyter on the Trinity: A Study of the Text and the Doctrine, Studia Ephemeridis “Augustinianum,” 4 
(Roma: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1970), 7; James Leonard Papandrea, “ ‘Between Two Thieves’: The 
Christology of Novatian as ‘Dynamic Subordination,’ Influenced by His Historical Context, and His New Testament 
Interpretation” (Ph.D. diss. Northwestern University, 1998), 1-5. 
783 Cruttwell, Literary History, 2:628. 
784 Russell J. DeSimone, Novatian: The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods, In Praise of Purity, Letters, The 
Fathers of the Church, volume 67  (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1974), 22-23; Joseph M. 
Hallman, The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in History and Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991) 70. 
785 Fortman, Triune God, 119. 
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generative relationship. That is in all probability why historians of Christian doctrine have pointed 
to linguistic or conceptual weaknesses in Novatian. Some of the more complex passages found in 
Novatian and their alleged incongruities will be explored below. First, it is imperative to review 
the manner in which he sketches the elementary professions of Christianity as manifested in the 
“rule of faith.” That rule is closely associated with the Christian religion’s public acknowledgment 
of God as Father of the Son. Novatian’s initial literary concern in De Trinitate is the “rule of truth” 
(regula veritatis) or the “rule of faith” (regula fidei). He alludes to the regula veritatis, which in 
principle regulates teaching or biblical exegesis undertaken by the assembly of Christ: 
It requires that we should first of all things believe on God the Father and Lord 
Omnipotent; that is, the absolutely perfect Founder of all things, who has suspended the 
heavens in lofty sublimity, has established the earth with its lower mass, has diffused the 
seas with their fluent moisture, and has distributed all these things, both adorned and 
supplied with their appropriate and fitting instruments (De Trinitate 1).
788 
 
The presbyter’s opening words elicit memories of the Apostles’ Creed (“I believe in God, the 
Father Almighty”) which underscores having faith in God the Father before it stresses additional 
tenets of the Christian religion.
789 As the apparent original title of De Trinitate leads one to 
surmise, Novatian stresses the ecclesiastical ascendancy of the “rule of truth.”
790 He thereby 
demonstrates the integral nexus that obtains between the Father, the Son and that rule which 
elevates Christian truth. However, to what extent are the Father and the Son related in Novatian’s 
thought? Does he affirm the eternal generation of the Son? This study will now discuss these 
issues by appealing to De Trinitate 31 and modern historico-theological literature. 
 
1.  De Trinitate 31 
 
For Novatian, God the Father is the unbegotten, ingenerate, unlimited or atemporal deity. 
He suggests that the ingenerate God has always been Father, even prior to the Son’s generation.
791 
 
787 Kelly, Doctrines, 125. 
788 Compare Novatian, De Trinitate 17. 
789 Seeberg, Text-book of the History of Doctrines, 1:84. 
790 De Trinitate 21.1. 
791 Kelly writes: “Further, in his reasoning about time, Novatian would have it that the Father was always Father; 
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But God did not have a Son until he willed “the sacred and divine nativity” (De Trinitate 31) of the 
Logos (a Stoic-informed doctrine familiar to readers of Justin, Tertullian and Lactantius). In this 
case, one again witnesses the old philosophical distinction between the lo,goj 
endia,qetoj (the immanent word) and the lo,goj proforiko.j (the uttered word).
792 
With customary flourish, Novatian writes:  
 
Thus God the Father, the Founder and Creator of all things, who only knows no beginning, 
invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, is one God; to whose greatness, or majesty, or power, I 
would not say nothing can be preferred, but nothing can be compared; of whom, when He 
willed it, the Son, the Word, was born, who is not received in the sound of the stricken air, 
or in the tone of voice forced from the lungs, but is acknowledged in the substance of the 
power put forth by God, the mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an 




The problem with this text stems from its overt mention of the Father willing the Son’s inscrutable 
preternatural nativity. The mention of divine volition implies that the Son’s generation is both non-
eternal (possibly infected with temporality) and contingent: Novatian does not appear to believe 
that the Word is an eternal hypostatic entity known as the Son. God could have elected to generate 
the Son (on this reading of the text) or the Father could have elected not to generate the Son; thus 
the contingent nature of the Word’s nativity.  
Novatian evidently implies that the Son’s nativity is an act of God the Father’s supreme 
will, “something he chose to do but need not have done.”
794 Yet, one would expect the Son’s 
generation to be intrinsic to the being of God, if he were fully deity or eternally generated by the 
Father.
795 But Novatian almost certainly postulates a contingent generation for the Son; one that 
 
792 See Colish, Stoic Tradition, 2:35-36. She appears to minimize Novatian’s dependence on Stoic philosophy. 
793 De Trinitate 31.1-2: Est ergo Deus pater omnium institutor et creator, solus originem nesciens, inuisibilis, 
immensus, immortalis, aeternus, unus Deus, cuius neque magnitudini neque maiestati neque uirtuti quicquam, non 
dixerim praeferri, sed nec comparari potest. Ex quo, quando ipse uoluit, sermo filius natus est: qui non in sono percussi 
aeris, aut tono coactae de uisceribus uocis accipitur, sed in substantia prolatae a Deo uirtutis agnoscitur. Cuius sacrae 
et diuinae natiuitatis arcana nec apostolus didicit, nec prophetes comperit, nec angelus sciuit nec creatura cognouit. See 
the Latin text in Novatiani Romanae Urbis Presbyteri De Trinitate liber: Novatian’s Treatise on the Trinity, ed. 
William Yorke Fausset (Cambridge: University Press, 1909), 115-116. 
794 Kelly, Doctrines, 125. 
795 If the Son’s generation is non-contingent, this means that given the fact of the Son’s generation, it is not 
possible that the Son’s generation not obtain. Employing the tools of modal logic, one could say that the putative 
eternal generation of the Son would thus obtain in all possible worlds, if it were non-contingent. It would therefore be 
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finds its source in the omnipotent will of God.
796 Besides intimating that the Son’s nativity is 
contingent, a mysterious generation of the Son by means of divine volition further seems to entail 
that the Father’s decision to engender the Son of God is somewhat arbitrary or voluntarist (i.e. the 
divine will is preeminent with respect to an event or action). However, does Novatian avoid 
problems of this sort in his formulation of the Son’s first generation? It is certainly possible that he 
circumvents making the Son’s generation conditional; but the following paragraphs will explore 
De Trinitate 31 to discern how Novatian might avoid introducing voluntarism to his account of the 
Son’s generation. 
2.  Novatian on the Son’s Generation from the Father 
 
Novatian reputedly believes that God is eternally Father with a personal (i.e. substantial) 
Son. On the other hand, he is apparently “far from envisaging the idea of eternal generation”; 
moreover, Novatian generally thinks of the Father and Son’s relationship in terms of a moral rather 
than an essential unity.
797 He also evidently contends that the divine perfections “in the true 
sense”
798 belong solely to God the Father:  
And still, nevertheless, the Father is proved to be one God; while by degrees in reciprocal 
transfer that majesty and divinity are again returned and reflected as sent by the Son 
Himself to the Father, who had given them; so that reasonably God the Father is God of all, 
and the source also of His Son Himself whom He begot as Lord.
799  
 
Novatian professes that divinity in its fullness belongs to the Father alone. The Father is the “God 
of all” and “source” of the Son. Consequently, Kelly argues that Novatian only avoids ditheism 
“by strongly subordinating” the Son to the Father or by positing filiation as “a passing moment in 
 
illuminating example that illustrates the concept of metaphysical necessity in his text The Conscious Mind: In Search 
of a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 132. 
796 Hans Urs von Balthasar tries to avoid this conclusion by postulating an ontological identity of divine freedom 
and necessity ad intra Deum. He suggests that the Father’s generative act vis-à-vis the Son is both free and necessary. 
It is neither constrained per se nor arbitrary since it “coincides” with the “act-quality” of God’s essence. See Margaret 
M. Turek, Towards a Theology of God the Father: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theodramatic Approach (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2001), 96-99. Even if this move adequately explains what transpires ad intra Deum, Balthasar does not 
necessarily account for the problematic implications that follow from Novatian’s thought. 
797 Kelly, Doctrines, 126. 
798 Ibid. 
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the divine life of the Father.”
800 Furthermore, the word “Trinity” does not appear in Novatian. He 
seems to be unaware of God’s putative triunity even on a conceptual level.
801 In the context of 
defending the belief that the Son of God is not a mere man, the presbyter implies that the Spirit or 
Paraclete is one of Christ’s inferior productions: “But if He [the Paraclete] has received from 
Christ what He may declare to us, Christ is greater than the Paraclete, because the Paraclete would 
not receive from Christ unless He were less than Christ” (De Trinitate 16).
802 Those arguing that 
Novatian’s theology clearly anticipates post-Nicene orthodoxy possibly have misconstrued his 
position.
803 On the other hand, perhaps interpretational confusion stems from Novatian’s imprecise 
formulation of the Trinity or eternal generation doctrine as opposed to his distinct theological 
beliefs. For instance, Fortman suggests that what Novatian professes concerning the Son’s 
generation is not that transparent or precise.
804 It is possible that he believes the Son is a hypostatic 
distinction eternally generated by the Father. Nevertheless, Fortman points out that “It is difficult 
to escape the impression that Novatian is not clear about his own thought on this matter.”
805 
Conversely, Ayres insists that “Novatian does not possess a theology of eternal generation” since 
the Word is in the Father eternally, then proceeds from the Father as Son when the Father wills.
806 
Despite the variant interpretations, however, one thing does appear certain; Novatian apparently 
borders on ditheism or subordinationism in order to delineate the Father and the Son’s purported 
ontological relationship, whereas he virtually ignores the Holy Spirit in his famed treatise.  
One Biblical account that shapes the thought of Novatian regarding the Son is the first 
century apostolic letter to the Philippians that recounts Christ’s self-emptying kenotic act (De 
 
800 Kelly, Doctrines, 126. Theologians customarily distinguish between functional, ontological and theanthropic 
subordination where the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are concerned. Kelly evidently alludes to ontological 
subordination in his comments pertaining to Novatian, although he does not make his meaning explicit in the text. 
DeSimone argues that Novatian is so intent on avoiding ditheism that he falls “headlong” into the pit of 
subordinationism (Treatise of Novatian, 169). 
801 See Joseph Priestly, An History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ (Birmingham: Pearson and 
Rollason, 1786), 281-282; Stuart George Hall, Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church (Grand Rapids: W.B. 
Eerdmans, 1992), 83-84. On the other hand, J. F. Bethune-Baker suggests that Novatian favors an economic rather 
than immanent form of the Trinity doctrine. See An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, to the 
Time of the Council of Chalcedon (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1962), 107. 
802 See Priestly, An History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ, 281-282. 
803 Kelly, Doctrines, 126.   
804 Fortman, Triune God, 121. 
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Trinitate 22.5-6). Novatian construes Philippians 2:6 (in which the apostle Paul elaborates on the 
Son’s kenosis) as a passage that unfolds the Son’s (ontological) inequality with the Father. Hence, 
Edmund Hill notes: 
 
For Novatian, to argue the divinity of Christ, which he does with great vigor, actually 
involves arguing his inequality to the Father. The assumption is that Christ can only be both 
divine and other than the Father if he is divine in a different and lesser degree. Novatian 
interprets the famous text of Phil 2:6, ‘who, though he was in the form of God, did not 
count equality with God a thing to be grasped,’ as meaning that though Christ was divine, 
in the form of God, he never dreamt of claiming equality with God.
807 
 
But if Novatian professes that the Son is divine “in a different and lesser degree” than the Father, it 
makes the manner in which he may posit an eternal generation for the Son somewhat problematic. 
In what sense could the Son be “truly God” for Novatian, if his mode of being God is inferior to 
the Father’s mode of being God? Of course, there are rival interpretations of Novatian that attempt 
to interpret coherently the doctrine of Christ that one finds in his De Trinitate. This investigation 
will now examine one such construal of Novatian’s Christology. However, exploring a variant 
interpretation of his doctrine of Christ will necessitate scrutinizing the notion of causal priority 
formulated by Aristotle. Therefore, the next section of this chapter will probe the topic of causal 
priority as it relates to the Trinity doctrine. After discussing causal priority, this study will then 
endeavor to ascertain whether the notion of causal priority appears in Novatian. 
 
3.  Causal Priority and Eternal Generation in De Trinitate 31 
 
According to Stuart Hall, Novatian argues that the Father (in some sense) precedes the Son. 
Nevertheless, he contends that the Son exists in the Father before the creation comes into 
existence.
808 Hall believes that Novatian professes: “God is in himself a Father with a Son, and the 
Son is not simply a function of God’s action in time (‘economic trinitarianism’), but belongs to his 
 
807 Hill, Mystery of the Trinity, 52. Compare DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 108. He concludes that “The 
distinctive mark of subordinationism is clearly and apodictically found” in Novatian’s exegesis of Philippians 2:6-11 
(De Trinitate 22). 
808 Hall, Doctrine and Practice, 83. See De Trinitate 31.2-3: “To the Son alone they are known, who has known 
the secrets of the Father. He then, since He was begotten of the Father, is always in the Father. And I thus say always, 
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own being.”
809 The insinuation here is that “Father” does not function as a metaphor (an as-if 
construct) or accidental signifier for God (as in Tertullian), but serves as an essential description of 
an invisible and ingenerate divine person. This interpretation may do justice (in some respects) to 
Novatian’s doctrine of God the Father. Nevertheless, other portions of his treatise imply that God 
does not eternally or atemporally generate the Son:  
He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the 
Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the 
Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father. 
810  
 
The Son is generated because the Father wills that his Son be generated. A generation brought 
about by means of divine volition seems to be non-eternal or contingent in nature. The text also 
raises questions concerning the Father’s causal relationship to the Son. The notion of causal 
priority with respect to the Father and the Son consequently needs to be examined since this issue 
has a significant bearing on Novatian’s use of paternal terminology for God. In this connection, 
one thought-provoking aspect of De Trinitate 31 is the text wherein Novatian insists that the Father 
precedes the Son:  
And He is always in the Father, unless the Father be not always Father, only that the Father 
also precedes Him, in a certain sense, since it is necessary, in some degree, that He should 
be before He is Father. Because it is essential that He who knows no beginning must go 
before Him who has a beginning; even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him, 
having an origin because He is born, and of like nature with the Father in some measure by 
His nativity, although He has a beginning in that He is born, inasmuch as He is born of that 
Father who alone has no beginning.
811 
 
The Logos is always “in” the Father, but the omnipotent Father precedes the Son “in a certain 
sense” and to a certain degree. Novatian may also think that God somehow exists as Father 
“before” he generates the Son, suggesting that the Father is prior to his Son, in an undefined sense. 
But what type of priority might Novatian be referencing? Is he alluding to temporal or logical 
priority? 
It is probably advisable not to emphasize Novatian’s employment of the adverbial “before” 
since he confesses that God the Father atemporally generates the Son of his own volition. Contra 
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810 De Trinitate 31.4. 
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Tertullian, Novatian seems to consider God “Father” even before the uttered Word emanates from 
him, before the foundation of the world. Granted, he makes a case for the Son having a 
“beginning” which seems to militate against the eternal generation doctrine. Nevertheless, there 
apparently is no thought of the Father existing temporally prior to the Son since Novatian believes 
that God is timeless.
812 Therefore, temporal qualifiers such as “always” or “before” might bear 
figurative or anthropomorphic senses when applied to the Christian deity. Wielding such 
nomenclature is possibly a creaturely method of expressing transcendent concepts with a degree of 
inadequacy. Wolfson nonetheless has insisted that when Novatian speaks of priority or 
antecedence in the Godhead, he is referring to the causal priority of the Father in relation to the 
Son.
813 What, however, does Wolfson mean by “causal priority”? Does Novatian truly espouse this 
concept? 
Aristotle outlines five distinct senses of the term “prior.” He initially analyzes temporal 
(e.g. X is older than Y), sequential (e.g. the asymmetrical priority of numbers), orderly (e.g. the 
letters of the alphabet are prior to syllables) and natural (e.g. according other humans a form of 
superiority or honor) priority, of which the latter category he adjudges “strange” 
(avllotriw,tatoj).
814 Finally, the Stagirite evaluates a fifth type, namely, causal priority. He 
explains:  
For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any 
way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature “prior” to the effect. It is plain that 
there are instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the 
proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition 
wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that 
he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of 
the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of 
the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's 
being or not being.
815 
 
Christopher Hughes maintains that causal priority refers to a type of precedence wherein some 
entity (X) makes, causes or is responsible for the existence of another distinct entity (Y).
816 For 
 
812 Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 1:196. 
813 Ibid. 
814 Categories 12. 
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example, a father (X) per necessity is causally prior to his son (Y), whose existence the father 
efficiently causes. Moreover, Leonardo da Vinci is causally prior to the Mona Lisa since he is the 
efficient cause of the painting: he brings it about that the Mona Lisa exists. Aquinas too argues that 
the “form” (that by which an entity subsists) of a material substance is causally prior to both matter 
(i.e. the individuating principle of the substance) and the material substance itself.
817 Therefore, 
the soul (in Thomistic thought) as the form or act of the organized body is causally prior to the 
body (SCG 2.68); it is the formal means by which the body subsists.
818 Finally, that which causes 
the existence of an object—being the ground of its existence—is causally prior to the entity whose 
being it causes: God is thus causally prior to the world since God causes its existence. 
This type of Aristotelian priority implies that the cause of a particular entity may be 
temporally prior to its effect, although this may not be a necessarily implication of causal 
priority.
819 Does Novatian employ the notion of causal priority to explicate the generative 
relationship obtaining between the Father and the Son? Is he asserting that the Father precedes the 
Son with respect to causality and only causality? Perhaps this explanatory move resolves a number 
of supposed perplexing texts encountered in De Trinitate; for it is conceptually possible that 
Novatian does have causal priority in mind when he places the Father before the Son in some sense 
and to some degree.
820 While conceptually possible, however, even this view does not fail to be 
unproblematic for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, Vladimir Lossky points out that the language of causality with respect to the 
Godhead is probably inadequate and somewhat defective.
821 Vocabulary that posits causality of 
God conatively endeavors to articulate the monarchy of the Father and his alleged relation of 
origin to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Nonetheless, Lossky argues that causality is an unsatisfactory 
expression of how the Father relates to the Son since there is evidently neither posteriority nor 
priority of any form in the Trinity: “This unique cause [the Father] is not prior to his effects, for in 
the Trinity there is no priority and posteriority. He is not superior to his effects, for the perfect 
 
817 ST Ia.13.1. 
818 Ibid. I.75.1, Responsio. 
819 See Hughes, Complex Theory, 32. 
820 De Trinitate 31. 
821 In the Image and Likeness of God, trans. John H. Erickson and Thomas E. Bird (Crestwook, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
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cause cannot produce inferior effects. He is thus the cause of their equality with himself.”
822 The 
Father (strictly speaking) does not “cause” the Son and the Son is not (strictly speaking) an 
“effect” of the Father: 
The Greeks use the words “cause” and “principle” indifferently, when speaking of God; 
whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word “cause,” but only “principle.” The reason is 
because “principle” is a wider term than “cause”; as “cause” is more common than 
“element.” For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not 
the cause. Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (ST I.33.1, 
ad. 1).  
 
It is evidently a category mistake to literally attribute “cause” and “effect” to God.
823 The 
terminology is considered a necessary but unsatisfactory attempt to articulate the Father’s 
generation of the Son. Even “Greeks” such as Athanasius, who may use “cause” or “principle” 
without distinction still believe that there is no priority or posteriority in God (in the strictest 
sense). Bulgakov similarly affirms that the Son and Holy Spirit essentially are (i.e. they do not 
come to be or originate by means of the Father).
824 While Novatian had not developed his thought 
about the Father and Son to the same extent as post-Nicene theologians like the Cappadocians or 
Athanasius had, he must have known at least some of the philosophical conclusions that appear to 
follow from employing the concept of Aristotelian causal priority. Novatian certainly knew that if 
God is timeless or atemporal, then there is neither before nor after, neither causality nor effect 
subsisting between the Father and the Son. 
Even if atemporal causality is an objective phenomenon ad intra Deum, we evidently have 
no knowledge of it in the sensible realm. For example, William Hasker suggests that an atemporal 
causal relationship may obtain between the soul and the body.
825 But the “soul” (as traditionally 
understood) is not a phenomenal entity. Kant contends that it is a noumenon that is thinkable but 
not knowable (a postulate of pure practical reason). Hence, there possibly are epistemological 
constraints that limit creaturely theoretical knowledge of a causal nexus between the soul and the 
 
822 Ibid. Aquinas contends that there is neither priority nor posteriority in God (ST I.42.3). He attributes this view to 
Athanasius. 
823 Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, 82-83. 
824 Bulgakov writes that the hypostases “do not originate. They exist eternally. The interrelation of the hypostases, 
as the interrelation of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, should be understood not on the basis of their 
origination but on the basis of their concrete self-definition” (The Comforter, 136. Italics in original).                                      146 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
body, if one takes Kantian epistemology seriously. Furthermore, the discussion concerning the soul 
in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) appears to restrict the extent to which 
one can rationally demonstrate the logical possibility of the soul’s existence without encountering 
various antinomies.
826 On the other hand, one might choose to take issue with the Kantian 
bifurcation of noumena and phenomena, thereby obviating certain arguments that are opposed to 
the notion of atemporal causality. But any attempt to subvert the intuitive understanding of 
causality presupposed in the Cappadocians or other early church writers—an understanding that 
implies spatio-temporal contiguity as well as a relation of dependence obtaining between a cause 
and effect—ultimately does not appear successful in this context. Not even Hasker’s approach 
seems to ameliorate the discomfited features of causality language with respect to the Father and 
Son since talk of causality in relation to the divine naturally implies priority or posteriority in God. 
Yet, according to the ancient church writers, God is timeless (there is no “before” or “after” in the 
immanent divine life).  
The Cappadocians would later point to the inadequacy of causality language vis-à-vis the 
Godhead based on deity’s reputed immanental timelessness.
827 Since Novatian affirms the 
immanent atemporality of God (De Trinitate 2.1-3), it does not appear that he simultaneously 
acknowledges (in any metaphysical or ontological sense) the causal priority of the Father in 
relation to the Son.
828 Although one could legitimately infer that he adopts causal priority with 
respect to the Father and the Son, another likely possibility could be that this inference stems from 
Novatian’s imprecise speech acts or his persistent efforts to undermine Sabellianism. The mode of 
expression wielded in De Trinitate may not be sufficiently clear or distinct; it may accordingly 
lead to certain hermeneutical misapprehensions among his interpreters.
829 
Secondly, various passages from De Trinitate lead one to believe that causal priority does 
not satisfactorily account for Novatian’s understanding of the Father-Son relationship. For 
instance, this study already has scrutinized the claim: “the Father also precedes Him [the Son], in a 
 
825 God, Time, and Knowledge, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989), 153. 
826 See note 158 above. 
827 Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, 82-83. 
828 Hallman, Descent of God, 70. 
829 DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 101, 181.                                      147 
 
 
                                                
certain sense, since it is necessary, in some degree, that He should be before He is Father.”
830 
Novatian claims that the Father precedes the Son in that he exists as God “before” he generates the 
Son. Furthermore, he maintains that God the Father has no beginning, but is the Son’s divine locus 
of origination. Most significantly, Novatian is rather vague when it comes to explaining the 
Father’s priority with respect to the Son since he uses the qualifying expressions “in some degree” 
or “in some sense.”
831 It is thus not altogether clear whether he excludes the Father from being 
temporally prior to the Son or not. On the other hand, certain passages indicate that Novatian may 
invoke the notion of causal priority to delineate the mysterious generation of the Son: “And 
reasonably, He [the Son] is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by 
Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made. Assuredly God proceeding 
from God, causing [constituting] a person second to the Father as being the Son, but not taking 
from the Father that characteristic that He is one God.”
832  
In the final analysis, one may justifiably conclude with Fortman that much of what 
Novatian writes about God generating the Son is not very clear. This same principle could apply to 
the issue of causal priority in Novatian. Alternatively, there is sufficient evidence that Novatian 
possibly did not believe that the Son is eternally generated from the Father. He appears to argue 
that the Son is an entity resembling the anhypostatic “immanent Word” that becomes “the uttered 
Word.” However, Novatian affirms that God is inherently paternal before the Son’s first nativity 
occurs. Consequently, he probably thinks of God as “Father” properly or non-metaphorically, 
unlike Lactantius or Tertullian. This existential priority of the Father in relation to the Son is 
coherent when one apprehends Novatian’s concepts through the metaphysical lens of Stoicism that 
conceives of relations in terms of corresponding accidental dispositions over against thinking of 
them as entities that constitute the being of a thing. Nevertheless, this investigation submits that 
subordinationist thought manifestly occurs in De Trinitate: 
Moreover, the Son is God of all else, because God the Father put before all Him whom He 
begot. Thus the Mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature 
 
830 De Trinitate 31.3-4. 
831 Ibid. 
832 Ibid. 31.5: et merito ipse est ante omnia, sed post Patrem, quando per illum facta sunt omnia. qui processit ex 
eo, ex cuius uoluntate facta sunt omnia, Deus utique procedens ex Deo, secundam personam efficiens post patrem, qua 
filius, sed non eripiens illud patri, quod unus est Deus (Fausset, De Trinitate, 118-119).                                      148 
 
 
                                                
subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God; with every creature subdued 
to Him, found at one with His Father God, has, by abiding in that condition that He 
moreover “was heard,” briefly proved God His Father to be one and only and true God.
833 
 
The subordinationist position of Novatian remains salient despite the extensive redacting that has 
occurred in the final section of De Trinitate.
834 The Son is God in relation to all created things. But  
in relation to the Father, the Son is subordinate in that he endeavors to glorify the “one and only” 
true God. Novatian believes that the Father has subjected all things to the Son; the Son, however, 
remains subject to God the Father (De Trinitate 22). He ultimately affirms that the Son is divine 
“in a different and lesser degree” vis-à-vis the Father (Hill, Mystery of the Trinity, 52). 
 
C.  Minucius Felix (160-240 CE) 
 
Another African writer, who exploits the term “Father” metaphorically, is Marcus 
Minucius Felix. Although the Christian apologist was from Africa, in time, he practiced law as a 
skilled advocate at Rome (De viris illustribus 58; Epistle 70 ad Magnum).
835 Minucius’ legal 
background shaped his literary style and approach to apologetics. Moreover, it undoubtedly 
explains the setting that appears in the Octavius, namely, a cordial dialogue between acquaintances 
that is conducted along the coast of Ostia (at the mouth of the Tiber River).
836 Clarke argues that 
the setting further reflects an exploitation of the philosophical dynamic encountered in Cicero’s De 
natura deorum.
837 The literary background and dialogical approach taken in Minucius’ work may 
also be a result of his rhetorical training which entailed writing declamatory treatises known as 
controversia (wherein a thesis is affirmed or denied).
838 In any event, there apparently is no need 
 
833 Ibid. 
834 Grant, Gods and the One God, 160; DeSimone, The Trinity, 111; idem, Treatise of Novatian, 175; Harnack, 
History of Dogma, 2:314. However, Fausset thinks that the form of subordinationist thought one encounters in 
Novatian’s De Trinitate is not at variance with the orthodox doctrine of Christ that came into being after Nicea. See De 
Trinitate, xxxiii. 
835 Compare DI 5.1.22. 
836 Octavius 2. 
837 The Octavius of Marcus Minucius Felix, ed. G. W. Clarke (New York: Newman Press, 1974), 26-27. The Latin 
text used in this study for literary work composed by Minucius Felix is Bernhard Kytzler, M. Minuci Felicis Octavius, 
Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1982). 
838 Clarke, Octavius, 28. See Gerard L. Ellspermann, The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers Toward 
Pagan Literature and Learning (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949), 6.                                      149 
 
 
                                                
for an appeal to symbolic factors in order to account for the mise-en-scène of the Octavius.
839 The 
author’s training sufficiently explains the literary setting chosen in the apologetic treatise. 
One on-going question in patristic scholarship is whether Minucius wrote Octavius before 
or after Tertullian composed Apologeticum.
840 On one hand, Daniélou thinks that Minucius 
preceded Tertullian in the literary tradition of the West, but Frend places Tertullian before 
Minucius.
841 The latter argues that Minucius borrows copiously from Tertullian’s work and he 
suggests that Octavius could have been written as late as 240 CE.
842 Clarke notes that Lactantius is 
the first pre-Nicene to reference or mention the Octavius. He considers it a product of Severan 
Rome and places Minucius’ flourishing “within the first third of the third century.”
843 Clarke also 
attaches much weight to Cornelius Fronto’s polemic speech (fl. ca. 140-175 CE) against Christian 
customs (Octavius 31) in order to establish a terminus a quo for the work of Minucius. Finally, he 
reasons that Minucius possibly influenced the literary content of Cyprian as opposed to shaping 
Tertullian’s concepts (Clarke, Octavius, 11-12). In the final analysis, it seems that Tertullian is the 
originator of Latin theology. Nevertheless, while Minucius probably is not the first Latin 
theological writer, he certainly has informative thoughts concerning God the Father. Before 
examining his concept of divine paternity, however, it is necessary to review the theological 
presuppositions that govern Minucius’ notions of God’s transcendence. Firstly, he reasons that 
creatures who sufficiently uphold God’s majesty readily acknowledge that God is 
incomprehensible:  
This God cannot be seen; He is too bright for sight. He cannot be grasped; He is too pure 
for touch. He cannot be measured; He is too great for our senses—a boundless infinity, 
sharing with Himself alone the knowledge of His vastness. But the understanding we have 
is too limited to comprehend Him and that is why we measure Him worthily when we say 




839 Ibid. 27. 
840 Dennis V. M. Holmes, “The Date of the Octavius,” AJPh 50:2 (1929): 185-189; Clarke, Octavius, 8-12. 
Ellspermann (Attitude of Early Christian Writers, 14) favors the literary priority of Minucius. 
841 Daniélou, Origins, 192; Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 283. 
842 Frend, Rise of Christianity, 291-292. 
843 Clarke, Octavius, 9-12. 
844 Octavius 18.8: Hic nec videri potest: visu clarior est; nec conprehendi potest nec aestimari: sensibus maior est, 
infinitus inmensus et soli sibi tantus, quantus est, notus. Nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, et ideo sic eum 
digne aestimamus, dum inaestimabilem dicimus (Kytzler Latin text, 15).                                      150 
 
 
                                                
The apologist’s teaching here evokes concepts found in Philo, who stresses God’s beyondness, 
ineffability or utter incognoscibility (De posteritate Caini 169; De somniis 1.11.67; Quod Deus 
immutabilis sit 13.62). Minucius contends that one cannot know God by means of the senses or the 
intellect: the divine one is completely incircumscribable (Octavius 18). While it is possible that 
one can detect hints of Stoic or Gnostic influence in his particular brand of apophatic theology, 
Gnosticism or Stoicism are by no means the only possible resources that shaped Minucius’ thought 
since he follows conceptually in the steps of his Christian predecessors.
845  
One particularly can witness the influence of early Latin theology in the emphasis on God’s 
anonymity. Minucius urges that humans should dispose of names for God because they evidently 
originate “by nature” (fu,sei), not “by convention” (qe,sei).
846 He thus contends that 
creatures should abandon all titles for God (including Father) or simply invoke the Christian God 
as Deus—a practice that purportedly upholds the divine transcendence (= beyondness): 
Nor should you seek a name for God: God is His name. We have need of titles in cases 
where we want to separate individuals from a large group; we use, then the distinguishing 
mark of personal names. But God is unique; all He has for title is God. Should I call Him 
father, you would consider that He is earthly; should I call Him king, you would suspect 
that He is made of flesh; should I call Him lord, you would certainly understand that He is 
mortal. Remove the aggregate of names and you will clearly see His splendor.
847   
 
Minucius’ proposal is that names obfuscate rather than clarify the nature of God. Hence, creatures 
should eliminate divine names to behold God’s glory. Daniélou considers this view “radical”; he 
attributes it partly to the influence that Stoicism probably had on the working concepts that one 
encounters in Octavius.
848 Moreover, this radical statement of the apologetic work is reminiscent 
of what one encounters in the Philonic corpus (De mutatione nominum 13-15). It stresses the 
absolute ineffability of God, as suggested in the maxim: “It is easier to say what God is not than to 
say what he is.”
849 Minucius is convinced that names diminish God.
850 Therefore, he maintains 
 
845 Daniélou, Origins, 192-193. 
846 One encounters the famed debate regarding language being a product of convention or nature in Cratylus. See 
Daniélou, Origins, 193; Octavius 16. 
847 Octavius 18:8-10: Nec nomen deo quaeras: Deus nomen est. Illic vocabulis opus est, cum per singulos propriis 
appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est: deo, qui solus est, dei vocabulum totum est. Quem si patrem dixero, 
terrenum opineris; si regem, carnalem suspiceris; si dominum, intelleges utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta 
nominum et perspicies eius claritatem (Kytzler Latin text, 15). 
848 See Daniélou, Origins, 189-207; Colish, Stoic Tradition, 2:30-31. 





                                                                                                                                                               
that when one does not wield designations such as “Father” or “Lord,” one then allows God’s 
splendor (in all its fullness) to manifest itself. Although Minucius generally prefers to shun all 
divine names (nomina divina) with the exception of “God” (Deus), his preferred appellation for the 
Supreme Being is “the Parent of all.”
851 He manifests a predilection for the term in Octavi
The term parens can denote a procreator, parent—a father or mother.
853 Ancient writers 
also employ it with a transferred sense to signify ancestors or grandparents (i.e. progenitors).
854 
Furthermore, the word is used metaphorically as a reference to an emblematic father in the sense of 
a founder, inventor or author.
855 The term appears as a metaphorical reference to Jupiter in 
Horace’s Carmina 1.12.1: “Whom praise we first? The sire on high, Who gods and men unerring 
guides, Who rules the sea, the earth and sky (quid prius dicam solitis parentis laudibus, qui res 
hominum ac deorum, qui mare ac terras variisque mundum temperat).
856 Lactantius also refers to 
God as the “parent of all” in a passage about the Father dispatching his Son to extricate humankind 
from bondage to evil (Divinae institutiones 4.13.1). The potential meaning of parens seems to be 
“parent” although context may determine whether the term is translated “Father” or “Parent” in 
reference to God. 
Appealing to the familiar Platonic text Timaeus 28C, Minucius acknowledges God as the 
cosmic parent, who constructed all things in heaven and on earth; he professes that this Father-
Creator nevertheless is ineffable or unknowable.
857 On the other hand, in spite of God’s presumed 
ineffability, Minucius contends that acknowledging God as a parent (i.e. Father) somehow 
promotes unity among Christians: 
 
850 Daniélou, Origins, 192. 
851 See Octavius 17, 19, 31. Compare Lactantius’ use of this expression (De opificio dei 2; DI 4.13.1). 
852 Octavius 19.14-15: Platoni itaque in Timaeo Deus est ipso suo nomine mundi parens, artifex animae, caelestium 
terrenorumque fabricator, quem et invenire difficile prae nimia et incredibili potestate et.  “Eadem fere et ista, quae 
nostra sunt: nam et deum novimus et parentem omnium dicimus et numquam publice nisi interrogati praedicamus” 
(Kytzler Latin text, 17-18). 
853 Cornelia (mother of the Gracchi) was venerated as Deus parentem by her sons. See Taylor, Divinity of the 
Roman Emperor, 49; Marleen B. Flory, “The Deification of Roman Women,” The Ancient History Bulletin 9.3-4 
(1995): 127-134. 
854 William Smith and Theophilus D. Hall, A Copious and Critical English-Latin Dictionary (New York, 
Cincinnati and Chicago: American Book Company, 1871), 536. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Horace: Odes and Epodes, ed. Paul Shorey and Gordon J. Laing (Chicago: B.H. Sanborn, 1930), 1919. 
857 Compare DI 1.8.2. 152 
 
 
                                                
Thus, in short, we do not distinguish our people by some small bodily mark, as you 
suppose, but easily enough by the sign of innocency and modesty. Thus we love one 
another, to your regret, with a mutual love, because we do not know how to hate. Thus we 
call one another, to your envy, brethren: as being men born of one God and Parent, and 
companions in faith, and as fellow-heirs in hope. You, however, do not recognize one 
another, and you are cruel in your mutual hatreds; nor do you acknowledge one another as 
brethren, unless indeed for the purpose of fratricide.
858 
 
He apparently does not conceive God the Father in ontologically gendered terms. First, Minucius 
believes that Father is a term that one can eradicate in order to achieve a clearer vision of God 
himself.
859 Father does not predicate what God is according to essence (secundum essentiam). 
Second, Minucius ostensibly prefers the designation “Parent” (parens) to “Father” (pater). Even 
when these appellations are employed, however, he qualifies these terms by associating parens 
with the world’s creation or with spiritual redemption. This investigation therefore submits that 
Minucius Felix appears to view the term  “Father” as a metaphor for God. He does not utilize this 
concept to designate an eternal or immutable distinction within the triune God. The paternal title 
for deity does not function as a proper name in Octavius. 
 
D.  Arnobius of Sicca 
 
Arnobius Afer (fl. 290-303 CE) probably taught Lactantius the art of rhetoric.
860 He was 
born in rustic Sicca Veneria (Proconsular Africa in Numidia) near Carthage and in time converted 
to Christianity.
861 The writing style of Arnobius resembles that of a neophyte who articulates 
concepts earnestly, but simultaneously lacks the epistemic wherewithal to formulate theological 
notions systematically. Yet Arnobius does appear competent in the matter of subverting pagan 
arguments promulgated against the Christian faith.
862 Conversely, his thought is evidently 
 
858 Octavius 31.8: Sic nos denique non notaculo corporis, ut putatis, sed innocentiae ac modestiae signo facile 
dinoscimus; sic mutuo, quod doletis, amore diligimus, quoniam odisse non novimus; sic nos quod invidetis, fraters 
vocamus, ut unius dei parentis homines, ut consortes fidei, ut spei coheredes. Vos enim nec invicem adgnoscitis et in 
mutual odia saevitis nec fraters vos nisi sane ad parricidium recognoscitis (Kytzler Latin text, 30). 
859 See Justin’s Apology 2.6. 
860 J. A. Tixeront, Handbook of Patrology (St. Louis: Herder, 1944), 125; Wace and Piercy, Early Christian 
Biography, 49. 
861 H. D. McDonald, “The Doctrine of God in Arnobius’ ‘Adversus Gentes’ ” SP 9.3 (1966): 75. 
862 Michael Bland Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian, The 
Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 16-18; Micka, Problem of Divine Anger, 158. 153 
 
 
                                                
“unorthodox” in some respects.
863 Cruttwell writes that while Arnobius articulates the person of 
Christ in glowing terms or affirms that he is truly God, “he yet regards Him rather as the Divine 
Revealer of the One God than as Himself the object of worship.”
864 Cruttwell’s observation might 
be technically inexact since Arnobius does appear to profess that he and other then contemporary 
Christians worshiped the Son as God.
865 However, the ancient professor apparently vacillates 
between a ditheistic and a subordinationist outlook (Aduersus nationes 1.27; 2.74-75; 3.2-3).
866 
Arnobius views Christ as more of an exalted sage, who (to some degree) is less majestic or divine 
than the Father is; he believes that the Son is a demiurgic entity appointed by the Father to 
mediate between God and man.
867 Nevertheless, Arnobius does profess that the Son is (in some 
sense) God. His apologetic treatise also indicates that second-third century Christians (in some 
manner) venerated Christ as deity.
868 
Certain historians charge Arnobius with being heterodox in his description of the man, 
Jesus Christ.
869 Some comments made by Arnobius categorically imply a form of Docetism (the 
doctrine that asserts that Christ only seemed to be human).
870 In particular, Aduersus nationes 
1:53.4 states: “But, freed from the body which He carried about as a small part of Himself, He 
afterwards suffered Himself to be seen and allowed it to be known who and how great He 
was.”
871 Arnobius speaks of Jesus carrying about his body. Truth-claims such as these have 
confounded patristic scholars. Which influences does Arnobius reflect in his prima facie Docetic 
 
863 See Hagenbach, Textbook, 1:234-235. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 16; McGiffert, History of Christian 
Thought, 1:43. Cf. De viris illustribus 79; Adversus nationes 3.8-15. 
864 Literary History, 2:638-639. The capitalization of certain terms appears in Cruttwell’s original text. 
865 Aduersus nationes 1.36: “ ‘But,’ they say, ‘the gods are not hostile to you because you worship the Omnipotent 
God but because you maintain that a man, born a human being, and one who suffered the penalty of crucifixion, 
which even to the lowest men is disgraceful punishment, was God, and you believe that He still exists and you 
worship Him in daily prayers.’ ” Arnobius professes that Christians of his day worshiped one who was born man 
(Aduersus nationes 1.37). Although his comments suggest that Christians worshiped Christ in the ancient liturgy, 
Theodor Klauser’s observation seems pertinent when he argues that prayers of the liturgy usually were directed 
primarily to the Father through the Son. See A Short History of the Western Liturgy:   An Account and Some 
Reflections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 30. 
866 See McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, 2:43-44 regarding Arnobius’ ditheism and modalism. 
Moreover, this section of the investigation is heavily indebted to McCracken (Case against the Pagans, 1:27). 
867 Aduersus nationes 1.53. 
868 Ibid. 1.37-38, 56; 2.65. 
869 McCracken, Case against the Pagans, 1:298. 
870 See Aduersus nationes 1.61-62. 
871 McDonald believes that Arnobius’ “insufficient stress” on the humanity of Jesus results from his insistence 
that Christ is God (“The Doctrine of God in Arnobius’ Adversus Gentes,” 80). 154 
 
 
                                                
passages? Is his Christology quasi-Gnostic? Do fashionable notions of pagan deities shape his 
doctrine of Christ or is the Arnobian Christology proto-Nestorian? Answers to these questions are 
not wholly unproblematic.
872 For instance, Michael von Albrecht and Gareth L. Schmeling 
believe that the reputed Docetic sentiments articulated by Arnobius emanate from “some kind of 
dualism” or “African Platonism” latent in Aduersus nationes.
873 On the other hand, it is 
conceptually possible that Arnobius ornamented his portrait of Christ (Christusbild) with the garb 
of language befitting pagan divinities without making ontological assumptions about Christ.
874 
Perhaps his Christological speech-acts only appear heterodox: it is likely that confusion stems 
from Arnobius’ manner of expression rather than the material content of his doctrines. In the final 
analysis, it appears that the extant work of Arnobius does not allow one to make definitive 
conclusions regarding this matter. The immediate source of his Docetic proclivities remains a 
matter of speculation. 
Arnobius seems to be heterodox in other respects. For instance, he palpably espouses the 
“aloofness of God” doctrine.
875 Divinities cannot experience anger, he states, because wrath is 
savage, cruel, poisonous and insane; these properties do not befit authentic gods.
876 Moreover, 
Arnobius reasons that if God instantiates emotions, then he is susceptible to grief or vicissitudinal 
change; but where there is sorrow or grief, weakness and decay obtain.
877 But none of these 
attributes properly characterizes deity.
878 Arnobius thus insists that God does not instantiate or 
 
872 McCracken, Case against the Pagans, 1:298. 
873 A History of Roman Literature, Vols. 1 & 2 from Livius Andronicus to Boethius: with Special Regard to Its 
Influence on World Literature, Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava, 165 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 2:1591. 
Ernst Robert Curtius also uses the expression “African Platonism,” but he does not elaborate on its meaning. See 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), 544. However, we do know that Plotinus of Deltaic Lycopolis exemplified so-called African Platonism in The 
Enneads as did Apuleius in The Golden Ass and On Plato and His Doctrine. See Inge, Philosophy of Plotinus, 93. 
874 McCracken, Case against the Pagans, 1:298. 
875 See Aduersus nationes 1.19-20. Micka, Problem of Divine Anger, 49-54; Pelikan, Christian Tradition, 1:53; 
Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity, 191-192. The Latin text that this study uses for the writings of 
Arnobius is Arnobii Adversvs nationes libri VII, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, volume 4, ed. 
August Reifferscheid (Vindobonae: apvd C. Geroldi filivm, 1875). 
876 Aduersus nationes 1.17 (Reifferscheid CSEL 4:13): Quid est enim aliud irasci, quam insanire, quam furere, 
quam in ultionis libidinem ferri et in alterius doloris crucibus efferati pectoris alienatione bacchari? 
877 Ibid. 1.18 (Reifferscheid CSEL 4:14): Ubi enim est ullus, sicut sapientibus videtur, adfectus, ibi esse necesse 
est passionem: ubi passio sita est, perturbationem consentaneum est consequi; ubi perturbatio est, ibi dolor et 
aegritudo est; ubi dolor et aegritudo est, imminutioni et corruptioni iam locus est; quae duo si vexant, adest vicinus 
interitus, mors omnia finiens et cunctis adimens sentientibus vitam 
878 See Ibid. 7.4-8, 36; McCracken, Case against the Pagans, 7-8. 155 
 
 
                                                
experience emotional states. While the teaching of impassibility (avpa,qeia) is common in the 
pre-Nicenes, however,
879 his doctrine of impassibility seems to deviate from orthodox teaching. 
The concept becomes pure detachment in Aduersus nationes.
880 But regardless of his alleged 
heterodox tenets, Arnobius is an important witness to the North African church’s early 
understanding of God the Father. Additionally (on balance) he may not be “heterodox” at all in 
the matter of God’s nature.
881 A relatively current investigation possibly redeems Arnobius, even 
if some of its suggestions are questionable.  
The influential study written by Michael Simmons has advanced scholarly knowledge of 
Arnobius and his theology. Despite its problematic elements, Simmons’ investigation clarifies 
Arnobian thought by attempting to establish a historical context for Aduersus nationes. Simmons 
indicates that “Saturnian theology” possibly informs the Arnobian concept of God.
882 This 
terminology refers to the doctrine of God that prevailed in Roman North Africa during the age of 
Diocletian (284-305 CE).
883 Saturn was the chief god of North Africans and his cultus revolved 
around agrarian concerns such as crops, farming implements or weather control.
884 Certain factors 
that lead Simmons to adjudge that “Saturnian theology” informs Arnobius’ theology are portions 
of  Aduersus nationes that disputably attribute Saturnian epithets to the omnipotent deity of 
Christianity. One readily encounters the terms genitor,  pater,  dominus and frugifer in 
Arnobius.
885 Of course, this linguistic phenomenon does not necessarily confirm that the cult of 
Saturn functions as a backdrop for Arnobius; nonetheless, Simmons considers it a likely 
 
879 See Peter R. Forster, “Divine Passibility and the Early Christian Doctrine of God,” in The Power and 
Weakness of God: Impassibility and Orthodoxy, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron (Edinburgh: Rutherford House Books, 
1990), 33. He discusses how Justin (inadvertently) posits change in God. 
880 Hallman, Descent of God, 72-73. Lactantius also affirms the Father’s impassible nature but still believes 
emotions subsist in God (Compare DI 2.8.44 with De ira Dei 5). Hence, the former student of Arnobius logically 
obviates belief in the aloofness of God doctrine. 
881 See McCracken, Case against the Pagans, 1:33. 
882 Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 16. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Ibid. 
885 Ibid. See Aduersus nationes 1.29.7; 1.65.8 (virtutum omnium dominus); 6.10.5. The North Africans in 
Carthage demonstrably identified Saturn with Jupiter or Pluto, and deemed him protector of harvests (frugifer). 
Constantine provides evidence of this tendency when he invokes the divinity thus: Iovi Saturno Augusto. On the other 
hand, the Egyptians imputed the designation frugifer to Osiris (cf. Lewis-Short entry on frugifer). Vide Serge Lancel, 






                                                
possibility. While pagan concepts may shape the Arnobian understanding of divine fatherhood, it 
nonetheless seems more feasible that polemical strategy or unawareness respecting certain 
doctrines as well as his situational context influences the Arnobian do
One perplexing element of Arnobian thought is that there is no authentic Christology in 
his work nor does he refer to the Trinity, the Incarnation or the consecrated sacraments.
887 How 
can one justify omissions of this nature? One could account for them by appealing to the author’s 
status as an ecclesiastical neophyte. However, it is more probable that genre (i.e. polemical 
strategy) regulates the inclusion or omission of familiar theological motifs.
888 Aduersus nationes 
is reputedly an apologetic treatise; hence, the range of knowledge exhibited by its author is broad, 
but its raison d’etre is somewhat narrow. One probably should not be astounded to find 
inchoately developed theological formulations in Arnobius since his task is apologetic, not 
systematic. Furthermore, he possibly vacillates between subordinationist and ditheistic thought. 
While Arnobius ostensibly believes that Christ is God (Aduersus nationes 1.42),
889 Gabarrou 
suspects that he may not positively affirm the deity of God’s Son; Micka, however, does not agree 
with his assessment of Arnobian Christology.
890  
Arnobius seems to think that two distinct natures are morally united in Christ; that is, he 
submits that the hypostatic union is not ontological in nature but functional.
891 But the extent to 
which Arnobius views Christ as deity or the manner whereby he subordinates the Son to the 
Father and his beliefs concerning the Incarnation remain unresolved questions.
892 Nonetheless, 
his literary work does explore God’s paternity in that Arnobius conceives of divine fatherliness 
within a determinate cultural matrix. He relates that Christians worship “God, the Father of all 
things,” (Deum colimus rerum patrem) and “from Him ask protection when we are tired or 
 
886 Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 18. 
887 Ibid. 
888 McCracken, Case against the Pagans, 1:26. Cruttwell attributes the doctrinal inadequacies of Adversus 
nationes to Arnobius’ neophyte status as a Christian (Literary History, 2:632). 
889 Compare Aduersus nationes 1.39. 
890 See Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 19; Micka, Problem of Divine Anger, 52-53. 
891 Ibid. 54. 
892 The subordination of Christ to the Father in Arnobius is possibly hierarchical rather than ontological 
(Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 172). See M. Nilsson, “The Most High God and the Mediator,” HTR 56 (1963): 101-
120. Micka states that Arnobius believes that “Christ is in some way subordinated to the Father” (Problem of Divine 157 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
weary.”
893 However, Arnobius does not limit the extent of God’s paternity to Christians or pious 
individuals. Similar to Lactantius or Justin Martyr, he considers God to be the Father of all things 
(animate and inanimate).
894 There is thus somewhat of a metaphorical cast to his affirmation of 
God’s fatherhood.  
Arnobius further underscores the emblematic nature of God’s fatherhood when analyzing 
the human soul. His attempt to refute pagan concepts of the soul results in God’s universal 
paternity being solidified. Attempting to subvert Neo-Platonism, Hermetism, the Chaldean 
Oracles and other then current religio-philosophical movements, Arnobius contends that rational 
beings are not born with souls that God has immunized from death.
895 He deems the immortal 
soul doctrine an artificial construct woven by “certain upstarts” (nouis quibusdam dicitur uiris) 
who ostensibly introduce novel concepts at variance with the Christian faith:  
Wherefore there is no reason that that should mislead us, should hold out vain hopes to us, 
which is said by some men till now unheard of, and carried away by an extravagant 
opinion  
of themselves, that souls are immortal, next in point of rank to the God and ruler of the 
world, brought forth by that Begetter and Father, divine, wise, learned, and not touchable 
by any contact with the body.
896 
 
The novi quidam uiri (i.e. Neo-Platonists, Hermetists, Chaldean Oracles, et al.) delude others by 
means of the immortal soul doctrine. They apparently set the human soul on par with divinity. 
Conversely, Arnobius maintains that souls do not causally emanate from God the Father 
(Aduersus nationes 2.36). He reasons that it is the height of folly to assume that souls belonging 
to rational creatures resemble the supreme Father in the matter of immortality
897; for God has 
reserved deathlessness as his sole prerogative. On the other hand, souls “have one origin, we 
 
Anger, 53). Nevertheless, he demonstrates that the ancient professor is not reticent about explicitly ascribing Deus to 
Christ (Ibid). 
893 Adversus nationes 1.28. 
894 Ibid. 
895 See McCracken, Against the Pagans, 1:301. 
896 Aduersus nationes 2.15.1: Quare nihil est quod nos fallat, nihil quod nobis polliceatur spes cassas, id quod a 
nouis quibusdam dicitur uiris et inmoderata sui opinione sublates, animas immortales esse, domino rerum ac principi 
gradu proximas dignitatis, genitore illo ac patre prolatas, diuinas sapientes doctas necque ulla corporis attrectatione 
continguas (Reifferscheid CSEL 4:59-60). See Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the 
Late Pagan Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 200; Colish, Stoic Tradition, 2:37. Both 
sources explain the distinctive teachings of the “upstarts.” 
897 Ibid. 2.16.3. 158 
 
 
                                                
therefore think exactly alike; we do not differ in manners, we do not differ in beliefs; we all know 
God (Deum); and there are not as many opinions as there are men in the world, nor are these 
divided in infinite variety.”
898 Arnobius thereby submits an explanation for the primal origin of 
human souls in his polemic against certain upstarts. He believes that souls derive from an angelic 
intermediary.
899 Their source consequently is not the Father since he transcends evil; nor can the 
Father relate to inferior human beings in view of his transcendence. Furthermore, it appears that if 
souls initially originated from one primordial fount, then they would have begun to exist at a 
definite point in time. If souls began to exist at a definite point in time, however, then it would 
appear that they are not innately deathless. If they are not innately deathless, then souls do not 
exist into perpetuity. This is the fundamental line of reasoning utilized by Arnobius (Aduersus 
nationes 2.19, 35-36). Nevertheless, this is not the only conclusion that seems to follow from the 
major or minor premises that he sets forth in his argument. The native from Sicca contends that if 
multitudes of gods exist (as the Greeks and Romans claim) then such deities evidently are 
beholden to the vicissitudes of temporality since they reputedly were generated posterior to the 
Father: 
They are also later in order and time: if later in order and time, they must have an origin, 
and beginning of birth and life; but that which has an entrance into and beginning of life in 
its first stages, it of necessity follows, should have an end also.
900 
 
The consensus among theists of Arnobius’ time was that there is one Father of all things, who 
generated lesser divine entities.
901 If these subordinate divine beings naturally had their origin in 
the Father or existed posterior to him in a temporal sense, Arnobius infers that they must also 
 
898 Ibid. 2.15.3: Et quia uno ex fonte omnium nostrum defluunt animae, idcirco unum conueniensque sentimus, 
non moribus, non opinionibus discrepamus, idem [Deum] omnes nouimus nec, quot in orbe sunt homines, nobis sunt 
sententiae totidem necque infinita uarietate discretae (Reifferscheid CSEL 4:60). The expression “quot homines, tot 
sententiae” is a famous adage evidently first encountered in Terence (Phormio 454). Cicero also uses the maxim in 
De finibus bonorum et malorum 1.15. See De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rackham (London: W. 
Heinemann, 1914), 18-19. Where some MSS read idem, McCracken favors Deum in Aduersus nationes 2.15.3. See 
his Case against the Pagans, 1:316. 
899 See Aduersus nationes 2.36. 
900 Ibid. 2.35.4: Nam si omnes concedimus, unum esse rerum patrem, immortalem atque ingenitum solum, 
nihilque omnino ante illum quod alicuius uocaminis fuerit inuenitur, sequitur ut hi omnes quos opinatio credit deos 
esse mortalium aut ab eo sint geniti aut eo iubente prolati. Si sunt prolati et geniti, et ordinis sunt posterioris et 
temporis; si ordinis posterioris et temporis, ortus necesse est habeant et exordia natiuitatis et uitae: quod autem habet 
introitum et uitae incipientis exordium, necessario sequitur ut habere debeat et occasum (Reifferscheid CSEL 4:76). 159 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
have a temporal end.
902 But if the “immortals” experience birth and death, necessarily they must 
be inferior to the impassible and eternal Father who allegedly engenders them; this line of 
reasoning functions as an argument reductio ad absurdum for Arnobius.
903 Whether his 
arguments are valid or sound, however, the Arnobian polemic directed against Greco-Roman 
deities illustrates one early Christian understanding of divine paternity. God is not a literal Father 
for Arnobius. Rather, divine paternity marks God as “the first cause, the place and space of things 
created, the basis of all things whatsoever they be.”
904 As the source of all things in the universe, 
God is not necessarily masculine. Arnobius seems to reason that the maximally excellent being 
only discloses “himself” as masculine in relation to us (quoad nos). He is inclined to contend that 
the practice of referring to God with masculine terminology is an accidental feature of human 
language (Aduersus nationes 1.59). The next section examines texts that evidently uphold this 
suggestion. 
 
1.  Arnobius on the Question of Divine Gender 
 
Arnobius seems to disclose his thoughts on divine gender in two sets of texts, both of 
which merit our attention. First, he manifestly denies the belief that God is male. Arnobius bases 
his confutation of God’s maleness on how Christian belief regarding the Father conflicts with 
both the paternal and maternal god or goddess veneration of Greco-Roman mythology: 
And yet, that no thoughtless person may raise a false accusation against us, as though we 
believed God whom we worship to be male, for this reason, that is, that when we speak of 
Him we use a masculine word, let him understand that it is not sex which is expressed, but 
His name, and its meaning according to custom, and the way in which we are in the habit 
of using words. For the Deity is not male, but His name is of the masculine gender: but in 
your ceremonies you cannot say the same; for in your prayers you have been wont to say 
 
901 Belief in God’s existence was a common presupposition in antiquity. See Octavius 32; Stromata 5.12-14 which 
testify to this phenomenon.  
902 Aduersus nationes 2.35. Compare the observation of Tatian in Oratio ad Graecos 21: “If you speak of the 
origin of the gods, you also declare them to be mortal.” 
903 Aduersus nationes 2.36. Arnobius believes that God does not generate souls, but his argument is an example of 
polemic concession or granting the argument to his opponents. 
904 Ibid. 1.31: Prima enim tu causa es, locus rerum ac spatium, fundamentum cunctorum quaecumque sunt 
(Reifferscheid CSEL 4:20). 160 
 
 
                                                
whether thou art god or goddess, and this uncertain description shows, even by their 
opposition, that you attribute sex to the gods.
905  
 
Referring to God with masculine terms is a human convention possibly necessitated by the 
accidents of language.
906 Arnobius insists that God does not have a sexed body; corpora 
differentiated by gender or sex only belong to the created order.
907 Gender or sexual identity is for 
the purpose of reproduction (Aduersus nationes 4.19-29). Deities evidently do not need bodies 
informed by hormones, genitalia or chromosomes since they do not literally generate offspring: 
We cannot, then, be prevailed on to believe that the divine is embodied; for bodies must 
needs be distinguished by difference of sex, if they are male and female. For who, 
however mean his capacity, does not know that the sexes of different gender have been 
ordained and formed by the Creator of the creatures of earth, only that, by intercourse and 




Arnobius appears to closely associate sex and gender in this passage. Of course, this view was 
common in times of antiquity. The propensity to form a conceptual disjunction between gender (a 
cultural or sociological category) and sex (a biological category) is relatively modern. Arnobius 
probably would have found this disjunction somewhat hard to understand. He certainly implies 
that there is a natural correlation between gender and sex within the created order. Moreover, 
Arnobius associates differentiation of gender or sex with reproduction. That is, he contends that 
God has ordained these socio-biological variations in order that men and women may have the 
potential to generate offspring. Arnobius thus appears to doubt that it would be appropriate for 
God to possess a gender, whether masculine or feminine. On the other hand, he suggests that God 
 
905 Ibid. 3.8.1-2: Ac ne tamen et nobis inconsideratus aliquis calumniam moueat, tamquam deum quem colimus 
marem esse credamus, ea scilicet causa, quod eum cum loquimur pronuntiamus genere masculino, intellegat non 
sexum sed usu et familiaritate sermonis appellationem eius et significantiam promi. Non enim Deus mas est, sed 
nomen eius generis masculini est, quod idem uos dicere religione in uestra non quitis. Nam consuestis in precibus 
‘siue tu Deus es siue dea’ dicere, quae dubitationis exceptio dare uos diis sexum disiunctione ex ipse declarat 
(Reifferscheid CSEL 4:116). 
906 McDonald, “The Doctrine of God in Arnobius’ Adversus Gentes,” 77. 
907 A similar contention appears in Ambrose of Milan’s writings (De fide 1.12.78): “Surely the common order [of 
human generation] is determined by difference of sex; for this is implanted in the nature of our flesh, but where flesh 
is not, how can you expect to find the infirmity of flesh?” 
908  Aduersus nationes 3.8.3: Adduci ergo non possumus, ut corpora credamus deum. Nam esse necesse est 
corpora, si sunt mares ac feminae, insignificatam esse generum disiunctionem. Quis enim uel exigui sensus nescit 
terrenorum ab illo animantium conditore non alia de causa generis diuersi sexus institutos esse atque formatos, nisi ut 




                                                
possibly transcends the ontological category of gender. A consideration of his remarks on Greco-
Roman thought certainly indicates that Arnobius professes the divine one’s transcendence in 
relation to the category of gender. 
In an attempt to demythologize ancient Greco-Roman legends, Arnobius appeals to the 
notion of sexless deities in order to reason with his audience. He believes that if “reason has 
demonstrated, and truth declared, that among the gods there is no difference of species, and that 
they are not distinguished by any sexes,” then myths concerning gods with distinct sexes should 
be forsaken
909; for imputing sex to the gods would seem to be an erroneous act, if the gods are not 
differentiated in terms of sex. If the gods exist, then they do not appear to be categorized in terms 
of male/female oppositions since they are reputedly immortal. Moreover, gods do not literally 
engender progeny. Arnobius thereby reckons that they are not distinguished in terms of sex or 
(probably) gender.
910 His analysis of paternal or maternal speech for divinity appears to indicate 
that gender-specificity applies neither to God nor to the Greco-Roman gods. 
 
E.  Cyprian (martyred 258 CE) 
 
The final writer that will be discussed in this chapter is another ecclesiastic, namely, Bishop 
Cyprian (Thascius Caecilius Cyprianus). In addition to being a North African Christian, he also 
was a rhetorician (Divinae institutiones 5.1.24-28). As such, he received a comprehensive 
education in the noted Roman provincial city of Carthage.
911 Cruttwell proposes that Cyprian was 
an aristocrat.
912 His sophisticated literary style certainly lends itself to that suggestion, as does his 
overall tranquil bearing exhibited in the epistolary correspondences with those subject to his 
bishopric. Moreover, Cyprian was an affluent disciple of Christ,
913 who not only encouraged his 
 
909 Ibid. 7.19.1. 
910 Ibid. 7.19.2: Sapientium uirorum non aduocabo sententias, qui risum nequeunt continere, cum discrimina 
sexuum diis audiunt immortalibus attributa: unoquoque ab hominum quaero, an ipse apud se credat sibique ipse 
persuadeat, distinctum esse deorum genus, mares ac feminas hos esse et ad generandos fetus conuenientium 
membrorum dispositione formatos (Reifferscheid CSEL 4:252-253)? 
911 De viris illustribus 67. 
912 Literary History, 593. 
913 Campenhausen, Church Fathers, 2:37. 162 
 
 
                                                
flock to give alms,
914 but also established a salutary pattern by being liberal in his own life.
915 In 
spite of his socio-economic background, however, the memorable historical details regarding 
Cyprian are his ecclesiology, sacramental theology and turbulent episcopate.
916 The focus of this 
section is Cyprian’s use of Father as a metaphor for God. This portion of the study will 
concentrate on texts that appertain to his paterology.
917  
Cyprian argues that there is no salvation outside the church: “He can no longer have God 
for his Father, who has not the church for his mother” (Habere iam non potest Deum Patrem, qui 
ecclesiam non habet matrem).
918 He reasons that the Christian assembly eternally liberates those 
who participate actively in the liturgy and sacraments.
919 Cyprian argues that unless one 
recognizes the church as mother through the sacraments (= the external signs of God’s inward 
grace), corporate worship and dutiful submission to the bishop, one cannot have God as Father.
920 
It seems that both “mother” and “Father” are metaphors or tropological figures in this context.
921 
The church is not an ontological mother, but fulfills a maternal role.
922 Hence, it seems reasonable 
to believe that for Cyprian, “Father” does not refer to God’s essence; the term is a metaphor with 
an as-if character. Other portions of Cyprian’s oeuvre indicate that paternal speech for God (in a 
Christian context) is a linguistic pronouncement, not a metaphysical truth-claim. One instance of 
an unfamiliar identity synthesis or metaphor is the Cyprianic speech-act, “God, in proportion as 
 
914 On Works and Alms (De opera et eleemosynis) 25. 
915 De viris illustribus 67; De vita Cypriani 2. See Cruttwell, Literary History, 2:595; Wace and Piercy, Early 
Christian Biography, 218-219; Josef A. Jungmann, Christian Prayer Through the Centuries (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1978), 10; Ellspermann, Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers, 45. 
916 Campenhausen, Church Fathers, 2:57. 
917 Seeberg, History of Doctrines, 1:170.  
918 On the Unity of the Church (De Unica) 6; Epistula 73.7; 74:6. 
919 The Greek leitourgi,a  generally has  religious connotations in Christian literature. It bears  the 
potential lexical sense “public service” (Hebrews 8:6). See BDAG 591. The English term “liturgy” fittingly refers to 
corporate worship. 
920 Campenhausen, Fathers of the Church, 2:48. Joseph Conrad Plumpe argues that the concept of mh,thr 
evkklhsi,a (mater ecclesia) for the visible Corpus Christi began to emerge by the middle of the second century 
CE. See Mater Ecclesia: An Inquiry into the Concept of the Church as Mother in Early Christianity (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1943), 20-21. Visions 2.4.1; 3.8.2-5 demonstrates how early writers 
formulated concepts of the church as “mother.” 
921 Galatians 4:21-26 employs “mother” as a trope.   
922 See the entry for mh,thr  in  BDAG; Plumpe, Mater Ecclesia, 45-47; J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, 
Vocabulary of the Greek Testament (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1997), 411. 163 
 
 
                                                
with the affection of a Father is always indulgent and good, in the same proportion is to be 
dreaded with the majesty of a judge.”
923  
Cyprian states that God is a father or judge.
924 He appears to use these divine terms 
figuratively. Furthermore, Cyprian affirms that believers can recognize divine fatherhood through 
God’s manifestation of qualities like indulgence or goodness. However, the North African bishop 
does not believe that God is blithely permissive; one must honor or fear the Father “in the same 
proportion” as one honors or fears the authority of a human judge or father (Malachi 1:6).
925 
Cyprian thus preserves the requisite tension existing between the transcendent goodness and 
severity (bonitas et severitas) of God (Romans 11:22). Moreover, he implies that God is an 
emblematic Father to his people—not a literal masculine progenitor. Cyprian further stresses the 
metaphorical character of God’s fatherliness when explaining the Pater Noster. Emulating his 
literary and conceptual exemplar, Tertullian,
926 Cyprian is motivated to compose a treatise on the 
famed prayer recorded in the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew 6:9-13). His reflections on the 
dominical invocation provide vital insight regarding God the Father. They imply that “Father” is 
treated as a metaphor. Hence, this study will analyze his exposition of the notable prayer to God 
in the remaining paragraphs of this section. It will consequently attempt to determine whether he 
employs “Father” metaphorically or literally.
927 
 
1.  Cyprian on the Pater Noster 
 
Cyprian deems the Pater Noster a compendium of spiritual virtue and heavenly teaching.
928 It 
avers that God is Father for the regenerated, those who have experienced a spiritual birth from 
 
923 On the Lapsed (De Lapsis) 35. 
924 Compare Adversus Hermogenem 3.4 (Waszink Latin text). 
925 De lapsis 35. 
926 De viri illustribus 53. 
927 See James Moffatt, “Cyprian on the Lord’s Prayer,” The Expositor 18 (1919): 176-189. It is linguistically 
possible that Cyprian could employ “Father” both literally and figuratively of God. However, that possibility seems 
unlikely in view of how Christians have traditionally applied the term to deity. 
928 De oratione Dominica 9. See Tertullian’s comments on the Pater Noster in De oratione 1.36-37: “so that 
really in the prayer there is contained an epitome of the whole Gospel” (Ut re vera in oratione breviarium totius 
evangelii comprehendatur). Latin: Evans; ET: Souter. See Tertullian's Treatises: Concerning Prayer and Baptism, 




                                                
above (De oratione Dominica 9). Such individuals have received the Son (i.e. placed their faith in 
him) and, consequently, the Son has granted believers the right (potestas) to address God as 
“Father.”
929 Christians (to a degree) accordingly renounce their mundane fathers while steadfastly 
recognizing one Father in heaven. Cyprian thus makes a stark contrast between earthly fathers and 
the authentic parent addressed in the Pater Noster.
930 These sentiments underscore the 
exhortation in Matthew 23:9. Rather than applying the Matthean passage to religious authorities, 
however, Cyprian directs attention to biological fathers.
931 That is to say, he exhorts Christians to 
disavow (in a sense) their biological fathers in order to reverence God the Father.
932 Cyprian 
evidently believes that the Messiah’s kenotic assumption of flesh and his ignominious death 
profoundly altered God’s covenant relationship with Israel. While Christians ostensibly have a 
divine right to invoke God as Father, he argues that Israel (as a nation) has lost its right to 
approach the Father.
933 Cyprian maintains that one can identify a son by the obedient path that he 
chooses to take; Israel (he insists) has spurned the preeminent Son of God, thence renouncing its 
omnipotent Father.
934 God consequently has become the Father of Christians, while no longer 
being Father to Jacob’s progeny: “In repudiation of these, we Christians, when we pray, say Our 
Father; because He has begun to be ours, and has ceased to be the Father of the Jews, who have 
n Him.”
935  
Although Cyprian’s interpretation of the Pater Noster discloses in what sense he affirms 
that God is Father to Christians, his seemingly pejorative remarks directed towards Judaism may 
appear anti-Semitic to modern-day readers of his text. The present author nonetheless submits that 
a more precise categorization of the discourse found in On the Lord’s Prayer (De oratione 
Dominica) is “de-Judaizing locutionary performative” (not anti-Semitic rhetoric).
936 Cyprian’s 
speech-acts reveal a tendency to distance Christianity from Judaism and establish the former as a 
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Gr  for Biblical Study, number 25 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 45-47. 
ne Dominica 9. 
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dition, 1:55. 
929 Ibid. See John 1:11-12. 
930 De oratione Dominica 9. 
931 Contrast Cyprian’s observation with that of J. P. Louw and Eugene Albert Nida in Lexical Sem
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well-defined religion or figurative nation over against Israel.
937 While the locutions of Cyprian 
may seem distasteful in our era, they actually do not seem to provide any support for an anti-
Semitic position since his remarks are motivated by ecclesiastical rather than ethnic
ic remarks directed against the Jewish nation are rooted in pastoral matters. 
Finally, Cyprian reminds those under his episcopal care that being deemed a child of God 
entails certain responsibilities: “We ought then, beloved brethren, to remember and to know, that 
when we call God Father, we ought to act as God's children; so that in the measure in which we 
find pleasure in considering God as a Father, He might also be able to find pleasure in us.”
938 
Developing a Pauline metaphor found in the Corinthian Epistles (1 Corinthians 3:16-17; 2 
Corinthians 6:16-18), he exhorts believers to comport themselves in a manner that befits 
regenerate offspring of God.
939 The writings of Cyprian thus seem to indicate that he views God 
as a tropic Father. Preeminently, God is he Father of Jesus Christ; secondarily, he is Father of 
those who receive the Son in faith.
940 Cyprian is also convinced that invoking God as “Father” 
obligates a believer to comply with the divine will. He contends that adoption into the divine 
family should orient one’s conduct and speech in a hallowed direction, in order to accord with the 
Father’s reception of justified children into his family. These notions regarding God the F
 
An exploration of the Latin pre-Nicenes indicates that most of these writers conceived God as 
Father metaphorically. Tertullian seems to have believed that there was a time when God was not 
Father as such but only after he spoke the Son into existence, thereby making his Word, the Son 
of God (Aduersus Praxean 11:1; Aduersus Hermogonem 3.4). The term “Father” in Tertullian is 
at the very least an accidental rather than an essential divine signifier. He evidently thinks that it 
is possible for God to exist without being Father or Son. This view may also be found in the 
 
937 Epistle to Diognetus 3-4. 
938 De oratione Dominica 11. 
939 Ibid. 166 
 
 
n, however, the pre-Nicenes generally seem to think of God as 
Father 
from the created order to help us grasp a semblance of his glory 
(Hilary te 1.18-19). 
                                                                                                                                                              
writings of Novatian, although it is hard to determine whether Novatian affirms the eternal 
generation of the Son or not. It is also hard to ascertain whether Novatian believes that God is a 
literal, eternal or metaphorical Father in relation to the Son. The problematic nature of Novatian 
theology may arise from the imprecision of his language as opposed to the content of his ideas. 
With the exception of Novatia
in a metaphorical sense. 
Not only does Tertullian appear to employ “Father” as an accidental or metaphorical term 
for God, but Cyprian uses both metaphors and similes that point to the figurative nature of God’s 
paternity. God is “like” a Judge or Father for the bishop. Yet, even granting the as-if character of 
metaphor in the case of Cyprian, he nonetheless affirms that God is “Father” in the most authentic 
sense. But God’s authentic paternal nature must function at the level of metaphor, not in terms of 
literally exemplifying the properties attributed to the maximally excellent being. Both Justin 
Martyr (Apology 2.6.1) and Minucius Felix (Octavius 18.1-10) are examples of the pre-Nicene 
tendency to construe “Father” as a term that is accidental to God’s existence or metaphorical. The 
latter maintains that removing the term from God actually results in worshipers of God more 
clearly grasping his transcendence or clarity. Finally, Arnobius of Sicca manifests a predilection 
for not interpreting “Father” as a term that implies God is male or masculine. Any associations 
with gender emanate from the accidents of human language; just because a word is grammatically 
masculine does not mean that its referent instantiates masculinity in se. There are passages in the 
writings of Lactantius that indicate he too does not conceive God the Father in masculine 
ontological terms. God is comparable to a Father. The paternal imagery evidently should be 
construed metaphorically. It seems that the pre-Nicenes were aware that God speaks to humanity 
in terms that finite minds can grasp. They did not generally infer that “Father” or “King” are 
metaphysical pronouncements regarding the divine one. These writers appear to have understood 
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the Son
    
 
Excursus B: Hippolytus of Rome (died ca. 236) 
 
Although Hippolytus did not compose any theological documents in Latin, Tertullian extensively 
shaped his thought concerning God the Father and Logos Christology. Briefly reviewing his 
theory of how the Son of God ontologically developed in stages will thus facilitate 
comprehension of Lactantian paterology and Christology. The Logos is an emergent, dynamic 
entity in Hippolytus’ system. He accordingly posits three progressive stages for the Logos—
which is God’s Word that ultimately becomes the perfect Son of God.
941 Initially, Hippolytus 
proposes, God exclusively or eternally subsists as one person in solitariness.
942 Nevertheless, God 
was not alone in the strictest sense because within his eternal being 
s analogous to human ratiocination: “In the first phase, then, the Logos (endia,qetoj) 
was eternally in the Father, but impersonally as divine intelligence and wisdom.”
943 Hence, 
wisdom, power and counsel reside in God by means of the Logos.
944 
In the second stage discussed by Hippolytus, when God creates the world, he generates the 
Logos from his own substance and becomes a Father by making the Logos his Son.
945 Hippolytus 
(like Tertullian) creates a nexus between his doctrine of Christ and cosmology.
946 The Logos 
becom
 in the latter’s second phase of ontological development, Hippolytus still maintains that 
the Son’s gradual development is not complete until he assumes human flesh (Contra Noetum 
15). 
                                             
941 See Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, 108-109. 
tra Noetum 10. 
etum 10. 
 14. Cf. Seeberg, History of Doctrines, 1:127-128; Studer, Trinity and 
Inc
942 Refutatio 10.29; Con
943 Fortman, Triune God, 118. 
944 Contra No
945 Ibid. Refutatio 10.33; Contra Noetum
arnation, 71. 
946 J. A. McGuckin, Handbook, 164. 168 
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and paterology contribute meaningfully to an ameliorated understanding of God’s emblematic 
paternity.
951 Furthermore, one encounters the dynamic view of divine fatherhood posited by 




                                                
In the third phase, the Word comes to be enfleshed; at that point, he emerges as the perfect 
Son of God.
947 Hippolytus’ concepts additionally entail that the first generation of Christ is a 
logical consequence of God’s free decision to produce the Son in salvation history.
948 Yet, 
Fortman and Lonergan hold that the temporal or v
y since a requirement for being God supposedly is complete exemplification of the 
ce, not eternal existence per se.
949 Conversely, Henry Barclay Swete provid
ve quote from Contra Noetum 8, and then he writes: 
Neither of the terms “economy” and “person,” which Hippolytus uses perhaps for the first 
time, suggests the existence of eternal relations in the life of God, and the Divine Unity 
[sic] appears to be secured by a subordinationism which it is difficult to reconcile with the 
essential equality of the persons.
950  
 
Whether the language of Hippolytus 
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949 See Fortman, Triune God, 114; Contra Noetum 10, 16. 
950 The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church: A Study of Christian Teaching in the Age of the Fathers (Grand Rapids: 
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951 Hippolytus apparently believes that God is one immanently but three in terms of his economic expression 
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                                           Chapter 5     
 
The Anonymous God and Father of All 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to document conceptual antecedents of Lactantian thought 
pertaining to God’s innominable fatherhood. Discernable traces of apophatic theology are 
contained in Divinae institutiones. An examination of Christian and pagan writings that predate 
Lactantius’ apologetic treatise indicates that the apophaticism manifested in his work is 
influenced mutually by pre-Nicene and Greco-Roman writings. On the basis of sources that 
Lactantius utilizes in his treatise, this chapter will make Philo and Christian predecessors of 
Lactantius the focal point of inquiry. It will explore the respective propensities of the former and 
latter to attribute innominability to God before examining the concept of innominability in 
Divinae institutiones. 
Another aim of this chapter is to spell out the theological, logical and practical 
implications of God’s paternity. To that end, this chapter will discuss how God’s fatherhood 
affects the Christian understanding of why God permits evil, how it might shape the Christian 
justification of God’s ways to rational creatures and finally, the chapter will review what 
Lactantius has to say about the practical implications of God’s fatherhood. First, this study will 
lay the groundwork for tracing the concept of divine innominability in Lactantius. 
The pre-Nicenes are in general agreement that no designation except God (Deus) is 
suitable for the (presumed) first person of the Trinity (Novatian, De Trinitate 4; Apology 2.6.1 
[Justin Martyr]; Octavius 18.1-10).
952 Therefore, ancient ecclesiastical writers living prior to 
Nicea generally do not use “Father” as a proper name for God. Rather, they profess that the 
 
952 Cooper supplies four distinctions for the term “name”: (1) proper name (e.g. Bill, Yahweh, and John); (2) 
proper noun (e.g. Lord, God, President, King); (3) common name (e.g. dog, cat, and tree); (4) any linguistic reference 
(e.g. X is Y). The pre-Nicenes, when arguing that God has no name, seem to mean that God has no proper name. See 
Our Father, 118. 170 
 
 
                                                
supreme divinity is the anonymous God and Father of all.
953 The only proper name (nomen 
proprium) that the Most High possesses is Deus: “Because God is unique, his proper name is 
God” (Divinae institutiones 1.6.5).
954 The Corpus Hermeticum (5.34) supplies an analogous 
portrait of the divine: “And for this cause He has all Names, because He is the One Father; and 
therefore He has no Name, because He is the Father of all.”
955 
One encounters a less paradoxical testimony regarding the anonymous God and Father in 
Justin Martyr: “To the Father of all, no name is given; for anyone who has been given a name has 
received the name from someone older than himself. Father and God and Creator and Lord and 
Master are not names but appellations derived from his benefices and works” (Apology 2.6.1).
956 
He forthrightly states that rational creatures do not possess a true appellation for the supreme and 
ineffable divinity. Signifiers that appear to be names for God are nothing more than conceptual 
vehicles that outline God’s manifold functions toward creation.
957 Furthermore, the terms that 
Justin enumerates (e.g. “Father” or “Creator”) ostensibly are ways to invoke God based on his 
interpersonal revelatory activity (Romans 1:19-20).  
Nevertheless, in order to apprehend Justin’s doctrine of innominability, it is imperative to 
make a conceptual distinction between names (o;nomata) and forms of address 
(prosrh,seij). Expressions such as “Father” (path,r) or “Lord” (ku,rio,j) are not 
o;nomata but prosrh,seij.
958 They do not designate what God is, but simply permit finite 
rational beings to invoke God with reverential awe. Osborn maintains that God is a person to 
whom one may speak “but of whom one may not speak”; he is known as “thou” but never as 
“he,” so to speak.
959 For Justin, consequently, not even the lexeme “God” is a name since it does 
 
953 See E. Bikerman, “Anonymous Gods,” Journal of the Warburg Institute 1.3 (1938): 187-196. 
954 Comparable affirmations occur in DI 2.16.5-6: “As I explained in the beginning, God needs no name because 
he is the only god, and though the angels are immortal, they do not allow themselves to be called gods nor do they 
want to be: their one and only duty is to attend to the wishes of God and to do absolutely nothing without his 
command” (Bowen and Garnsey, 162) See Braun, Deus Christianorum, 35. He quotes Lactantius thus: Deo autem 
quia semper unus est, proprium nomen est Deus (DI 1.6.5). 
955 Bowen and Garnsey (Divine Institutes, 70) indicate that the pentateuchal account of the thornbush in Exodus 
3:13-15 possibly influenced Lactantian thought concerning God’s innominability.  
956 Compare Dialogus cum Tryphone 127. See Carabine, Unknown God, 227; Warner, After the Apostles, 160. 
957 Marsh, Triune God, 189. Justin even denies that qeo.j is a divine name. 
958 Eric Francis Osborn, Justin Martyr, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 47 (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1973), 
22. 
959 Ibid. 171 
 
 
                                                
not have a discernable meaning.
960 Osborn maintains that his use of the word prosrh,seij is 
“much more perceptive” than Clement of Alexandria’s preferred terminology which suggests that 
the human mind utilizes divine titles as “forms of support.”
961 Yet, both Justin and Clement 
believe that God is strictly innominable. 
Justin categorically affirms his belief in God’s utter namelessness when professing that the 
Father is “a God who is called by no proper name.”
962 Affirmations such as these cause Osborn to 
observe: “The similarity of these statements with those of contemporary Platonism is clear. 
Albinus speaks in similar terms of the inapplicability of names to the One. God is ineffable and to 
be grasped by mind alone because he is neither genus, species nor differentia.”
963 It thus appears 
evident that Middle Platonism shaped Justin’s doctrine of innominability. He too formulated his 
doctrine of God in a particular cultural milieu or specific Christian matrix informed by 
contemporary Platonic thought.
964 God has no proper name (according to Justin): he is 
anonymous; and it is not hard to perceive a conceptual nexus between Justinian innominability 
and the Lactantian doctrine of God’s namelessness. Both writers forged their individual theistic 
notions in the same cultural milieu or discourse universe. Their questions concerning God are 
framed within similar intellectual or problematic contexts. The next section will delineate the 
intellectual context of Lactantius; the focus particularly will be divine anonymity. 
 
A.  Divine Anonymity in Philonic Thought 
 
Philo of Alexandria (50 BCE-20 CE) was a preeminent Second Temple advocate of divine 
innominability.
965 A number of passages in the Philonic corpus reveal his thought concerning 
God’s namelessness, which he bases partly on the Tanakh and partly on theoretical abstractions. 
 
960 Ibid. 22-23. Compare Novatian, De Trinitate 4. 
961 Ibid. 
962 Apology 1.10. 
963 Osborn, Justin Martyr, 22. See Erwin Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Jena: Frommannische 
Buchhandlung, 1923); Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 85. 
964 Compare Didaskalikos 10. 
965 Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2 
volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), 2:110-112; Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic 
Culture (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), 326-327. 172 
 
 
                                                
In accordance with the Pentateuch, Philo recapitulates the significance of the thorn bush account 
in Exodus by writing: “First tell them that I am He Who Is, that they may learn the difference 
between what is and what is not, and also the further lesson that no name at all can properly be 
used of me, to Whom existence belongs.”
966 He appeals to Exodus 3:14 in order to demonstrate 
that God is both anonymous (avkatono,mastoj) and ineffable (a;rrhtoj).
967 Furthermore, 
Philo contends that there is no designation aptly befitting the existent one.
968 He evidently thinks 
that God is innominable.
969 However, it is here that the Philonic writings become somewhat 
complex. In what sense is God nameless? Is it possible for theists to utter sacred terms of address 
(prosrh,seij) to or about deity? 
Philo answers these queries by making a distinction between the ineffable sacred name 
and the appellation that God reveals in his creative works: “The third law [contained in Exodus 
20:7] is one about the name of the Lord, not about that name which has not yet reached his 
creatures; for that name is unspeakable, but about the name which is constantly applied to him as 
displayed in his powers; for it is commanded that we shall not take his name in vain.”
970 Based on 
this passage, Philo apparently believes that one may reverentially speak the name that the 
 
966 Vita Mosis 1.75-76:  
to. me.n prw/ton le,ge fhsi,n  “auvtoi/j o[ti evgw, eivmi o` w;n ×na 
maqo,ntej diafora.n o;ntoj te kai. mh. o;ntoj prosanadidacqw/sin w`j ouvden 
o;noma to. para,pan evpv evmou/ kuriologei/tai ≤￿ mo,nw| pro,sesti to. 
e≡nai.” 
967 In the Tanakh, a name could be directly associated with the entity bearing the name or with the substance of a 
name-bearer (Borchert, John 1-11, 117). For example, Isaiah 62:2 speaks about Israel acquiring a new name or 
identity. The apocalyptic NT book of Revelation also contains references to a “new name” (o;noma kaino.n). 
Ben Witherington III argues that the “new name” that the exalted Christ mentions in Revelation 2:17 “implies a new 
identity and being someone special in the kingdom.”  See  Revelation, New Cambridge Bible Commentary 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 104. Robert Thomas adds that the “new name” refers to a new 
state of being. He also points out that the Bible practically identifies one’s name with one’s personality (Revelation 1-
7, 202). Hence, the words of John’s Apocalypse fittingly describe the resurrected believer’s new condition in Christ. 
Significantly, the Platonic One transcends “all being, names and knowledge.” See Joseph C. McLelland, God the 
Anonymous: A Study in Alexandrian Philosophical Theology, Patristic Monograph Series, number 4 (Cambridge, 
MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1976), 10; Platonis Respublica 509b. Nevertheless, compare Symposium 
211a-b which seems to qualify the statements made in Platonis Respublica. For the Lactantian view of Christ’s name, 
see Divinae institutiones 4.7.1-5. 
968 Vita Mosis 1.75. 
969 Sean M. McDonough, YHWH at Patmos: Rev. 1:4 in Its Hellenistic and Early Jewish Setting, WUNT, 107 
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1999), 80. 
970 Quis rerum divinarum heres 170. 173 
 
 
                                                
incomprehensible “powers” (duna,meij) of God unveil, but he does not consider it possible to 
vocalize the unutterable designation hidden to creatures: “It was, therefore, quite consistent with 
reason that no proper name could with propriety be assigned to him who is in truth the living 
God.”
971 The Alexandrian thinker also refers to YHWH as he “who may not be named nor spoken 
of, and who is in every way incomprehensible.”
972 Philo thereby associates God’s namelessness 
(avkatono,mastoj) with his incomprehensibility (avkata,lhptoj) or ineffability 
(a;rrhtoj).
973  
As an indication that Scripture is the primordial ground for the Philonic doctrine of divine 
innominability, we are informed that Moses is the sacred historian who “showed that he knew that 
there was none properly belonging to him; but that whatever appellation any one may give him 
[YHWH], will be an abuse of terms; for the living God is not of a nature to be described, but only 
to be.”
974 It is factually impossible to describe a God whose nature is pure act: Philo consequently 
believes that the deity of the Tanakh is the anonymous o` w;n (the existing one) of Exodus 
3:14-15 whose indefinable nature is “to be” simpliciter. He argues that existence and essence 
coincide in God. However, while Philo thinks that a proper name for God is not requisite or even 
possible (in the case of creaturely speech for God), he still infers that a divine referencing term 
has been unveiled to humanity in view of God’s subsistent nature.
975 o` w;n is that proximate 
referring-expression.
976 It is “proximate” because the Greek noun phrase purportedly allows one 
to designate God without circumscribing his essence.
977 Rational creatures thus ostensibly have 
recourse to descriptive forms of address in order to articulate what divinity has disclosed: “And, 
if, in their natural weakness, they [rational agents] seek some [divine] title to use, tell them not 
only that I am God, but also the God of the three men whose names express their virtue,” that is, 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
978 Creatures may need to employ divine appellations in view of mortal 
weakness. God has consequently unveiled a proximate term that allows creatures to speak 
 
971 De mutatione nominum 11.15. 
972 De somniis 1.67. 
973 Wolfson, Philo, 2:111. 
974 De Somniis 1.230. 
975 See De mutatione nominum 12; McDonough, YHWH at Patmos, 81. 
976 De Somniis 1.231. See McDonough, YHWH at Patmos, 80. 
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proximately of deity. Nevertheless, o` w;n does not define God’s immanental essence; it merely 
delineates his autonomous existence (= aseity) in relation to the created order.
979 
The Greek expression (o` w;n) used by Philo and the LXX (strictly speaking) only 
depicts “an aspect of [God’s] potencies”
980 since God reputedly does not possess any 
distinguishing self-assignation: “God indeed needs no name; yet, though He needed it not, He 
nevertheless vouchsafed to give to humankind a name of Himself suited to them, that so men 
might be able to take refuge in prayers and supplications and not be deprived of comforting 
hopes.”
981 Philo effectively makes a distinction of reason (distinctio rationis) between names of 
substance (nomina substantiae) and names of mercy (nomina misericordiae) when he suggests 
that there is a proximate referring term for YHWH.
982 It is his contention that there exist names 
that are descriptive of God’s substance and names vouchsafed to creatures founded on YHWH’s 
compassionate mercy. However, Philo submits that God is immanently anonymous. One 
witnesses an analogous working concept in Cratylus 400d-e. 
The Philonic doctrine of innominability seems aporetic in view of the emphasis on a 
nomen proprium for God in the Tanakh (Exodus 3:15; Isaiah 42:8; Zechariah 14:9).
983 The 
Tetragrammaton (YHWH) occurs nearly 7,000 times in the canonical Hebrew-Aramaic 
Scriptures.
984 Did Philo actually know Hebrew or was he personally acquainted with the 
 
978 Vita Mosis 1.76. 
979 Aquinas believes that a definition (definitio) manifests the quiddity (whatness or essence) of an entity by 
supplying its genus and difference. Since God (ex hypothesi) has neither genus nor differentiae, he reckons that one 
cannot define God. See ST Ia.13.1. 
980 Carabine, Unknown God, 208-209.   
981 ovno,mastoj ga.r o` qeo.j ouv dei/tai mh. deo,menoj dΗ 
o[mwj evcari,zeto tw/| ge,nei tw/n anqrw,pwn klh/sin oivkei,an ×nΗ 
e;contej katafugh.n pro.j I`kesi,aj kai. lita.j mh. avmoirw/sin evlpi,doj 
crhsth/j (On Abraham 51). The name Philo speaks of here is “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the 
God of Jacob.” See On Abraham 54-55. 
982 See David T. Runia, “Philo, Alexandrian and Jew,” Idem, in Exegesis and Philosophy: Studies on Philo of 
Alexandria (Variorum, Aldershot, 1990), 1-18. 
983 See Christopher R. Seitz, “The Divine Name in Christian Scripture” in This Is My Name Forever, 26; Robert 
Jenson, Triune Identity, 5. 
984 See Cooper, Our Father, 99-101. Concerning its religious significance, Maimonides writes: “It is well known 
that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are derived from His actions, except one, namely, the 
Tetragrammaton, which consists of the letters yod, he, vau and he. This name is applied exclusively to God, and is on 
that account called Shem ha-meforash, ‘The nomen proprium.’ It is the distinct and exclusive designation of the 
Divine Being; whilst His other names are common nouns, and are derived from actions, to which some of our own 175 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
quadrilateral name of God (YHWH) contained in the Tanakh?
985 It is highly probable that he was 
neither conversant with Hebrew nor the proper name of God (Shem ha-meforash).
986 A number of 
related factors certainly suggest that Philo lacked adequate proficiency in a Semitic language: his 
educational background, vital social context and philosophico-theological treatises all indicate 
that he did not have a suitable grasp of Hebrew. 
Firstly, it is evident that Philo had a traditional Hellenic education.
987 He possessed a 
comprehensive knowledge of Homer, Demosthenes, Greek poetry as well as Platonic and Stoic 
philosophy (De Congressu Quaerendae Eruditionis Gratia 3.11; 4.16-18).
988 Although Philo had 
an “excellent education” in matters Greek, Dillon thinks that he was not proficient with Hebrew 
as evidenced by his vague allusions to the Tetragrammaton and his mistaken etymologies for 
Semitic names.
989 Philo “frequently” misconstrues Semitic etymologies, ostensibly being 
dependent on the Greek Septuagint (LXX) version of Scripture.
990 The extant data would appear 
to indicate that he scarcely knew any Hebrew and possibly did not even have first-hand 
acquaintance with the four letters that constitute God’s proper name in Hebrew (YHWH or 
יהוה).
991  
Secondly, Koine Greek was the universal language (Weltsprache) of first century Jews in 
Alexandria.
992 This socio-historical datum is one factor that motivates David Runia to conclude: 
“That Philo himself had no knowledge of Hebrew is almost certain. It was therefore an event of 
 
are similar, as we have already explained” (The Guide for the Perplexed, 1.61). Compare how the Tanakh utilizes the 
term meforash in Nehemiah 8:8. 
985 See Wolfson, Philo, 2:122; Vita Mosis 2.23, 114-115; Decal. 19.93-94. 
986 But see McDonough, YHWH at Patmos, 81. 
987 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 140. To obtain a comprehensive view of ancient education, see H. I. Marrou, A 
History of Education in Antiquity. An updated account of education in the ancient period is The Chreia and Ancient 
Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, trans. and ed. Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
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enormous importance for the Jewish community in Alexandria that the Hebrew Bible was 
translated into Greek.”
993 Hence, Philo’s lack of familiarity with Hebrew may partially explain 
his innominability doctrine. On the other hand, his theoretical assumptions pertaining to ultimate 
reality also categorically shaped this belief since Philo affirms that God (YHWH) is the “Creator 
and Father of all,” a nominal phrase that he probably culls from Timaeus 28C (a text that alludes 
to God’s incognoscibility).
994 The thorn bush account of Exodus 3:14 further shaped Philo’s 
doctrine of divine namelessness. For the ancient thinker from Alexandria, God is the anonymous 
universal Father or existent being (De legatione ad Gaium 115-116). 
Philo believes that God (as Father) profoundly esteems his figurative offspring.
995 The 
fatherhood of YHWH  is therefore associatively connected  with the divine governance and 
creation of the universe. The Abrahamic God “is in truth the father, and creator, and governor of 
all things in heaven and in the whole world” (De mutatione nominum 29-30). Copan and Craig 
accordingly propose that the deity acknowledged as Father in the Philonic corpus possibly 
engenders intelligible objects before creating the sensible realm of phenomena.
996 De opificio 
mundi 2.7 certainly lends itself to this interpretation, even if one construes intelligibles as 
abstracta (i.e. propositions, sets or classes).
997 Nonetheless, if the proposal set forth by Copan and 
Craig faithfully represents Philo’s pragmatic locutionary intent, one evidently could say that God 
engenders or creates intelligible abstracta that at least logically precede sensible objects.
998 One 
detail supporting this interpretation is Philo’s belief that YHWH (figuratively) generates the 
transcendent Logos: “His Father is God, who is likewise Father of all, and his mother is Wisdom, 
through whom the universe came into existence” (De fuga et inventione 109).
999 The identity of 
the Logos in this context is not easy to determine. But if one identifies the Philonic Logos with 
intelligible objects or with the noetic realm that God (possibly) engenders, then one could say that 
 
992 See A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville: 
Broadman Press, 1934), 49-51. 
993 See David T. Runia, “Philo, Alexandrian and Jew,” 1-18. 
994 On the Creation of the World (De opificio mundi) 2.7. 
995 Ibid. 2.7-12. 
996 Creation out of Nothing, 109-110. 
997 See Reale, History of Ancient Philosophy, 4:190-192. 
998 The emphasis, in this case, is on logical or explanatory as opposed to temporal priority since abstracta by 
definition are timeless or non-causal entities. 
999 See Quis rerum divinarum heres 205; Gregory J. Riley, River of God, 57. 177 
 
 
                                                
God unequivocally is a Father to noetic objects that are capable of being apprehended by the 
intellect. Moreover, the writings of Philo might serve as evidence that the notion of a paternal 
being of whom one cannot predicate literal attributes or speak univocally characterized the 
established cultural milieu of first century Alexandria.
1000  However, early Christian writings may 
also demonstrate that the notion of God the anonymous is not just restricted to Philo or his 
philosophical contemporaries (Pedagogus 1.8). The Christian predecessors of Lactantius also 
chose to affirm God’s putative namelessness. The next section will review the apparent pre-
Nicene professions of God’s innominability. 
 
B. God’s Name and the Pre-Nicenes 
 
Christian, Jewish and pagan literature probably shaped Lactantian apophaticism. Philo thought 
that God is nameless, but he was not alone in this respect since post-apostolic Christians espoused 
analogous beliefs. In fact, this study proposes that the pre-Nicenes articulated a number of reasons 
for disavowing that God has a proper name or needs one. This investigation will now enumerate 
some of their stated motivations below which may not exhaust their psychological rationale for 
adopting the stance that God is nameless: 
(1) The pre-Nicenes were acquainted with the Gnostic conscription of the Tetragrammaton 
(YHWH or Ιa,w) in magic ceremonies. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Justin Martyr show 
awareness of this Gnostic practice in their polemico-apologetic treatises designed to confute 
heresy.
1001 Cyril Richardson even suggests that Justin refuses to ascribe a name to God for this 
very reason.
1002 Discussing baptismal procedures in his day, the Martyr avers: “For no one can 
utter the name of the ineffable God; and if any one dares to say that there is a name, he raves with 
 
1000 De opificio mundi 16, 20. 
1001 See Adversus haereses 1.4.1; Stromata 5.6; Apology 1.61. For the controversy surrounding YHWH or Iao in 
sacred texts, see Martin Rösel, “The Reading and Translation of the Divine Name in the Masoretic Tradition and the 
Greek Pentateuch,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 31.4 (2007): 411-428. John G. Gager (ed.) documents 
how Iao or the Tetragrammaton was employed in the magical papyri. See Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the 
Ancient World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 55, 67. 
1002 It appears that “Justin was aware that the Old Testament divine name was used for magical purposes (as Iao 
and the like), and hence his vigorous condemnation of a practice he considers not only wrong (as all Jews would) but 178 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
a hopeless madness.”
1003 Adherents of Judaism evidently no longer pronounced the divine name 
by the third century BCE.
1004 In a manner akin to Philo, they universally believed the Name 
(Hashem) was unspeakable or incomprehensible.
1005 Furthermore, worshipers of YHWH 
generally thought that vocalizing God’s name was a sign of irreverence (Sanh. 7.5; 10.1). 
Tradition appears to state that during the Second Temple period only Jewish priests were 
permitted to utter the quadrilateral name of God at certain places or ordained times (Mishnah 
Sotah 7:6; Tamid  7:2; Ecclesiasticus 50:20) although devout adherents of Judaism certainly 
employed some form of the divine name in casual greetings elsewhere.
1006 In this regard, 
Josephus apparently called the Tetragrammaton that “hair-raising name.”
1007 On the other hand, 
the Pre-Nicenes not only chose to avoid pronouncing God’s covenantal designation (YHWH) but 
they customarily affirmed the divine innominability concept, thereby excluding a proper name for 
God the Father (Dialogus cum Tryphone 127). Then contemporary Gnostic practices may have 
shaped their view of attributing a proper name to God. 
(2) Early Christian writers considered it less problematic to say what God is not than to 
say what he is.
1008 Hence, they reasoned that it is impossible to predicate literal attributes of God 
the Father such that any predicating term (F) discloses God’s quiddity (i.e. whatness) or F-
ness.
1009 Apophaticism largely infiltrated Christianity by means of Platonic thought.
1010 Both pre 
 
impossible.” See Early Christian Fathers, trans. and ed. Cyril C. Richardson, et al. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1953), 283. 
1003  Apology 1.61. Pace Charles Gieschen, Justin does not teach that the quadrilateral name of God was 
pronounced over initiates during the ceremony of baptism. He seems to emphatically deny that God the Father has a 
personal name. Moreover, he considers anyone hopelessly deranged, who tries to pronounce Hashem. See Gieschen’s 
“The Divine Name in Ante-Nicene Christology,” VC 57 (2003): 115-158. 
1004 The manner in which Jews ceased to vocalize YHWH is attended by mystery. Christopher Seitz notes that it is 
“unclear” how articulating God’s proper name stopped and divine circumlocutions started. See “The Divine Name in 
Christian Scripture,” in This Is My Name Forever, 29-30; Jenson (Triune Identity, 19) dates the cessation of 
verbalizing the Tetragrammaton to the third century BCE. Cf. Owen Barfield, Saving the Appearances: A Study in 
Idolatry (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), 112-113. He concurs with Jenson’s observation. See TDNT 
5:268-269. 
1005 Justin relates: “And all the Jews even now teach that the nameless God spoke to Moses” (Apology 1.63). 
1006 Thompson, Promise of the Father, 176. 
1007 Ibid. 
1008 Stromata 5.11-12. See Michael J. Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love: A Study of the Teaching of St. 
Thomas Aquinas on Divine Immutability in View of Certain Contemporary Criticism of This Doctrine (Fribourg, 
Suisse: Éditions universitaires, 1986), 195. 
1009 Novatian (De Trinitate 4.10-11) lucidly and representatively expresses this pre-Nicene viewpoint: “When God 
takes      for Himself a name or manifests it for certain reasons and on certain occasions, we know that it is not so 179 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
and post-Nicene thinkers commonly quote Timaeus 28C to substantiate the belief that one cannot 
declare what God is in Godself.
1011 McClelland rigorously traces the historical connections 
between Platonic thought and Christian apophaticism or the divine innominability doctrine. He 
notes that the Supreme Being in Middle Platonism “transcends the whole polarity of A and not-
A.”
1012 It is not just that one is able to conclude that God is B because he is not-A. The Platonists 
contended that God is beyond naming; he is ineffable (Didaskalikos 10). And it was in this 
cultural environment that Christians formulated their own type of negative theology. It must be 
conceded, however, that Origen of Alexandria (in opposition to Celsus) maintains that one can 
comprehend God in the sense that familiarity with divine attributes may conceivably guide one 
who heeds God’s truth toward partial knowledge and understanding of deity. More specifically, 
Origen explains that it is factually possible for the Word of God  (understood as Christ in this 
context) to facilitate understanding of the divine insofar as human nature permits.
1013 Origen thus 
circumspectly qualifies in what sense he believes that one can know or comprehend God: 
But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of 
God’s attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so enable him to 
comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by human nature, then there is no 
absurdity in saying that “He can be described by name.”
1014 
 
Origen affirms that there is a sense in which creatures are able to describe or comprehend God. 
Such comprehension is not exhaustive but relative or to a degree. Therefore, the often heard 
maxim “God may be apprehended, but not comprehended”
1015 probably needs to be qualified.
1016 
Origen indicates that rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God—to an extent. 
 
much the real nature of the name that has been made known to us as a vague symbol appointed for our use, to which 
men may have recourse and find that they can appeal to God’s mercy through it.” See Oratio ad Graecos 4 (Tatian) 
and Cratylus 400d-e for similar observations on God’s proper name.  
1010 See Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford: Clarendon, 1886). 
1011 Dialogue with Heraclides 3.26; Stromata 5.11-12. See Lampe in A History of Christian Doctrine, 24-25; 
Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 74. 
1012 God the Anonymous, 19-20. 
1013 Ibid. 102-103. Widdicombe, Fatherhood of God, 57. 
1014 Contra Celsum 6.65ff. Origen evidently thinks that the words of Scripture really delineate God (De Martyrio 
46). Moreover, he does not perspicuously differentiate God’s describability from his cognoscibility. See 
Widdicombe, Father of God, 55. 
1015 Oden, Systematic Theology, 1:44. 
1016 ST I.12.7, Responsio. 180 
 
 
                                                
(3) Certain pre-Nicenes argue that divine names are only human vehicles for addressing 
God.
1017 Terms of address for God do not say anything significative concerning the Father’s 
quiddity; spatio-temporal bound language is not capable of unfolding the Christian object of 
worship with respect to his essence. Strictly speaking, the ancient ecclesiastical writers conceive 
divine names as manifestations of God’s benevolence.
1018 Because of his unbounded or infinite 
compassion, the Father permits humans to use divine “forms of address” (prosrh,seij) rather 
than “names” (o;nomata).
1019 
(4) Justin reasons that God does not have a proper name since bearing a self-marking 
designation implies that a name-giver preceded the one so designated.
1020 Yet, there is no 
individual substance or entity temporally prior to God the Father: he is from eternity to eternity 
(Revelation 15:3).
1021 Therefore, the Father is nameless. Justin might fail to consider the logical 
possibility that God’s proper name could be coextensive with his nature. That would obviate the 
need for the Father to have a name-giver. But Justin possibly believes that atemporal existence 
logically necessitates or entails deific innominability (= divine namelessness). However, the name 
of God the Father is probably not accidental but essential to God’s being (Exodus 3:12-15).
1022 
(5) Another pre-Nicene line of reasoning is that only created entities have names: “He has 
no name, for everything which has a name is kindred to things created.”
1023 Some early church 
writers openly reason that uncreated entities like the Father do not require designations. God is an 
individual uncreated (primary) substance; therefore, God (the Father) does not need a self-
designation. The categories of genus or species do not apply to deity. Consequently, one does not 
need to differentiate God from other divine beings. Moreover, the pre-Nicenes generally contend 
 
1017 Octavius 18-19; De Trinitate 4.11 (Novatian). 
1018 David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Thought, Alexandrian and Jew,” Studia 
Philonica Annual 7 (1995): 144-145. 
1019 Apology 2.6 (Justin Martyr). 
1020 “For God cannot be called by any proper name, for names are given to mark out and distinguish their subject-
matters, because these are many and diverse; but neither did any one exist before God who could give Him a name, 
nor did He Himself think it right to name Himself, seeing that He is one and unique, as He Himself also by His own 
prophets testifies, when He says, ‘I God am the first,’ and after this, ‘And beside me there is no other God’ ” 
(Cohortatio ad Graecos 21). 
1021 See Oratio ad Graecos 4 (Tatian). 
1022 See Etienne Gilson, Christian Philosophy:  An Introduction, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), 12-13. 
1023 Aristides, Apology 1. 181 
 
 
                                                
that appellations circumscribe the substances they name. To define an entity or substance implies 
that it has both genus and species (e.g. “Socrates is a man”).
1024 But the Father is infinite (= 
without genus or species); therefore, the Father is anonymous (Cohortatio ad Graecos 20-21). 
The pre-Nicenes also believed that God’s essence is unknowable since God is unique (sui 
generis). Ultimately, they argued that it is impossible to circumscribe God by means of terms or 
concepts since one cannot apply concepts to a being that does not possess genus, species or 
differentiae. There is only one authentic inestimable Creator and Father of all.
1025 Other objects of 
reverence are merely purported gods. If there is only one God, then it is unnecessary to name this 
deity:  
Neither must you ask the name of God. God is His name. Among those there is need of 
names where a multitude is to be distinguished by the appropriate characteristics of 
appellations. To God who alone is, belongs the whole name of God; therefore He is one, 
and He in His entirety is everywhere diffused.
1026 
 
(6) The Father has not published his proper name.
1027 Tertullian maintains that humans 
only know God as “Father” because Christ explained his Father (John 1:18) and taught his 
disciples how to pray (Luke 11:2).
1028 God the Father has not revealed his proper name: it is not 
even possible for the Father to disclose a name that delineates his essence since human language 
does not have the ability to define or express that which is perpetually infinite (semper 
immensus).
1029 For this reason, knowledge of the Father’s proper name is unattainable: early Latin 
and Greek Christian thinkers insist that God has not deigned to reveal his consecrated self-
appellation.  These six factors do not exhaust their reasons for affirming God’s anonymity; 
however, they do seem to epitomize the primary stated motivations undergirding the pre-Nicene 
adherence to the divine innominability concept.  
But what are the logical implications of a conceptual framework that prefers to conceive 
the Father as God the anonymous? Are there potential theological problems that may result from 
 
1024 Wolfson, Philo, 2:111. 
1025 Octavius 18. 
1026 Cyprian, Quod idola dii non sint 9. 
1027 De oratione 3.   
1028 Ibid. 
1029 See De Trinitate 4.10-11 (Novatian); Hallman, Descent of God, 70-71. 182 
 
 
                                                
refusing to cataphatically predicate anything about the Father’s essence or to assign God a name 
quoad se? The next section will address these questions. 
 
C.  Critique of the Innominable God Concept   
  
Since rational creatures seem capable of knowing whether God exists by means of general 
revelation but utterly incapable of fathoming the divine essence (i.e. God’s immanent being), 
Justin and Philo insist that we should utilize expressions which signify divine existence such as 
“He That Is” or “The Being” (o` w;n).
1030 Nevertheless, on this view, created entities cannot 
possess quidditative knowledge since knowing or articulating the quiddity of God would define 
his essence; the act of defining his essence, in turn, would objectively limit or encompass the 
boundless Creator.
1031 Therefore, Arnobius contends that the only legitimate alternative to 
defining God is reverential silence: “There is but one thing man can be assured of regarding 
God’s nature, to know and perceive that nothing can be revealed in human language concerning 
God.”
1032 However, is reverential quietude a plausible option for devout theists seeking 
understanding of the deity, whom they religiously profess? Frank Kirkpatrick ostensively 
addresses this question when he remarks that hardly any theist withdraws into silence concerning 
God. Rather, theists usually choose to articulate something definitive about God through 
corporate worship or theological discourse: “As the language about God as ‘act-of-being’ makes 
clear, some words continue to be used with respect to God.”
1033 Deferential silence thus does not 
 
1030 Carabine, Unknown God, 209. 
1031 Sanders, God Who Risks, 27. 
1032 Aduersus nationes 3.19: Unus est hominis intellectus de dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo 
posse mortali oratione depromi.  
Clement of Alexandria makes a similar observation in Stromata 6.18: “For human speech is by nature 
feeble, and incapable of uttering God. I do not say His name. For to name it is common, not to philosophers only, 
but also to poets.” 
1033 Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 35. One is here reminded of Wittgenstein’s concluding proposition in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wovon man nicht sprechen 
kann, darüber muß man schweigen). 183 
 
 
                                                
appear to be a viable theolinguistic option.
1034 Nevertheless, what genuine alternative to 
reverential quietude is there? 
Arnobius of Sicca considers God indescribable; consequently, he maintains that the 
deity’s name ipso facto is unspeakable and his quiddity unknowable (Aduersus nationes 3.19). On 
the other hand, more than one critical thinker has warned that impredicable deities cursorily 
become superfluous deities.
1035 In order for a transcendent referent to bear meaning in relation to 
finite moral agents, that entity apparently must be cognoscible or effable in some vital way or on 
some conceptual level; otherwise, a transcendent referent ultimately proves to be noumenal or 
completely estranged from sensible experience and the intersubjective affairs of humanity. 
Gordon Kaufman has accepted the logical consequences of postulating an inexpressible God.
1036 
But most theists probably are not content with the logical corollary of an indescribable God. One 
can illustrate the natural outcome of positing an ineffable God (who is wholly other in a strict 
sense) by reviewing Tillichian concepts vis-à-vis the Absolute. This investigation submits that 
Tillich’s systematic theological paradigm demonstrates the apparent non-viability of a strictly 
wholly other deity for Christianity. The manifest inadequacy of Tillich’s theological framework 
for referencing God constitutes the reason for this study’s examination of his approach. 
Tillich has offered an innovative analysis pertaining to transcendent reality and the human 
belief in that which exceeds the finite stream of vicissitudinal relativities.
1037 He initially 
scrutinizes the etymology of “absolute” with respect to the cognitive realm of being, and then 
subsequently indicates that it is possible to ascertain the meaning of “absolute” by apprehending 
the definition for the term absolvere.
1038 This infinitive potentially bears the lexical signification, 
“to loosen.”
1039 The potential denotation of the Latin verb (absolvere) implies that the absolute is 
 
1034 Compare ST Ia.13.1. See Brümmer, Speaking of a Personal God, 36-37, 53; Kenneth Nordgren, God as 
Problem and Possibility: A Critical Study of Gordon Kaufman's Thought Toward a Spacious Theology, Acta 
Universitatis Upsaliensis, 13 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Universitet, 2003), 86-87.   
1035 Oden, Systematic Theology, 1:28. 
1036 See Gordon D. Kaufman, God the Problem (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 50-55; 
Nordgren, God as Problem and Possibility, 150-151, 171. 
1037 Tillich’s corpus includes: My Search for Absolutes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967); The Courage to 
Be (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971); Der Mut zum Sein (Furche-Verlag: 1968); Systematic 
Theology, 3 volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper, 1958). 
1038 Absolvere is the present infinitive active form of absolvo.  
1039 Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, 66. 184 
 
 
                                                
not fettered by subject-object dichotomies: it absolves, loosens or makes such distinctions wholly 
superfluous. From this starting point in My Search for Absolutes, Tillich reasons that being-itself 
is absolute in that no relation delimits or conditions it. Moreover, no metaphysical dichotomies 
are concomitant with undifferentiated reality. His argument thereby implies that it is not factually 
possible—not possible in view of reality’s known structure—for finite existents to invoke the 
absolute as a subject or conceive it as an object of thought: being as such utterly transcends the 
bounded stream of conditioned relativities.
1040  
Since being-itself (within the framework of Tillichian thought) evidently surpasses the 
customary subject-object dichotomy experienced by ontic or particular beings, it does not appear 
that members of a specific phatic community can designate being-itself “an absolute being,” as if 
it were one being among many. Tillich accordingly reasons that the absolute is not one entity 
alongside other lesser entities: it is being as such.
1041 Hence, to avoid conditioning that which is 
wholly other or unconditional, he christens the ultimate Ground of Being “the God above God” 
(Der Gott über Gott).
1042 By means of this linguistic formula, Tillich suggests that the 
unconditional supersedes the deity of traditional theism.
1043 The power of being (Des Macht des 
Seins) thereby remains incognoscible; not even mysticism can infiltrate this postulated “cloud of 
unknowing” (vocabulary not used by Tillich in this context but aptly descriptive of his theological 
project).
1044 However, “the power of being” evidently does not have much relevance for the finite 
realm of transitory sensibilia. Tillich intimates that the only thing that creatures are able to state 
with any propriety whatsoever concerning the absolute is that the unconditional Ground of Being 
is not not (i.e. double negation). His language accordingly reflects the pervasive influence of 
 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Ibid. 127. 
1042 Idem, Courage to Be, 186-190. Houston A. Craighead is extremely critical of this move by Tillich and argues 
that it is theologically unfeasible. See “Paul Tillich’s Arguments for God’s Reality,” Thomist 39.2 (1975): 309-318. 
1043 Tillich’s preferred nomenclature for being-itself or undifferentiated reality is the unconditional. Much 
ambiguity surrounds this technical term. Is it a reference to the ultimate concern of finite beings? Alternatively, does 
it refer to God or to being as such? Tillich himself characterizes the unconditional as “paradoxical.” Yet, he explicitly 
states that God symbolizes the unconditional in the same way that faith (as actus) is a symbolic act. In the final 
analysis, it appears that Tillich believes that one must take a metalogical approach to undifferentiated reality: he 
seems to argue that the unconditional is cognitively impenetrable or beyond human comprehension. See Paul Tillich, 
What Is Religion? trans. James Luther Adams (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 14-15, 79; Kaufman, God the 
Problem, 65, note 23. 
1044 See idem, Courage to Be, 182-187; What is Religion, 90-91. 185 
 
 
                                                
Hegel’s triadic dialectical scheme upon his thought. Hegel posits the historical unfolding of the 
World Spirit (Weltgeist) through the process of affirmation, negation and negation of the 
negation.
1045 Tillichian thought ultimately is an extension of German Idealism exemplified in 
Hegel, Schelling and Fichte. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual influences that shape Tillichian thought cannot be restricted 
to Hegel, Schelling or Fichte.
1046 One further encounters adumbrations of the German 
theologian’s system in early Hellenistic thought. The Presocratics Anaximander and Xenophanes 
reason that the absolute should be conceived as inexpressible, impredicable or undifferentiated: 
Anaximander refers to the unconditional as to a;peiron (”the boundless” or “indeterminate”) 
to delineate its limitless, indeterminate or indeterminable nature.
1047 Of course, when employing 
this vocabulary, he apparently is referring to the rudimentary cosmic substrate; Anaximander is 
not speaking about the maximally excellent being that ultimately grounds all existence.
1048 
Nevertheless, his indistinct portrayal of that which accounts for being as such is quite germane 
regarding certain formulations of “wholly other” language for the Christian God. For example, 
Burkert indicates that Anaximander’s to a;peiron is all-encompassing, providential, 
immortal and “divine.”
1049 The boundless or indeterminate neither comes to be nor passes away; 
in short, it grounds “beings” (ta. o;nta) and “being” (o` o;n).
1050 
 
1045 See Merold Westphal, “Hegel, Tillich, and the Secular,” JR 52.3 (1972): 223-239; Kenny, Brief History, 277. 
1046 Ibid. 
1047 Sanders, God who Risks, 27; Sandywell, Presocratic Reflexivity, 138-140; Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, 
19-20; John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1961), 52-53.  Tillich’s 
proposed undifferentiated reality shares certain features with Anaximander’s notion of the “boundless” or 
“indeterminate.” It also reflects vestiges of Plato’s concept of the “unconditional.” See Tillich, What Is Religion, 14. 
1048 Wheelwright, The Presocratics, 54. Guthrie contends that to a;peiron in Anaximander is boundless in 
several possible ways. It is certainly indeterminate with respect to time: the boundless has neither a temporal 
beginning nor temporal end (History of Greek Philosophy, 1:83-84). Anaximander, Guthrie cautiously mentions, also 
possibly believes that to a;peiron is quantitatively indeterminate respecting space (1:84). But he tends to rule 
out this possibility in light of the fact that Anaximander probably did not grasp the concept of strict quantitative 
infinity. The most likely sense in which the boundless is indeterminate for Anaximander is with respect to opposites 
such as hot-cold or wet-dry being initially indistinguishable or indeterminate (1:86-87). Nevertheless, one cannot rule 
out other possible senses for the construct to a;peiron. 
1049 Greek Religion, 307. Aristotle states that Anaximander’s “indeterminate or “boundless” is divine. See Physica 
3.4.203b7-15; 5.204b22. 
1050 See Karl Popper, The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998 [2001]), 36. 186 
 
 
                                                
The biblical deity, conceived as absolute or wholly other in an unmitigated sense, 
allegedly is unspeakable and incircumscribable (De Sacrificiis Abelis et Cain 59).
1051 
Additionally, the “wholly other” approach to God presupposes that human language and speech 
potentially circumscribes or delimits the divine being. This prevalent assumption concerning God 
prompts Sanders to inquire: “Does language have the capacity to limit the object, or is it merely 
our understanding that is limited?”
1052 Is it ontologically possible for human speech to restrict 
(objectively) God’s essence? Does vocabulary that creatures employ to designate seemingly 
mind-independent entities such as ants or dogs circumscribe those particular beings? Upon closer 
inspection, what language or speech apparently delimits are human concepts—not extramental 
designated objects.
1053 Moreover, it seems unlikely that a finite creature could experience genuine 
kinship with an (absolutely) infinite or unbounded God of whom it is not possible to predicate P 
or Q quoad se.
1054 Such a being likely would bear little to no significance for the determinable 
world of phenomena inhabited by rational and non-rational creatures. For an impredicable God 
would probably belong to Kant’s proposed noumenal realm of things-in-themselves which is 
ostensibly the epistemic boundary point for rational creatures. 
This investigation submits that there is another factor to consider in this matter regarding a 
deity of whom one cannot predicate P or Q quoad se. Feuerbach brings this issue to the forefront 
by categorically insisting that an ineffable substance cannot exemplify any predicates 
whatsoever.
1055 However, logically speaking, that which does not instantiate predicates such as P 
or Q necessarily cannot subsist: it cannot be an actual concrete entity that obtains. Therefore, a 
God that does not instantiate predicates necessarily cannot subsist: “To deny all the qualities of a 
being is equivalent to denying the being himself.”
1056  A strictly ineffable God does not seem to 
 
1051 See Frank G. Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 68; Walter T. Stace, Time and Eternity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), 153-155; Jenson, Triune Identity, 163-164. 
1052 God Who Risks, 29. 
1053 Ibid. 
1054 See Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1995), 53. Along with Barth, he denies the “absolute infinity” (limitlessness) of God. Rather, he elects to argue 
that finitude is grounded in Almighty God. Bloesch contends that God can make himself finite and thereby commune 
with finite entities. 
1055 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York, Evanston and London: 
Harper and Row, 1957), 14. Compare Sanders, God Who Risks, 29ff. 
1056 Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, 14. 187 
 
 
                                                
be a viable option for those who are theists.
1057 Renouncing all cataphatic terms of predication for 
the divine essence seems to be “a subtle, disguised atheism.”
1058  
Finally, reason dictates that one must know (to a certain degree) that which one denies: 
“Rational denial seems clearly to presuppose rational affirmation. Knowledge of what something 
is not seems to be based upon knowledge of what, to some extent, it is.”
1059 If one predicates 
immutability (not-P), immortality (not-Q) or impassibility (not-R) of God, it seems that one must 
know or claim to know what God is (to some extent). It is hard to deny P concerning what one 
does not know. Perhaps it is conceptually possible for one taking the strict apophatic approach to 
justify this kind of unspeakable deity on the grounds of divine mystery or revelation. But the 
satisfactory alternative to strict negative theology—this investigation tentatively submits—is the 
employment of full or partial univocal cataphatic terms for God. Of course, there are apparently 
viable forms of apophatic or analogical speech that systematic theology uses in order to preclude 
theolinguistics from becoming “misleading” lest one obfuscates divine appellations such as 
Judge, King or Father.
1060 In the case of such assignations for God, Christians often appear to be 
“saying and unsaying to a positive effect.”
1061 That is, God is “Father” but he is not a male or God 
is “King” but a throne does not literally circumscribe him. Nevertheless, genuine apophatic God-
talk or analogical speech appears to be based on hitherto univocal cataphatic affirmations 
respecting the divine nature. Gregory Nazianzen even fittingly contends that rational creatures 
must employ cataphatic affirmations when speaking of God (Oration 28.9). This study maintains 
that the inability to say that “God is P or X” quoad se does not appear to be a suitable alternative 





1057 See De Fide Orthodoxa 1.1. Oden refers to God as “indescribable” and “ineffable.” However, he submits that 
one must nuance this usage of apophatic terminology (Systematic Theology, 1:321). It must be factually possible to 
employ cataphatic expressions of God himself as well or theology becomes irrelevant. 
1058 Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, 14. 
1059 Morris, Our Idea of God, 23. He is critical of those who construe apophatic theology in a strict fashion. See 
Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus, 100. His work outlines Scotus’ objection to a strict 
apophatic approach. 
1060 Ware, Orthodox Way, 14. 188 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
D.  Lactantius and the Anonymous God of All 
 
Now that the innominability doctrines of Philo and the pre-Nicenes have been analyzed, the focus 
of this section will be divine anonymity and paternity in Lactantius. The present section will 
discuss aspects of Divinae institutiones concerned with the namelessness of God. More 
specifically, it will demonstrate the conceptual associations that Lactantius explicitly makes 
between God’s putative anonymity and his transcendent paternity. 
Lactantius considers divine revelation immeasurably superior to human reason: “Even 
when he refers to the nature and reason of man, it is always God who must make accessible the 
way to real cognition.”
1062 Therefore, the North African primarily is apophatic in his theological 
orientation, fervently seeking to persuade his audience that rational creatures cannot immediately 
apprehend God’s quiddity through the senses or the mind.
1063 In Lactantius, one encounters 
another Christian writer maintaining that it is less complex to predicate what God is not (quid 
deus non est) than to predicate what God essentially is. Humans cannot penetrate the divine 
oracles unless the Most High deigns to reveal sacred truth to finite intellects (Divinae institutiones 
2.8; 3.6.3-4; Epitome 4).
1064 Advocating supernatural revelation over against unilluminated 
reason, Lactantius argues that neither sensory experience nor human intellection can bridge the 
yawning chasm that demarcates infinite being and finite beings.
1065 He professes that spatio-
temporal bound agents apprehend the infinite only when God unveils himself to those having 
pious inclinations.
1066 The disclosure of transcendent reality evidently occurs through God’s 
revelatory initiative. For if the finite could grasp the infinite apart from the infinite condescending 
to the finite, then divine supremacy or otherness would severely be compromised.
1067 However, 
 
1061 Cardinal Newman quoted in Ibid. 
1062 Van Campenhausen, Fathers of the Church, 2:70. 
1063 DI 1.1.5. 
1064 Ibid. See Albrecht Bender, Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis bei Laktanz und seinen apologetischen 
Vorgängern (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1983), 21. 
1065 DI 1.1.5. See Quod idola dii non sint 9 (Cyprian). 
1066 Ibid. 1.1.6-7. 
1067 Ibid. 1.1.5. 189 
 
 
                                                
since “it is impossible for divine thinking to become known to man by his own efforts,” both 
God’s preeminence and otherness remain unscathed in the transcendent act of revelation.
1068 
In a relatively succinct manner, Lactantius appears to contend that humans are incapable 
of attaining the secret counsel of the Most High God by means of natural ability or shrewd 
ratiocination.
1069 He endeavors to persuade his readers that there would be no objective 
(metaphysical) difference between God and rational creatures, if unaided reason could fathom the 
eternal counsels or heavenly decrees of the Supreme Being.
1070 In harmony with his overall eristic 
project, Lactantius emphasizes the utter impotency of creatures to know God apart from 
revelation. But the Father has not left rational creatures to their own devices. Rather, the deity has 
taken active steps to bridge the ontological abyss separating finite beings from the maximally 
excellent being:  
As it is impossible for divine thinking to become known to man by his own efforts, so God 
has not allowed man in his search for the light of wisdom to go astray any longer, 
wandering in inescapable darkness with nothing to show for his toil: eventually he opened 
man’s eyes and made him a gift of the acquisition of truth, first to demonstrate that human 
wisdom is non-existent, and then to show the errant wanderer the path to immortality.
1071 
 
God beneficently imparts wisdom or divine truth to humankind; he condescends so that rational 
creatures might navigate sagaciously the rugged upward path leading to immortal life. 
Nevertheless, Lactantius still believes that God the Father reveals no proper name to humanity 
except God (Deus), the only name that God requires.
1072 What literary or conceptual sources 
inform this Lactantian conviction? Why does Lactantius concur with the notion of divine 
namelessness that one finds in Philo and early Latin Christian writings? 
The pre-Nicenes almost universally espoused belief in divine innominability based on 
certain metaphysical assumptions regarding God and the thornbush account in Exodus.
1073 
Lactantius undoubtedly familiarized himself with select pre-Nicene writings and portions of 
 
1068 Ibid. 1.1.6. See G. R. S. Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes: Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis, Being 
a Translation of the Extant Sermons and Fragments of the Trismegistic Literature, with Prolegomena, Commentaries, 
and Notes, 3 volumes (London: J.M. Watkins, 1964), 3:10-11. 
1069 DI 3.10.13. 
1070 Ibid. 1.1.5. 
1071 Ibid. 1.1.6. 
1072 Ibid. 1.6.5. 190 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Scripture that either imply or explicitly teach divine namelessness.
1074 Furthermore, he intimately 
knew and profoundly respected the Hermetica.
1075 The Lactantian reliance on the quasi-inspired 
work of Hermes probably accounts for the strand of Egyptian notions (including his insistence on 
divine anonymity) found throughout Divinae institutiones. For instance, the apologist notes that 
Thoth (Hermes) eponymously bequeathed Egyptians the name of their first month, September.
1076 
According to prevalent lore, Thoth also constructed the town of Mercury (the Greek Hermopolis) 
and primordially received honor or reverence there.
1077 Religion associated with Hermes 
Trismegistus (“thrice greatest Hermes”) consequently had its inception in Egypt.
1078 It was in that 
geographical region that worshipers forged a conceptual link between Hermes and Thoth, the 
preeminent divinity of the Egyptian pantheon.
1079  
Johnson relates that certain Egyptians viewed Thoth as the god of wisdom and scribes; as 
a result, devotees of Thoth believed that he invented both languages and alien culture in 
conjunction with diverse social mores.
1080 Not only did ordinary Egyptians regard Thoth as a 
divine copyist associated with sages or scribes, however, but some members of the Egyptian 
priesthood ultimately attributed the role of a cosmic demiurge to Thoth. He thus assumed the role 
of universal artisan; or to be precise, Thoth functioned as an entity that brought the universe into 
being through distinctly enunciated articulations.
1081 There is clearly an eastern stress on the 
alleged power of verbal communication or magic in this account.
1082 More significantly, themes 
indigenous to eastern narratives markedly appear in the Lactantian corpus.
1083 The Greek 
rationale for associating Hermes with Thoth thereby becomes manifest. Both gods were 
 
1073 See Goodenough, Theology of Justin Martyr, 130-131. Origen appears to part ways with other pre-Nicenes, in 
this respect (Contra Celsum 6.65). 
1074 See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 14-17; Pierre Monat, Lactance et la Bible: Une propédeutique 
latine à la lecture de la Bible dans l'Occident constantinien, 2 volumes (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1982), 1:20. 
1075 Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 16-17. DI 6.25.10-11; 7.18.3-4. 
1076 DI 1.6.3. See T. Nicklin, “The Origin of the Egyptian Year,” CR 14.3 (1900): 146-148 for an example of how 
the Egyptians utilized “Thoth” as the name for one of their months. 
1077 DI 1.6.3. 
1078 Carabine, Unknown God, 66; Lebreton, History of the Dogma of the Trinity, 1:53. 
1079 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 22. 
1080 Johnson, Civilization of Ancient Egypt, 86. 
1081 Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 59. 
1082 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 23; Lebreton, History of the Dogma of the Trinity, 1:53. 
1083 DI 1.6.3-4. 191 
 
 
                                                
messenger divinities; both gods had a close affinity with the moon or underworld.
1084 
Additionally, worshipers of Thoth were convinced that Trismegistus (termaximus) originated the 
popular Hermetic doctrines.
1085 Elysian “Hermes” uses symbolic terms such as Father, Son or 
Grandson that correspond to God, the cosmos and humanity.
1086 Trismegistus also states that the 
Creator is “the supreme Father” in that he produced the universe along with all its metaphysical 
trappings.
1087 Ultimately, it appears that these particular Hermetic concepts influentially shaped 
Lactantian paterological thought:  
He [Hermes] wrote books, and those in great numbers, relating to the knowledge of divine 
things, in which he asserts the majesty of the supreme and only God, and makes mention 
of Him by the same names which we do, “lord and father.”
1088 
 
These words partly are an attempt to establish the authoritative nature of the Corpus Hermeticum. 
However, it must be conceded that Lactantius was not the first writer in antiquity to posit a 
terrestrial origin for the Olympian messenger Hermes; Cicero suggests that there were at least five 
persons who claimed to possess the moniker “Hermes.”
1089 De natura Deorum further illustrates 
the tendency that some Greeks already exhibited to dissociate conceptually Trismegistus from 
Hermes (Thoth).
1090 Nevertheless, the narratival accretion concerning a god establishing the 
Egyptian city of Hermopolis ostensibly commenced with Lactantius: he was its innovator.
1091 
Lactantius also demonstrates an awareness of what Hermes Trismegistus proclaims about God as 
Father. He refers to passages from the Hermetic literature when relating how the Father generates 
the Son.
1092 Furthermore, it is in the context of quoting Trismegistus that Lactantius speaks of 
God’s Son as a creature or alludes to his first generation (Divinae institutiones 4.6.3-4, 9; 4.9.1-4). 
Other passages in Lactantius reveal some Hermetic influence on his concept of divine 
innominability: “And that no one might inquire His name, he said that He was without name, and 
 
1084 Johnson, Civilization of Ancient Egypt, 140; Florian Ebeling, The Secret History of Hermes Trismegistus: 
Hermeticism from Ancient to Modern Times, trans. David Lorton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 3-4. 
1085 Carabine, Unknown God, 66. 
1086 Ibid 
1087 Ibid. 66-67. 
1088 DI 1.6.3-4. 
1089 De natura Deorum 3.22. 
1090 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 25. 
1091 Ibid. 24. 
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that on account of His very unity He does not require the peculiarity of a name. These are 
Trismegistus’ words: ‘God is one, and what is one needs no name. He that is is nameless.’”
1093 
The Corpus Hermeticum declares that since God is unique or a se esse, God does not need a self-
designating marker.
1094 The work recounts that it is not necessary to distinguish a sui generis 
existent from lesser beings. Similarly, a number of early pagan and Christian writers maintain that 
the providential Godhead is neither genus nor class nor species, because the Godhead is singular, 
whereas finite or complex entities are differentiated.
1095 Early Christians thus routinely affirm that 
God is limitless or unconditioned (in some sense): God qualitatively transcends the finite created 
order of sensory phenomena.
1096 Moreover, Latin Christian writers maintain that no socially 
constructed lexis is able to define God, much less attribute a name to the Father in order to 
circumscribe his quiddity.
1097 Lactantius argues in like manner that the Father possesses no self-
distinguishing marker nor is he obliged to possess one.
1098 Hence, he professes belief in God the 
anonymous. 
 
E.  God the Father of All in the Divine Institutes 
 
Reminiscent of Philo of Alexandria, Lactantius envisions God as a Father, who is innominable. 
But God is not literally or properly a Father for him since Lactantius believes that “Father” is a 
metaphor.
1099 In Divinae institutiones, God is portrayed as relating to Christ, the angels, and 
humans as though he were a Father. Accordingly, there are varied metaphorical aspects presented 
of God’s paternity. The following paragraphs accordingly will stress Lactantian thought regarding 
the Father. Since Chapter 5 of this inquiry will discuss God’s paternity as it relates to the Son, the 
manner in which God engenders humankind will comprise the focus of this section. The purpose 
 
1093 Ibid. 1.6.4. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 See Grant, Gods and the One God, 152-156. 
1096 Ad Autolycum 1.3; Octavius 18.8-10; Quod idola dii non sint 9. 
1097 De Trinitate 2 (Novatian). 
1098 DI 1.1.6; Epitome 4. 
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University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 13. 193 
 
 
                                                
of this discussion is to elucidate in what sense Lactantius believes God is Father to rational 
creatures.  
There are a number of senses in which Lactantius thinks that God is Father. For instance, 
he contends that God is a Father to humanity, his principal terrestrial creation. Humans differ 
from other animate corporeal entities since “When our one and only father was making man as an 
intelligent being capable of reason, he raised him up from the ground and elevated him to 
contemplation of his maker” (Divinae institutiones 2.1.15).
1100 The Stoics teach that humans 
especially are “fragments of God”
1101 or qeoi, since God has invested humanity with the 
capacity to reason, cogitate or engage in discursive thinking.
1102 Lactantius seems to maintain that 
rational creatures enjoy cosmic preeminence because the divine one has fashioned men and 
women in an upright position to walk erect.
1103 Humans consequently exemplify the God-given 
ability to behold the starry heavens above or praise the splendor of God manifested in the starry 
firmament.
1104 Meditation on the celestial realm above can fill the human heart with awe: “[God] 
has made man straight and tall so that we may know that we are called to things on high in 
heaven.”
1105 Lactantius suggests that God is Father in a unique sense to rational creatures. 
Humans have been created upright or “straight and tall” in order to behold and contemplate the 
awe-inspiring mysteries of God’s creation. 
Ovid, whom Lactantius describes as a “gifted poet” (ingeniosus poeta) attests to 
humanity’s putative rationale for looking into the starry heavens (Divinae institutiones 2.1.15). 
The poet seemingly indicates that rational creatures base their faith partly on what they behold in 
the heavens.
1106 One could say that the heavens are doxastic in that they can inspire belief in God. 
Moreover, Scripture refers to heaven as God’s abode (1 Kings 8:27, 43) or his majestic throne 
 
1100 Compare DI 2.17.12, where Lactantius refers to “God the father of the human race” (parentem generis 
humani Deum). 
1101 Discourses 1.14; 2.8 (Epictetus). 
1102 See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 61 for the Stoic view of God. Compare De natura Deorum 1.39.   
1103 See Cratylus 399. 
1104 DI 2.1.16-19. Lactantius argues that “His heavenly father will know” the man who looks up to heaven and 
uses reason to praise God. This person acts in harmony with his or her God-given nature (Ibid. 2.18.6). Compare 
Immanuel Kant’s observation: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the 
oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within” in Critique of 
Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 170.  
1105 Ibid. 2.17.9. 194 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
while it depicts earth as the deity’s footstool (Isaiah 66:1). Therefore, Lactantius reasons that 
rational creatures are stirred to contemplate or put faith in God when they peer into the heavenly 
expanse since heaven is the Father’s (symbolic) abode.
1107 Lactantius thereby illustrates how his 
life situation or the sacred Judeo-Christian writings of antiquity function as a crucible of ideas: 
Cicero and the prodigious bard Ovid (accompanied by Scripture) evidently inform Lactantian 
thought pertaining to God the Father.
1108 It becomes apparent that the apologetic notions of 
Lactantius did not arise in a vacuum (in vacuo); nor did post-Nicene writers in the Latin tradition 
utterly neglect his work. One can detect vestiges of Lactantian thought in the writings of 
Augustine. 
 Augustine offers this invocation to God: “For you have created us for yourself and our 
heart is restless until it might find repose in thee” (Confessiones 1.1).
1109 He clearly professes that 
rational beings cannot experience veritable peace unless they find rest in God. Furthermore, 
Augustine implies that the utmost end of humanity is to worship God and glorify him forever.
1110 
Lactantius correspondingly insists that God formed the first man, Adam, so that he might give 
himself wholly to God the Father. He relates that Adam’s teleological end was to offer exclusive 
devotion to his Father, who shaped him from the dust: 
After these things, God, having made man in the manner in which I have pointed out, 
placed him in paradise, that is, in a most fruitful and pleasant garden, which He planted in 
the regions of the East with every kind of wood and tree, that he might be nourished by 
their various fruits; and being free from all labors, might devote himself entirely to the 
service of God his Father.
1111 
 
Therefore, God discharged the office of a true father. He Himself formed the body; He 





1106 Ibid. 2.1.15-17. See Ellspermann, The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers, 77. 
1107 DI 2.1.17. 
1108 Metamorphoses 1.84-86. See Michel Perrin, L'homme antique et chrétien: l'anthropologie de Lactance, 250-
325 (Théologie historique, 59. Paris: Beauchesne, 1981), 73ff. 
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LCL, trans. William Watts and W. H. D. Rouse, 2 volumes (London: W. Heinemann, 1912), 2-3. 
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Lactantius consequently believes that the utmost good (summum bonum) of created rational 
beings is to serve God: humanity’s fashioner discharged the office of an authentic father by 
shaping the human body and permeating the soul with dynamic vitality.
1113 The term “Father” 
therefore appears to be a functional, not an ontological term for Lactantius insofar as God relates 
to humans. God is a tropic Father to humankind. Masculinity consequently does not seem to be a 
pressing concern for the Latin apologist when he applies the well-known epithet to God. 
Lactantius fittingly states that the Supreme Being is humanity’s Father in that God creates rational 
existents body and soul: “And so of man alone the right reason, the upright position, and 
countenance, in close likeness to that of God the Father, bespeak his origin and his Maker.”
1114 
Even the human body testifies to the workmanship of God since it bears a glorious likeness to its 
Maker in some undefined manner (De ira Dei 8).
1115 This claim implies that Christians ought to 
eschew the denigration of human flesh: the body is a living testimony to God’s peerless 
omniscience and wisdom. Yet, if the Father so deeply loves the creatures that he has invested with 
reason—namely, the finite entities made in his image (Genesis 1:26-28; Wisdom 2:23)—then 
why does God allow evil to obtain? Why does the God who has discharged the office of a true 
Father permit sentient or rational beings to undergo suffering or evil? The next section explores 
this issue and its relationship to divine paternity. 
 
F.  God the Father’s Permission of Evil in the Divine Institutes 
 
One of the most critical questions to preoccupy the human intellect is “whence evil?” 
What is the origin of evil? Why does God allow it to persist?
1116 In addressing these queries, let 
 
1113 Ibid. 
1114 De Ira Dei 8; DI 3.10.10-12; 6.9.1. 
1115 McDonald, Minor Works, 25. 
1116 A sampling of secondary literature that reviews the philosophical preoccupation with the logical problem of 
evil and attempted solutions to the so-called “problem” includes Peter Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to 
Perfection in Clement of Alexandria, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, volume 43 (Leiden, Boston and Köln: 
Brill, 1998), 1-2; Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 4-5, Peter van Inwagen, Problem of Evil, 1-17; William Edward Gregory Floyd, Clement of 
Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil, Oxford Theological Monographs (London: Oxford University Press, 
1971); Kaufman, God the Problem, 177-200; Gijsbert van den Brink, Almighty God: A Study of the Doctrine of 
Divine Omnipotence (Kampen-The Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1993), 268-269. 196 
 
 
                                                
us define evil as that which brings it about that physical-mental harm, distress or pain exists. 
Richard Swinburne prefers to define evil as a “positive bad state,”
1117 although one finds evil 
commonly defined as a privation of good (privatio boni).
1118 The present author does not object to 
Swinburne’s definition of evil. Yet, his approach to this metaphysical issue does not materially 
affect the view presented herein which primarily is expositional in nature. Swinburne’s definition 
of evil may nonetheless illuminate an ancient logical problem concerning a widespread bane of 
human existence. His definition forces us to ask whether one should define evil in terms of a 
metaphysical presence or in terms of an absence. Regardless of the potential utility of 
Swinburne’s treatment of evil, however, the following paragraphs will examine how Lactantius 
addresses the logical problem of evil in the context of a discussion regarding divine paternity. 
First, some vital conceptual distinctions must be made and this study must then emphasize certain 
Lactantian control beliefs (i.e. cognitive templates for the interpretation of experience) that help to 
render his treatment of the problem of evil coherent. 
It is initially necessary to make a conceptual distinction between natural and moral 
evil.
1119 The former refers to phenomena such as earthquakes, hurricanes or floods (i.e. evil not 
wrought immediately by dint of human volition) while the latter entails purposive human 
behavior or human neglect that brings it about that harm or pain adversely affects sentient or non-
sentient entities.
1120 Peter van Inwagen also makes a distinction between global and local 
arguments from evil, that is, between arguments based on vast quantities of evil in the world over 
against arguments based on particular cosmic evils.
1121 However one makes distinctions with 
respect to evil, it must be observed that all evil might not necessarily be immoral since one 
Hebrew prophet speaks of God creating both “evil” (ra) and peace (Isaiah 45:7 ASV).
1122 
Similarly, a child whom parents might ground for a week could rightly deem the punishment to be 
an evil, which is not to say that the “evil” in question is perforce immoral. All evil nonetheless 
 
1117 Is There a God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15. 
1118 Peter van Inwagen, Problem of Evil, 60. 
1119 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991), 118-121. 
1120 See S. T. Davis, Logic and the Nature of God (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1983), 98. 
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analytically (i.e. by definition) involves suffering or pain.
1123 But why does God allow suffering 
or grief to befall his creation? Lactantius essays a retort to the ancient query “whence evil” (unde 
malum)
1124 by appealing to three concepts by virtue of which he interprets the problem of evil, 
namely, virtue, vice and God’s paternity.
1125 Lactantius provides three clear responses to the 
problem of evil; his rejoinders are discussed in the paragraphs below. 
Firstly, God tolerates evil so that evil may battle with good: strife of opposites must exist 
as a natural matrix for the cultivation of virtue (Epitome 24).
1126 Lactantius contends that it would 
not be possible for endurance (patientia) to obtain, if rational agents did not undergo tribulation 
(Divinae institutiones 3.11.9).
1127 Defining virtue as “a sturdy resistance to vice and evil,” he 
believes that it is self-evidently true that vice and evil must subsist jointly in order for virtue to be 
cultivated.
1128 For instance, he argues that neither virtue nor piety would be admirable unless the 
Father permitted a supernatural tempter to test the faith of God’s people.
1129 Lactantius also 
professes that virtue would not be cherished for its rarity if God did not allow the impious to 
outnumber the pious.
1130 Evil must obtain in order that rational creatures may cultivate virtuous 
qualities such as goodness or piety (De ira Dei 13). God chiefly permits evil for this reason 
(Divinae institutiones 3.12.34-36). 
Secondly, the Father tolerates atrocities in which he takes no pleasure so that vice patently 
may be contrasted with virtue. Lactantius makes a case for the notion that humans cannot know 
what is good or apprehend the nature of intrinsic goodness unless evil or badness subsists.
1131 He 
states: “God is like a most indulgent parent, however: when the latter days were approaching, he 
sent a messenger to restore that time long gone and to bring back judgment from exile” that 
humankind might be delivered from error.
1132  The Father dispatches a messenger of salvation 
 
1123 See J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert 
Merrihew Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 31-33. 
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1131 DI 5.7.5. 
1132 Ibid. 5.7.4-6. 198 
 
 
                                                
(Jesus Christ) to instruct humanity in the ways of divine truth. Nevertheless, God allows evil to 
persist in order that virtue and vice may be contrasted.
1133 Lactantius thinks that virtue cannot be 
manifested “without the contrast of vice or is not perfected without the test of adversity.”
1134 Just 
as one purportedly cannot apprehend the concept of light without a contrasting notion of darkness 
or grasp the concept of superiority without a disjunctive conception of inferiority, so Lactantius 
believes that it is impossible to identify virtue without the existence of its contrary trait, vice.
1135 
Thirdly, God has purposed that certain rational agents will suffer eternal punishment or 
shame but that others will experience perpetual honor: there is an appointed time for the living 
and the dead to receive everlasting judgment from God.
1136 The Father will reveal his unmitigated 
wrath at the “end of time” when the “dread forewarnings of the prophets of old” come to 
fruition.
1137 Lactantius accordingly insists that God’s permission of evil is neither gratuitous nor 
in vain. The Father will rectify all wrongs committed in the here and now. In fact, Lactantius 
notes that God has preserved his righteous indignation for the eschaton; the Father will manifest 
divine wrath against the impious at that time.
1138 Meanwhile, Christians struggle with evil in 
order that virtue perceptibly might be distinguished from vice.
1139 However, evil is not just an 
immanent phenomenon. Christianity teaches that there is also a transcendent dimension to evil 
(Matthew 6:13; 1 John 5:19).  
In this regard, Alvin Plantinga skillfully has demonstrated the formal possibility that 
demons (i.e. impious angels) are (possible) logical or explanatory causes for both moral and 
natural evil. The intricacies of his argument supporting the logical possibility that unclean spirits 
possessing free will cause both forms of evil have been rehearsed elsewhere in adequate 
detail.
1140 It will now suffice to observe that Lactantius probably would concur with Plantinga 
respecting the possible malevolent activity of ungodly angels. For Lactantius professes that 
 
1133 Augustine reasons: “And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own 
place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the 
evil” (Enchiridion 11). 
1134 DI 5.7.4. 
1135 But see Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 30-31. 
1136 DI 2.17.1. 
1137 Ibid. 2.17.2. 
1138 Ibid. 7.17.10-11. 
1139 Ibid. 6.4.19. 





                                                
demons, since they abhor divine truth, apparently rouse the irreligious to persecute Christians 
with intemperate ferocity (Apocalypse 2:10).
1141 The Devil (as ostensible prince of the unholy 
angels) is “the author of evil himself.”
1142 He has abused the free will given to him by God and 
motivated those without knowledge of divine truth to persecute those attempting to worship God 
the Father (Divinae institutiones 2.8.4-6). Yet, God allows Christians to be persecuted in order 
that the unjust will imagine that worship rendered to the Father is futile.
1143 But Lactantius is 
persuaded that those who esteem consecrated service to God a vain activity unwittingly are 
neglecting the ultimate depth or reason of human existence. The viewpoint espoused in Divinae 
institutiones is that the supreme reason for human existence is spiritual; bodily goods scarcely 
matter in comparison to the goods of the soul. Both the soul and its eternal goods are 
imperceptible to human se
A quote that Lactantius dubiously attributes to Euripides fittingly summarizes his 
evaluation of the physical in relation to the spiritual: “What here are thought ills are in heaven 
goods.”
1145 These sentiments hearken back to the Pauline exhortation: “Set your minds on things 
that are above, not on things that are on earth” (Colossians 3:2 NRSV).
1146 This viewpoint 
anticipates the Thomistic insistence that no created good is capable of qualifying as the utmost 
good of humankind.
1147 Nonetheless, Lactantius is not simply an abstract or otherworldly thinker. 
He believes that Christianity has tangible implications for social creatures living in the present 
age. Therefore, the apologist reasons that worship of God the Father directly affects quotidian 
social intercourse. Section F consequently will analyze the connection that Lactantius perceives 
between God’s fatherhood and ameliorated social conditions. Of particular interest are his 
remarks on piety and equity. 
 
 
1141 DI 5.21.3-6. 
1142 Ibid. 6.4.24.  
1143 Ibid. 5.21.7. 
1144 Ibid. 5.21.8-11. Lactantius contends that virtue is the soul’s chief good. 
1145 See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 312. They point out that Lactantius gives the (Euripidean) verse in 
trimeter (poetic meter of three feet per line): quae hic mala putantur, haec sunt in caelo bona (Brandt CSEL 19:449). 
1146 Ta. a;nw fronei/te mh. Ta. evpi. th/j gh/j. 
1147 See Ralph M. McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 30. 200 
 
 
                                                
G. The Social Implications of Acknowledging God’s Paternity   
 
Lactantius is convinced that the voluntary act of acknowledging God’s paternity radically 
affects one’s social behavior; specifically, when all members of a particular community or social 
institution adjudge that God is the universal Father or that all rational creatures are siblings 
because the Father has vouchsafed (impartially) soul and breath to every rational entity on earth, it 
then becomes possible for peace and goodness to obtain within a determinate social group.
1148 
Irrevocable peace and goodness ultimately is based on communal recognition of God’s 
paternity.
1149 But Lactantius believes that genuine equality only becomes a concrete reality when 
figurative children of the divine one coexist in unity. Hence, it appears that Lactantius is an 
egalitarian (in some respects). For he insists that Christians are spiritual equals (i.e. metaphorical 
brothers and sisters) in the sight of God.
1150 Therefore, even if a believer is confined to a life of 
servitude, even if a Christian’s socio-economic status is marked by abject poverty or destitution, 
that Christian is still part of a familial community of believers.
1151 Lactantius recounts that only 
virtue causes one Christian to be more preeminent than another Christian.
1152 Equity  is a 
pragmatic reality within the community of faith since Christians worship God the Father: 
“Though we are therefore all equal in humility of spirit, free and slave, rich and poor, yet in God’s 
eyes we are distinguishable for virtue: the more just we are, the higher we stand with him.”
1153 
This view presages the Augustinian statement recorded in De civitate Dei 19.15: “By nature, in 
the condition in which God created man, no man is the slave either of man or of sin” (Nullus 
autem natura, in qua prius Deus hominem condidit, servus est  hominis aut peccati).
1154 
Nevertheless, while a cursory reading might lead one to conclude that Lactantius is a strict 
egalitarian, a circumspect perusal of his work  reveals that the Lactantian understanding of 
 
1148 DI 5.8.11; 5.15.2-3. 
1149 Ibid. 
1150 Ibid. Jane F. Ferguson suggests that the Christian notion of spiritual equality “is a protest against the reduction 
of the human person to the status of a thing.” See The Philosophy of Equality (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1943), 195. 
1151 DI 5.15.3. 
1152 Ibid. 5.14.4-5. 
1153 Ibid. 5.15.5. 
1154 For a discussion of varying ideological positions on slavery in antiquity, see Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 14-15. 201 
 
 
                                                
equality (aequalitas) or fairness (aequitas) lends itself to certain nuances that may be at odds with 
the concept of rigid egalitarianism. One factor that must be considered is how Lactantius views 
private property and its relation to social equity. 
The belief that humans are socially unequal by nature was prevalent in antiquity (Politics 
1.1254bl-1255al). While the Stoics adopted the conviction that all rational beings are portions of 
God (Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.65), it appears that no ancient secular writer reprimanded then 
existing legal or social inegalitarianism, as does Lactantius.
1155 He sorts out justice in terms of 
piety and equity.
1156 Moreover, his construal of fairness (aequitas) as equality (aequabilitas) 
indicates that “Lactantius is sailing in uncharted waters.”
1157 Advocating a form of equality in 
which humans arithmetically are on identical social planes seems progressive. However, other 
passages found in the Lactantian corpus may indicate that he is not consistent regarding his view 
of social equity.  
First, Lactantius censures Plato’s theory of a utopian republic since it eschews private 
property in the name of facilitating economic uniformity among philosopher-rulers or guardians 
(Platonis Respublica 416d).
1158 The political views of Lactantius conversely resemble those of 
Aristotle, who evidently believes that collective ownership of property is unfeasible or 
detrimental to a well-ordered polis (Politics 2.1261b34). All the same, one might inquire whether 
it is factually possible for equality to obtain in a society that espouses the legal concept of private 
property; for while non-collective ownership of property certainly appears to supply an 
environment in which personal freedom and responsibility can flourish, Garnsey and Humfress 
maintain that the legal or political notion of private property does not seem conducive to socio-
economic equality.
1159 Hence, they conclude that Lactantian egalitarianism is not logically 
congruent since it advocates parity on one hand while, on the other hand, it evidently does not 
 
1155 Garnsey and Humfress, Evolution of the Late Antique World, 204. 
1156 DI 5.15; Epitome 60; Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 213; Allen Verhey, Remembering Jesus: 
Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral Life (Cambridge, UK and Grand Rapids: 2002), 465; Christopher 
Ocker, “Unius Arbitrio Mundum Regi Necesse Est: Lactantius’ Concern for the Preservation of Roman Society,” VC 
40 (1986): 348-364. 
1157 Garnsey and Humfress, Evolution of the Late Antique World, 204; Elaine Fantham, “Aequabilitas in Cicero’s 
Political Theory, and the Greek Tradition of Proportional Justice,” CQ 23.2 (1973): 285-290. 
1158 DI 3.22.5: Quia non rerum fragilium sed mentium debet esse communitas (Brandt CSEL 19:251). 
1159 Evolution of the Late Antique World, 204. 202 
 
 
                                                
favor eradicating the legal institution (i.e. private property) that apparently impedes social or 
accidental equality among individual phatic agents. Therein lies the ostensible incongruent 
reasoning of Lactantius. However, Ferguson suggests that only individual equality (in the liberal 
sense) entails the obliteration of private property: equality and ownership of private property are 
not necessarily at odds with one another.
1160 If Ferguson’s analysis is preferable to Garnsey and 
Humfress’ critique of Lactantian egalitarianism, then it does not follow logically that private 
property is at variance with basic principles of equality.
1161 Both private property and equity 
might be capable of obtaining coextensively. 
Second, Lactantius evidently minimizes social equality in Divinae institutiones 5.15.2-3, 
turning instead to a discussion of spiritual equity that involves the human soul, which supposedly 
issues from the Father to all rational agents.
1162 The rhetorical change in direction indicates that 
Lactantius believes that socio-economic parity in this life is an elusive reverie. Nevertheless, 
although he thinks that social egalitarianism is unattainable at present, the apologist deduces that 
having a pious God-given soul is not unfeasible. In fact, he states that Christians experience 
equality or equity among themselves prior to the eschaton because of their spiritual relationship to 
the Father, the divine person who has evidently given rational souls to humankind.
1163  
One societal datum that Lactantius mentions in association with God’s fatherhood is 
poverty. He asks not only what sociological factors contribute to crime,
1164 but he also explores 
what brings it about that acute poverty obtains in the first place. The Lactantian answer is 
predictably theological. He contends that indigence primarily subsists because rational agents 
refuse to acknowledge God as their common spiritual Father.
1165 Yet, Lactantius professes, socio-
economic equity only subsists when rational agents honor or reverence God as Father.
1166 He thus 
painstakingly argues that it is not sufficient to worship God: one must revere or acknowledge 
deity as the common Father of all men and women: “If the godhead [sic] which governs this 
 
1160 Ferguson, Philosophy of Equality, 257. 
1161 Ibid. 
1162 Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 211.  
1163 DI 5.15.3-5. 
1164 Compare Aristotle’s observation that poverty “produces factional conflict and crime” (Politics 1265bl). See 
Carnes Lord, The Politics (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 65. 
1165 Ibid. 5.14, 15. 
1166 Ibid. 5.14.16-17. 203 
 
 
                                                
world sustains the human race with an incredible generosity and cherishes it with a virtually 
paternal kindness, it surely wants thanks and honour in return.”
1167 Lactantius consequently 
strives to persuade his audience that acknowledgment of God’s paternity brings about the 
eradication of all social problems, including poverty, murder and crime.
1168 He reasons that since 
the Father created all things, it logically follows that the Father wills the eradication of all 
contingent extremes that pervade the human sphere.
1169 The Father does not will the existence of 
acute (i.e. severe) poverty or prodigious wealth (Proverbs 30:8-9).
1170 Nor does God will that the 
bodies of women should  be utilized as commodities in the act of prostitution (Divinae 
institutiones 5.8.6-8).  To the contrary, it is evidently the Father’s good pleasure that fiscal 
equilibrium should exist in society, whereby there is no extreme stratification of classes or social 
inequalities resulting from economic deprivations.
1171 Lactantius therefore endeavors to 
demonstrate the auspicious social consequences that apparently stem from esteeming God as 
Father. Conversely, he believes that spurning the Father may lead to societal anarchy or chaos. 
Although there are multitudinous deities that rational agents evoke as “Father,” Lactantius avers 
that there is only one being to whom creatures should append the title “Father”: he is the proper 




Lactantius derives his view of divine paternity from his Christian predecessors, Scripture, 
Hellenistic Judaism and the Corpus Hermeticum. He believes that the Father is nameless or 
anonymous; God is his name. For Lactantius, there is no need to distinguish the Father from other 
beings by assigning him a self-referential designation since God is unique (Divinae institutiones 
1.6.5). The Supreme Being is peerless or without equal vis-à-vis other entities that he has brought 
into existence. Therefore, even though “Father” metaphorically describes God’s rapport with his 
creatures, Lactantius does not think that the divine epithet is a proper name for deity since the 
 
1167 Ibid. 4.3.3: nam si diuinitas, quae gubernat hunc mundum, incredibili beneficentia genus hominum sustenat et 
quasi paterna indulgentia fouet, uult profecto gratiam sibi referri et honorem dari. 
1168 Ibid. 5.8.5-9, 11. 
1169 Compare Platonis Respublica 421d-422b. 
1170 DI 6.12. The maxim “virtue stands in the middle” (in medio virtus stat) seems applicable in this case. 
1171 Ibid. 5.14.19-20. 204 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Father does not need a nomen proprium. Divine innominability is an almost universal 
phenomenon among the pre-Nicenes who consistently argue that God the Father is nameless in 
view of the fact that he is sui generis. Lactantius believes that God is the anonymous Father and 
Maker of all. He appeals to the Corpus Hermeticum to argue that God does not need a name since 
he is unique and unbegotten. In this regard, Lactantius emulates his predecessors in the Christian 
East and West. Moreover, it is quite possible that the Lactantian reluctance to attribute a self-
identifying marker to God also derives from Egyptian sources since Lactantius is accustomed to 
cull arguments and notions from diverse sources. 
Lactantius argues that God is the Father of all creatures, his Son and of those who worship 
him in acknowledgement of his cosmic paternity. He believes that God has figuratively 
engendered humanity by bestowing a soul to each rational agent. The Father also made 
humankind upright in order that they might look to the authentic source of their being. Since God 
is the Father of rational creatures, they are obligated to use life in worship and praise to God. 
Lactantius professes that one can only find genuine fulfillment when human life is used in service 
to the Father and Maker of all (Divinae institutiones 2.12.15-16; 2.17). God made rational 
creatures to contemplate the utmost good or to use reason in consecrated service to deity. These 
abilities set humans apart from other earthly forms of life. 
Despite his emphasis on reason in connection with human existence and the divine will, 
the paternity of God is not a mere abstract concern for Lactantius. He thinks that it has concrete or 
practical implications for life in the here-and-now. Acknowledging the fatherhood of God brings 
about peace among those who submit to divine authority (Octavius 18:1-10). Lactantius argues 
that worshiping the Father of all even results in ameliorated socio-economic conditions (Divinae 
institutiones 5.14-15). Christians do not practice stealing nor do they employ their bodies in the 
service of prostitution (Justin Martyr, Apology 1.27; Divinae institutiones 5.8.6-8; 6.20.27). 
Moreover, they share their possessions with one another as a united spiritual family that is equal 
in the eyes of God. Regardless of one’s socio-economic status, Christians remain equal regarding 
their standing with God. Only virtue elevates one Christian above another; and honoring God as 
Father obviates anarchy, disorder and chaos. 
 
1172 Ibid. 4.3.13-21. 205 
 
 
                                                
 
Excursus C: God-talk and Knowing God 
 
There are three primary approaches that theists employ to articulate God’s character or 
apprehend the divine.
1173 Christian worshipers of God commonly believe that one apprehends 
deity by embarking upon the intellectual paths of gradual ascension (via eminentiae), analogy (via 
analogiae) or negation (via negationis).
1174 Ancient Greek philosophers referred to the first 
intellectual path as evpagwgh/|  (epagoge). This term or its Latin equivalent denotes an 
“inductive return to the source.”
1175 That is, the way of eminence (via eminentiae) positively 
derives divine attributes (attributa divina) by inductively elevating characteristics of entities in 
the finite created order “to the order of the infinite.”
1176 Hence, by reflecting on the created order 
and all beings therein, one is able to reason from finite power to omnipotence (maximal power); 
from limited knowledge to omniscience (maximal knowledge). This method purportedly yields 
the datum that it is only God who necessarily instantiates maximal excellence in every possible 
world since deity is omnipotent, omniscient or omnibenevolent (vel cetera).
1177 The way of 
eminence suggests that God necessarily exemplifies great-making properties. Therefore, Aquinas 
writes that what humans refer to as “goodness” or “life” actually “pre-exist in the source of all 
things, although, in a higher way than we can understand or signify.”
1178 This is a classic 
statement of the eminent way. 
The second enunciative approach to deity that the ancients recognized is via analogiae. 
Ancient philosophers based this approach on Plato’s analogy of the Sun in Republic 508a-c.
1179 
Just as the Sun provides light in the sensible realm, so the Good elucidates intelligible objects 
apprehended by the mind. Christian theology subsequently came to affirm the doctrine of 
 
1173 Gregory P. Rocca, O.P., Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive 
and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 4. 
1174 See McLelland, God the Anonymous, 18. 
1175 See F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, 6; LSJ entry for evpa,gw. Cf. Topica I56a4; I57a21 in 
Aristotle, The  Organon, trans. Hugh Tredennick and E. S. Forster (London and Cambridge, UK: William Heinemann 
and Harvard University Press, 1938-1960); Rhetorica 1356b8. 
1176 Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 326. 
1177 Peter van Inwagen, Problem of Evil, 32-33. 
1178 ST 1.13.2: Prout in eo praeexistit vita, licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur. 206 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
analogia entis, whereby creaturely effects stand in an analogical relationship to the uncreated first 
cause. Thomas Aquinas is an articulate representative of this approach. He develops his theory of 
analogy along Aristotelian lines (ST I.13.1). For Aquinas, analogical predication emphasizes the 
similarities and differences that obtain between God and creatures.
1180 The similarities and 
differences between God and creatures are rooted in the causal relation between the former and 
the latter (ST I.13.4). 
The third path employed to predicate or articulate the sort of God Christians worship is the 
way of negation (via negationis) or way of remotion (via remotionis).
1181 Witt (following 
Albinus) appeals to geometry in order to illustrate how the way of remotion works in practice. He 
explains that a rational subject gradually reaches the conception of a geometrical point by 
abstracting the surface from the body, then abstracting the line from the surface and finally 
abstracting the point from the line.
1182 Predicating something of God evidently is an analogous 
process.
1183 Based on the way of negation or way of remotion, “we know God in some fashion” 
by means of knowing what God is not (quid deus non est).
1184 God does not exemplify the 
“imperfections” that attend creaturely existence; the way of remotion (via remotionis) therefore 
prescinds from such creaturely limitations by progressively stripping imperfections away from 
our conception of the maximally excellent being.
1185 This way systematically disavows the belief 
that God partakes of finite or temporal limitations (e.g. it asserts that God is immutable, immortal, 
impassible, atemporal). Moreover, the way of remotion reminds creatures that one cannot know 
God’s essence: “In the case of God, however, we cannot know what he is; but we can know what 
he is not” (ST I.3. proem). 
 
1179 Cf. Ennead 6.10. 
1180 Oden, Systematic Theology, 1:43. 
1181 Rocca presses the functional distinction between via negativa and theologia negationis. The former, though it 
sometimes overlaps semantically with the latter, more specifically refers to a path or method which one utilizes in 
vita beata et vita contemplativa to attain union with deity. Theologia negationis, conversely, refers to a theoretical 
model that concerns itself with the signification of divine predicables. See Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 4 
1182 Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, 132. See Didaskalikos 10. 
1183 Symposium 209e-211c; Ennead 1.6. Rocca notes that Albinus is dependent on Euclidean geometry’s “negative 
definition of the point” here. One abstracts the Euclidean point by abstracting the three dimensions of space. 
Similarly, one only adequately delineates God (naturally) or reaches God (through reason) by disassociating sensible 
predicates from deity (Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 10). 
1184 Dodds, Unchanging God, 195. Gilson (Christian Philosophy, 43) cites Augustine’s formula melius scitur 
nesciendo (“God is better known by not knowing”) in De ordine 2.16.44. 207 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Finally, certain ancient thinkers believed that one could only approach God by means of 
mystical union (e;ksta±sij).
1186 But this modus operandi is not necessarily opposed to the 
aforementioned intellectual paths to God.
1187 Diotima reportedly taught Socrates that mystical 
union is “the final object” of dialectical ascent toward the superlative form of absolute beauty.
1188 
He relates: “When a man has been thus far tutored in the lore of love, passing from view to view 
of beautiful things, in the right and regular ascent, suddenly he will have revealed to him, as he 
draws to the close of his dealings in love, a wondrous vision, beautiful in its nature” which is 
e;ksta±sij.
1189 Therefore, mystical union is not necessarily at variance with the three 




Excursus D: Widdicombe on Fatherhood in Origen  
 
Origen contends that an “intrinsic relationship” obtains between signifiers and designated 
concepts (= signifieds) themselves.
1191 The classic debate regarding language being a 
conventional or natural phenomenon occurs in Plato’s Cratylus with respective dialogue partners 
taking the side of convention (nomos) or nature (phusis). Being acquainted with at least three 
theories of language (Aristotelian, Epicurean and Stoic), Origen argues that names disclose 
intrinsic qualities of creatures and God.
1192 Hence, language is not a mere arbitrary convention. 
Moreover, based on his view of language being intrinsically associated with those concepts to 
which it refers, Origen also reasons that God’s name is invariable or immutable.
1193 While there is 
possibly more than one name for God, he insists that any divine name must “have the same 
 
1185 Dodds, Unchanging God, 195. See Ennead 6.3.9; Stace, Time and Eternity, 11. 
1186 De vita Plotini 23.   
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meaning.”
1194 This view is the logical outcome of the simplicitas dei doctrine that Origen affirms. 
The doctrine of God’s simplicity further motivates him to invoke deity as o` w;n (De oratione 
24).
1195 First, he argues that the participle w;n  is God’s “self-designation.” God is being 
itself.
1196 The multiple names of God (all having the same meaning) thereby delineate his 
essence: God is “he who is.”
1197 Additionally, “Father” is one of God’s names (De oratione 14). 
Origen professes that this name (like every divine assignation) describes the very essence of God, 
not his uncreated energies.
1198 Widdicombe argues that addressing God as “Father” implies that 
he is inherently generative or intrinsically relational. Moreover, the Father (in Origen) appears to 
be the eternal source of existence insofar as he continuously or atemporally generates the Son.
1199 
However, appendix B of this study will question this common reading of Origen. There appears to 
be some ambiguity that surrounds the expression “eternal generation” in his extant treatises. 
 
1194 Ibid. 
1195 Compare Exodus 3:14 (LXX). 
1196 Widdicombe, Fatherhood of God, 59. 
1197 Ibid. 60. 
1198 See Homily on Jeremiah 9.4. 
1199 Widdicombe, Fatherhood of God, 3. 209 
 
 




Relative Dispositions of Father and Son in the Divine Institutes 
 
McGiffert apparently overstates his case, when he claims that Lactantius was not “at all 
concerned” with the essence of the Logos or the Father and Son relationship delineated in 
Scripture.
1200 Contrary to this claim, the fourth book of Divinae institutiones actually serves as a 
literary fulcrum for the entire Lactantian magnum opus in that it endeavors to unfold the sapiential 
work of Christ and his ontological provenance from the Father.
1201 That is, Lactantius does show 
concern for the essence of the Logos and he tries to explain how Father and Son generatively 
relate to one another. This chapter accordingly will scrutinize God’s paternity as it pertains to 
Father-Son relations. More precisely, it will develop how Lactantius conscripts Stoic metaphysics 
to elucidate the transcendent nature of the Father and the Son. 
Like his literary predecessor, Tertullian, Lactantius exploits Stoic conceptual distinctions 
to develop an understanding of Father-Son relations; he too conceives of Father and Son as an 
instance of relative dispositions. For Lactantius, Father-Son primarily explains how (not what) the 
Father and Son are. The purpose of accidental dispositions in Stoic thought “is to classify 
properties which one thing possesses in relation to something else.”
1202 Particular examples of 
relative dispositions are father-son, mother-daughter, master-slave, and sun-sunbeam relations. 
One can discern the salience of “Father-Son” accidental dispositions in Divinae institutiones 4, 
which the following sections will analyze. 
 
A.  The Father and Son in Divine Institutes 4.6-7 
 
Lactantius contends that before God produced the world and other angels, he “created a 
holy and incorruptible spirit whom he called his son,” since this particular spirit personage was 
 
1200 McGiffert, History of Christian Thought, 2:48. 
1201 Paul McGuckin, “Christology of Lactantius,” 814. 210 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
firstborn or distinguished by “a name of divine significance” in that God granted his preeminent 
Son custodial ownership of his matchless authority and supremacy.
1203 Lactantius therefore 
believes that God applies the designation “Son” to the Logos (sermo), but only after the Logos 
performs some act which qualifies as a divinely ordained trial (Divinae institutiones 2.8.5).
1204 
Hence, the Son does not inherently possess divine titles; they are not intrinsic to his being. Rather, 
God (the Father) refers to the Logos as “Son” or allows him to bear the name “God” because of 
his proven faithfulness to God (the Father).
1205 A subordinationist outlook consequently informs 
Lactantian theology. 
Bowen and Garnsey believe that Lactantian thinking at some points “smacks of 
Arianism.”
1206 They evidently think that certain statements in Divinae institutiones verge on 
subordinating the Son to the Father quoad essentiam. Conversely, other historians exhibit 
sympathy toward the Lactantian writings, presuming that they reflect the cultural situation in 
which he composed them prior to the first ecumenical council of 325 CE.
1207 This study proposes 
that there were certain angelic beings recognized in ancient Judaism who seemingly possessed the 
holy name of God ex officio or who stood in an exalted ordained relationship with deity (Exodus 
23:20-22; 3 Enoch 12:5; Apocalypse of Abraham 10-11).
1208 Lactantius may perceive a 
correlation between the status of angels in Judaism and the position of the Logos in Christian 
circles when he argues that God the Father vouchsafes the divine name to the Son.
1209 In fact, it 
appears that he considers the Son an angel whom God promotes to the status of divinity: “In fine, 
of all the angels, whom the same God formed from his own breath, he alone was admitted into a 
participation of his supreme power, he alone was called God. For all things were through him, and 
 
1202 A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 163. Italics are in the original. 
1203 DI 4.6.1-4. 
1204 Ibid. See Schneweis, Angels and Demons, 21. Contrast McGuckin’s remarks in “Christology of Lactantius,” 
816. 
1205 DI 2.8.2; 4.6.1-4. 
1206 Divine Institutes, 232. See Paul McGuckin, “Christology of Lactantius,” 815-816. 
1207 Wace and Piercy, Early Christian Biography, 640. 
1208 See Darrell L. Bock, Blasphemy and Exaltation in Judaism: The Charge against Jesus in Mark 14:53-65 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000); Saul M. Olyan, A Thousand Thousands Served Him: Exegesis and the Naming of 
Angels in Ancient Judaism (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1993); Peter R. Carrell, Jesus and the Angels: 
Angelology and the Christology of the Apocalypse of John, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series, 95 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5; Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology, 197. 
1209 DI 4.6.2. 211 
 
 
                                                
nothing was without him” (Epitome 42).
1210 If Lactantius does view the Son as an angel 
(ontologically), one can venture to say that such concepts regarding the Son possibly find their 
provenance in Hermes, the ancient prophets of Judaism and other Christian writings. In order to 
buttress his argument for the unique status of Christ vis-à-vis the angels of God, Lactantius 
appeals to the prophetic words of Hermes Trismegistus and the Sibylline Oracles. The Corpus 
Hermeticum affirms that God the maker of all things produced a second deity, who was the 
Father’s “first and unique creation,” one whom he loved as a son.
1211 Lactantius apparently 
believes that this “created” Son spoken of by Hermes is God, but he implies that Christ does not 
exemplify all divine-constituting properties that God the Father instantiates.
1212 The Son evidently 
was brought into existence, whereas the Father was not. The apologist indicates that the Son 
might not be fully God. When invoking the prophets of antiquity, Lactantius also quotes Proverbs 
8:22-31 and applies the sophianic account regarding Wisdom being “made” (condidit)  “founded” 
(fundavit) or “fathered” (genuit) by YHWH to the generation of the Son.
1213 Divinae institutiones 
relates that God employed his Son as an “adviser” (su,mboulon) or “craftsman” 
(dhmiourgo.n) in the creation of the world.
1214 By using such language, Lactantius may 
subordinate the Son to the Father. This study will now explore the extent to which he possibly 
subordinates the former to the latter. 
 
B.  Relative Dispositions in Divine Institutes 4.8 
 
Lactantius insists that the Father generates the Son twice: “First we affirm that he was 
born twice, in the spirit and then in the flesh.”
1215 However, the Son’s duplex origin does not 
entail that the Father had carnal intercourse with a feminine consort (whether supernal or earthly) 
since coitus is an activity indigenous to animals and humans, who both partake of creaturely 
 
1210 Denique ex omnibus angelis, quos idem Deus de suis spiritibus figurauit, solus in consortium summae 
potestatis adscitus est, solus Deus nuncupatus. “Omnia” enim “per ipsum et sine ipso nihil.” (Epitome, Heck and 
Wlosok, 51-52). 
1211 DI 4.6.4-5. 
1212 Ibid. 4.29. 12, 15; Oracula Sibyllina 8.264-266; Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 232. 
1213 DI 4.6.6-8. See Monat, Lactance et la Bible, 1:168-169; 
1214 DI 4.6.9. See Contra Noetum 10. 
1215 DI 4.8.1. 212 
 
 
                                                
mortality.
1216 From a natural standpoint, reproduction perpetuates human or animal species; 
therefore, God apparently has differentiated humans and animals in terms of gender or sex.
1217 
But Lactantius reasons that God was alone before he produced the Son (Divinae institutiones 
2.8.1-5). Consequently, the maximally excellent being could not have “fathered” his Son by coital 
means. Nor is God both male and female, as Orpheus reasons.
1218 For if God were dual-gendered, 
sexually dimorphic or both male and female, then God could have initiated sexual intercourse 
with Godself or been capable of procreating offspring without the employment of reproductive 
activity.
1219 Furthermore, if God were androgynous, it stands to reason that the holy prophets 
would call deity both “Father” and “Mother,” which they manifestly refrain from doing, even 
though the sacred writings press into service paternal and maternal metaphors as well as similes 
when predicating the divine nature.
1220 Nevertheless, if God does not bring about the Son’s 
existence through fleshly or carnal means, how does Lactantius think that God engenders him?  
Lactantius deduces that while the preternatural acts of God “can neither be known nor 
fully reported by anyone,” the holy writings of Christianity reveal that the Son is the Father’s 
Word.
1221 He further contends that Scripture equates the angels of God with the divine breath.
1222 
Having established this conceptual distinction between the Logos and consecrated angels (i.e. 
speech over against breath), he discloses his conception of God’s Logos qua Son. Firstly, 
Lactantius characterizes human speech as “an expiration of breath with significant noise.”
1223 
Lactantius consequently thinks that the Son (in the capacity of Word or Discourse) differs from 
the angels as nasalized breath differs from articulated speech.
1224 The Son functions as divine 
speech; the angels as God’s breath: “But since breath and speech emerge from different areas, in 
that breathing comes from the nostrils and speech from the mouth, there is a great difference 
between this son of God and the other angels.”
1225 Lactantius suggests that the angels are sons of 
 
1216 Ibid. 4.8.3-4. 
1217 Ibid. Compare Ambrose of Milan’s pointed remarks in De fide 1.12.77. 
1218 DI 4.8.3-5. 
1219 Ibid. 




1224 Ibid. 4.8.7-8. 
1225 Ibid. 213 
 
 
                                                
God. The Word of God is also an angel (he appears to contend) with respect to his essence. Yet, 
the apologist states that there is a significant disparity between God’s foremost Son and “the other 
angels.”
1226 But what lack of metaphysical correspondence does he discern between God’s 
preeminent Son and the holy angels of deity?  
Lactantius believes that the Son (as speech qua speech) issues from the divine mouth 
while angels are taciti spiriti (from God’s nose, figuratively speaking) in that they do not convey 
the Father’s revelation to humans.
1227 In one sense, the hypostatic Word is an emblematic Son 
issuing from the Father’s mouth. From another standpoint, he is a tropic notion of God’s 
consciousness. For the Word of God was “conceived not in a womb but in a mind” (the divine 
consciousness).
1228 The Son qua Word actively formulates coherent divine vocalizations: “God 
uttered him in the first place so that he himself could speak to us through him, and so that his son 
could unveil for us the word and will of God.”
1229 Nevertheless, Lactantius supposes that the 
angels are immortal as God is immortal since they constitute his metaphorical breath. But he 
states that God’s Son draws potency and “sense” from the Father who is the unoriginated source 
of the generated Logos.
1230 This observation implies that Lactantius views the divine Word as a 
figurative Son ontologically subordinate to the Father. Schneweis proposes that Lactantius “leans 
considerably” in the direction of subordinationism, but nonetheless distinguishes “the Word 
sharply from the angels.”
1231 Lactantius certainly discriminates between the begettal of the Son 
from God’s mouth and the Father’s later creation of the “other angels” by means of his nostrils. It 
thus appears that he posits a similarity of origin for the angels and God’s Word: both are potent 
spirits derived from God.
1232 While issuing from the same fount of existence, however, Lactantius 
evidently believes that the Son and angels differ in their metaphysical constitution. 
 
1226 Lactantius may imply that both the Son and angels were created from eternity (Schneweis, Angels and 
Demons, 20-23). Justin uses similar language when referring to the Son and the “other angels” that are like the Son in 
Apology 1.6.1-2. See Grant, Early Christian Doctrine of God, 81; Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology, 193-194. 
1227 DI 4.8.7.   
1228 Ibid. 4.8.9. 
1229 Ibid. 4.8.8. 
1230 Ibid. 4.8.9-11. 
1231 Schneweis, Angels and Demons, 67-68. 
1232 Ibid. See Epitome 42. 214 
 
 
                                                
What is the provenance of these Lactantian christological notions? What literary 
antecedents possibly explain his version of the Son’s first generation? Lactantius reveals his 
primary sources by quoting Psalm 33:6 and then applying it to the Son: in this context, he refers 
to Christ as God’s breath through whom all things came into being.
1233 Second, like other early 
Christian apologists, Lactantius applies Psalm 45:1 to the Logos.
1234 Basing his thoughts on this 
nuptial psalm, he alludes to God’s heart disgorging the Son prior to and for the purpose of 
creation.
1235 Subsequently, Lactantius quotes Ecclesiasticus 24:3-4, a Second Temple text 
expressly stating that Wisdom emanated “from the mouth of the Most High before all creation.” 
Finally, there is an appeal to the Gospel of John 1:1-3, which further attributes mediatorial agency 
to the Logos.
1236 The Lactantian theory of divine emanative generation thus seems to find its chief 
provenance in Scripture or extra-canonical Judaic texts. Nevertheless, Scripture does not fully 
account for the unique aspects of Lactantius’ theory regarding the Son’s first generation (prima 
nativitas) since there are certainly residual elements of Tertullian’s Apologeticus 21.11-14 in his 
narrative of the Son’s prima nativitas.
1237 Additionally, the identifying marks of Egyptian Hermes 
seem discernible in Lactantian thought concerning the Son’s generation: “God is in reality the 
first of all entities, eternal, unbegotten, craftsman of the whole of existence. But by his agency a 
second god came to be in his image, and by him the second god is sustained, nurtured and 
immortalized, as from an eternal father, everlasting because he is immortal” (Corpus Hermeticum 
8.2). Lactantius most certainly extracted rudiments of his christological ideas from Hermetic 
literature.
1238 The Hermetists believed that God generated his Word with the consequence that 
this divine generation brought about an indissoluble bond between Father and Son-Logos: “Know 
that what sees in thee and hears is the Lord's Word (Logos); but Mind is Father-God. Not separate 
are they the one from other; just in their union [rather] is it Life consists” (Corpus Hermeticum 
1.6). Neoplatonists thought of nou/j as an emanative divine hypostasis too.
1239 These ancient 
 
1233 DI 4.8.14. 
1234 Ad Autolycum 2; Adversus Praxean 5-7. 
1235 DI 4.8.14. 
1236 Ibid. 4.8.15-16. 
1237 W. H. C. Frend, “Lactance: Institutions Divines IV,” JEH 44.1 (1993): 102-103. 
1238 Digeser, Making, 70. See DI 4.6.3-4, 9; 4.7.3; 4.8.5; 4.9.1-3; 4.13.1-5; 4.27.19. 
1239 Digeser, Making, 70-72. 215 
 
 
                                                
philosophical thinkers may account for some of the elements found in the Lactantian corpus. Yet, 
there are still other fundamentals of Lactantian Christology whose provenance requires an 
explanation. 
The generation of the Logos from God’s breath starkly bears some resemblance to what 
ancient Egyptian literature attests concerning Ptah.
1240 Ptah was the preeminent Memphite god, 
whom numerous citizens likely worshiped during and after the Early Dynastic Period (3000-2686 
BCE).
1241 While it is possible that the cosmogonic story about Ptah and similar myths might have 
been introduced to subsequently legitimate the form of theocratic rule that obtained at the 
intersection of Upper and Lower Egypt posterior to 700 BCE,
1242 Johnson thinks it is more 
probable that The Memphite Theology (the significant Egyptian text containing the story of Ptah) 
was composed prior to the inception of theocratic rule in Memphis.
1243 It was theology which 
produced the political structure that revolved around Ptah, the creator. Other facets of this deity 
associate him with the Logos. These facets specifically reveal the nexus between the Logos being 
uttered and Ptah making other divine beings. 
Egyptologists usually regard Ptah as a sun god, but this attribution is problematic.
1244 It is 
more likely that Ptah was the foremost deity of those working with metal and stone.
1245 This 
factor could explain why ancient Egyptians living in Memphis associated the god with 
Hephaestus (= Vulcan).
1246 Additionally, The Egyptian Book of the Dead professes that Ptah 
designed, conceived, planned and organized the cosmos in the manner of an artisan.
1247 Ancient 
Egyptians thought Ptah was a demiurgic accomplice in conjunction with Khnemu, who 
purportedly created material entities under the auspices of Thoth (creator and moon god).
1248 The 
 
1240 See E. A. Wallis Budge, The Gods of the Egyptians or Studies in Egyptian Mythology, 2 volumes (New York: 
Dover, 1969); Digeser, Making, 71; Johnson, The Civilization of Ancient Egypt, 25. 
1241 Budge, Gods of the Egyptians, 1:500. 
1242 Johnson, The Civilization of Ancient Egypt, 25. 
1243 Ibid. See Bruce G. Trigger, et al., Ancient Egypt: A Social History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 72-73. 
1244 R. E. Witt, Isis in the Ancient World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 157. 
1245 Budge, Gods of the Egyptians, 1:500-501. Cf. Morenz, Egyptian Religion, 23. 
1246 Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 59. Herodotus likewise associates Ptah with Hephaestus (Histories 3.37). See 
Morenz, Egyptian Religion, 267. 
1247 See Plate XIX, chapter 15. 
1248 Budge, Gods of the Egyptians, 1:501. Michael Fishbane insists: “It will be remembered that at the creation of 
the world Thoth reduced the unseen and unknown creative élan to the words carried into effect by Ptah and 216 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
literary evidence thus suggests that the devotees of Ptah possibly viewed him as a divine artisan 
rather than a sun deity.
1249 In Memphis, Ptah worshipers professed that he fashioned the Egyptian 
pantheon by means of his heart and tongue.
1250 The pantheon of Egypt is fittingly spoken of as 
Ptah’s teeth and lips.
1251 It is this particular religious belief that evidently approximates to 
Lactantian faith concerning the Word’s first nativity. However, in Lactantius, the Father generates 
the Son by articulating speech or conceiving thought rather than brining about an entire pantheon 
of gods.
1252 The Son qua God’s Word becomes the intermediate agent through whom the cosmos 
is brought into existence.
1253 Whether Lactantius is influenced by the Egyptian notion of Ptah is 
not easy to substantiate historically; but the emphasis in both literary accounts on speaking or 
bringing entities into existence by means of articulated speech is conspicuous. Furthermore, it is 
evident that Lactantius was exposed to Egyptian concepts through his reading of the Corpus 
Hermeticum. On the other hand, another possible source of Lactantian Christology is 
Ecclesiasticus 24:5: “I came out of the mouth of the most high, the firstborn before all creatures.” 
Lactantius alludes to this text in Divinae institutiones 4.8.15. As this study has already 
maintained, however, neither Ecclesiasticus nor John’s Gospel nor the Tanakh fully explain the 
Logos theology that one encounters in Divinae institutiones. There are unsolved variations in this 
ancient work that force one to seek elsewhere for the provenance of Logos concepts in Lactantius. 
Examining passages from the Corpus Hermeticum may provide a fuller understanding of how 
Lactantius frames his doctrine of Christ. 
 
C.  The Mission and Person of the Son in Divine Institutes   
    
Earlier in this study, the question concerning the Son’s subordination to the Father was broached. 
In this section, the issue regarding the extent to which the Christ is subordinate to the Father (in 
 
Khnemu.” See “Jeremiah IV 24-26 and Job III 13: A Recovered Use of the Creation Pattern,” VT 21. 2 (1971): 151-
167. Compare the Egyptian Book of the Dead LXIV. 
1249 Maj Sandman Holmberg, The God Ptah (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946), 45. 
1250 See Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 59; 
Holmberg, The God Ptah, 6-11.  
1251 Ibid. 21; Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes, 89, 91-92. 
1252 DI 4.8.8-9. 
1253 Ibid. 4.8.14. 217 
 
 
                                                
Lactantius’ estimation) will now be addressed. Does Lactantius believe that the Son is 
ontologically or functionally subordinate? It seems that one can discern a Lactantian tendency to 
perceive an intimate connection between the Son’s temporal mission, his divine nature and self-
emptying. He reasons thus with respect to the kenosis of Christ:  
When God most high, parent of all, wished to transmit the worship of himself, he sent a 
teacher of justice from heaven so that the new worshippers received the new law in him, or 
through him, which was not what he had done before, when he did it through a man; this 
time he wanted his teacher to be born like a man, so that he would be like his supreme 
father in all respects. God the father himself, the origin and start of all things and having 
no parents, is most accurately called ‘fatherless’ and ‘motherless’ by Trismegistus because 
he was born of no one (Divinae institutiones 4.13.1-2).  
 
God—who is parent of all—wills that humans worship him in truth. Accordingly, Lactantius 
relates that God dispatched a sage from heaven to instruct the Father’s earthly children in the 
paths of divine justice or righteousness. This celestial teacher of righteousness assumed the nature 
of a man: Lactantius affirms that the teacher of justice (magister iustitiae) was human in all 
respects.
1254 He thereby argues that God purposed the human birth of the Son (the heavenly sage) 
in order that he might be similar to his celestial Parent, who is both “fatherless” (apator) and 
“motherless” (amētor).
1255 Lactantius emulates Trismegistus in his use of these expressions 
(Divinae institutiones 1.7.2; 4.13.2): he manifestly claims that there is a sense in which the Son is 
motherless and fatherless. Hence, the Son (so that he might resemble the Father) is generated 
“motherless” in his preexistence since God produces him without the cooperation of a feminine 
consort. Furthermore, Lactantius maintains that Christ becomes the motherless Son in spirit.
1256  
Lactantius believes that Christ is fatherless in that the Virgin Mary bore him without a 
male parent: “He had a spiritual father in God, and just as God was father of his spirit without a 
 
1254 Ibid. 4.13-14. 
1255 Paul McGuckin argues for development in Lactantian thought concerning the Son. He construes the 
Lactantian language “in all respects” to mean that Christ is identical to the Father in an absolute sense. But it seems 
preferable to qualify Lactantius’ words. He appears to be saying that the Son is completely like his Father in the sense 
that he is both “fatherless” and motherless.” DI 4.13.1-2 associates Christ becoming like his Father “in all respects” 
with his assumption of humanity, not his exemplification of deity. Lactantius does not seem to believe that Christ 
exemplifies every divine-constituting property instantiated by the Father (DI 2.8.2; 4.6-7). See “Christology of 
Lactantius,” 816. 
1256 DI 4.13.5. 218 
 
 
                                                
mother, so a virgin was mother of his body without a father.”
1257 In view of the Son’s unique 
generative origin as a human, Lactantius confesses that the Son is simultaneously God and man 
(fuit igitur et deus et homo).
1258 He supports his belief in the Son’s divinity by appealing to Psalm 
45:6-7 (44:6-7 LXX), which is construed to mean that the Son is God.
1259 Like Tertullian 
(Aduersus Praxean 13.3) or other pre-Nicenes,
1260 Lactantius evidently interprets the Greek or 
Latin syntax of this biblical psalm as an instance of the nominative of address or vocative case 
(“Your throne, O God, is forever and ever”).
1261 It thus seems that he does not regard the 
construction in Psalms as a subject nominative, although the LXX allows for either reading.
1262 In 
what sense is Christ God for the apologist? Does Lactantius profess that the Son is fully God—
that he exemplifies all divine-constituting properties?  
Once Lactantius explains the Son’s mission and nature, it becomes apparent that his use of 
the proper noun “God” as a title designating Christ probably should be understood in a mitigated 
sense. He asserts that Christ is “God in the spirit” and draws a conceptual parallel between the 
Son and Apollo.
1263 The Son demonstrated faith and trust in the Father by fulfilling his God-given 
mission: “he taught that there is one God and that he alone is to be worshipped, and he never said 
that he was God himself: he would not have kept faith if after being sent to get rid of gods and to 
assert a single God he had introduced another one besides.”
1264 Christ did not proclaim his own 
Godhood. Lactantius reasons that if the Son had publicly revealed his own divinity, then he would 
 
1257 Ibid. 4.25.4: habebat enim spiritalem patrem deum et sicut pater spiritus eius Deus sine matre, ita mater 
corporis eius uirgo sine patre (Brandt CSEL 19:376). Lactantius employs the rhetorical device of chiasm here. 
Moreover, he addresses the question, Cur Deus homo, although it is debatable what he means by “God” (Deus). 
1258 DI 4.13.6; 4.25.5-6. 
1259 Ibid. 4.13.9: thronus tuus, Deus, in saecula saeculorum (Brandt CSEL 19:318). 
1260 See André Pautler, Biblia patristica: index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la littérature patristique 
(Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 2000). 
1261 Young (Intermediate NT Greek, 12-13) notes that Hebrews 1:8, which quotes Psalm 45:6-7 (44:6-7 LXX), has 
been interpreted respectively as a nominative of address, a subject nominative and a predicate nominative. Young 
thinks that this construction is a nominative of address. Other grammarians classify this usage as a nominative for a 
vocative. See Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 59. 
1262 See Brooke F. Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews (London: 1889), 25-26; Murray J. Harris, Jesus as God: 
The New Testament Use of Theos in Reference to Jesus (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), 216-218; George W. Buchanan, 
To the Hebrews, The Anchor Bible (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), 20. 
1263 DI 4.13.11-13. 
1264 DI 4.14.18-20: docuit enim quod unus Deus sit eumque solum coli oportere, nec umquam se ipse deum dixit, 




                                                
have contravened the teaching of monotheism. He also believes that Christ would not have 
demonstrated faith in the one true God of Scripture, if he had stressed his own divine nature.
1265 
Nevertheless, because the Son proved himself “so faithful and because he took nothing at all for 
himself,” never claiming to be God, he “received the dignity of eternal priesthood, the honour of 
supreme kingship, the power to judge and the name of God.”
1266 It consequently seems that the 
Son progressively becomes “God” in the narrative of Lactantius; he does not inherently exemplify 
every divine-constituting property instantiated by the Father. On the other hand, Lactantian 
Christology might be informed by the self-emptying kenotic act of the Son, wherein the Son 
makes himself of no repute that through his relative poverty, many creatures might be enriched 
(Philippians 2:6-7; 2 Corinthians 8:9; Divinae institutiones 4.16.1-5). 
First, the apologist contends that the teacher of justice (magister iustitiae) does not acquire 
the epithet “Son” until the Father allows him to be tried in the face of extreme duress.
1267 Then 
Lactantius states that God the Father rewards the faithfulness of the heavenly sage (vis-à-vis his 
cosmic mission) by granting him the eternal priesthood, supreme kingship, the power of judgment 
and the name of God. It therefore appears that Christ does not truly become Deus for Lactantius 
until he assumes flesh, instructs others about the one God, suffers, dies and experiences a 
resurrection by means of divine power (2 Corinthians 13:4; Divinae institutiones 4.19.2-11).
1268 
Divinae institutiones suggests that the term “God” (Deus) only applies to Christ in a fuller sense 
after he undertakes his divine commission.
1269 Yet, the Son apparently is subordinate to the Father 
(respecting his essence) before and subsequent to his ascension.
1270 Lactantius at any rate 




1266 Ibid. 4.14.20. 
1267 Ibid. Studer does not think that the Lactantian treatment of Christ as magister iustitiae conflicts with the 
purported Lactantian belief in the God-man. See Trinity and Incarnation, 94. 
1268 DI 4.14.20. See Alvan Lamson, The Church of the First Three Centuries: Or, Notices of the Lives and 
Opinions of the Early Fathers, with Special Reference to the Doctrine of the Trinity (Boston: Walker, Wise and Co, 
1860), 237. He points to DI 4.25.4, wherein Lactantius professes that the Son is “mediam inter deum et hominem 
substantiam gerens” (Compare Quod idola dii non sint 11). He concludes that in Lactantian thought, the Father is 
supreme in relation to the Son, who is ontologically subordinate to the Father (DI 4.25.1).  
1269 DI 4.17-18. 
1270 Ibid. 2.8.7. 220 
 
 
                                                
No discussion of the Son’s economic mission would be comprehensive without taking into 
account the Father’s supreme act of liberating humankind from evil through the crux Christi. In 
this regard, Lactantius explains that God the Father permits Christ to suffer and die for the benefit 
of rational creatures.
1271 Both Scripture and the Christian tradition bear testimony to the Father’s 
unfathomable love for his Son (John 3:35; 5:20; 10:17; 15:9-10; 16:32; 17:24-26; Aduersus 
Praxean 16; Novatian, De Trinitate 28; cf. Victorinus’ Commentary on the Apocalypse of the 
Blessed John, chapter I). But if the Father supremely loves his Son, then why does he allow the 
Son to undergo the reproach associated with crux Christi? The Lactantian response is that Christ 
endures “the torture, the wounds and the thorns” for a transcendent universal good.
1272 He 
subjects himself to an excruciating or ignominious death befitting a criminal in order that rational 
creatures might conquer death through his example and sacrifice.
1273 Lactantius avers that Christ 
has overcome death by rendering it inoperative or placing it in figurative bonds.
1274 It seems that 
God permits his Son to undergo anguish with the intention of conquering death. Nevertheless, 
why does the “Supreme Father” not only allow but also prescribe an ignominious death for 
Christ? Why does the indulgent Father of all will that his own Son undergo this specific type of 
execution?
1275  
The Son’s mode of execution appears to have been “indecent.”
1276 He experienced a death 
befitting a criminal (Aduersus nationes 1.36).
1277 Hence, Lactantius adduces four primary reasons 
that Christ suffered execution on a crux: (1) The instructor of virtue had to die in an abased 
manner so that he could fully disclose the magnanimous universality of God’s salvific act 
(Epitome 51). The Son’s odious manner of dying confirmed that even the “lowest in society” 
could imitate the Son’s faithful pattern of martyrdom;
1278 (2) Christ’s body had to be preserved 
 
1271 Ibid. 4.18.2; 4.26.29. 
1272 Ibid. 4.26.27. 
1273 Ibid. 4.26.28. 
1274 Ibid. 
1275 Ibid. 4.26.29. 
1276 Ibid. Compare Octavius 9.4; Epitome 51. 
1277 DI 4.16.1. Timothy George, Galatians (Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1994) demonstrates how first 
century citizens viewed the stauros or crux.  Martin Hengel’s Crucifixion in the Ancient World and the Folly of the 
Message of the Cross (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977) thoroughly documents the ancient disdain for the penal 
crux. 
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for the resurrection, which Lactantius argues would occur two days after the “loathsome” 
execution of Christ;
1279 (3) by having Christ slain in a disgraceful public manner, God made him 
visible to all the nations in fulfillment of sacred prophecy;
1280 (4) God subjugates evil by means 
of the Son’s horrific execution on an odious instrument of death.
1281 Christ is slain according to 
weakness, but defeats mortality through God’s power (2 Corinthians 13:4); the instrument of 
death on which he is executed signifies the manner whereby God employs presumably abhorrent 
things to conquer evil: “For nothing in the dispensation of God is found to be mean, and ignoble, 
and contemptible. Such only occurs in man’s arrangement” (Aduersus Marcionem 5.5). That 
which appears ignoble to non-believers is honorable in God’s dispensation (Divinae institutiones 
4.26.29-30). 
From this brief appraisal of Lactantian comments pertaining to the ignominious death of 
Christ, it is evident that Divinae institutiones exploits numerous legal concepts recognizable to 
ancient Roman citizens. However, not only is the Son’s death analyzed within the framework of 
ancient Roman law, but so is the manner in which the Father and the Son relate to one another. 
The remainder of this chapter will illustrate the attention that Lactantius devotes to father-son 
relative dispositions. Moreover, the following section discloses the seeming extent of Lactantius’ 
subordinationist Christology. 
 
D.  The Son in the Father’s Household 
 
Lactantius appears to be utilizing the metaphysical categories of Stoic philosophy (i.e. 
relative dispositions) when he explains the ontological relationship between the Father and the 
Son. Father and Son are correlative concepts: that is, one cannot be deemed a father without 
engendering a child nor can a fetus have the potential for birth as a son unless a father “creates” 
him.
1282 There is a sense in which both father and son create one another (Divinae institutiones 
4.29.4); for it is evident that one cannot be a son without having a father. However, one cannot be 
 
1279 Ibid. 4.26.31. 
1280 Ibid. 4.26.33. 
1281 Ibid. 4.26.28. 
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a father without having a child. The outcome of this relational process is that father and son come 
to have “one and the same mind in each, one and the same spirit and one and the same 
substance.”
1283 Nevertheless, the difference between two accidental dispositions (in the case of 
Christ and his Father) is that the Father is comparable to a spring “in full flow,” whereas the Son 
is analogous to a flowing stream that originates from the primordial source of divinity.
1284 
Furthermore, employing another analogy, the Father is akin to the Sun; Christ, on the other hand, 
is comparable to “a ray projected from it.”
1285 By means of these indirect speech-acts, Lactantius 
appears to emphasize a moral union
1286 that obtains between the Father and Son: the Son is one 
with his Father in that Christ is loyal to God the Father.
1287 
Lactantius not only uses a river or the sun as models of comparison, but he also invokes 
examples such as the necessary relationship between a voice and mouth or virtue and a body to 
depict the unitive and logically necessary correlation between God the Father and his Son: 
“Equally, a voice cannot be divorced from a mouth, nor can virtue or an act of virtue be detached 
from a body.”
1288 A more “immediate example” (propiore uti exemplo libet) that explains the 
familial concord of the Father and Son is that of a compassionate father appointing his son over 
the household.
1289 Civil law in Rome permitted one male to be lord of the household; Roman law 
specified that fathers were the sole masters of their family units which included children and 
slaves. But the law did allow fathers to grant their sons “the name and power of master,” under 
the overarching authority of the legal paterfamilias.
1290 Hence, while Roman fathers might permit 




1285 Ibid. 4.29.4. See Adversus Praxean 13. 
1286 Lamson, Church of the First Three Centuries, 238. 
1287 Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 10. McGuckin appeals to DI 4.29.4 to substantiate his belief that there 
is development in Lactantian thought regarding the Father and Son. However, it does not seem prudent to read 
approximate post-Nicene senses into the Lactantian formula, “una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est” 
(Brandt CSEL 19:392). While attempting to make an argument for catechetical development in the writings of 
Lactantius, McGuckin nevertheless concedes that the possible analogy between the “post-Nicene victory” and the 
language contained in DI 4.29.4 “should not be pressed.” See “Christology of Lactantius,” 817. 
1288 DI 4.29.5. 
1289 Ibid. 4.29.6-7.   
1290 Ibid. 223 
 
 
                                                
one master of it.”
1291 A father and son thus were one from a legal standpoint. It consequently 
seems that Lactantius relies on principles derived from ancient civil law to illustrate the Father 
and Son’s moral (as opposed to ontological) oneness.
1292 Additionally, he draws a parallel 
between the Godhead represented in two persons and a family situation under Roman law 
whereby a father enables his son “to assume in a legal sense his father’s personality.”
1293 
Lactantius is probably thinking of the Roman paterfamilias when he argues that God is master 
and father of the universal household that he allows the Son to govern (Divinae institutiones 
4.29.8-9). Figuratively speaking, the Son only becomes legally competent or independent (sui 
juris) after a formal ceremony of emancipation (emancipatio).
1294 
Lactantius presumes that Christians can only approach or worship God with any 
semblance of definitive legitimacy through his peerless Son.
1295 Nevertheless, the Father is the 
exclusive master over the created order or universal household: “the world has one king, one 
father and one lord only.”
1296 Lactantius insists that “So it is necessary, then, that the whole 
divine power be in one [person], by whose nod and command all things are ruled. He is so great 
that He cannot be described in words nor grasped by the senses of man” (De ira Dei 11.6).
1297 
Other passages in the Lactantian corpus suggest that the “one person” (necesse est in uno) whom 
Lactantius references is the Father.
1298 He evidently believes that God the Father is the only true 
 
1291 Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 10. Compare Augustine’s use of dominus domūs in Confessiones 
8.8.19 (PL 32). 
1292 Lactantius is far from the formalized Trinity doctrine. He appears to be more of a ditheist (Hagenbach, Text-
book, 244). Hagenbach believes that the thought of Lactantius (Christologically speaking) is “wholly Arian” since he 
compares Christ to an earthly son who shares all things with his father while dwelling in the father’s house (Text-
book, 244). Bowen and Garnsey (Divine Institutes, 10) posit a similar view. But Lamson probably expresses 
Lactantian thought best, when he refers to it as one step removed from Arianism (Church of the  First Three 
Centuries, 238). See Campenhausen, Fathers of the Church, 2:75-77 for details concerning a first and second God (a 
major and minor divinity) in Lactantius.  
1293 Cruttwell, Literary History, 2:649.   
1294 Ibid. Emancipatio was a pro forma legal act to voluntarily release a minor from the authority of his or her 
parents. See Heikki E. S. Mattila, Comparative Legal Linguistics, trans. Christopher Goddard (Aldershot, England: 
Ashgate, 2006), 113; Antti Arjava, “Paternal Power in Late Antiquity,” JRS 88 (1998): 147-165. 
1295 DI 4.29.14-15. 
1296 Ibid. 1.7.3. 
1297 Omnem igitur diuinam potestatem necesse est in uno esse cuis nutu et imperio regantur omnia, et ideo tantus 
est, ut ab homine non posit aut uerbis enarrari aut sensibus aestimari (Brandt CSEL 27:95). The English translation is 
McDonald, Minor Works, 86. Compare the language of Quod idola dii non sint 8. See Epistula 63.14 (Cyprian) and 
Octavius 18.8 (Minucius Felix) for analogous refrains. 
1298 De ira Dei 4; Epitome 2. 224 
 
 
                                                
God in the strictest sense: the Father is deity without qualification.
1299 However, Lactantius 
presses his analogies respecting Father-Son relative dispositions further; he contends that the 
management of a household is comparable to exercising geo-political dominion (Divinae 
institutiones 4.29.8).
1300 One God is “the provident paterfamilias of the universe, both Father and 
Lord, with the power of reward and punishment.”
1301 God as paternal head appropriately 
undergirds the discourse on justice in book 5 of Divinae institutiones.
1302 Since deity is both 
Father and Lord, rational agents ought to fear and love him in response to the beneficences 





For Lactantius, God is Father to the Son in that the Logos was created as an angel, but given 
priority over the other angels by dint of having the Father’s name conferred upon him, after he 
passed some type of divinely ordained arduous trial. Although God the Father has conferred the 
divine name upon the Logos, Lactantius possibly believes that he remains ontologically 
subordinate to the Father.
1304 The Father subsequently dispatches his preeminent angelic son as a 
teacher of justice to bring it about that men learn divine righteousness and true religion from the 
words and deeds of the Son. Since he is faithful to his divine commission, the Father allows the 
Son to possess the name “God.”
1305  
Lactantius construes the Father-Son relative dispositions in legal or forensic terms. God 
and his Son are one in that the Father has permitted the Son to rule over the one household of 
God. Moreover, the Son is not sui juris in relation to the Father. He voluntarily and perpetually 
submits to the authority of his Father, even though Lactantius believes that he is one in mind and 
 
1299 John 17:3 (Vg): solum verum Deum. 
1300 Frances Young, “Christianity,” 656. 
1301 Ibid. 
1302 Campenhausen observes: “In his [Lactantius’] opinion, therefore, God is the ‘Father,’ just because He is 
simultaneously ‘dominus,’ the Lord, and as such exercises the ‘imperium’ ” (Fathers of the Church, 2:78). Lactantius 
professes that God is the Emperor writ large. He accordingly emphasizes the iustitia and imperial authority of the 
Father (Ibid). 
1303 DI 4.4.1-2. 
1304 Ibid. 4.29.9. 
1305 Ibid. 4.14.20. 225 
 
 
                                                
substance with the Father.
1306 Of course, the word “substance” in Lactantius probably has Stoic 
overtones. One probably should accordingly exercise discretion before imputing post-Nicene 
connotations to Lactantian usage. Lactantius believes that the Father is the one true God in the 
strict sense (sensu strictu).
1307 Nevertheless, he avers that worshipers of God must approach the 
Father through his exalted Son, who is God’s veritable temple (on one hand) and the door of the 
temple (on the other hand).
1308  
Lactantius not only extracted his concepts from other early Christian writers or the sacred 
texts of Judeo-Christianity, but it seems that his formulations of the relation of origin between 
Father-Son or the ontological provenance of the Son from the Father partly rely on Egyptian 
notions communicated through Hermetic literature. The fourth book of Divinae institutiones also 
illuminates the sense in which God is Father to the Logos. Lactantius ultimately professes that 
Father (in the Son’s case) functions as a tropic signifier that delineates the emblematic role God 
plays in bringing it about that the Son exists (Divinae institutiones 4.6-7). God does not literally 
engender the Son. Rather, the Father brings it about that the Logos exists in a manner resembling 
God’s other angelic sons, but in a manner analogous to speech uttered from the mouth rather than 
air exhaled from the nostrils. It consequently appears that Lactantius is an ontological 
subordinationist, who presses Stoic categories into service: he possibly conceives of the Son in 
angelic rather than Angelomorphic terms. But Lactantius may avoid Arianism insofar as he does 




1306 Ibid. 4.29.9. 
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Paterology and Eschatology in the Divine Institutes 
 
Lactantius maintains that the God and Father of Jesus Christ uniquely manifests himself as 
Father in the eschaton. For Christian theology, the designation “Father” points forward 
eschatologically.
1309 When God thus reveals the extent of his universal dominion apocalyptically, 
another facet of divine paternity will become apparent. The final book of Divinae institutiones 
clarifies this aspect of God’s fatherhood. Accordingly, it is fitting that the concluding portion of 
this study unfold the Lactantian understanding of God the eschatological Father by analyzing 
Book 7 of Divinae institutiones. This chapter will emphasize the paternal aspects of Lactantian 
eschatology and stress its conceptual influences. Its task is to make a case for the eschatological 
Father concept being present in Lactantius. In order to accomplish this task, book 7 of Divinae 
institutiones will be examined analytically. First, however, the ground must be prepared for this 
study’s analysis of the Lactantian magnum opus. 
 
A.  The Eschatological Father’s Indulgence and Severity 
 
Eschatology signifies the study or doctrine of the last things.
1310 Although the term is 
relatively modern, it encompasses multifaceted notions that characterized the thinking of ancient 
ecclesiastical authors.
1311 Christian eschatology fundamentally professes that God will deliver his 
people from earthly tribulation or avenge the blood of holy martyrs (Commentary on the 
Apocalypse of the Blessed John 6.9; De resurrectione carnis 25; Divinae institutiones 1.1.15). 
The Father will bring about a re-creation of all things which entails a resurrection for those who 
are dead in Christ (Contra Celsum 5.17-20). Systematic theologians therefore contend that the 
scope of eschatology includes death, judgment, heaven, hell, as well as the Parousia and 
 
1309 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 139. 
1310 John A. McGuckin, Handbook, 122. 227 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
millennial reign of Jesus Christ.
1312 Moreover, God’s fatherliness is evidently unveiled in the 
fruition of these Christian “last things.” 
While the wrath of God will be revealed in the eschaton, one probably should not interpret 
God’s eschatological paternity exclusively in terms of grave severity or vengeful remuneration. It 
is certainly possible to think of God the Father “as the sternly just distributor of rewards and 
penalties” rather than as a deity of unmerited favor or indulgence (indulgentia). However, Kelly 
insists that it is misleading to focus on “such one-sided expressions of the Christian faith.”
1313 
Eschatological thought in ancient Christian treatises attempts to balance conceptually the 
indulgence and severity of God. Hence, Christianity ultimately teaches that mercy triumphs over 
judgment: God is a perpetually good and merciful Father (James 2:13). But he is not permissive 
concerning evil. 
Lactantius roots the dialectic of goodness or indulgence and severity in a number of 
diverse religio-philosophical traditions, which he synthesizes to good rhetorical effect (Divinae 
institutiones 7.19-20; Epitome 73).
1314 His thought represents a syncretistic cross-fertilization of 
early Latin eschatological speculation, the Asian chiliastic tradition (Historia ecclesiastica 
3.39.11-13),
1315 and noted philosophico-literary reflections on death and immortality.
1316 
Additionally, it seems that there are elements of Jewish apocalyptic found in the writings of 
 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Owen C. Thomas, Introduction to Theology (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Pub, 1994), 217. 
1313 Doctrines, 461. 
1314 Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages, Records of Civilization, 
Sources and Studies, 96 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 23-24. Jean Doignon writes concerning DI 
7.20: “The text of Lactantius is in reality the production of an amalgam of several sources (Le texte de Lactance est 
en réalité le produit d’ un amalgame de plusieurs sources).” See “Le ‘Placitvm’ Eschatologique Attribué Aux 
Stoiciens Par Lactance” in Colloque d'études historiques et patristiques, Jacques Fontaine, and Michel Perrin, 
Lactance et son temps: recherches actuelles: actes du IVe Colloque d'études historiques et patristiques, Chantilly, 
21-23 Septembre 1976, Théologie historique, 48 (Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1978), 165-170. Leonhard Atzberger 
gives a very helpful overview of Lactantian eschatology in his text Geschichte der christlichen Eschatologie 
innerhalb der vornicänischen Zeit: mit theilweiser Einbeziehung der Lehre vom christlichen Heile überhaupt 
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1970), 583-611. 
1315 McGinn, Visions of the End, 17-18. Moreover, Lactantius has a decided theological and literary preference for 
John’s Apocalypse (Cruttwell, Literary History, 2:650). The NT book largely influences his eschatological 
framework. David Aune observes that DI 7.17.10-11 is reminiscent of Apocalypse 20:9 (Revelation 52C:1080). 
1316 Brian Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 67; Ella Bourne, “The Messianic Prophecy in Vergil’s Fourth Eclogue,” The 




                                                
Lactantius.
1317 One example of this conceptual strand is the doctrine of the last judgment, which 
Russell calls “the most characteristic doctrine of Jewish apocalyptic.”
1318 The last judgment is the 
grand cosmic event for Jewish apocalyptic thinkers.
1319 God manifestly rectifies all wrongs 
during the final judgment. Of course, a possible locus classicus for the complementary relations 
of severity and goodness in Lactantius is the NT book of Romans: the apologist merely develops 
salient Pauline notions within his eschatological framework (Romans 11:22). However, it appears 
that the Pauline tendency to balance divine goodness and severity actually matures in the soil of 
ancient Judaism.  
The sacred writings of Judaism and Christianity indicate that God is both good and severe, 
indulgent and rigorous (Exodus 34:6-7; Nahum 1:2-3). Furthermore, the goodness or severity of 
God the Father appears to be dependent on the free response of rational creatures: “The Father 
himself is not impassible. He has the passion of love” (Homilies on Ezekiel 6.6).
1320 Therefore, 
the Pauline Epistle to the Romans exhorts Christians to ponder the goodness and severity of 
God.
1321 Lactantius also endeavors to maintain the tension that seems to obtain between God’s 
severity and illimitable goodness: “For to the wicked, who still rage against the righteous in other 
parts of the world, the Omnipotent will also repay the reward of their wickedness with a severity 
proportioned to its tardiness; for as He is a most indulgent Father towards the godly, so is He a 
most upright Judge against the ungodly.”
1322 The impious receive divine severity; upright persons 
experience the Father’s in
 
1317 Compare DI 7.19.8-9 with 1 Enoch 91:9. See Hayman, “The Book of Enoch in Reference to the New 
Testament and Early Christian Antiquity,” VC 37-46. 
1318 David Syme Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 200 BC-AD 100, The Old Testament 
Library (London: SCM Press, 1964), 380. 
1319 Ibid. 
1320 Compare Homily on Numbers 23.2; Grant, Early Christian Doctrine of God, 30-32. Questions concerning 
God’s impassibility have caused no little dissension in the scholarly literature. Pelikan contends that God (YHWH) 
involved himself with Israel in “love and wrath”, implying that the Hebrew prophets did not view God’s absolute 
freedom through the prism of impassibility (apatheia). See The Christian Tradition, 1:52; Davis, Logic and the 
Nature of God, 47-51; Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 115-116. Conversely, Paul Helm and Edward Wierenga construe 
Tanakh narratives that delineate the wrath or love of YHWH as anthropomorphisms. Both thinkers maintain that God 
does not (strictly speaking) act in response to the actions of his creatures; he is not moved by the free acts of rational 
creatures. See Helm’s Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and 
Wierenga’s The Nature of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
1321 Vide ergo bonitatem et severitatem Dei in eos quidem qui ceciderunt severitatem in te autem bonitatem Dei si 
permanseris in bonitate alioquin et tu excideris (Romans 11:22 Vg). 
1322 DI 1.1.15. 229 
 
 
                                                
The Father’s unbounded indulgence (indulgentia) is not just associated with God’s 
futurity, however; it is not exclusively proleptic. Lactantius indicates that Christians now partake 
of the eschatological Father’s indulgence as an anticipatory token of the future eschaton.
1323 
Furthermore, he contends that God is not going to dispense everlasting punishments with 
uncompounded severity. Rather, the Father discloses paternal qualities of compassion, indulgence 
or goodness prior and posterior to the Son’s chiliastic reign (Divinae institutiones 6.25.13).
1324 
Book 7 of the Lactantian magnum opus contains vivid depictions of God’s indulgence and 
severity. The remainder of this chapter accordingly will examine how Lactantius attempts to 
reconcile these divine attributes within his eschatological framework. In order to discern how he 
formulates a rhetorical appeal to all rational creatures in association with Christian worship of the 
Father, this study will analyze Lactantian concepts about the Father’s rationale for disciplining the 
impious. 
 
B.  The Father’s Rationale for Disciplining the Impious 
 
Lactantius affirms the existence of an indulgent God in whom resides “perfect virtue.”
1325 
He also professes that God the Father internally exercises “perfect patience.”
1326 If the Father 
literally exemplifies patience and indulgence, however, then one seemingly may infer that God 
necessarily has emotions. Contra Arnobius and the Stoics, Lactantius does believe that God (the 
Father) matter-of-factly instantiates anger, sadness, joy and wrath along with mercy, love, 
indulgence (indulgentia) and patience (Divinae institutiones 5.22.13).
1327 But if God (the Father) 
instantiates divergent emotions, then Stoic thinking is evidently misguided.
1328 However, in what 
sense does Lactantius think that the Stoic theory of emotions is defective? 
 
1323 Ibid. 4.3.3. 
1324 Ibid. 6.9; 7.18. 
1325 Ibid. 2.17.3. 
1326 Ibid. 2.17.3-4. 
1327 Ibid. Compare Aristotle’s list of emotions in Ethica Nicomachea 2.5. 
1328 See Sanders, God Who Risks, 145; Wilken, Spirit of Early Christian Thought, 297-298. Cf. DI 6.10.11; 





                                                
The Stoics claim that God is impassible (avpa,qeia): deity does not feel compassion, 
love, hate, joy or sadness; nor does God act in response to events that occur in the phenomenal 
realm. According to these ancient Greek thinkers, God does not have emotions. There is no love, 
hate, joy or sadness in God. Additionally, the Stoics espouse a theory in which the soul is 
believed to be corporeal and exclusively rational.
1329 The logical corollary of this psychological 
theory is that emotions rather than being natural potencies of the soul (as in Aristotle)
1330 become 
mental disturbances experienced by rational creatures.
1331 But Lactantius reasons that the Stoics 
are in error; emotions cannot be “disturbances of the mind” befalling only creatures, if God 
exhibits various passions or sentiments.
1332 He contends that the philosophical belief which 
claims that emotions are mere disturbances of the mind or creaturely subjective effects is 
responsible for the obliteration of divine truth and authentic religion.
1333 Lactantius thus writes an 
entire treatise (De ira Dei) that endeavors to refute the Stoic theory of a transcendent being, who 
is never angry, wrathful or perturbed.
1334 In his thought-world, it is unreasonable to assert that 
God never exemplifies states such as wrath or anger.
1335 He ardently insists that only inanimate 
entities ontologically lack emotional sta
Based on what Lactantius writes in De ira Dei, certain Stoic philosophers evidently 
viewed anger or wrath as emotions not befitting the common Father of all.
1337 They maintained 
that if virtuous creatures universally praise rather than harm one another, then (a fortiori) God 
 
1329 Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 47. 
1330 Aristotle contends that three types of things can be discovered in the soul: emotions, capacities and 
characteristics. See Ethica Nicomachea 2.5. 
1331 Knuuttila, Emotions, 55. 
1332 DI 2.17.3-5 
1333 Ibid. 2.17.4-5. 
1334 Ibid. 2.17.5. Weinandy considers De ira Dei a “primarily pastoral” as opposed to philosophical treatise. See 
Does God Suffer, 106. But Lactantius directly addresses arguments set forth by the Stoics and Epicureans and some 
of his arguments are theologically or philosophically novel. The pastoral aspects of this treatise, which Lactantius 
apparently wrote for theological and philosophical reasons, do not appear that discernable.  
1335 Hallman, Descent of God, 66-70. 
1336 De ira Dei 5. Lactantius’ reasoning possibly serves as a corrective to modern-day Stoic thinking exemplified 
in Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, Divine Attributes, 107-108. These authors suggest that God has non-emotive anti-
attitudes and pro-attitudes toward actions such as the Holocaust (i.e. God non-emotively disapproves of this historical 
occurrence) or acts of charity (i.e. God dispassionately approves of helping those in need). Yet, Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz say that God neither hates nor loves (sensu strictu) since God is incorruptible. The argument posed by 
De ira Dei controverts this Stoic-informed argument. 
1337 De ira Dei 5. 231 
 
 
                                                
should perpetually act with supernal non-emotive kindness towards rational creatures. 
Nevertheless, while the Stoic argument is plausible, it is ultimately specious to Lactantius.
1338 He 
retorts by utilizing a mundane illustration to demonstrate the archetypal nature of God’s anger. 
One can outline his argument by means of using analogical language. 
Lactantius professes that God must exhibit anger toward the impious or else he does not 
love the pious. For if a given rational agent loves what is good, that agent presumably does not 
love what is evil; conversely, if an agent does not hate what is evil, the agent apparently cannot 
love the good. Lactantius accordingly believes that just as rational creatures are incapable of 
cherishing life without hating death or unable to seek moral light without fleeing from moral 
darkness, so God cannot love pious creatures without hating those who are impious.
1339 The same 
principle hypothetically applies to a housemaster (dominus domūs) in possession of both a good 
and bad servant. Lactantius reasons that a housemaster does not both love and hate or praise and 
reward good and bad servants equally.
1340 An equitable or prudent housemaster lauds a dilligent 
servant, even assigning the servant greater responsibilities in the household; but the bad servant 
the master disciplines with scourging, shackles, hunger and thirst (Matthew 18:21-35; 24:45-51; 
25:14-30; Mark 14:14).
1341 It is therefore just for God to recompense the pious; but he necessarily 
metes out vengeance on the impious. 
Lactantius assumes that it is logically possible for the same master to love and hate, 
depending on the actions or dispositions of his servants. He subsequently infers: “there are those 
who ought to be loved and those who should be hated.”
1342 His thoughts on divine anger and 
notions concerning hatred of the impious evidently comport with the imprecatory psalms of the 
Tanakh (Psalm 69:22-28; 83:16-18; 139:21-23).
1343 The logical consequence of Lactantius’ 
analysis is that God cannot treat the pious and impious equally while continuing to uphold the 
righteous standards that he has eternally decreed. Unless the Father is angry at the wicked or 





1341 DI 5.23 suggests that God will discipline the impious.   
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come to such great confusion” with resultant human audacity prevailing.
1344 Hence, Lactantius 
argues that a well-ordered household, society or cosmos only obtains where divine punishment or 
the conceptual possibility of divine retribution subsists. 
Lactantius also persuades his readers that it is factually impossible for a just God to treat 
good and bad servants equally. Otherwise, the good servants will not be motivated to obey the 
Father; conversely, the bad servants will not reverence or fear God.
1345 Hence, in accordance with 
the dictates of absolute justice, the Father bestows unmerited kindness on the godly but 
punishment or wrath on the impious.
1346 Nevertheless, all humans are metaphorical children in 
the eyes of God, not just servants or slaves. Therefore, as a responsible Father who is concerned 
that order and justice obtain in the universal household, God has determined to recompense all 
evil that constantly plagues his obedient children. For “they will suffer punishment for their 
impiety and guilt, who, rebelling against God, the Father of the human race, have undertaken 
inexpiable rites, and violated every sacred law.”
1347 God is our authentic Father since he created 
the universe.
1348 He thereby merits human adoration or reverence.
1349 Lactantius assures his 
readers that God will bring it about that rebels no longer mar his creation or disturb cosmic
The Father of humanity apparently cannot remunerate evil acts committed against his 
obedient children without meting out justice to the impious (De ira Dei 16). God’s metaphorical 
offspring should thus exclusively adore the ineffable name of the divine parent; God (the Father 
of rational creatures) will repay the wanton impiety committed by those figurative children who 
rebel against him (Divinae institutiones 2.17.12). Otherwise, the pious will never experience a 
well-ordered life characterized by peace and prosperity: “When this happens, my dear Asclepius, 
then the lord and father and god and creator of the first and only god will look upon events and 
will defy disorder with his own will,” concerning which Hermes prophesied.
1350 Lactantius 
consequently discloses that God will annihilate evil in his role as eschatological Father.
1351 The 
 
1344 De Ira dei 16. 
1345 Ibid. 6. 
1346 Ibid. 
1347 DI 2.17.12. 
1348 Ibid. 7.5.5. 
1349 Ibid. 
1350 DI 7.18.4. Lactantius quotes Corpus Hermeticum Asclep. 26. 
1351 DI 5.18: God will reward the pious and punish the impious after death. 233 
 
 
                                                
details of that fateful period are made explicit in the Epitome and book 7 of Divinae Institutiones. 
Hence, the next two sections of this study discuss how Lactantius unfolds his concept of the 
eschatological Father in these documents. An examination of the Epitome will be undertaken first. 
Then, this investigation will analyze the final book of Divinae institutiones and its eschatological 
content that pertains to God the Father. 
 
C.  The Eschatological Father in the Epitome 
 
Lactantius believes that God will annihilate irreverent persons during his great day of 
wrath, wherein “torrents of blood shall flow,” and “the prince also of the demons himself, the 
author and contriver of evils, being bound with fiery chains, shall be imprisoned, that the world 
may receive peace, and the earth, harassed through so many years, may rest.”
1352 Lactantius 
follows John’s Apocalypse closely here as he recounts that Christ will resurrect the pious dead to 
eternal life and rule with them on earth. “This kingdom of the righteous,” he declares, “shall be 
for a thousand years.”
1353 Moreover, Lactantius bases his apocalyptic vision of the Father’s 
eschatological work on the ancient prophets (Isaiah 11:6-9; Hosea 2:18), who describe an age in 
which unreasoning beasts will reside harmoniously with one another and coexist peacefully with 
the righteous: “the dove shall be united with the hawk, the serpent shall have no poison; no 
animal shall live by bloodshed.”
1354  
Nevertheless, the Apocalypse of John foretells that “the prince of the demons” will be 
loosed when the thousand years of Christ’s millennial reign terminate.
1355 The Devil will then 
provoke multitudes from the nations to revolt against the people of God (Apocalypse 20:7-10). 
Those loyally adhering to the prince of demons consequently “storm the city of the saints.” 
 
1352 Epitome 72. By contrast, God’s Son is called “prince of the angels” in DI 4.14.17. 
1353 Epitome 72. 
1354 Ibid. 
1355 Lactantius contrasts Satan (ha Satan), “the prince of demons” with Christ “the prince of the angels” (DI 
4.14.17). One again discerns the possible conceptual influence of Jewish apocalyptic literature in Divinae 
institutiones. Additionally, the Testament of Simeon 2.7 designates ha Satan “the prince of deceit” and the Testament 
of Solomon 6.7 conscripts the expression “prince of all the demons” when describing Satan. Compare Justin Martyr’s 
Apology 1.28.1. He implies that early Christians generally utilized the epithet “prince of demons” (among others) in 
their ordinary religious discourse. Such nomenclature still does not mitigate the fact that Judaism earlier recognized 
Satan (“Beliar” in Qumran literature) as the “prince of evil spirits.” 234 
 
 
tment of this 
subject matter. 
                                                
However, Lactantius affirms that the seditious multitudes will not prevail since God will cause a 
great earthquake to annihilate the impious rebels.
1356 Moreover, the Father will “rain upon the 
wicked fire with brimstone and hail, and they shall be on fire, and slay each other”; but he will 
conceal the righteous under the earth until the divine anger has passed (Epitome 72).
1357 Divine 
judgment culminates in an earthquake of immense magnitude, which ruptures mountains and 
sinks valleys. Lactantius reports that all carcasses belonging to the rebels led by the prince of 
demons will be “heaped” together at a burial place designated Polyandrion.
1358 The geographical 
name “Polyandrion” alludes to a common burial place for those killed in battle.
1359 The 
Lactantian utilization of this expression implies that the number slaughtered will be immense 
(Ezekiel 39:11). Yet, he believes that the eternal prospect of the unjust functions as a moral 
warning to those ascending the rugged path of truth. The Father is indulgent towards the pious but 
severe respecting the ungodly: “Therefore, unless a man shall have received Christ, whom God 
has sent, and is about to send for our redemption, unless he shall have known the Supreme God 
through Christ, unless he shall have kept His commandments and law, he will fall into those 
punishments of which we have spoken.”
1360 All Christians accordingly are enjoined to scorn 
extravagant bodily pleasures in order to attain eternal goods.
1361 Eternal goods should take 
precedence over goods of the body; goods of the soul are paramount in relation to goods of the 
body. Lactantius outlines how the eschatological Father will reward the virtuous individual who 




1356 Epitome 72. 
1357 Compare Isaiah 26:20; Ezekiel 38:1-23; Zechariah 14:12-13. 
1358 Epitome 72.   
1359 See the entry for Polu,andreion in LSJ. The word is a compound of polloi.  +  a;ndrej 
(“many men”). Fittingly, it was a common designation for burial places in Greece. The LXX uses the term twice in 
Ezekiel 39:11 within the context of the decisive eschatological battle between YHWH and Gog of Magog. The 
prophet uses the term to delineate the “valley” wherein Gog is buried (Polu,andrion  tou/ Gwg). W. 
Kendrick Pritchett also details controversial issues surrounding the nature of Greek burial for the dead in The Greek 
State at War, 5 volumes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 4:94-95.  
1360 Epitome 73. 




C.  God the Eschatological Father in Divine Institutes 7 
in-text citations that appear below refer to Divinae 
institut
, 4) since the Father has appointed him the official 
potenta
                                                
 
The seventh book of Divinae institutiones represents the culmination of Lactantian 
eschatological thought. This portion of his major apologetic treatise discloses the tension existing 
between divine severity and indulgence. Lactantius is convinced that the Father will recompense 
the pious. However, God will dispense retributive justice on those who repudiate his paternal 
authority. The following paragraphs analyze the salient aspects of Lactantian teaching regarding 
the Father’s severity and indulgence. All 
iones unless otherwise indicated.
1362 
God the Father is severe and indulgent, rigorous and tolerant. Therefore, he cannot permit 
injustice or evil to obtain forever. God forthwith dispatches his Son to instruct rational creatures 
about the path of justice, and the Son brings about the eradication of unrighteousness by teaching 
justice to rational creatures (Divinae institutiones 7.18). Divine instruction through Christ also 
presages the annihilation of all humanly crafted deities (7.19). Not only does the Father act with 
severity toward artificial divinities and those venerating them, though, but he also resurrects 
individuals who have been consigned to the underworld by means of death. Christ will judge 
those who rise from the nether regions (7.20.1
te of heaven and earth (7.20.1-2).
 1363  
But Lactantius qualifies his remarks about eschatology by noting that the Son will only 
judge pious individuals who are “well practiced in God’s religion” (7.20.5); he is evidently 
alluding to the first resurrection concerning which John apparently testifies in Apocalypse 20:4-
5.
1364 When bearing witness to this event, Lactantius tries to persuade his audience that it is 
superfluous for the Father to judge the impious at that time since he has already passed adverse 
judgment on them (7.20.5). It is unnecessary to pronounce judgment on those who completely 
disdain the exalted wisdom of God. Therefore, the Son juridically scrutinizes “only those who 
know God” (7.20.6) to determine their intrinsic worth for everlasting beatitude. The Father sifts 
 
1362 Relevant Latin or English texts from each passage will appear in the footnotes for this section. 




1365 One easily can discern inchoate adumbrations of 
purgato
is chapter analyzes his treatment of the soul’s possible capacity for 
receivin
                                                                                                                                                              
deeds performed by righteous persons in order to ascertain whether the just acts of those who 
know God offset their unjust acts. Ultimately, “if their good and just deeds are more numerous 
and significant, they will be dispatched to the life of bliss, but if their evil deeds prevail, they will 
be condemned to punishm
ry in this account. 
Although the human soul is purportedly incorporeal, Lactantius contends that God can 
nonetheless apprehend and everlastingly punish the soul “because it is God’s part to be 
omnipotent” (7.20.11; 7.21.1). But even an omnipotent God seemingly cannot violate the law of 
non-contradiction. Aristotle reasons that not even God can change the past or do that which is 
logically impossible; God apparently does not countermand the law of non-contradiction.
1366 
According to this logical law, a given entity or state of affairs cannot be A and non-A at the same 
time or in the same respect (Metaphysica 4). Applying the law of non-contradiction to Christian 
theology, one could say that the Father reasonably does only that which is logically, factually, 
conceptually or metaphysically possible.
1367 Nevertheless, how does God (ex hypothesi) bring it 
about that an intangible soul can be grasped or experience acute psychosomatic sensations like 
pain? Lactantius attempts to provide a response to this query in a discussion about the final 
judgment. The remainder of th
g divine punishment. 
Lactantius presumably thinks that it is not only logically or conceptually possible for God 
to punish the human soul, but it is also factually possible (i.e. possible within the framework of 
reality’s structure) for him to chastise angelic spirits. Consequently, the demons believe in one 
God and tremble (James 2:19); they know that it is possible for them to receive justice at his 
figurative hand (Divinae institutiones 7.21.1). The Lactantian reasoning is straightforward: (a) 
God has the power to punish unclean spirits; (b) all rebellious angels (demons) are unclean spirits; 
(c) therefore, God has the power to punish all rebellious angels. The salient divine attribute under 
consideration is God’s omnipotence (7.20.11). Is it factually possible for an omnipotent God 
 
1364 Ibid. See Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 429. 
1365 See Oracula Sibyllina 2:313-320 (Geffcken, 43). 
1366 Ethica Nicomachea 6.2. 
1367 Brümmer discusses these modal distinctions in Speaking of a Personal God, 68-83. 237 
 
 
(Jesus Christ). Only under such 
circum
Divinae institutiones unfolds these events in a manner similar to the Apocalypse. This 
                                                
(Deus omnipotens) to bring it about that an incorporeal entity undergoes the sensation of pain? If 
the arguments of Lactantius are sound and valid, it follows that it is logically or conceptually 
possible for all unclean spirits to suffer (eternal) punishment from an omnipotent God (7.21.2). 
However, logical possibility is not sufficient for Lactantius. He deems the chastisement of 
unclean spirits a factual possibility. Moreover, if the Father is able to punish unclean angels, he 
supposedly can and will discipline incorporeal souls by reclothing them with flesh (7.21.3). But 
this flesh will be “indestructible and everlasting” in order that God may torment recalcitrant souls 
for all eternity by means of an inextinguishable fire (7.21.3).
1368 Additionally, Lactantius suggests 
that even the pious will be tested by fire, although they will not undergo anguish from the 
Father’s disciplinary flames, if their good deeds outweigh their bad actions (7.21.6-7); and the 
Christian rhetorician is convinced that all deceased humans will remain in the underworld until 
they render an account for their earthly deeds. After the first resurrection, the pious will receive 
immortality; conversely, those who have not learned to worship God in accordance with his 
righteous decrees will be “doomed to certain punishment” by sharing the fate meted out to the 
impious ones (7.21.8). While Lactantius argues that God punishes rational agents for witting or 
unwitting impiety, he also believes that the Father grants all rational creatures the opportunity 
(beforehand) to know him through the teacher of justice 
stances would God’s judgment ostensibly be equitable. 
Not only intractable humans receive God’s wrath, however, but the Father also will 
dispense judgments on unclean angels depicted as “world forces of this darkness” (NASB).
1369 
Both Judaism and Christianity attribute the universal phenomenon of evil to “the prince of 
demons,” namely, the Devil.
1370 Lactantius affirms that God will not neglect this obstinate enemy 
of righteousness: the Father will recompense evil by means of the Devil’s everlasting 
chastisement. Lactantius  provides a distinct construal of the Devil’s fateful end. This account (as 
one might expect) is largely based on chapter 20 of John’s Apocalypse; it profoundly alludes to 
the millennial reign of Christ and events that transpire shortly thereafter. The seventh book of 
 
1368 Daley, Hope of the Early Church, 67; Cf. Tertullian (Apologeticum 48.14); Minucius Felix (Octavius 35). 
1369 Ephesians 6:11-12:    ou/ sko,touj tou,tou.  tou.j kosmokra,toraj t238 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
investigation’s final paragraphs examine the aspects of Lactantius’ discussion that make God’s 
fatherliness prominent in connection with his judgment upon the Devil. 
 Lactantius is a chiliast or millenarian: he interprets the Millennium of Christ literally.
1371 
Closely adhering to John’s Apocalypse in his narratival account, he vividly outlines how “the 
prince of demons” is bound with figurative divine chains at the commencement of Christ’s “holy 
reign” spanning one thousand years in duration (7.26.1). After the thousand years have reached 
their terminus ad quem, Lactantius reports that God will liberate the Devil (the prince of demons) 
from his abyss or prison so that he may wage war upon the holy city of New Jerusalem 
(Apocalypse 20:9-10; 21:1-2). This event presages God’s “final wrath” that comes against those 
wittingly subjecting themselves to the Devil (Divinae institutiones 7.26.2). Manifold displays of 
natural phenomena (fire, sulphur, brimstone and earthquakes) accompany God’s wrath as the 
Devil undergoes defeat at the Father’s omnipotent hands (7.26.2). God’s paternal severity thus 
obliterates injustice and its associated menace, evil. On the other hand, the Father protects his 
own people by concealing them in the hollow of the earth for three days (7.26.3). Interpreting 
Ezekiel’s apocalyptic narrative rather matter-of-factly (Ezekiel 39:8-10), Lactantius indicates that 
God’s people will emerge from their “lairs” after three days to find corpses of the impious dead 
lying on the ground. Then the righteous (those constituting earth’s sole nation) will annihilate 
carnal weaponry as they savor everlasting peace and quietude (Divinae institutiones 7.26.4). 
Lactantius points out that when the thousand years have reached their end, God will “fold 
up the sky and alter the earth” (7.26.5). He insists that humanity eventually will assume an angelic 
form by becoming white as snow. The righteous (in this angelic form) will offer praise to God 
forever (Apocalypse 20:11-15). Nonetheless, despite the blessings that accrue to the righteous, the 
Father must still dispense justice on those he deems impious. Lactantius refers to “the second, 
public resurrection of everybody” by means of which God banishes the impious “into eternal 
torment” (7.26.6).
1372 They in conjunction with the Devil “will be condemned to punishment, and 
with him the whole mob of the impious will be burnt for their sins for ever with perpetual fire in 
the sight of the angels and the just” (7.26.7). This retribution comes upon the unjust or impious 
 
1370 DI 4.14. See Wisdom 2:24; Life of Adam and Eve 16. 
1371 J. A. McGuckin, Handbook, 58; Bardenhewer, Patrology, 204. 239 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
because they obstinately refuse “to acknowledge the lord and father of the world” (7.26.6). The 
impious habitually employed their volition to repudiate the omnipotent Father and his peerless 
sovereignty; now it is time for divine recompense to occur in the sight of those deemed righteous 
persons (cf. Apocalypse 14:10-11). 
Despite the severity of God’s wrath, Lactantius indicates that deity is “the fairest of judges 
and kindest of fathers,” one who ideally bestows peace and life rather than toil, strife, death or 
that which is ephemeral (7.27.2). The rewards that stem from the Father during the eschaton far 
outweigh “the bitterness and misery” that creatures presently undergo on earth. In this context, 
Lactantius appeals to the notable words of Terence (Phormio 249): “we must work at the mill, get 
flogged and carry fetters” (Molendum esse usque in pistrino;  uapulandum habendae 
compedes).
1373 The lesson that one can extract from the playwright’s words is that God the Father 
allows tribulation (i.e. evil) to refine Christians living in this age. But Terence only relates part of 
the cosmic story since (for disciples of Christ) “there are prison, chains and torture to bear, pain to 
suffer, and even death itself to be accepted and endured” (carcer catenae tormenta patienda, 
sustinendi dolores, mors denique ipsa et suscipienda est et ferenda) in order to attain the prize 
that the Father grants virtuous humans (7.27.3 Brandt). The Father (by means of special 
revelation) reassures his worshipers that he will bestow the everlasting reward for piety or virtue 
through the righteous sage that he dispatched to the world in order to liberate humans from 
cosmic evil. As Lord and Father, God “created and made out of nothing (conflauit ac perfecit e 
nihilo) everything there is in this world of his; he saw the mistakes of men, and sent a guide to 
open the path of justice for us” (7.27.5 Bowen and Garnsey translation). This leader sent from the 
Father did not merely articulate the path of justice. Lactantius professes that he personally walked 
in rectitude as he taught humanity how to live virtuously before the supreme God and Father of all 
(7.27.7). Christ is the paramount teacher of righteousness, who instructs Christians in preparation 
for the God ordained millennial rule on earth: he discloses the divine way of righteousness for 
obedient humanity (hominum ducem misit qui nobis iustitiae uiam panderet).
1374 Lactantius 
 
1372 Daley, Hope of the Early Church, 68. 
1373 DI 7.27.3: English translation is Bowen and Garnsey. The Latin text is Brandt CSEL 19:669. See Phormio 
249 in Publii Terentii Comoediae sex, ed. Edward St. John Parry (London: Whittaker, 1857). 
1374 DI 7.27.5-6. See Brandt CSEL 19:670; Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, 440-441. 240 
 
 
                                                
acknowledges this preeminent sage as the unique guide whom Christians are bound to obey. He is 
the Father’s preeminent Son. 
Conversely, Lactantius notes that a different eventuality awaits those who spurn the 
eternal for the temporal or heavenly treasures for fleshly delights. He argues that those who insist 
on looking down toward earth instead of up toward heaven—those who choose to venerate 
lifeless idols rather than live in accordance with the eternal and righteous laws of God “will be 
punished as deserters of him who is their master, their commander and their father” (7.27.15). 
While the final book of Divinae institutiones may appear stringent, it seems that Lactantius still 
invokes God’s indulgent treatment of the pious (amid his talk of judgment for the ungodly) so that 
Christians might be persuaded to “win from [their] lord the prize for virtue which he himself has 
promised.”
1375 On the other hand, the Lactantian description of what awaits the impious evidently 
functions as a moral warning for those who tread the path of divine justice. His portrayal of God’s 
judgment admonishes Christians that the summum bonum is “to serve our father and lord most 
high for ever and to be God’s eternal kingdom.”
1376 These sentiments purportedly encapsulate the 
Father’s perduring counsels for humanity. The only authentic or suitable goods are those which 
are eternal in nature. Lactantius ultimately professes that the realization of God’s will in the 





Christian eschatology attempts the difficult task of conceptually balancing God’s severity 
and indulgence. Lactantius believes that God will manifest his severity to those rational creatures 
who fail to heed his voice or who spurn the teacher of justice (the Son of God). In order that he 
might distribute punishments in a just or righteous manner, God has dispatched the teacher of 
justice to disclose the way of righteousness (Divinae institutiones 4.10.1; 4.13.1). That instructor 
also has revealed the summum bonum hominis for the rational creatures whom God has fathered. 
 
1375 Divinae institutiones 7.27.16 (Bowen and Garnsey English translation). 
1376 Ibid. 7.6.1 (Bowen and Garnsey). 241 
 
 
Lactantius argues that the utmost good for humanity is to serve the God and Father of all 
(2.11.19). Moreover, he suggests that divine paternity is eschatological in that rational creatures 
only have experienced a measure of divine goodness prior to the eschaton; it is just a harbinger of 
the paternal kindness that will be manifested when the Father blesses the pious but eternally 
punishes the ungodly (4.3.3). The final book of Divinae institutiones thus functions as an 
exhortation for rational creatures to glorify and praise humanity’s Lord and Father (7.27.1). 
Lactantius reasons that God the Father must be passible (in a certain sense) if he is going 
to treat both his good and bad servants with justice. He insists that a righteous God and Father 
must find pleasure regarding the pious acts of his servants but feel wrath for those acts which are 
not in accordance with divine law, those acts that do not promote human flourishing (De ira Dei 
5). Nevertheless, if the Father is literally going to make a distinction in terms of the treatment that 
good and bad servants receive, then he must instantiate emotions. These states must be 
objectively differentiated in God lest he proves to be inanimate (Divinae institutiones 5.22.13). 
Since Lactantius is persuaded that some creatures—by dint of their actions—merit being hated or 
loved, he maintains that the Father must have actual emotions to qualify as a righteous deity (De 
ira Dei 6; Divinae institutiones 6.19.8). The only impassible entities are those beings that are 
inanimate or dead. Neither rocks nor trees nor sand can show emotions. However, Lactantius 
believes that the living God does experience such variations within himself (De ira Dei 4). 
Furthermore, he contends that where emotions do not exist, virtue cannot exist (Divinae 
institutiones 6.15.9). The virtuous Father of all is thus moved (internally) as he responds to 
virtuous or vicious human actions. His well-ordered experience of phenomenal subjectivity 
ensures that evil will not obtain forever since God apparently will treat evil and goodness in 
proportion to their respective dues (De ira Dei 16). 
Lactantius reasons that if God is the authentic Father of all rational creatures with the 
pious constituting his children in the most eminent sense, then it seems almost certain that evil 
cannot plague humanity without ceasing (Divinae institutiones 7.19.1-2). Righteous agents often 
remember what others have done in their behalf. For instance, an indulgent master does not 
receive good treatment from a servant without reciprocating such behavior. While it must be 
conceded that a master legally does not owe anything to a servant for that which the latter is 242 
 
 
obligated to do (Luke 17:1-10), Lactantius does profess that the indulgent or gracious master 
willingly renders kind acts to the good servant but distributes retribution on the bad servant (De 
ira Dei 5).  
Since he avers that God the Father is an indulgent or equitable master, Lactantius 
apparently does not believe that it is factually possible for God to let pious behavior go 
unrewarded (Divinae institutiones 6.12.2). Divinae institutiones thus maintains that God’s 
paternity is (to some extent) proleptic. It is only in the eschaton that God will reveal the full extent 
of his fatherliness. Furthermore, the ancient work written by Lactantius argues that the Father will 
not disregard the pious whose good deeds outweigh their bad. Lactantius consequently appears to 
be convinced that the Father will recompense all creaturely actions in the day of wrath: “the 
bitterness and misery we suffer here on earth when we perform our acts of justice cannot be 
compared or matched at all with that reward” (Divinae institutiones 7.27.2). The punishments and 





There are four major ideas that this study has made its focus. The conclusion will now review and 
synthesize the four primary concepts hitherto discussed. This study’s focus has been to determine 
(1) the possible conceptual or ecclesiastical antecedents that motivated Lactantius to apply 
“Father” to God; (2) to explore what Lactantius and other Christian writers possibly mean by 
“Father” as a divine title; (3) to scrutinize how Lactantius conceives the relationship between the 
Father and the Son; (4) to probe the eschatological significance that “Father” possibly has for 
Lactantius. The first concept that this conclusion will review is how the pre-Nicenes (including 
Lactantius) understood God and divine gender.  
Firstly, the ancient Christians (pre-Nicenes) acknowledged God as the Father of humanity 
and the Lord Jesus Christ (Divinae institutiones 2.8.3; 2.10.22). They generally did not think of 
God as masculine or as literally engendering the Son or humanity. Rather, they framed their 
discourse concerning divine paternity in terms of God engendering the Son like the created 243 
 
 
intellect generates concepts or the mouth gives birth to speech (Aduersus Praxean 5-7; 11.1; 
Aduersus Marcionem 2.27). The early followers of Christ employed “Father” as a metaphor to 
delineate the relationship that God has with his people or to describe the unique relationship 
obtaining between the Father and the Son (Divinae institutiones 4.6.1-3). Similar to the Bible 
writers, the pre-Nicenes probably gave little thought to God’s supposed ontological gender 
(Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9); it is likely that they did not ontologize divine gender. Professing 
God as “Father” was a rhetorical device as opposed to a metaphysical pronouncement (Octavius 
18.1-10;  Divinae institutiones 2.17.12). The metaphor of divine fatherhood was common in 
ancient Greece and Rome, in the venerable writings of Judaism and among other civilizations of 
the ancient near East (e.g. Mesopotamia and Egypt). Christians forged their concept of God the 
Father within a particular cultural milieu where the metaphor of divine fatherhood prevailed. 
Secondly, it seems that the pre-Nicenes did not construe “Father” as a proper name for 
God. John W. Cooper has defined the expression “proper name” as that which is distinct from a 
proper noun in terms of its specificity and referential function (Our Father, 118). An example of a 
proper noun (according to Copper) might be Queen, President or King whereas proper names 
would include John, YHWH or Jesus. One can subsume proper names under the rubric of proper 
nouns, but the latter evidently does not exhaust the former. It also seems clear that proper names 
are more restrictive or narrower in scope than common nouns: they usually do not function as 
titles but as self-identifying markers. A proper name sets YHWH apart from other gods (e.g. 
Jupiter or Cronus) or John from other humans. But the pre-Nicenes evidently tended to believe 
that God the Father has no need of a proper name (in Cooper’s sense of the word). While they 
worshiped God as Father, they apparently did not think that “Father” served to narrowly 
demarcate God from other deities (Apology 1.61). They reasoned that there is one God; hence, 
there is no need for a proper divine name (Dialogus cum Tryphone 127). The term “Father” 
served as what Cooper would call “a proper noun” as opposed to a proper name. However, neither 
Justin Martyr (Apology 2.6) nor Minucius Felix (Octavius 18.1-10) nor Novatian (De Trinitate 
4.10-11) nor Lactantius (Divine institutiones 1.6.5) believed that “Father” serves to identify God’s 
whatness or quiddity. The concept “Father” (they appear to contend) does not circumscribe God 
or refer to what God essentially is (Cohortatio ad Graecos 21). Minucius Felix actually suggests 244 
 
 
that it is only by employing the via remotionis with respect to divine titles that one can discern 
God’s transcendence. Christians must abstract from proper nouns such as “Father” or “Lord” to 
ascertain the divine majesty or beyondness. Lactantius also denies God has a proper name. He 
states ex professo that the only name requisitely belonging to deity is God (Divinae institutiones 
1.6.5): “But since God is always one, his proper name is God” (deo autem, quia semper unus est, 
proprium nomen est deus). 
It has been this study’s contention that Lactantius employs “Father” as a metaphor to 
delineate what he perceives God’s revealed nature to be. One could understand “metaphor” (in 
this context) as a rhetorical trope or a conceptual domain. Metaphor thus could be a way of 
speaking or a manner of thinking based on bodily experience. It is beyond the scope of this 
investigation to adjudicate matters concerning the rhetorical or conceptual nature of metaphor. 
There appears to be no strict linguistic reason to take an either/or approach in this instance: 
metaphors probably are both rhetorical and cognitive figures. But regardless of how one 
conceives metaphors, the evidence from antiquity suggests that metaphoric tropes exemplify an 
as-if (als ob) character. Quintillian, Cicero, Aristotle and Lactantius probably all think of 
metaphors as metasememes, that is, as words that highlight similarities or undergo some type of 
change in particular contexts (De Oratore 3.152-155; Rhetorica  3.1410b). The speech act of 
metaphoring entails taking words that apply to one entity or discourse field and applying them to 
other entities or discourse fields (Poetica 21.1457b).  Metaphoring (according to cognitive 
semantic theory) signifies an act of transferring concepts from one domain to another. Therefore, 
in the case of “Father,” a term that conventionally applies to males in certain social, legal or 
biological contexts is applied to God. Hence, a certain level of incongruence is brought about; but 
when this incongruence is capable of being resolved, then one can say that a necessary condition 
for metaphoricity exists. Lactantius undoubtedly viewed metaphors in terms of as-if structures 
since he was familiar (as a rhetor) with the metaphor theories that appear in the works of 
Aristotle, Quintillian and Cicero. Moreover, he was probably influenced by these apparent 
substitution theories of metaphor or made use of them in his treatises. It is accordingly probable 
that Lactantius used “Father” as a metaphor or as-if structure. His specific uses of the word lead 245 
 
 
one to believe that the term counted as a metaphor for him. The next paragraph reviews some of 
these usages. 
Lactantius argues that God is the Father of humanity, the Son and the cosmos. He 
apparently accepts the narrative in Genesis about YHWH creating Adam from the dust of the 
ground and breathing into his nostrils the breath of life (Genesis 2:7). The first pentateuchal book 
indicates that God (as Father) placed Adam in a place of “great fertility and beauty” (Divinae 
institutiones 2.12.15) located in the East. That garden fulfilled every need of primordial man in 
order that he would be free to “serve God the Father with total devotion, free from any labour” 
(ibid.). His utmost purpose in life was to worship and glorify the Father. Lactantius relates that 
God assisted Adam in this endeavor by supplying “precise commandments” that would help him 
to attain immortality. However, the man disobeyed the explicit mandate of God concerning one 
tree in the midst of the garden (ibid. 2.12.16). This act of transgression occurred at the behest of a 
spirit whom the Father had endowed with free choice. The rebellious spirit chose to abuse the 
faculty of volition granted him by God (ibid. 2.8.4-5). Lactantius thus roots human anarchy or 
chaos in an act of disobedience to the Father. The poets and philosophers also indicate that human 
troubles are associated with a failure to acknowledge God’s paternity. It is only by worshiping 
God as Father that humans can coexist in peace. This is the affirmation of Lactantius and other 
early Christian writers (Octavius 31; Divinae institutiones 5.23.1-2). 
Not only is God the Father of humanity, however, but he has also engendered the Logos in 
a first and second nativity. Lactantius uses the language of creation and generation to delineate 
the nativity of the Son. In view of how he describes the generation of the Son in Divinae 
institutiones 4.6.1-3 and 4.8.1-8, it appears that Lactantius views God as a metaphorical or 
emblematic Father to the Son. God does not literally generate the Son. Rather, he “creates” or 
articulates the Son in some inscrutable manner. Passages such as the foregoing imply that there 
are most certainly elements of cosmological or ontological subordinationism in Lactantius. 
Nevertheless, it would probably be anachronistic to label him an Arian. On the other hand, the 
Lactantian use of “Father” as a metaphor seems to manifest itself when the apologist spells out 
the Son’s relationship to the Father or explains how God brings it about that the Logos becomes 246 
 
 
                                                
God’s Son. His treatment (in this respect) is somewhat reminiscent of Tertullian’s account in 
Aduersus Praxean 11: God made the immanent Word his own Son.  
Besides functioning as a case study of Lactantius’ Divinae institutiones, a major concern 
of this investigation is human discourse regarding the divine. What do Christians usually mean 
when they employ “Father” in reference to God? What implications are there for liturgy or how 
systematic theology formulates the Christian doctrine of God? This study implies that 
metaphoring is a speech act analogous to commanding, asserting, interrogating or promising. It is 
by means of constitutive rules that metaphors count as Y in a given context, C.
1377 Phatic or 
speech communities are responsible for valorizing the lexical meanings of signifiers or sentential 
locutions (Aduersus nationes 1.59). Denotations are communally derived unlike the connotations 
of terms which appear to be more pragmatic or shaped by the context of utterance.
1378 
Consequently, in the case of “Father,” it seems to be the phatic community known as the 
Christian ecclesia that determines the significance that “Father” will have in the liturgy or in 
systematic theology. However, the community of God’s people must remain faithful to the 
inspired Word that contains Father imagery: “No one will be so impressed by the exhortations of 
any of the saints, as he is by the words of the Lord Himself, the lover of man” (The Exhortation to 
the Heathen 9). Furthermore, Christians address God as Father in the liturgy, but they must still 
recognize the tension that exists between the “is” and the “is not” of this metaphor: there is a 
sense in which God both is and is not Father. Metaphor ultimately emphasizes both similarity and 
difference between two distinct domains such as “father” and God.
1379 The ontologization of 
gender vis-à-vis the divine being should consequently be avoided; the metaphor must not become 
ossified or lose its significance qua metaphor. The Christian congregation thus has to ensure that 
Father will count as a metaphor in the context of liturgy (corporate worship) or theology. It should 
remind believers that “Father” (in this context) is a metaphor, not a metaphysical pronouncement 
concerning God’s immanent being. 
 
1377 Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 165. 
1378 See Teresa Dobrzyńska, “Translating Metaphor: Problems of Meaning,” Journal of Pragmatics 24.6 (1995): 
595-604. 
1379 See the caveats regarding metaphor given by Brian S. Rosner in his work Greed as Idolatry: The Origin and 
Meaning of a Pauline Metaphor (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007), 63. He argues that there are manifest 247 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Metaphors have a necessary role or function in Christian discourse; they accomplish what 
“proper speech” cannot. Metaphors possibly mediate between the noetic world and the sensible 
realm or between the world of spirit and the corporeal realm of existence. Thomas Aquinas 
fittingly reminds us that metaphors which communicate spiritual truths are based on sensible 
appearances (ST Ia.1.9, Responsio). Such theological metaphors are also part of our lived 
existence insofar as tropic imagery of the divine plays a part in making human experience cohere. 
The metaphor “Father” helps us to structure our experience of God. For this reason, the first 
century Christians, Hilary of Poitiers, Lactantius, Augustine of Hippo, and Thomas Aquinas all 
recognized the integral role of metaphor in Christian discourse, even if they did not all concur 
with the assessment that “Father” is a metaphor. However, it is this study’s contention that 
Lactantius views “Father” as a controlling theological metaphor that structures the Christian 
understanding of God. The concept exemplifies an as-if character for Lactantius to the extent that 
he uses it to describe God’s relationship to the creation, the Son and to rational creatures living on 
earth. 
This study has been an exercise in historical theology and theolinguistics. As such, it has 
appealed to metaphor and speech act theory as well as the categories of systematic theology to 
ascertain what Christians mean when using the term “Father.” This investigation has taken a 
descriptive approach to the question of divine gender and the early church rather than assuming a 
prescriptive tone. While it appears that the early Latin church viewed “Father” as a metaphor or 
denied its status as a divine proper name, it is not the intent of the present writer to insist that the 
practice of the early Latin theologians should function as a normative precedent for the modern 
community of those who profess Christ. However, it does seem reasonable to assume that the 
contents of Divinae institutiones and other ancient Christian treatises should function as a matrix 
wherein theologians can formulate concepts or seek understanding (fides quaerens intellectum) of 
God the Father which includes the putative gender of God. However, gender evidently was not a 
central preoccupation for Lactantius. He apparently construed the “Father” as a metaphor that 
describes God’s relationship with his covenant people and God’s Son.
 
similarities and differences between greed and the biblical metaphor of “idolatry” used to further define greed or 
covetousness.   248 
 
 




A.  The Curriculum for Ancient Rhetoric 
 
 Initially, the Greek term rhetor denoted a “public speaker.”
1380 Classical writers apply the 
morpheme to judges, politicians, legal advocates (in the papyri) and the terminology later 
describes professors who teach others the art of elocutionary speech.
1381 Cole describes rhetoric 
(in part) as “the influencing and swaying of the mind through words” (yucagwgi,a).
1382 It 
constitutes a te,cnh or craft of public discourse.
1383 In classical terms, on the other hand, 
rhetoric also is the science of persuasive speaking or writing.
1384 Aristotle himself defines this 
particular craft as the employment of available means for the sake of persuasion or for discerning 
“persuasive facts” in each individual case. Therefore, it seems probable that from a diachronic 
perspective, one can speak legitimately of rhetoric as “the written word attempting to do the work 
of the spoken word.”
1385 Unfortunately, those who practiced the art of rhetoric during its inchoate 
stage lent an air of suspicion to the trade.
1386 Rhetoric thereby continued to be a pejorative 
signifier until modernity. 
In spite of its established negative connotations, rhetoric became a distinctive or stable 
element of Greco-Roman education. Ancient professors of rhetoric usually delivered or read 
 
1380 Acharnians 38, 680. The extant documents of ancient Greece lead one to believe that Plato devised the art of 
rhetoric. See Thomas Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1991), 2. The term “rhetoric” is not attested before the Gorgias. See Gorgias 453a, where Plato refers to rhetoric as 
“the artificer of persuasion” (Ibid). However, see Andrew Ford, “Sophists without Rhetoric: The Arts of Speech in 
Fifth-Century Athens,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden, Boston and Köln: 
Brill, 2001), 87-90. 
1381 LSJ 1570. 
1382 See Phaedrus 261a7-8; 271c. 
1383 Kennedy, 3. The application of te,cnh to rhetoric illustrates the negative assessment that early Greeks 
generally had toward the craft. One can discern pejorative overtones vis-à-vis rhetoric in certain Platonic dialogues as 
well. See Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, 38-39. 
1384 See Rhetorica 1.2 1355b; 1.2.1356-57. 
1385 Cole, Origins of Rhetoric, 1. 
1386 Ibid. 159. 249 
 
 
                                                
model speeches to their pupils as part of the learning curriculum.
1387 Moreover, prospective 
rhetores were taught speech structure as well as how to vary the style or subject matter of formal 
discourse.
1388 Those studying rhetoric also learned the five venerable canons of well-formed 
speech, namely, invention (eu[resij), disposition (oivkonomi,a or ta,xij), style 
(le,xij), delivery (u`pokri±sij), and memorization (mnh,mh).
1389 Pupils were thus 
obligated to construct periods (peri,odoi) in accordance with strict rules that governed the 
craft of rhetoric. Subsequently, their instructors would only permit them to quote or cite what 
could be demonstrated explicitly from their hitherto constructed texts.
1390 The goal of this 
extensive training (ideally) was developing the ability to speak extemporaneously in laudatory 
discourse. Lucian drolly alludes to this practice in Dialogues of the Dead 10.10. 
 
B.  Origen and the Eternal Generation of the Son  
 
There is some debate to what extent Origen affirms God’s paternity. Does he teach the 
eternal generation doctrine? In what sense is God “Father” in Origenian thought? While the 
ancient writer is not altogether clear in this respect, there probably is a sense in which Hall’s 
analysis of Origen aptly encapsulates his thought: “God was however always Father; he could not 
change from one condition (not-Father) to another (Father). So the Son exists in God’s timeless 
eternity.”
1391 Origen himself possibly affirms the eternal generation of the Son in view of his 
sentential locution “There was not when he was not.”
1392 Nonetheless, his theological account 
suggests that the Son is not intrinsically God (autotheos), but God by derivation only 
 
1387 Hatch, Influence of Greek Ideas, 30. 
1388 Ibid. 
1389 Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, 102; Lanham, Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 165-166. Donald L. 
Clark lists the Latin terms for these five parts of the rhetorical canon: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria and 
pronuntiatio or actio. These expressions refer to the integral elements of a persuasive speech. One must bring the 
right elements together, arrange them effectively, find the appropriate terms, memorize a speech and deliver it with 
persuasion. See Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 69. 
1390 Hatch, Influence of Greek Ideas, 30. 
1391 Hall, Doctrine and Practice, 105. 
1392 See Crouzel, Origen, 186; Widdicombe, Fatherhood of God, 68. Peri Archon 1.2.2; 1.2.9; 4.4.1; 4.4.28; 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 1.5 (PG 14); Homily on Jeremiah 9.4. However, Crouzel observes that 
Origen’s use of aivw,n or aivw,nioj are not clear (187). 250 
 
 
                                                
(Commentary on the Gospel of John 2.2).
1393 The Son is not “self-sufficiently” God
1394; only the 
Father is Godself (autotheos) in Origen’s theological paradigm. The Son is God in a strictly 
predicative manner
1395 or to a lesser degree than the Father is.
1396 But in what sense is the Father 
greater than the Son in Origen’s system? 
Hall indicates that Origen possibly balances his alleged subordinationism by means of the 
eternal generation doctrine, which would mean that the inferiority which he evidently ascribes to 
the Son is not ontological in nature.
1397 On the other hand, William J. Hill observes: “Still, eternal 
generation does not of itself give divine status because Origen views all spiritual beings, both 
what he calls theoi and human souls, as eternal.”
1398 Similarly, Brown laments Origen’s 
problematic approach to Christology and the Trinity since “he also taught the preexistence of 
individual human souls and spoke of those who are in Christ as eternally begotten.”
1399 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that this speculation about eternal souls does not diminish 
Origen’s trinitarian contribution to the church. Nevertheless, Brown acknowledges that while 
Origen’s eternal generation doctrine seemingly defeated the notion that the Son is temporally 
posterior to the Father, it “did not entirely throw off the assumptions of earlier Christian thinkers 
that the Son is subordinate to the Father” or not fully divine.
1400 Studer equally concludes that 
Origen “does not succeed in ruling out subordinationism.”
1401 He points to Origen’s belief that 
there are hierarchical grades in deity with the Son possibly being one of the Seraphim in Isaiah’s 
vision of YHWH’s glory (Peri Archon 1.3.4).
1402 Yet, certain scholars attempt to resolve the 
intricacies of Origen’s scheme by positing the Son’s subordination to the Father in an economic 
 
1393 Studer, Trinity and Incarnation, 85. 
1394 Hall, Doctrine and Practice, 106. 
1395 Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, 155. 
1396 Hall, Doctrine and Practice, 106; Tripolitis, Origen, 18. 
1397 Ibid. Compare Contra Celsum 8.15. 
1398 W. J. Hill, Three-Personed God, 39. Granted, Origen attributes divinity to the Son. However, he makes a 
curious statement in Commentary on John 2.2 regarding the Son’s maintenance of his divinity through uninterrupted 
contemplation of the Father. 
1399 H. O. J. Brown, Heresies, 90. See Jean Daniélou, Origen (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1972), 256; Ehrman, 
Lost Christianities, 155. 
1400 Heresies, 91. 
1401 Trinity and Incarnation, 85. 
1402 Ibid. Both Fortman (Triune God, 57) and Daniélou (Origen, 255) refer to Origen’s “hierarchical view of 




                                                                                                                                                              
sense. What makes matters more problematic, however, is that the extant writings of Origen 
suggest that he himself may have inconsistently formulated his doctrine of the Father and the 
Son.
1403 It is possible that Origen views the Son as ontologically subordinate to the Father 
(Contra Celsum 8.15) whereas other passages appear to teach that he does not think the Son is 
lesser in relation to his Father.
1404 The treatises of Origen accordingly tend to be a
Another factor lending itself to the aporetic tendencies of Origen’s theology is his use of 
the term “creature” (kti,sma) for the Son.
1405 This usage has generated many discussions in 
Origen studies, discussions that have not led to wholly satisfactory conclusions. The first 
systematic theologian evidently derives kti,sma from Proverbs 8:22-25 (LXX).
1406 
Neoplatonism may also influence what seems to be an idiosyncratic utilization of “creature” 
(kti,sma).
1407 Crouzel in fact believes that “creation” (kti,sij) for Origen applies to 
“everything that comes from God.”
1408 Along with Prestige and Wiles, he notes the fluid 
synonymity that existed between the words “generate” (genna,w) and “create” (gi,nomai) 
prior to Nicea.
1409 If this line of reasoning corresponds with the speech strategy of Origen, there 
would appear to be no genuine conflict between his supposed affirmation of the eternal generation 
doctrine and his manifest employment of “creature.” Yet although the Father putatively generates 
the Son timelessly in the thought of Origen, he clearly adheres to the notion that there are grades 
of being in the divine.
1410 Bulgakov thinks that Origen does not master cosmological 
subordinationism “with reference to the mutual relations of the hypostases, with reference to their 
 
Seraphim but he does not make much of Origen’s “subordinationism” nor the account contained in Isaiah. See Origen 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 23-24. 
1403 Brown, Heresies, 91. Compare Peri Archon 1.3.7 with Commentary on John 13.25; 25.152. 
1404 Ehrman, Lost Christianities, 155. 
1405 Widdicombe (Fatherhood of God, 89) insists that Origen “almost certainly called the Son a kti,sma in the 
original text of De Principiis [Peri Archon].” Nevertheless, he states that the word’s sense in Origen (when applied to 
the Son) is not clear (Ibid). See Peri Archon 4.4.1; Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 1:191; Charles W. Lowry, “Did 
Origen Style the Son a kti,sma?” JTS 39 (1938): 39-42. 
1406 Hill, Three-Personed God, 39. 
1407 Frend, Rise of Christianity, 377. See A.H. Armstrong, “The Plotinian Doctrine of nou/j in Patristic 
Theology,” VC 8.4 (1954): 234-238. 
1408 Origen, 186. Cf. Peri Archon 1.2.10. 
1409 Maurice Wiles, “Eternal Generation,” JTS 12 (1961): 284-291; Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, 37-54. 
1410 Murray, The Problem of God, 37. 252 
 
 
                                                
equal dignity and divinity.”
1411 Even if he did posit a timeless or eternal generation for the Son, 
Origen also argues that other “created” rational spirits are eternal.
1412 In the final analysis, if 
“Father” is a metaphor for Christianity’s first systematic theologian, it is a rather curious trope 
that appears in his writings. 
 
C.  Nietzsche and Metaphor 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche insists that contexts are never “absolutely determinable.”
1413 They are 
mutable or in a constant state of flux. As a result, contexts seem to partake incessantly of Heraclitean 
becoming (panta rhei). Nietzsche appears to think that there are no brute facts (= mind-independent 
facts), only institutional “facts” which are in essence illusory.
1414 Furthermore, he does not believe it 
is essential to distinguish between phenomena and noumena since he completely disavows Kant’s 
theory of the “thing in itself” (Ding-an-sich).
1415  
Nietzsche avers that metaphor filters every sort of human knowing. He thereby believes that 
sapient cognition only transpires under the auspices of metasememic indirection. Epistemologically, 
this means that rational sentient beings can never access the world immediately or directly: “There 
are no unfiltered facts.”
1416 Nietzsche additionally contends that metaphors are signifiers that now 
and again bridge distinct entities which human beings reference through natural language systems: 
“It is this way with all of us concerning language; we believe that we know something about the 
things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but 
 
1411 The Comforter, 20. Wiles also concludes that “The idea of eternal generation as it stands in Origen’s scheme 
of thought as a whole does not really have any effective anti-subordinationist significance at all” (“Eternal 
Generation,” 288). See Daniélou’s remarks on Origen’s “subordinationism” in Origen, 255, 261. On the other hand, 
Crouzel maintains that subordinationism is a “quite equivocal notion” in that it is capable of being employed to 
describe both Origen’s and Arius’ Christology. But he insists that the “subordinationism” of the former should not be 
confused with that of the latter Origen, 188. 
1412 R. A. Norris Jr., God and World in Early Christian Theology, 150-152. 
1413 Quoted in Ward, Word and Supplement, 89. 
1414 Naugle, Worldview, 101. However, one should qualify this Nietzschean belief since it ostensibly changes over 
time. See Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, 96. 
1415 Consult Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human; David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand 
Rapids and Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2002), 98-99; Schacht, Nietzsche, 84-85. 
1416 See Holmes, Fact, Value, and God, 170. 253 
 
 
                                                
metaphors for things-metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.”
1417 Naming is 
consequently an abuse of language; it is catachrestic for Nietzsche. There is allegedly no strict 
metaphysical association between signifiers and their creaturely designated referents. Therefore, he 
insists that metaphors (= the human implementation of language) are not “natural kinds” but 
contingent, social constructions.
1418 There purportedly are no facts, only interpretations; that is, there 
are no facts in themselves or, at least, one cannot demonstrate apodictically that brute facts 
objectively subsist.
1419 Of course, the belief that no brute facts exist is a natural consequence of the 
notion that God is dead. If God is dead, no extrametaphorical grounding obtains; rather, there is only 
an infinite play of signifiers utilized by discourse agents.
1420 
Nietzsche regrettably does not define the referring-expression “metaphor.” However, he 
does conscript Übertragung or ubertragen to classify “the basic operation of tropes in general 
rather than name metaphor as such.”
1421 This “basic operation of tropes” includes metaphor 
proper, metonymy and synecdoche. Nietzsche views these rhetorical tropes as variant forms of 
metasememic transference.
1422 One can observe an example of this line of reasoning, when he 
aphoristically postulates an identity between Will and Wave (Wille und Welle) in the 
posthumously named The Will to Power (Der Wille zur Macht).
1423 The sensible objects of the 
phenomenal realm (Nietzsche maintains) correspond to subjective states. Hence, he posits an 
existential correlation between “Will and Wave”: the distinction between metaphor and world 
consequently disintegrates in his worldview (Weltanschauung).
1424  
Nietzsche is palpably convinced that the empirical world of sensible objects reflects 
subjective states externalized and nothing more.
1425 The phenomenal realm ostensibly is a 
projection of the will since the will holds primacy in relation to the external world or artistically 
 
1417 On Truth and Lies, 82-83. 
1418 Murphy, Nietzsche. 
1419 John T. Wilcox argues (on the basis of Beyond Good and Evil 108 and Twilight of the Idols 8.1) that there 
considers morals or values matters of perspective or interpretation (Truth and Value in Nietzsche, 38-39). However, 
he qualifies this observation by noting that there appear to be passages in Nietzsche that imply values are not simply 
matters of perspective. 
1420 Schacht, Nietzsche, 118-121. 
1421 Murphy, Nietzsche, 22. 
1422 Ibid. 23. 
1423Arendt, Judging, 164-165. 
1424 Ibid.                                              254 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
creates it.
1426 Consequently, for Nietzsche, all truth is “anthropomorphic” or filtered: reality is 
identical with “transference.”
1427 He thus fatefully collapses the traditional distinction between 
metaphor and nature; Alan Megill fittingly classifies Nietzsche’s theoretical framework as 
aesthetic.
1428 The world (on this view) is an aesthetically generated product. 
Despite the manifest brilliance on display in his writings, one frequent criticism of 
Nietzsche’s account respecting world and metaphor is that it appears to be self-referentially 
incoherent. If there actually are no brute facts, then his metaphorology cannot be representative of 
any ultimate state of affairs. It too must be an institutional “fact” or one individual’s cosmic 
perspective.
1429 On the other hand, if a state of affairs does obtain beyond phenomenal appearances, 
then one cannot say what state of affairs (Verhältnisse) objectively subsists beyond sensible 
appearances; one is simply confined to asserting that mind-independent Verhältnisse subsist or do 
not subsist. Additionally, Nietzsche’s philosophical approach does not facilitate ascertaining how he 
arrives at the conclusion that the world is a self-creating aesthetic object or metaphor. However, that 
does not seem to be a Nietzschean concern. 
Contra Nietzsche, John Searle reasons that certain states of affairs or entities just are P, 
regardless of any given percipient subject’s manner of representation. That the Sun is a certain 
distance from the earth or that the atomic weight of helium is two evidently does not depend on 
human subjectivity (i.e. phenomenality): Searle argues that these simply are brute facts.
1430 
Moreover, if every so-called fact or utterance is metaphorical,
1431 it appears that there would be no 
possible way to differentiate metaphoric from literal language and then claim that all language is 
metaphorical.
1432 This investigation therefore submits that not all speech is metaphorical.
1433 Some 
literal permanence of semanticity must obtain in an abstract lexis in order for communication to 
 
1425 Ibid. 166. 
1426 Arendt, Judging 165. 
1427 See Gumpel, Metaphor Reexamined, 26-27 for the thought that Nietzsche denies the existence of a thing-in-itself 
(Ding-an-sich) and The Gay Science (Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft). 
1428 See Prophets of Extremity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
1429 See McIntyre’s Three Rival. 
1430 The Construction of Social Reality, 190-194. 
1431 Lawrence M. Hinman, “Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43.2 
(1982): 179-199. 
1432 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, 44-45; Zimany, Vehicle for God, 52-53. 
1433 See Murphy, Nietzsche, Metaphor, Religion, 23-24; Hick, Myth of God Incarnate.                                              255 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  




D. Father and Metonymy 
 
A metonym is a rhetorical device or trope wherein one replaces the “proper terminology” (verbum 
proprium) with another term (verbum) that stands in “a real relationship” (not a comparative 
relationship) to the pragmatic intentionality of a determinate speaker or writer.
1434 Metonyms entail 
contiguity between A and B (e.g. God and Father) whereas metaphors emphasize similarities 
between A and B.
1435 Based on the foregoing definition, is it possible that “Father” is a metonym 
rather than a metaphor? Does it stand in a real (i.e. semantic) or does it stand in a comparative 
relationship to the signifier “God” such that “Father” can be a surrogate for “God”?  
It appears that “Father” (as a divine title) is not a metonym for Christians. It appears that one 
cannot legitimately substitute “God” and “Father” salva veritate in the context of Christian 
discourse. This position allegedly derives from the testimony of Scripture and the Patristics.
1436 The 
terms “God” and “Father” are not substitutable without a loss of meaning. Hence, “Father” evidently 
is not a metonym for “God”: Father is a signifier that predicates something of deity not contained in 
the term “God.” 
Not only do ecclesiastical writings demonstrate the plausibility of this notion, but Thompson 
maintains “the historical context of Jesus’ own day, as well as the New Testament data themselves, 
mitigate [sic] against the claims that the name of God is Father or Father, Son, Holy Spirit.”
1437 
There appear to be no OT passages wherein YHWH directly applies “Father” to his person.
1438 
Granted, worshipers of YHWH address him in this manner (Isaiah 63:8). But the divine title never 
seems to reach the level of a proper name (nomen proprium) in ancient Judaism. Just as father, 
 
 
1434 Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, § 565. 
1435 See Louis Goossens, “Metaphtonymy: The Interaction of Metaphor and Metonymy in Expressions for Linguistic 
Action,” in Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, 350-351. 
1436 Adversus Hermogonem 3.4; Apology 2.6; Octavius 18.8. 




                                                                                                                                                                  
mother, mom or dad are not proper names in human families, so “Father” or “Son” are not proper 
names with respect to the divine mode of being.
1439 And just as the quadrilateral self-designation of 
God was viewed as ineffable based on certain understandings of Leviticus 24:1-16, so “Father” 
probably became a reverential circumlocution in ancient Judaism (according to later rabbinic 
sources).
1440 Hence, ancient Jews or early Christians probably did not construe it as a proper name 
of God or as a metonym capable of being interchanged with the appellation “God
 
 
1438 Ibid. 177. 
1439 Ibid. 177-178. 
1440 De Somniis 1.67; De Mutatione Nominum 11-15; Apology 1.61, 63; Apology 2.6.1; Stromata 5.12.82.1.                                              257 
 
 
Timeline for Lactantius 
 
  
250-The birth of Lactantius. 
275-The birth of Constantine. 
303-Diocletian persecution of the church starts.  
305-Lactantius leaves Nicomedia. 
306-Constantine’s father, Constantius Chlorus, dies in York and his son is made Caesar. 
310-Constantine summons Lactantius to tutor Crispus. 
312-Constantine has a vision or dream and conquers Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge. 
315-Published De mortibus persecutorum. 
320-Lactantius composes the Epitome. 
321-Constantine made Sunday an official day of worship. 
325-Council of Nicea convenes and decides that the Son is homoousion to patri. In the same year, 
Lactantius evidently dies. 
337-Eusebius of Nicomedia baptizes Constantine on his deathbed. 
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